

# HISTORY OF GREECE;

FROM THE

EARLIEST PERIOD TO THE CLOSE OF THE GENERATION  
CONTEMPORARY WITH ALEXANDER THE GREAT.

By GEORGE GROTE

A NEW EDITION.  
IN TEN VOLUMES.—VOL.

WITH PORTRAIT, MAP, AND PLATE.

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**09-07-2018**

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### CONCLUSIONS

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**Abstract**

**Place the Policy at Hand to the General Festival of**  
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**THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO**

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# HISTORY OF GREECE.

## PART II.

### CONTINUATION OF HISTORICAL GREECE.

#### CHAPTER XLVIII.

FROM THE ECLIPSE OF POTIDEA DOWN TO THE END  
OF THE FIRST YEAR OF THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR.

Even before the recent hostilities at Kerkira and Potidea, it had been evident to reflecting Greeks that prolonged observance of the Thirty years' truce was becoming onerous, and that the mingled hatred, fear, and admiration which Athens inspired throughout Greece would prompt Sparta and the Spartan confederacy to seize any favourable opening for breaking down the Athenian power. That such was the disposition of Sparta was well understood among the Athenian allies, however considerations of prudence and general disunion in rendering might postpone the execution of carrying it into effect. Accordingly not only the Boeotians when they resolved had applied to the Spartan confederacy for aid, which they appear to have been prevented from obtaining chiefly by the public interests then agitating the Corinthians, but also the Lesbians had endeavoured to open negotiations with Sparta for a

Side of looking to Greece between the Thirty would mean that the Peloponnesians were recognised probably as a party at that time and as a confederacy—down international union with the Hellenes.









together with each other of the confederates in all other approved or claimed by Athens, presented themselves before the public assembly of Spartan citizens, prepared to prove that the Athenians had broken the treaty and were going on in a course of wrong towards Peloponnesus.<sup>1</sup> Even in the dignity of Sparta, such a question as this could only be decided by a general assembly of Spartan citizens, qualified both by age, by regular contribution to the public vote, and by obedience to Spartan discipline. To the assembly so constituted the deputies of the various allied cities addressed themselves, each setting forth his case against Athens. The Corinthians chose to reserve themselves to the last, after the assembly had been influenced by the previous speakers.

Of this important assembly, on which so much of the fate of Greece turned, Thucydides has preserved an account unusually copious. First, the speech delivered by the Corinthians envoys. Next, that of some Athenian envoys, who, happening to be at the same time in Sparta on some other matters, and being present in the assembly so as to have heard the speeches both of the Corinthians and of the other complainants, obtained permission from the magistrates to address the assembly in their turn. Thirdly, the address of the Spartan king Archidamus, on the course of policy proper to be adopted by Sparta. Lastly, the brief, but extremely characteristic, address of the Ephor Eklektidas, on putting the question for decision. These speeches, the composition of Thucydides himself, contain substantially the sentiments of the parties to whom they are ascribed. Neither of them is distinctly a reply to that which has preceded, but each presents the situation of affairs from a different point of view.

The Corinthians knew well that the assistance whom they were about to require had been thoroughly prepared for them; for the Landsmanian authorities had already given an actual promise to them and to the Fieldmars, at the moment before Pödena revolted, that they would invade Japan. Great was the conse-

<sup>3</sup>Thompson, L. W., *Canadian Fisheries and Aquaculture: An Overview to Industry and the Environment*. The change of focus in these two series is to be noticed.

inher in sentiment of the Spartans, except they had declined leading aid to the much more powerful island of Lesbos when it proposed to revolt—a revolution occasioned by the shared interests and sentiments of Coriath. Nevertheless, the Corinthians who knew that their positive grounds of complaint against Athens, in respect of wrong or violation of the existing treaty, were both few and feeble. Neither in the dispute about Potidea nor about Euboea had Athens infringed the treaty or wronged the Peloponnesian alliance. In both she had come into collision with Coriath, singly and apart from the confederacy. She had a right, both according to the treaty and according to the received maxims of international law, to lend assistance not to the Euboeans, at their own request: she had a right also, according to the principles laid down by the Corinthians themselves on occasion of the revolt of Samos, to restrain the Potidæans from revolting. She had committed nothing which could fairly be called an aggression. Indeed the aggression both in the case of Potidea and in that of Euboea was decidedly on the side of the Corinthians; and the Peloponnesian confederacy could only be so far implicated as it was understood to be bound to support the separate quarrels, right or wrong, of Coriath. All this was well known to the Corinthians except; and accordingly we find that in their speech at Sparta they touch but lightly and in vague terms on positive or recent wrongs. Even that which they do say completely justifies the proceedings of Athens about the affair of Euboea, since they confess without hesitation the design of arming the large Euboean navy for the use of the Peloponnesian alliance: while in respect of Potidea, if we had only the speech of the Corinthian envoy before us without any other knowledge, we should have supposed it to be an independent state, not connected by any permanent bonds with Athens—we should have supposed that the siege of Potidea by Athens was an unprovoked aggression upon an autonomous ally of Coriath<sup>1</sup>.—We should

The  
Corinthians  
were at  
least the  
strongest  
land power  
in the state  
alliance  
between  
Athens  
and  
Coriath.

But  
Athens  
was  
the  
strongest  
power  
of the time,  
as we find  
upon the  
point in  
Athens  
regarding  
Athens  
and  
Coriath—  
Athens  
to be  
the right.

<sup>1</sup> Thucyd. i. 10. At p. 10 the Athenian envoys declare, in the case of Euboea, that they are bound to support the separate quarrels, right or wrong, of Coriath.

never, have imagined that Coriath had deliberately instigated and seduced the words of the Chalcidians as well as of the Potidæans against Athens. It might be pretended that she had a right to do this, by virtue of her undefined metropolitan relations with Potidæa. But at any rate the incident was not such as to afford any decent pretext for charge against the Athenians either of outrage towards Coriath,<sup>1</sup> or of wrongful aggression against the Peloponnesian confederacy.

To dwell much upon specific allegations of wrong would not have suited the purposes of the Corinthian essay; for against such, the Thirty years' truce expressly provided that recourse should be had to amicable arbitration—to which recourse he never once alludes. He says that, as between Coriath and Athens, war had already begun at Potidæa; and his business, throughout nearly all of a very emphatic speech, is to show that the Peloponnesian confederacy, and especially Sparta, is bound to take instant part in it, not less by prudence than by duty. He employs the most animated language to depict the ambition, the unwarlike activity, the personal effort abroad as well as at home, the quick resolve, the vigorous hopes never dashed by failure, of Athens, as contrasted with the cautious, home-keeping, indolent, scrupulous reserves of Sparta. He reproaches the Spartans with their backwardness and timidity, in not having repressed the growth of Athens before she reached this formidable height; especially in having allowed her to fortify her city after the retreat of Xerxes and afterwards to build the long walls from the city to the sea.<sup>2</sup> The Spartans (he observes) stood close among all Greeks in the notable system of keeping down an enemy not by eating, but by delaying to act—not arresting his growth, but getting him down when his force was doubled. "Falsely indeed had they acquired the reputation of being wary, when they were in reality merely slow." In resisting Xerxes, as

Truce of the  
Corinthian  
war—  
LXXIII.  
allusion to  
recourse  
arbitration—  
LXXIV.  
allusion to  
recourse  
arbitration—  
LXXV.  
allusion to  
recourse  
arbitration—  
LXXVI.

<sup>1</sup> Coriath, i. e. the Coriathian or Coriathian war.

<sup>2</sup> Thucyd. I. 88. In the version of the city during the war, they had adopted the system of building the city to the sea.

<sup>3</sup> Thucyd. I. 88.

<sup>4</sup> Thucyd. I. 88. In the version of the city during the war, they had adopted the system of building the city to the sea.



successfully get, they feel like men robbed of what belongs to them; but the aspirations when realized appear like wishes compared with what remains to be acquired. If they sometimes fail in an attempt, new hopes arise in some other direction to supply the want; for with them alone the possession and the hope of what they want is at almost simultaneous, from their habit of quickly expiating all that they have once resolved. And in this manner do they sail throughout all their lives under hardship and pain, disregarding present enjoyment as the required thrust for success—knowing no other fatal recreation except the performance of active duty—and leaving nothing upon a want condition than following occupation. To speak the truth in two words, such is their labor tempo, that they will neither remain at rest themselves, nor allow rest to others.<sup>1</sup>

"Such is the city which stands opposed to you, Lacedæmonians — yet ye still hang back from action. . . . Your constant staples and quality would hardly be safe, even if ye had neighbours like yourselves in character; but as to dealings with Athens, your system is antiquated and out of date. In politics as in art, it is the modern improvements which are sure to come out victorious; and though unchanged institutions are best, if a city be not called upon to act, yet multiplicity of active obligations requires multiplicity and novelty of contrivance." It is through these numerous evils that the genius of Athens have arrived at much more new development than Rome."

The Corinthians concluded by saying, that if, after so many previous warnings, now repeated for the last time, Sparta still refused to protect her allies against Athens—if she delayed to perform her promise made to the Potentates of immediately invading Athens—they (the Corinthians) would forthwith look for safety in some new alliance, which they felt themselves fully justified in doing. They concluded her to look well to the

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I should like to inform you that we have received your letter of the 10th of the month and we are sorry that we cannot give you a more definite answer at this time. We are sorry that we cannot give you a more definite answer at this time.

doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0142001.g001

[illegible]



men, and to carry forward Peloponnesus, with undiminished dignity, as it had been transmitted to her from her predecessors.<sup>1</sup>

Such was the memorable picture of Athens and her citizens, as exhibited by her harriet suing before, the public assembly at Sparta. It was calculated to impress the assembly, not by appeal to moral or particular misdeeds, but by the general system of unprincipled and endless aggression which was imposed on Athens during the past—and by the certainty held out that this same system, unless put down by measures of decisive hostility, would be pushed still further in future to the utter ruin of Peloponnesus. And to this point did the Athenian carry (sitting in Sparta short some other negotiations, and now present in the assembly) address himself in reply, after having asked and obtained permission from the magistrates. The empire of Athens was now of such standing that the younger men present had no personal knowledge of the circumstances under which it had grown up; and what was needed as information for them would be impressive as a regulator even to their senses.<sup>2</sup>

He began by disavowing all intention of defending his native city against the charges of specific wrong or alleged infractions of the existing treaty. This was no part of his mission; nor did he recognize Sparta as a competent judge in disputes between Athens and Corinth. But he nevertheless thought it his duty to vindicate Athens against the general character of injustice and aggression ascribed to her, as well as to offer a solemn warning to the Spartans against the policy towards which they were obviously tending. He then proceeded to show that the empire of Athens had been honorably earned and easily deserved—that it had been voluntarily acknowledged and pressed upon her—and that she would not abdicate it without impairing her own separate existence and security. Far from thinking that the circumstances under which it was acquired needed apology, he appealed to them with pride, as a testimony of the genuine Hellenic patriotism of that day when the Spartan conquerors seemed disposed to run down as an enemy.<sup>3</sup> He then

<sup>1</sup>Thucyd. i. 15.

<sup>2</sup>Thucyd. i. 15.

<sup>3</sup>Thucyd. i. 15. *Antiquary*, 41. 4.  
superior officer from 4 pages



and interests of others, before she took a step from what there was no interest, and which exposed the future to changes such as no man on either side could foresee. He called on her not to break the treaty mutually sworn to, but to adjust all differences, as Athens was prepared to do, by the amicable arbitration which that treaty provided. Should she begin war, the Athenians would follow her lead and resist him, calling to witness those gods under whose sanction the treaty was taken.<sup>1</sup>

The facts recounted in the preceding chapters will have shown that the account given by the Athenians survey at Sparta of the origin and character of the conflict started by her city (though doubtless the account of a partisans) is in substance correct and equitable. The envoys of Athens had not yet learned to take the tone which they assumed in the strength and seriousness of the coming war, at Miletus and Kameiros. At any time previous to the affair of Euboea, the topics incident upon by the Athenians would probably have been moderately listened to at Sparta. But now the mind of the Spartans was made up. Having closed the assembly of all "citizens," and even all allies, they proceeded to discuss and determine the question among themselves. Most of their speakers held but one language—arguing on the wrongs already done by Athens, and urging the necessity of instant war. There was however one voice, and that a commanding voice, raised against this conclusion. The ancient and respected king Archidamus opposed it.

The speech of Archidamus is that of a deliberate Spartan, who, setting aside both hatred to Athens and blind partiality to allies, looks at the question with a view to the interests and honor of Sparta only—not however neglecting her interests, as well as her separate character. The preceding actors speak, ignorant

<sup>1</sup> Thucyd. i. 12. Both sides to which the treaty applies were, the Athenians and the Spartans. The treaty was made at the time of the Peloponnesian War, and was intended to prevent a third war between the two cities.

almost entirely, especially the latter, without apparent cause, & to the Athenians.

<sup>2</sup> Thucyd. i. 12. and also see the account of the war at the end of the book, where the Athenians are shown to be the aggressors.

spring, Athens, had probably appealed to Spartan pride, treating it as an intolerable disgrace that almost the entire land force of Dorica Peloponnesus should be thus hallooed by one single Ionic city, and should hesitate to counteract a war which one invasion of Attica would probably terminate. As the Corinthians had tried to evade the Spartans by well-timed terms and reproaches, so the subsequent speakers had aimed at the same object by panegyric upon the well-known valour and discipline of the city. To all these arguments *Andokides* set himself to reply. Invoking the experience of the citizens his contemporaries around him, he impressed upon the assembly the great responsibility, the uncertainties, difficulties, and perils of the war now which they were harrising without preparation.<sup>1</sup> He reminded them of the wealth, the population (greater than that of any other Grecian city), the naval force, the navy, the hospitals, the large foreign domination of Athens, and then asked by what means they proposed to put her down?<sup>2</sup> Ships they had five; trained men not fewer; wealth, next to none. They could indeed invade and ravage Attica, by their superior numbers and land force. But the Athenians had possessions abroad sufficient to enable them to dispute with the prodies of Attica, while their great navy would retaliate the like ravages upon Peloponnesus. To suppose that one or two devastating expeditions into Attica would bring the war to an end would be a deplorable error: such proceedings would merely enrage the Athenians, without impairing their real strength, and the war would thus be prolonged, perhaps for a whole generation.<sup>3</sup> Before they determined upon war, it was absolutely necessary to provide more efficient means for carrying it on; and to multiply their allies not merely among the Greeks, but among foreigners also. While this was in process, surveys ought to be sent to Attica to remunerate and obtain redress for the wrongs of the allies. If the Athenians granted this—which they very

Notes  
Andokides  
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Andokides  
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<sup>1</sup> *Andokides* 1. 20.  
<sup>2</sup> *Andokides* 1. 21. *Andokides* 1. 22. *Andokides* 1. 23. *Andokides* 1. 24. *Andokides* 1. 25. *Andokides* 1. 26. *Andokides* 1. 27. *Andokides* 1. 28. *Andokides* 1. 29. *Andokides* 1. 30. *Andokides* 1. 31. *Andokides* 1. 32. *Andokides* 1. 33. *Andokides* 1. 34. *Andokides* 1. 35. *Andokides* 1. 36. *Andokides* 1. 37. *Andokides* 1. 38. *Andokides* 1. 39. *Andokides* 1. 40. *Andokides* 1. 41. *Andokides* 1. 42. *Andokides* 1. 43. *Andokides* 1. 44. *Andokides* 1. 45. *Andokides* 1. 46. *Andokides* 1. 47. *Andokides* 1. 48. *Andokides* 1. 49. *Andokides* 1. 50. *Andokides* 1. 51. *Andokides* 1. 52. *Andokides* 1. 53. *Andokides* 1. 54. *Andokides* 1. 55. *Andokides* 1. 56. *Andokides* 1. 57. *Andokides* 1. 58. *Andokides* 1. 59. *Andokides* 1. 60. *Andokides* 1. 61. *Andokides* 1. 62. *Andokides* 1. 63. *Andokides* 1. 64. *Andokides* 1. 65. *Andokides* 1. 66. *Andokides* 1. 67. *Andokides* 1. 68. *Andokides* 1. 69. *Andokides* 1. 70. *Andokides* 1. 71. *Andokides* 1. 72. 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proceeding wisely on their side; we must stand upon security through our own precautions, but upon the chance of their co-operation. Indeed there is no great superiority in one man as compared with another: he is the strongest who is trained in the various trials. Let us for our parts not relax the discipline, which we have received from our fathers, and which we still continue to our very great profit: let us not hurry on in one short hour a resolution upon which depend so many lives, so much property, so many cities, and our own reputation besides. Let us take time to consider, since our strength puts it fully in our power to do so. Good evening to the Athenians on the subject of Peleides and of the other grievances alleged by our allies, and that too the rather as they are only to give us satisfaction; against one who offers satisfaction, custom forbids you to proceed, without some previous application, as if he were a proclaimed wrong-doer. But at the same time make preparation for war; such will be the stress of policy at once the best for your own power and the most terror-striking to your enemies."<sup>1</sup>

The speech of Archidamus was not only so richly full of plain sense and good sense, but delivered altogether from the point of view of a Spartan; appealing greatly to Spartan conservative feeling and even prejudice. But in spite of all this, and in spite of the personal animus entertained for the speaker, the tide of feeling in the assembly turned in the opposite direction was at that moment overwhelming. Archidamus—one of the five Ephors, to whom it fell to put the question for voting—closed the debate. The five words used at once the character of the man, the temper of the assembly, and the simplicity of speech, though without the wisdom of judgment, for which Archidamus had taken credit in his own opinion.

"I don't understand (as said) these long speeches of the Athenians. They have praised themselves abundantly, but they have never admitted what is bad in their charge—that they are guilty of wrong against our allies and against Peloponnesus. Now if in former days they were good men against the Persians, will we now still do so against us, they deserve double

<sup>1</sup> Thucyd. I. 121, 122.



in the other side". The assembly accordingly divided, and the majority was very great on the warlike side of the question.

The first step of the Lacedæmonians, after coming to that important decision, was to send to Delphi and inquire of the oracles whether it would be beneficial to them to undertake the war. The answer brought back (Thucydides seems hardly certain that it was really given) was, that if they did their best they would be victorious, and that the god would help them, invoked or uninvoked. They at the same time convened a general congress of their allies to Sparta, for the purpose of submitting their mutual resolution to the vote of all.

To the Corinthians, in their anxiety for the relief of Potidæa, the decision to be given by this congress was not less important than that which the Spartans had just taken separately. They sent round messages to each of the allies, entreating them to authorize war without reserve. Through such instigations, acting upon the general impulse then prevalent, the congress came together in a temper decidedly warlike. Most of the speakers were full of invective against Athens and rapturous for action, while the Corinthians, waiting as before to speak the last, wound up the discussion by a speech well calculated to secure a hearty vote. Their former speech had been directed to shame, excite, and alarm the Lacedæmonians; this point having now been surmounted, they had to address, upon the allies, generally, the dilemma as well as the impulse of standing from a willing leader. The cause was one in which all were interested, the island states not less than the mainland, for both would find themselves ultimately victims of the encroaching despotism. Whatever efforts were necessary for the war ought cheerfully to be made, since it was fully throughout that they could arrive at a peace and honourable peace. There were good hopes that this might soon be obtained, and that the war would not last long—as decided was the superiority of the confederacy, in numbers, in military skill, and in the equal heart and obedience of all its members. The

The Spartans had to Delphi to inquire of the oracles whether it would be beneficial to them to undertake the war.

General congress of allies at Sparta. Second speech of the Corinthians, urging the allies to authorize war without reserve.

<sup>1</sup> Thucyd. l. viii. 1-14 another speech.

<sup>2</sup> Thucyd. l. viii. 15. Xenophon is quite right in supposing, upon this point.



naval superiority of Athens depended chiefly upon hired sailors, so that the confederacy, by borrowing from the treasures of Delphi and Olympia, would soon be able to court her, take into pay her best mariners, and equal her equipment at sea. They would create revolt among her allies and establish a permanent fortified post for the ruin of Attica. To make up a common fund for this purpose was indispensably necessary; for Athens was far more than a match for each of these single-handed. Nothing less than hearty union could save them all from successive enslavement—the very supposition of which was intolerable to Peloponnesian States, whose fathers had liberated Greece from the Persians. Let them not shrink from undertakings and sacrifices in such a cause—it was their hereditary pride to purchase success by laborious effort. The Delphians had possessed them his co-operation; and the whole of Greece would sympathize in the cause, either from fear of the despotism of Athens, or from hopes of profit. They would not be the first to break the treaty, for the Athenians had already broken it, as the declaration of the Delphians had distinctly implied. Let them lose no time in sending aid to the Potidæans, a Boeotian population now besieged by Ionians, as well as to those other Greeks whom Athens had enslaved. Every day the necessity for effort was becoming stronger, and the longer it was delayed the more painful it would be when it came. "Be persuaded then (concluded the orator) that this city, which has constituted herself despot of Greece, had her means of attack prepared against all of us allies, some for present rule, others for future conquest. Let us recall and subdue her, that we may dwell securely ourselves hereafter, and may emancipate those Greeks who are now in slavery."<sup>1</sup>

the confederacy and forming a common fund for a navy which it is impossible to have done.

I suppose that the word *hellenes* here signifies the ten equal tribes of all the confederates in the general, as opposed to the Athenian power, which was composed partly of continental soldiers, partly of hired mercenaries—in both of which points, as we observe in the story, the Spartan power gave us to Athens. The word *hellenes* here designates the state that we find also in the speech at Athens (p. 115) wherein under the word *hellenes*

includes the Greeks, and implies that it is necessary to give all confederates equal and liberty in the cause. Perhaps, on the contrary, looking at the word that gives them the right of view, confederates is in a disjunctive sense, it denotes unity of purpose and determination.

Isop's view of this passage seems to me incorrect.

The same idea is expressed, a 104, some philosophers of every description and others and others also, etc.

<sup>1</sup>Thucyd. I. 103, 104.

If there were any "speeches delivered at this congress in opposition to the war, they were not likely to be successful in a cause wherein even Archelaus had failed. After the Corinthians had concluded, the question was put to the deputies of every city, great and small indiscriminately, and the majority decided for war.<sup>1</sup> This important resolution was adopted about the end of 425 B.C., or the beginning of January, 425 B.C.; the previous decision of the Spartans reportedly may have been taken about two months earlier, in the preceding October or November, 425 B.C.

Vote of the majority of the allies in favor of war.  
B.C. 425.

Reviewing the conduct of the two great Greek parties at this aggressive juncture, with reference to existing treaties and positive grounds of complaint, it seems clear that Athens was in the right. She had done nothing which would fairly be called a violation of the Thirty years' truce; while for such of her acts as were alleged to be such, she offered to submit them to that amiable arbitrage which the truce itself provided. The Peloponnesian confederates were manifestly the aggressors in the contest. If Sparta, usually so backward, now came forward in a spirit so decidedly opposite, we are to ascribe it partly to her standing fear and jealousy of Athens, partly to the pressure of her allies, especially of the Corinthians.

Therewithal  
of the allies  
in the  
aggression.

Thucydides, recognizing these two as the great determining motives, and indicating the alleged infractions of truce as simple occasions or pretexts, seems to consider the fear and hatred of Athens as having contributed more to determine Sparta than the urgency of her allies.<sup>2</sup> That the extraordinary agreement of Athens, during the period immediately succeeding the Persian invasion, was well calculated to excite alarm and jealousy in Peloponnesians is palpable. But if we take Athens on the stand in 425 B.C., it deserves notice that she had neither made, nor (so far as we know) tried to make, a single new acquisition

<sup>1</sup>Thucyd. I. 118. and the allies of Sparta were excluded. It seems that the decision was not absolutely unanimous.

<sup>2</sup>Thucyd. I. 118. Thucydides, II. 10. Archelaus was reported to have been the instigator also, of a previous war

between the Corinthians and the Athenians. These negotiations, made in 427 B.C., were, as the Peloponnesians, having heard of what the Athenians thought of the war, stopped after a while.

during the whole fourteen years which had elapsed since the conclusion of the Thirty years' truce;<sup>1</sup> and, moreover, that this truce marked an epoch of signal humiliation and rebuke to her power. The triumph which Sparta and the Peloponnesians thus gained, though not sufficiently complete to remove all fear of Athens, was yet great enough to inspire them with the hope that a second combined effort would subdue her. This mixture of fear and hope was exactly the state of feeling out of which war was likely to grow. We see that even before the quarrel between Coriath and Eorkyra, sagacious Greeks everywhere anticipated war as not far distant.<sup>2</sup> It was near breaking out even to the common of the result of Rome's<sup>3</sup> peace being then preferred partly by the commercial and material interests of Coriath, partly by the enmities of Athens. But the quarrel of Coriath and Eorkyra, which Sparta might have appeared beforehand had she thought it her interest to do so, and the junction of Eorkyra with Athens, withdrew the latter as again in a career of apprehension, and thus again brought into play the warlike feelings of Sparta; while they converted Coriath from the advocate of peace into a clamorous organ of war. The revolt of Potidaea—fomented by Coriath and encouraged by Sparta in the form of a positive promise to invade Attica—was in point of fact the first distinct violation of the truce, and the initiatory measure of the Peloponnesian war. The Spartan meeting, and the subse-

<sup>1</sup> Herodotus's biography of Pericles is worth studying from its indication of character, everything to us rather than feelings and impulses which really belong to a man. There he represents it, he places before the reader the portrait of a man, and not of a feeling, and the Coriathian case, as feeling became very popular at Athens even before the death of Socrates and Plato, and before those other circumstances which produced the "Thirty years' truce," and the great world, with its feelings for feeling, remained with commercial civilization. But even before these things occurred, the Athenians were not after the beginning of the Peloponnesian war. It was impossible that they could make any step in that direction until they had withdrawn their alliance with Eorkyra, and this was only done in the

year before the Peloponnesian war. Thus far, even then, is a qualified success and with much reason. All the first actions of the Peloponnesian war, the Athenians had nothing but lost, while the Peloponnesians had large hopes of all from the side of Sparta. While it is very true, therefore, that Pericles was certainly useful in dissuading war and distant commercial civilization, we must give him the credit of having saved Athens. There is no doubt in this, or towards Coriath, if Pericles had been any way involved in the marriage of Athens, which is for such a case, were hardly known, and after his death—in spite of the question again repeated by Pericles, Athens, v. 17.

<sup>2</sup> Thucyd. i. 10-12.

<sup>3</sup> Thucyd. i. 10, 11.

great degree of skill at Sparta, served no other purpose than to provide each Hellenism as were requisite to ensure the concurrent and hearty action of members, and to clothe with imposing solemnities a state of war already existing in reality, though yet unpronounced.

The sentiment in Peloponnesus at this moment was not the fear of Athens, but the hatred of Athens, and the confident hope of subduing her. And, indeed, such confidence was justified by plausible grounds. How might well think that the Athenians could never endure the entire denudation of their highly cultivated soil,—or at least that they would certainly come forth to fight for it in the field, which was all that the Peloponnesians desired. Nothing except the unparalled ascendancy and unshaken resolution of Perikles induced the Athenians to persevere in a scheme of patient defence, and to trust in that naval superiority which the resources of Athens, even and except the judicious Amphibamos, had not yet learned fully to appreciate. Moreover, the confident hopes of the Peloponnesians were materially strengthened by the widespread sympathy in favour of their cause, proclaiming as it did the intended liberation of Greece from a despotic city.<sup>1</sup>

To Athens, on the other hand, the coming war presented itself in a very different aspect; holding out nothing less than the certainty of prodigious loss and privation—even granting that, at this heavy cost, her independence and union at home and her empire abroad could be upheld. By Perikles, and by the more magnanimous Athenians, the chance of unavailing war was foreseen even before the Eorcyrean dispute.<sup>2</sup> But Perikles was only the first citizen in a democracy—estimated, trusted, and listened to more than any one else by the body of citizens, but warmly opposed in most of his measures, under the free speech and hostility of individual union which reigned at Athens, and even bitterly hated by many active political opponents. The formal determination of the Hellenizations to declare war must of course have been known

The troops  
and sails  
driven in  
the city of  
Sparta; the  
harbour the  
sails of  
Athens.  
The city  
was from  
Sparta in  
Athens  
with com-  
pliments and  
hospitality.  
What  
consequence  
the people  
have for  
war go on.

<sup>1</sup> Thucyd. II. 1.

<sup>2</sup> Thucyd. I. 87; Plutarch, Perikles, c. 12.

at Athens by three Athenian envoys who had returned on an evasive protest against it in the Spartan assembly. No steps were taken by Sparta to carry this determination into effect until after the congress of allies and their pronounced conformity vote. Nor did the Spartans even then send any herald or make any formal declaration. They despatched various propositions to Athens, not at all with a view of trying to obtain satisfaction, or of providing some escape from the probability of war, but with the contrary purpose—of multiplying demands and enlarging the grounds of quarrel.<sup>1</sup> Meanwhile the deputies, retiring home from the congress to their respective cities, hurried with them the general resolution for immediate warlike preparations to be made with as little delay as possible.<sup>2</sup>

The first requisition addressed by the Lacedæmonians to Athens was a political manoeuvre aimed at Pericles, their chief opponent in that city. His mother, Agariste, belonged to the great family of the Alcæcædæ, who were supposed to be under an hereditary taint, in consequence of the wrongs committed by their ancestor, Megacles, nearly two centuries before, in the daughter of the Egeian suppliants near the altar of the Venerable Goddess.<sup>3</sup>

Assured as this transaction was, it still had sufficient hold on the mind of the Athenians to serve as the basis of a political manoeuvre. About seventy-seven years before, shortly after the expulsion of Hippias from Athens, it had been employed by the Spartan king, Kleomachus, who at that time exacted from the Athenians a clearance of the ancient wrongs, to be effected by the banishment of Kleisthenes (the founder of the democracy) and his chief partisans. This design, allowed by Kleomachus to the Athenians at the instance of Isagoras, the rival of Kleisthenes,<sup>4</sup> had been then shaped, and had served well the purposes of those who sent it. A similar blow was now aimed by the Lacedæmonians at Pericles (the grand-nephew of

<sup>1</sup> Thucyd. i. 101. In saying it began before it really was, Thucydides speaks of the general opinion of the Athenians, from which they derived their own resolution to go to war, and not of the actual declaration.

<sup>2</sup> Thucyd. i. 102.

<sup>3</sup> See the account of the Egeian suppliants, and the wrongs which followed, in *Ant. History*, i. 2.

<sup>4</sup> See Thucyd. i. 57; compare it with Thucyd. i. 101; and see also the *Ant. History*.









them, which served them as matter for scandalous jokes on the part of this distinguished man.<sup>1</sup>

While the comic writers attacked Perikles himself for alleged intrigues with different women, they treated the name of Aspasia as public property without any reserve or concern; she was the Cenci, the Desdemona, or the Blod, to this great Hippias or Bess of Athens. At length one of these comic writers, Hermippus, not contented with comic attacks, indicted her before the *ekklesia*, for impiety, as participant in the philosophical discussions held, and the opinions professed, among the society of Perikles, by Anaxagoras and others. Against Anaxagoras himself, too, a similar indictment is said to have been preferred, either by Kleon or by Thrasyllos son of Makedon, under a general resolution recently passed in the public assembly at the instigation of Diogenides. And such was the sensitive antipathy of the Athenian public, shown afterwards totally in the case of Sokrates, and exhibited in this instance by all the artifices of political hatred, against philosophers whose opinions conflicted with the received religious dogmas, that Perikles did not dare to place Anaxagoras on his trial. The latter retired from Athens, and a sentence of banishment was passed against him in his absence.<sup>2</sup> But Perikles himself defended Aspasia before the *ekklesia*. In fact the indictment was as much against him as against her: one thing alleged against her (and also against Perikles) was the reception of free women to frequent the intrigues of Perikles. He defended her successfully and procured a verdict of acquittal; but we are not surprised to hear that his speech was marked by the strongest personal emotions and even by tears.<sup>3</sup> The *ekklesia* were accustomed to such appeals to their sympathies, sometimes even to extravagant excess, from ordinary accused persons. In Perikles, however, so much that an outbreak of emotion, stands out as something quite unparalleled; for constant self-mastery was one of the most prevailing

<sup>1</sup> Plutarch, Perikles, c. 32-33.

<sup>2</sup> This action was more probably done by Kleon, the instigator of Sokrates, and consequently more probable against Perikles, Perikles.

<sup>3</sup> 32-33; Plutarch, Perikles, c. 32; Diodor. Sicul. 15. 13. See also Aristarchus, Fragment, Anaxagoras, p. 40-41.

<sup>4</sup> Plutarch, Perikles, c. 32.

features in his character.<sup>1</sup> And we shall find him, near the close of his political life, when he had become for the moment unpopular with the Athenian people, distracted as they were at the moment with the terrible sufferings of the pestilence, bearing up against their unshared anger not merely with dignity, but with a pride of conscious innocence and desert which rises almost into defiance; inasmuch that the orator Demosthenes, who criticises the speech of Pericles as if it were simply the composition of Thucydides, censures just historians for having violated dramatic propriety by a display of innocence where humility would have been becoming.<sup>2</sup>

It appears also, so far as we can judge under very imperfect data, that the trial of the great sculptor Phidias, for a slight underbribe in the contract for his celebrated gold and ivory statue of Athena,<sup>3</sup> took place nearly at the same period. That statue had been finished and dedicated in the Parthenon in 438 B.C., since which period Phidias had been engaged at Olympia in his last and great masterpiece, the colossal statue of the Olympian Zeus. On his return to Athens from the execution of this work, about 432 or 431 B.C., the accusation of underbribe was instigated against him by the political enemies of Pericles.<sup>4</sup> A slave of Phidias, named Mneso, planted himself as a suppliant at the altar, professing to be cognisant of certain facts which proved that his master had committed perjury. Motion was made to receive his depositions and to ensure to his person the protection of the people; upon which he revealed various statements so greatly impeaching the pecuniary probity of Phidias, that the latter was put in prison, awaiting the day for his trial before the dikastery. The gold employed and charged for in the statue, however, was all capable of being taken off and weighed, so as to verify its accuracy, which Pericles dared the so-

Foundation of the temple of Athena Parthenos for the Parthenon—dedicated by the Athenians in 438 B.C. Charge of Perjury against Phidias. Mneso.

<sup>1</sup> Fischer, *Pericles*, s. 7, 38—39.

<sup>2</sup> Thucyd. B. III. c. 37: compares also his offering of sacrifices, s. 36; Demost. *Philippica*, de Thucyd. *Julia*, s. 38, p. 152.

<sup>3</sup> Fischer, *Pericles*, s. 31. See also *Antiquities of Athens*, s. 10.

<sup>4</sup> This fact, about placing Phidias

under the charge of underbribe, was the chief cause which led to the execution of Pericles' statue, which was taken down in 431 B.C. (Fischer, *Pericles*, s. 32).

<sup>5</sup> See the description of G. Müller (de *Phidias* Tüb., s. 17, p. 102, who says that the fact in the statue in which it was given there.

cases to do. But for the charge of unbecomingly, there were other circumstances which rendered Phidias unpopular. It had been discovered that, in the relief on the fane of the Parthenon, he had introduced the portraits of himself and Perikles in conspicuous positions. It seems that Phidias died in prison before the day of trial; and some even said that he had been poisoned by the masters of Perikles, in order that the suspicions against the latter, who was the real object of attack, might be aggravated. It is said also that Demosthenes proposed and carried a decree in the public assembly, that Perikles should be called on to give an account of the money which he had expended, and that the dikasts, before whom the account was rendered, should give their suffrage in the most solemn manner from the altar. This latter provision was modified by Agoræ, who, while proposing that the dikasts should be 1000 in number, retained the vote by publican in the art according to ordinary custom.<sup>1</sup>

If Perikles was ever tried on such a charge, there can be no doubt that he was honourably acquitted; for the language of Thucydides respecting his pecuniary probity is such as could not have been employed if a verdict of guilty on a charge of peculation had been publicly pronounced. But we cannot be certain that he ever was tried. Indeed another accusation urged by his enemies, and even by Aristophanes in the sixth year of the Peloponnesian war, implies that no trial took place; for it was alleged that Perikles, in order to escape this danger, "blew up the Peloponnesian war," and involved his country in such confusion and peril as made his own aid and guidance indispensably necessary to her; especially that he passed the decrees against the Megarians by which the war was really brought on.<sup>2</sup> We know enough, however, to be certain that such

<sup>1</sup> Plutarch, Perikles, c. 21-22.

<sup>2</sup> Aristophanes, Frogs, 107-109, compares Athens with a drunken man, Plutarch, c. 21-22, and the fable on the late passage of Aristophanes, Plutarch, Frogs, c. 11.

Thucydides has well as Plutarch, Aristophanes, c. 11, indicate whether both that Aristophanes were represented Perikles when he was in Athens for spirit and encouragement, and called

him the reason: Perikles told him that the war was now at hand he considered his situation, and that he was considering how the people should be done upon which Aristophanes seems him to be a correct opinion how he should state things to the people of this nation was that Perikles brought Athens into the Peloponnesian war, compare Aristophanes, Frogs, 107, with the fable, and Plutarch, Frogs, 117.



On this occasion, however, the Spartans did not succeed, nor did the Athenians listen to the requesters for punishing the sacrilegious Alkibiades. On the contrary, they replied that the Spartans too had up account of sacrifices to clear off; for they had violated the sanctuary of Poseidon at Cape Tenarus, in dragging from it some helot suppliants to be put to death, and the sanctuary of Apollo Chalkidion at Sparta, in blocking up and starving to death the guilty regent Pausanias. To require that Lacedæmon might be cleared of these two acts of sacrilege, was the only answer which the Athenians made to the demand sent for the punishment of Pericles.<sup>1</sup> Probably the actual effect of that demand was to strengthen him in the public esteem; a very different from the effect of the same manoeuvre when practised before by Alcibiades against Kleisthenes.

Other Spartan envoys shortly afterwards arrived with fresh demands. The Athenians were now required—1. To withdraw their troops from Potidea. 2. To replace Sigæa in its autonomy. 3. To repeal the decree of exclusion against the Megarians.

It was upon the latter that the greatest stress was laid; an intimation being held out that war might be avoided if such request were granted. We can plainly from this proceeding that the Lacedæmonians acted in concert with the anti-Periclean leaders at Athens. To Sparta and her confederacy the decree against the Megarians was of less importance than the rescue of the Chalkidian troops now blocked up in Potidea. But on the other hand, the party opposed to Pericles would have much better chance of getting a vote of the assembly against him on the subject of the Megarians; and this advantage, if gained, would serve to weaken his influence generally.<sup>2</sup> No measure was obtained however on either of the three points; even in respect to Megara, the decree of exclusion was vindicated and upheld against all the force of opposition. At length the Lacedæmonians—who had already resorted upon war and had sent their envoys in more compliance with the requests of ordinary

<sup>1</sup> Thucyd. i. 120, 121, 122.

<sup>2</sup> Plutarch, Pericles, c. 16.

positively not with any idea of bringing about an accommodation—and a third batch of envoys with a proposition which at least had the merit of disclosing their real purpose without disguise. Euphorbus and two other Spartans announced to the Athenians the simple injunction: "The Lacedæmonians wish the peace to stand, and it may stand, if you will leave the Greeks unmolested". Upon this demand, so very different from the proceeding, the Athenians resolved to hold a fresh assembly on the subject of war or peace, to open the whole question anew for discussion, and to determine once for all on a peremptory answer.<sup>1</sup>

The last demand presented on the part of Sparta, which went to nothing less than the entire annihilation of the Athenian empire—combined with the character, alike warning and assurance, of the demands previously made, and with the knowledge that the Spartan confederacy had pronounced peremptorily in favour of war—seemed likely to produce unanimity at Athens, and to bring together the important assembly under the universal conviction that war was inevitable. Such however was not the fact. The inclination to go to war was strong amidst the large majority of the assembly; while among a considerable portion of them it was so preponderant, that they even now reverted to the opening which the Lacedæmonians had before held out about the anti-Megarian decree, as if that were the chief cause of war. There was much difference of opinion among the speakers, several of whom insisted upon the repeal of this decree, treating it as a matter far too insignificant to go to war about, and denouncing the obstinacy of Pericles for refusing to concede such a trifle.<sup>2</sup> Against this opinion Pericles entered his protest, in a heroic discourse and encouraging, with Demosthenes of Halicarnassus ranks among the best speeches in Thucydides. The latter historian may probably himself have heard the original speech.

Final and peremptory demand of the Lacedæmonians—positively to leave the Greeks unmolested—thus laid the whole subject of war and peace.

Great difference of opinion in the assembly—important speech of Pericles.

<sup>1</sup>Thucyd. i. 100. It rather appears, from the words of Thucydides, that three various demands of the Lacedæmonians were made by one embassy, first by one embassy acting with great intemperance, but remaining during a month at the

walls between January and March, and a second in the latter of the months of Sparta, at Athens, amongst Demosthenes, Halicarn. i. 100.

<sup>2</sup>Thucyd. i. 100. Plutarch, Pericles, c. 20.









Pericles—having no such means as we possess to start from, and even compelled to shrink all that they did possess—both repelled the tyrant and brought matters forward to our actual point, more by advised operation than by good fortune, and by a daring courage greater than their best persons. We ought not to fall short of them: we must keep off our enemies in every way, and leave us unimpaired power to our successors.”<sup>1</sup>

These interesting arrangements of Pericles coincided with them the majority of the assembly, so that never was made in the navy, such as he recommended, on each of the particular points in debate. It was announced to them, however, on the general question of peace or war, that the Athenians were prepared to discuss all the grounds of complaint against them, pertinent to the treaty, by equal and amicable arbitration, but that they would do nothing under authoritative demand.<sup>2</sup> With this answer the crews returned to Sparta, and no war was put to negotiation.

It seems evident, from the account of Thucydides, that the Athenian public was not brought to this resolution without much reluctance and great fear of the consequences, especially destruction of property in Athens; and that a considerable minority took objection to the Megarian decree—the ground skillfully laid by Sparta for breaking the neutrality of her army, and strengthening the party opposed to Pericles. But we may also definitely infer from the same historian—especially from the proceedings of Cleon and Sparta as he sets them forth—that Athens could not have avoided the war without such an abasement both of dignity and power as no nation under any government will ever submit to, and as would even have left her without decent security for her individual rights. To accept the war tendered to her was a further act, surely of prudence but of necessity: the time of action allowed by the Spartan crews would have rendered

The assembly did not take the recommendation of Pericles. They said they would discuss every point in dispute.

Speech of Thucydides describing the grounds of complaint, and the result of the war. The war was decided in war.

<sup>1</sup> Thucyd. 2, 122, 123.

<sup>2</sup> Thucyd. 2, 122. See also another speech of Pericles on the same subject, and the answer given by Sparta, and the answer

given to the Spartan answer, and the answer given by Sparta to the Athenian answer, and the answer given by Sparta to the Athenian answer.



resolved not to let her stand as she was at the conclusion of the Thirty years' truce. It was their purpose to attack her and break down her empire, as dangerous, wrongful, and anti-McCormac. The war was thus partly a contest of principle, involving the popular proclamation of the right of every Gooden state to autonomy, against Athens; partly a contest of power, wherein Sparta and Corinthian coalition was not less conspicuous, and far more aggressive in the beginning, than Athenian.

Conformably to what is here said, the first blow of the war was struck, not by Athens, but against her. After the decisive answer given to the Spartan overture, taken in conjunction with the previous proceedings and the preparations actually going on, among the Peloponnesian confederacy, the truce could hardly be said to be still in force, though there was no formal proclamation of rupture. A few weeks passed as uneventful and uneventful intermission; though individuals who passed the border did not yet think it necessary to take a herald with them, as in time of actual war. Had the access of confidence been on the side of Athens composed with her success, this was the time for her to strike the first blow, carrying with it of course great probability of success, before their preparations were completed. But she remained strictly within the limits of the truce, while the dangerous series of mutual aggressions, destined to tear in pieces the mantle of Hellen, was spread by her enemy and her neighbor.

The little town of Plataeæ, still believed by the numerous victory over the Persians as well as by the treachery concerning received from Persia, was the scene of the confederate enterprise. It stood in Boeotia, immediately north of Kalliopeia; with the borders of Attica on one side, and the Theban territory (then which it was separated by the river Asopos) on the other; the distance between Plataeæ and Thebes being about seventy stadia, or eight miles. Though distant by descent, the Platæans

<sup>1</sup> Plutarch, l. i. c. 1. <sup>2</sup> Theophrastus, l. i. c. 1. <sup>3</sup> Theophrastus, l. i. c. 1. <sup>4</sup> Theophrastus, l. i. c. 1. <sup>5</sup> Theophrastus, l. i. c. 1. <sup>6</sup> Theophrastus, l. i. c. 1. <sup>7</sup> Theophrastus, l. i. c. 1. <sup>8</sup> Theophrastus, l. i. c. 1. <sup>9</sup> Theophrastus, l. i. c. 1. <sup>10</sup> Theophrastus, l. i. c. 1.







needed houses, paid at length the Thibons houses damaged and broken. That night was not less difficult than yesterday for they could not find their way out of the city, and even the gate by which they entered, the only one open, had been closed by a Flaine officer, who thrust into it the point of a pike in place of the key whereby the bar was commonly held fast. Disposed about the city and pursued by men who knew every inch of the ground, some ran to the top of the wall, and jumped down on the outside, most of them perishing in the attempt—a few others squeezed through an unguarded gate, by cutting through the bar with a hatchet which a woman gave to them—while the greater number ran into the open doors of a large house or building in conjunction with the wall, mistaking these doors for an approach to the town-gate. They were here locked up without a chance of escape, and the Flaine at first thought of setting fire to the building. But at length a convention was concluded, whereby they, as well as the other Thibons in the city, agreed to surrender at discretion.<sup>1</sup>

Had the reinforcements from Thibon arrived at the expected hour, the disaster would have been averted. But the heavy rain and dark night retarded their whole march, while the river Adige was so much swollen as to be with difficulty fordable: so that before they reached the gates of Flaine, their numbers within were either slain or captured. Which fatal had befallen them, the Thibons without could not tell; but they immediately resolved to seize what they could find, persons as well as property, in the Flaine territory (no provisions having been taken as yet to guard against the evils of war by keeping within the walls), in order that they might have something to exchange for such Thibons as were prisoners. Before this step could be executed, however, a herald came forth from the town to remonstrate with them upon their wholly preposterous in having so flagrantly violated the truce, and especially to warn them not to do any wrong without the walls. If they retired without inflicting further mischief, their prisoners

large town  
belonged to  
and from  
Thibon to  
rescue the  
soldiers  
sent to the  
gates—  
they were  
delivered by  
the rule  
and the  
strength of  
the Adige  
—their  
numbers  
diminished  
by and the  
Flaine  
persons and  
property  
taken from  
the walls.

<sup>1</sup> Trapp. 2, 3, 4.







carrying it on—and that there could be no further personal intercourse except under the protection of heralds.<sup>1</sup> The incident at Platae, striking in all its points, wound up all parties to the full pitch of warlike excitement. A spell of meditation and enterprise was abroad everywhere, especially among those younger citizens, yet unacquainted with the actual bitterness of war, whom the long truce but just broken had raised up. And the contagion of high-spirited feeling spread from the leading combatants into every corner of Greece, manifesting itself partly in multiplied oracles, prophecies, and religious legends adapted to the moment.<sup>2</sup> A recent earthquake at Delos, too, as well as various other extraordinary physical phenomena, were construed as prophecies of the civil struggle impending—a period hardly marked out, less by oracles, earthquakes, drought, famine, and pestilence, than by the direct calamities of war.<sup>3</sup>

An aggression so unwarlike as the assault on Platae tended

Proper-  
ties for  
war in the  
past of  
Athens—  
traditions  
may regard  
to her allies  
—diplo-  
matic  
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approved  
by a more  
realistic  
view of the  
Athenian  
policy. Again  
by the  
Athenian  
policy.

decisions to strengthen the unanimity of the Athenian assembly, to silence the opponents of Pericles, and to lend additional weight to those frequent exhortations<sup>4</sup> whereby the great statesman was wont to sustain the courage of his countrymen. Intelligence was sent round to governors and leaders up the numerous cities of Athens, tributary as well as free. The letters, with the inscription of the Thessalians, Akarnanians, and Messenians at Naupactus, were all similar—Chians, Lesbians, Euboeans, and Eolians. To the island of Euboea the Athenians sent envoys, but it was not actually required to their alliance until a few months afterwards.<sup>5</sup> With the Akarnanians, too, their relations had only been soured a short

time before, seemingly during the preceding summer, arising out of the circumstances of the town of Argos in Akrotholia.

That town, situated on the southern coast of the Akrotholia Gulf, was originally occupied by a portion of the Argive, a non-Hellenic tribe, whose language apparently was something

<sup>1</sup> Thucyd. II. 1-4.

<sup>2</sup> Thucyd. II. 1, 4. 2 or more things  
were perceived in the events of  
the war.

<sup>3</sup> Thucyd. I. 10.

<sup>4</sup> Thucyd. II. 38. See also Thucyd. II. 39 and 40. Thucyd. II. 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100.

<sup>5</sup> Thucyd. II. 1, 11, 12.

immigrants between Akarnanians and Epirots. Some colonists from Ambrakia, having been admitted as co-residents with the Amphibolians inhabitants of this town, previously expelled them, and retained the town with its territory exclusively for themselves. The expelled inhabitants, returning with their followers around as well as with the Akarnanians, looked out for the means of vengeance, and in order to obtain it invited the assistance of Athens. Accordingly the Athenians sent an expedition of thirty triremes under Phormio, who, joining the Amphibolians and Akarnanians, attacked and carried Argos, reduced the Ambrakiots to slavery, and restored the town to the Amphibolians and Akarnanians. It was on this occasion that the alliance of the Akarnanians with Athens was first concluded, and that their personal attachment to the Athenian general Phormio commenced.<sup>1</sup>

The numerous subjects of Athens, whose contributions stood embodied in the annual tribute, were distributed all over and around the *Ægean*, including all the islands north of Kribia, with the exception of Miletos and Thasos.<sup>2</sup> Moreover the elements of force collected in Athens itself were fully worthy of the metropolis of so great an empire. Perikles could make a report to his countrymen of 300 triremes fit for active service ;

Strength  
and no.  
of  
ships of  
Athens and  
her allies—  
300 triremes,  
and several  
smaller—  
battering-  
rams.

1500 horsemen and horse-archers ; 1000 bowmen ; and the great force of all, not less than 15,000 hoplites—mostly citizens, but in part also natives. The chosen portion of these hoplites, both as to age and as to equipment, were 12,000 in number ; while the remaining 3,000, including the older and younger citizens and the natives, did garrison duty on the walls of Athens and Peiræus—on the long line of wall which connected Athens both with Peiræus and Phaleron—and in the various fortified posts both in and out of Attika. In addition to these large military and naval forces,<sup>3</sup> the city possessed in the metropolis an accom-

<sup>1</sup> Thucyd. ii. 95. The time of which this expedition of Phormio and the capture of Argos happened, is not precisely stated by Thucydides. But the words seem to imply that it was before the commencement of the war, at Peiræus. Phormio was sent to that place about October or November, the

v.c. 3 44; and the opposition against Argos probably occurred not much later than that (the actual capture of) Byzantium and Antiochia having coincided with their alarm, Ambrakia captured—object of which had happened in the preceding spring.

<sup>2</sup> Thucyd. ii. 9.

total treasure of coined silver amounting to not less than 5000 talents, or about \$1,400,000, derived from annual laying up of tribute from the allies and perhaps of other revenue besides. The treasure had at one time been as large as 8700 talents, or about \$1,900,000, but the cost of the recent religious and architectural decorations at Athens, as well as the ships of Ptolemy, had reduced it to 4000. Moreover the temples and the temples throughout the city were rich in votive offerings, deposits, sacred plate, and other implements for the propitiations and festivals, &c., to an amount estimated at more than 500 talents, while the great stores of the public recently set up by Ptolemy in the Parthenon, composed of silver and gold, included a quantity of the latter metal not less than 60 talents in weight—equal in value to more than 400 talents of silver—and all of it arranged that it could be taken off from the stores at pleasure. In alluding to these sacred treasures among the resources of the state, Ptolemy spoke of them only as open to be so applied in case of need, with the free resolution of replying them during the best season of prosperity, just as the Christians had proposed to borrow from Delphi and Olympia. Besides the hoard thus actually in hand, there came in a large annual revenue, amounting under the single head of tribute from the subject allies, to 600 talents, equal to about \$135,000, besides all other items,\* making up a general total of at least 1000 talents, or about \$230,000.

To this formidable catalogue of means for war were to be added other means not less important, but which did not admit of being weighed and numbered: the controlled maritime skill and discipline of the masses—the disciplined veterans, able lawyers and engineers, of the general mass of citizens—and the superior development of directing intelligence. And when we consider that the money had failed on his side as warlike had been, but scarcely anything else—few ships, no trained crews, no funds, no power of combination or leadership—we may be excused that there were ample materials for an orator like Ptolemy to draw an encouraging picture of the future. He could depict

supplied  
by the  
state  
—the  
control  
of the  
state.

\* Thucyd. II. 12, *Zeugmata*, *ἀνέκδοτα* &c. &c.





promised to admit any single Athenian ship into their harbours.<sup>1</sup> Besides this, the Lacedæmonians had their schemes for sending expeditions to the Persian king and to other barbarian powers—a remarkable evidence of melancholy revulsion in Grecian affairs, when that potentate, whom the common arm of Greece had so hardly repulsed a few years before, was now invoked to bring the Persianian fleet upon into the Ægean for the purpose of attacking Athens.

The invasion of Attica however without delay was the primary object to be accomplished; and for that the Lacedæmonians issued circular orders immediately after the attempted capture of Piræus. Though the vote of the allies was requisite to sanction any war, yet when that vote had once been passed, the Lacedæmonians took upon themselves to direct all the movements of execution. Two-thirds of the hoplites of each confederate city—apparently two-thirds of a certain assumed rating for which the city was held liable in the books of the confederacy, so that the Spartans and others who furnished country were not constrained to send two-thirds of their entire force of hoplites—were summoned to be present on a certain day at the harbour of Corinth, with provisions and equipment for an expedition of some length.<sup>2</sup> On the day named, the entire force was found duly assembled. The Spartan king Archidamus, on taking the command, addressed to the commanders and principal officers from each city a discourse of solemn warning as well as encouragement. His remarks were directed chiefly to abate the tinge of sanguine over-confidence which reigned in the army. After adverting to the magnitude of the occasion, the mighty impulse springing all Greece, and the general good wishes which accompanied them against an enemy so much hated, he admonished them not to let their great superiority of numbers and bravery induce them into a spirit of rash disorder. "We are about to attack the enemy an enemy admirably equipped in every way, so that we may expect certainly that they will come out and fight."

Sketch of the naval force of the confederacy at the battle of Salamis.

<sup>1</sup> Thucyd. ii. 5. Thucydides says that the Athenian and Peloponnesian allies were repulsed in Piræus, and therefore sent out. <sup>2</sup> Thucyd. ii. 16. "We are about to attack the enemy an enemy admirably equipped in every way, so that we may expect certainly that they will come out and fight."



even if they be not now actually on the march to meet us at the border, at least when they see us in their territory ravaging and destroying their property. All men exposed to any unusual liability become alarmed, and set more under guard than under sedentary life, when it is actually brought under their eyes; such men will do otherwise by us, as soon as they are to expire, and to ravage the territory of others rather than to see their own so treated."

Immediately on the army being assembled, Archilochus sent Malchippus as envoy to Athens to announce the coming invasion, being still in hopes that the Athenians would yield. But a resolution had been already adopted, at the instance of Pericles, to receive neither herald nor envoy from the Lacedæmonians when their army was on its march: so that Malchippus was sent back without even being permitted to enter the city. He was ordered to quit the territory before sunset, with guides to accompany him and prevent him from addressing a word to any one. On parting from his guides at the border, Malchippus exclaimed, with a sadness but too accurately justified by the event—"This day will be the beginning of many calamities to the Greeks."

Archilochus, as soon as the reception of his last envoy was made known to him, continued his march from the borders into Attica—which territory he entered by the road of Eleusis, the frontier Athenian fortress of Attica towards Boeotia. His march was slow, and he thought it necessary to make a regular attack on the fort of Eleusis, which had been put into as good a state of defence, that after all the various modes of assault, in which the Lacedæmonians were not skilled, had been tried in vain<sup>1</sup>—and after a

his departure, he if other passages, IAC  
here is of of before with spirit in  
and cheerful effusions.

These reports of invasion are of  
great value in illustrating a scene of  
the feelings and circumstances which  
must have been the result of peace. What  
Archilochus so consistently anticipated  
did not come to pass.

<sup>1</sup> Orestes 4. 75.

<sup>2</sup> Orestes 4. 75. when their eyes

were directed to the city. The situation  
of Eleusis is not exactly agreed, some  
say it was situated on the coast, some  
say it was inland, and so on of the mode  
of attacking it. Some say it was situated  
on the coast, some say it was inland,  
and so on of the mode of attacking it.  
Some say it was situated on the coast,  
some say it was inland, and so on of the  
mode of attacking it.



even if they be not now actually on the march to meet us at the border, at least when they see us in their territory ravaging and destroying their property. All men exposed to any unusual indignity become incensed, and not more under yamunah than under calabration, when it is actually brought under their eyes; much more will the Athenians do so, accustomed as they are to empire, and to ravage the territory of others rather than to see their own so treated."

Immediately on the army being assembled, Archidamus sent Mithrippeas an envoy to Athens to announce the coming invasion, being still in hopes that the Athenians would yield. But a resolution had been already adopted, at the instance of Pericles, to receive neither herald nor envoy from the Lacedæmonians when once their army was on its march: so that Mithrippeas was sent back without even being permitted to enter the city. He was ordered to quit the territory before sunset, with guides to accompany him and prevent him from addressing a word to any one. On parting from his guides at the border, Mithrippeas exclaimed, with a solemnity but too accurately justified by the event—"This day will be the beginning of many calamities to the Greeks!"

Archidamus, on seeing the reception of his last envoy was made known to him, continued his march from the helona into Attica—which territory he entered by the road of Olus, the frontier Athenian fortress of Attica towards Boeotia. His march was slow, and he thought it necessary to make a regular attack on the fort of Olus, which had been put into as good a state of defence, that after all the various modes of assault, in which the Lacedæmonians were not skilled, had been tried in vain—and after a

the Athenians, in a few days, and the war to go on under their guidance in an unbroken line.

There is a great deal of speculation as to the nature of the battle and the result of it, but I think it is probable that the Athenians were completely defeated and did not come to pass.

<sup>1</sup> Thucyd. ii. 13.

<sup>2</sup> Thucyd. ii. 13. after their defeat.

about the Helona. The situation of Olus is not exactly agreed upon by the various authors, but it is generally supposed to be near the border of Attica, and on one of the roads from Athens to Boeotia, Phocæa, &c. &c. Thucyd. ii. 13. Archidamus marched probably from the Helona over the mountains, and not into Attica in order to receive the junction of the Spartan contingent after it had crossed Attica.

delay of several days before the place—he was compelled to renounce the attempt.

The want of confidence on the part of the Spartans—his uncalculated delays, first at the entrance, next in the march, and lastly before Clazomenæ—were all offensive to the fiery impetuosity of the army, who were bent to their workman, against him. He acted upon the calculation already laid down in his discourse at Sparta—that the highly-estimated aid of Athens was to be looked upon as a hostage for the pacific dispositions of the Athenians, who would be more likely to yield when devastation, though not yet inflicted, was nevertheless impending and at hand. In this point of view, a little delay at the border was no disadvantage; and perhaps the parliament of peace at Athens may have encouraged him to hope that it would enable them to prevail.

Nor can we doubt that it was a moment full of difficulty to Pericles at Athens. He had to proclaim to all the proprietors in Athens the painful truth, that they must prepare to see their lands and houses overrun and ravaged; and that their persons, families, and movable property must be brought in for safety either to Athens, or to one of the forts in the territory, or carried across to one of the neighbouring islands. It would indeed make a favourable impression when he told them that Archidamus was his own family friend, yet only within such limits as consisted with duty to the city: in case therefore the invaders, while ravaging Attica, should render assistance to spare his own lands, he would forthwith make them over to the state as public property. Such a case was likely enough to arise, if not from the personal feeling of Archidamus, at least from the deliberate enmity of the Spartans, who would seek thus to set the Athenian public against Pericles, as they had tried to do before by demanding the banishment of the unprincipled Alcibiades.<sup>1</sup> But though this declaration from Pericles

<sup>1</sup> Thucyd. i. 95, § 33.

<sup>2</sup> Thucyd. ii. 15. Compare Thucyd. i. 95, § 33. "Οὐδὲν γὰρ ἔστιν ἡμετέραν πόλιν ἀποβλέποντες, ὥστε μὴ καὶ αὐτὸν ἀποβλέποντες."

Alcibiades." Also Alc. i. 95.

Pericles states that the Spartan would have actually did force the lands of Alcibiades, and that he made them over to the people (ii.

would doubtless provide a hearty cheer, yet the cheer which he had to incite—*not* simply for adoption as prudent policy, but for actual practice—was one rendering little to the immediate interest, the dignity, and the sympathies of his countrymen. To see their lands all swept, without making an arm to defend them, to carry away their wives and families, and to desert and dismantle their country residences, as they had done during the Persian invasion—all in the confidence of compensation in which were and of remote ultimate secret—were recommendations which probably no one but Pericles could have hoped to enforce. They were moreover the more painful to secrets, known as the Athenian citizens had very generally retained the habit of residing permanently, not in Athens, but in the various towns of Attica, many of which still preserved their temples, their festivals, their local customs, and their limited municipal autonomy, handed down from the day when they had been free independent of Athens! It was but recently that the farming, the comforts, and the ornaments, thus distributed over Attica, had been restored from the ruin of the Persian invasion, and brought to a higher pitch of improvement than ever. Yet the fruits of this labour and the scenes of these local affections were now to be again deliberately abandoned to a new aggressor, and exchanged for the closest privation and discomfort. And—doubts might well doubt whether the Athenians would nerve themselves up to the pitch of resolution necessary for this distressing step, when it came to the actual crisis; and whether they would not constrain Pericles against his will to make propositions for peace. His delay on the border and postponement of actual devastation gave the best chance for such propositions to be made; though, as this calculation was not realized, the story raised plausible complaints against him for having allowed the Athenians time to save as much of their property.

From all parts of Attica the residents flocked within the spacious walls of Athens, which now served as shelter for the homeless. The Peloponnesians forty-nine years before—*active* families with all their movable property, and even with the woodwork

7. Thucydides does not say whether Pericles, i. 25.  
the war truly continued? see also Thucyd. ii. 13, 14.





evacuation of a Greek territory under invasion, when we find the great dike—which could not have contained less than 25,000 free inhabitants of both sexes and all ages, with at least an equal number of slaves—completely deserted. Archidamus calculated that when the Athenians actually saw his troops so close to their city, carrying fire and sword over their wealthiest estates, their indignation would become uncontrollable, and they would march off forthwith to battle. The Athenians, proportionately (he thought), would be foremost in refusing this longer and involving upon protection to their own properties—as if the remaining citizens refused to march out along with them, they would, after having been thus left unprotected to ruin, become demoralized and indifferent to the general war.<sup>1</sup>

Though his calculation was not realized, it was nevertheless founded upon most rational grounds. What Archidamus anticipated was on the point of happening, and nothing prevented it except the personal ascendancy of Pericles, strident to be very silent. So long as the invading army was engaged in the Thracian plain, the Athenians had some least hope that it might (like Marathon fourteen years before) advance no farther into the interior. But when it came to Athens within sight of the city walls—when the invaders were actually seen destroying buildings, fruit-trees, and crops, in the plain of Athens, a sight strange to every Athenian eye except to those very old men who recalled the Persian invasion—the suspension of the general body of citizens ran to a pitch never before known. The Athenians first of all—next the peaceful citizens generally—became really dangerous for writing and going forth to fight. Knowing well their own great strength, but less correctly informed of the superior strength of the enemy, they felt confident that victory was within their reach. Groups of citizens were everywhere gathered together,<sup>2</sup> eagerly debating the critical questions of the moment; while the usual conservatism of excited feeling—agrees and prophesies of diverse tenor, many of them doubtless

Thucyd. ii. 10.  
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<sup>1</sup> Thucyd. ii. 10.

<sup>2</sup> Thucyd. ii. 10. and Aristotle in Aristotle, 1871.

Thucyd. ii. 10. and Aristotle in Aristotle, 1871.





Perikles was anxious to prevent the Ekklesia from being held. The entire body of Athenians was now assembled within the walls, and if he refused to convene the Ekklesia, they might easily have met in the Pnyx without him; for which it would not have been difficult at such a juncture to provide plausible justification. The inviolable respect which the Athenian people manifested on this occasion for the forms of their constitutional constitution—sacred traditions by their long-established esteem for Perikles, yet opposed to an excitement alike intense and pervading, and to a demand apparently reasonable, in so far as regarded the calling of an assembly for discussion—is one of the most memorable incidents in their history.

While Perikles thus decidedly forbade any general march out for battle, he sought to provide as much employment as possible for the unemployed eagerness of the citizens. The country was swept forth, together with the Thessalians covering their flanks, for the purpose of restraining the movements of the enemy's light troops, and protecting the lands near the city from plunder.<sup>1</sup> At the same time he kindled not a powerful expectation, which called forth to ravage Poloponnesos, even while the invaders were yet in Attika.<sup>2</sup> Aristides, after having remained engaged in the devastation of Acharnes long enough to satisfy himself that the Athenians would not hazard a battle, turned away from Athens in a north-westerly direction towards the domain between Mount Ilionia and Mount Paros, on the road passing through Dekeleia. The army continued sweeping these districts until their provisions were exhausted, and then quitted Attika by the north-western road near Oropos, which brought them into Boeotia. As the Oropians, though not Athenians, were yet dependent upon Athens, the district of Gores, a portion of their territory, was held waste; after which the army dispersed and retired back to their respective homes.<sup>3</sup> It would seem that they quitted Attika

The Athenians were sweeping their walls, making provisions, and so prepared for battle.

<sup>1</sup> Thucyd. i. 95. The general movement of these three Thessalians was swept there up by Perikles near Athens, on the side of the Argolis, (Pnyx), i. 95, 96.

<sup>2</sup> Thucyd. i. 95-97 would have us believe that the expectation was not by Perikles, sweeping the Poloponnesos

which induced the Spartans to keep away their troops out of Attika. Thucydides gives no comment on this, but it is all possible.

<sup>3</sup> Thucyd. i. 95. The meeting of the army, according to Thucyd. would probably be at Oropos, Pnyx and other along the coast, to Oropos.



inhabitants of the neighboring Achaean town of Palerus—as well as Arisaka, from whence they expelled the despot Khardos, and assumed the town as a member of the Achaean alliance. From hence they passed over to Kephallinia, which they were fortunate enough they to capture as an ally of Athens without any opposition—with its four distinct towns or districts, Palis, Krati, Sandi, and Prodi. These various operations took up near three months from about the beginning of July, so that they returned to Athens towards the close of September<sup>1</sup>—the beginning of the winter half of the year, according to the distribution of Thucydides.

This was not the only maritime expedition of the summer. Thirty more triremes, under Kleopompeus, were sent through the Eurypus to the Lokrian coast opposite to the northern part of Euboea. Some disambiguations were made, whereby the Lokrian towns of Thronion and Alpea were united, and further demarcation inflicted; while a permanent garrison was placed, and a fortified post erected, in the uninhabited island of Anthusa opposite to the Lokrian coast, in order to restrain pirates from Opea and the other Lokrian towns in their excursions against Euboea.<sup>4</sup> It was further determined to expel the *Sligians* inhabitants from *Sligia*, and to occupy the island with Athenian colonies. This step was partly rendered prudent by the important position of the island midway between Attica and Peloponnesus. But a commercial motive, and probably the stronger motive, was the gratification of ancient antipathy and revenge against a people who had been, among the foremost in providing the war and in inflicting upon Athens so much suffering. The *Sligians* with their wives and children were all put on shipboard and landed in Peloponnesus—where the Spartans permitted them to occupy the maritime district and town of Thyrea, their last frontier towards Argos: while of them however found shelter in other parts of Greece. The island was made over to a detachment of Athenian *kliruchs*, or citizens, representatives sent thither by lot.<sup>5</sup>

To the reflection of the *Reflectors*, which we shall hereafter

1. *Thompson, R. B. 1990. Ecology, 4th ed. New York: Macmillan.*

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And still more deplorably aggravated, we have to add those of the Megarians. Both had been most anxious to avoid the war, but upon none did the distress of war fall so heavily. Both profusely shared the polemarchs' opinion. Athens felt among the Peloponnesian confederacy, that Athens could never hold out more than a year or two, and were thus induced to overlook their own undefended position against her. Towards the close of September, the fall in of Athens, citizens and country, swarmed into the Megara, under Pericles, and had won the greater part of the territory; while they were in it, the hundred ships which had been accompanying Peloponnesians, having arrived at Sygion on their return, went and joined their fellow-citizens in the Megara, instead of going straight home. The junction of the two formed the largest Athenian force that had ever yet been won together: there were 16,000 Athenian hoplites (independent of 5000 whom who were engaged in the siege of Potidæa), and 8000 Megarian hoplites—besides a large number of light troops.<sup>1</sup> Against so large a force the Megarians could of course make no head, so that their territory was all laid waste, even to the city walls. For several years of the war, the Athenians suffered this destruction, once, and often twice, in the same year. A decree was proposed in the Athenian Ekklesia by Charon, though perhaps not carried, to the effect that the *Strophi* every year should amount, as a portion of *Dei*—*Strophi* of *Strophi*,<sup>2</sup> that they would twice invade and ravage the Megarid. As the Athenians at the same time kept the port of Naxos blocked up, by means of their superior naval force and of the neighbouring coast of Salamis, the petroleum imported on the Megarid became extremely and insupportable.<sup>3</sup> Not merely their corn and fruits, but even their garden vegetables near the city, were rooted up and destroyed, and these afflictions seem often to have been that of a besieged city hard pressed by famine. Even in the time of Pericles, two centuries afterwards, the miseries of

<sup>1</sup> Thucyd. ii. 27, Diod. xii. 48.

<sup>2</sup> Thucyd. Pericles, ii. 28.

<sup>3</sup> See the striking picture in the *Antiquities of Athens* (vol. i. 250) of the Athenian Megarians selling their property in the city for their own food, and Athens, p. 282.

The position of Megara, by the city of Sygion and many of Athens, was insupportable in the same manner though not in the same degree. The city of Megara, in the war which preceded the battle of Salamis—more than two years after the Athenian war, 480, p. 282, ii. 282.

the town during those years were remembered and communicated to him, being assigned as the reason why one of their most memorable temples had never been completed.<sup>1</sup>

To the various military operations of Athens during the course of the summer, some other measures of moment are to be added. Moreover Thucydides notices an eclipse of the sun, which modern astronomical calculations refer to the third of August: had this eclipse happened three months earlier, immediately before the entrance of the Peloponnesians into Athens, it might probably have been considered as an unfavourable omen, and caused the postponement of the attack.

Expecting a prolonged struggle, the Athenians now made arrangements for placing Athens in a permanent state of defence, both by sea and land. What these arrangements were we are not told in detail, but one of them was sufficiently remarkable to be named particularly. They set apart one thousand talents out of the treasure in the acropolis as an inviolable reserve, not to be touched except on the single contingency of a hostile naval force about to assault the city, with no other means at hand to defend it. They further enacted that if any citizen should propose, or any magistrate put the question, in the public assembly, to make a different application of this reserve, he should be punishable with death. Moreover they resolved every year to keep back one hundred of their best triremes, and triremes to maintain and equip them, for the more special necessity.<sup>2</sup> It may be doubted whether this latter provision was placed under the same stringent restriction, or observed with the same rigour, as that concerning the money; which latter was not departed from until the twentieth year of the war, after all the disasters of the Sicilian expedition, and on the terrible news of the result of Clitus. It was on that occasion that the Athenians, having first repealed the sentence of capital punishment against any proposer of the fortification change, appropriated the money to meet the then imminent peril of the commonwealth.<sup>3</sup>

Thucydides  
states by  
reference to  
the previous  
history, as  
well as by  
its  
own  
authority,  
that the  
Athenians  
did not  
use the  
treasure  
in the  
acropolis  
for the  
purpose  
of  
defending  
the city  
in the  
event of  
a  
hostile  
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assault  
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they  
used it  
for the  
purpose  
of  
defending  
the city  
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event of  
a  
hostile  
naval  
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the city.

<sup>1</sup> Thucyd. i. 24, 3.<sup>2</sup> Thucyd. ii. 13.<sup>3</sup> Thucyd. viii. 34.

The resolution here taken about this moved reserve, and the Executive's express sentence interdicting contrary propositions, likewise, is pronounced by Mr. Winford to be an evidence of the insupportable barbarism of democratical government.<sup>1</sup> But we must recollect, first, that the sentence of capital punishment was one which could hardly by possibility come into execution; for no citizen would be so mad as to make the insoluble proposition, while that law was in force. Whoever desired to make it would first begin by proposing to repeal the prohibitory law, whereby he would incur no danger, whether the assembly decided in the affirmative or negative. If he obtained an affirmative decision, he would then, and then only, proceed to move the re-appropriation of the fund. To speak the language of English parliamentary procedure, he would first move the suspension or abrogation of the standing order whereby the proposition was forbidden—next, he would move the proposition itself. In fact such was the mode usually pursued, when the thing at last came to be done.<sup>2</sup> But though the capital sentence could hardly come into effect, the proclamation of it is however had a very distinct meaning. It expressed the deep and solemn conviction which the people entertained of the importance of their own resolution about the reserve—of forwarding all assemblies and all citizens to come, of the danger of diverting it to any other purpose—it surrounded the reserve with an artificial sanctity, which forced every man who aimed at the re-appropriation to begin with a preliminary proposition formidable on the very face of it, as removing a guarantee which previous assemblies had deemed of immense value, and opening the door to a contingency which they had looked upon as treacherable. The proclamation of a lighter pen-

<sup>1</sup> Winford, *Hist. of Greece*, &c. vol. 1, vol. 12, p. 121. "I cannot conceive Winford, with every view of the time when Winford wrote and Pericles spoke, and with Pericles held the principal influence in the re-appropriation, strongly move him to insupportable weakness and the insupportable barbarism of democratical government. A clause of the people declared that in this resolution was placed in a Senate or House of Lords, interdicted only by the present will of that assembly the condition of submission, against a law

motion, since the proposition of the people's Legislature, in this, is never repeated—this is the declaration of right, the proposition was proposed, against whatever should propose, and there was no other power as to the Greek law for the disposal of the money to any other person, or any other circumstance."<sup>2</sup>

Winford, vol. 12, p. 121, p. 122, p. 123, p. 124, p. 125, p. 126, p. 127, p. 128, p. 129, p. 130, p. 131, p. 132, p. 133, p. 134, p. 135, p. 136, p. 137, p. 138, p. 139, p. 140, p. 141, p. 142, p. 143, p. 144, p. 145, p. 146, p. 147, p. 148, p. 149, p. 150, p. 151, p. 152, p. 153, p. 154, p. 155, p. 156, p. 157, p. 158, p. 159, p. 160, p. 161, p. 162, p. 163, p. 164, p. 165, p. 166, p. 167, p. 168, p. 169, p. 170, p. 171, p. 172, p. 173, p. 174, p. 175, p. 176, p. 177, p. 178, p. 179, p. 180, p. 181, p. 182, p. 183, p. 184, p. 185, p. 186, p. 187, p. 188, p. 189, p. 190, p. 191, p. 192, p. 193, p. 194, p. 195, p. 196, p. 197, p. 198, p. 199, p. 200, p. 201, p. 202, p. 203, p. 204, p. 205, p. 206, p. 207, p. 208, p. 209, p. 210, p. 211, p. 212, p. 213, p. 214, p. 215, p. 216, p. 217, p. 218, p. 219, p. 220, p. 221, p. 222, p. 223, p. 224, p. 225, p. 226, p. 227, p. 228, p. 229, p. 230, p. 231, p. 232, p. 233, p. 234, p. 235, p. 236, p. 237, p. 238, p. 239, p. 240, p. 241, p. 242, p. 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absent, or a simple prohibition without any definite sanction whatever, would neither have announced the same emphatic conviction nor produced the same deterring effect. The assembly of 431 B.C. could not in any way meet here which subsequent assemblies could not reverse; but it could so frame its enactments, in case of positive subversion, as to make its authority strongly felt upon the judgment of its members, and to prevent them from entertaining motions for repeal except under necessity of some urgent and obvious case.

Far from thinking that the law now passed at Athens displayed barbarism, either in the end or in the means, I consider it principally remarkable for its cautious and long-sighted view of the future—qualifies the exact reverse of barbarism—and worthy of the general character of Pericles, who probably suggested it. Athens was just entering into a war which threatened to be of indefinite length, and was certain to be very costly. To prevent the people from exhausting all their accumulated fund, and to place them under a necessity of securing something against extreme necessities, war an object of immense importance. Now the particular necessity, which Pericles (assuming him to be the proposer) named as the sole condition of touching this one thousand talents, might be considered as of all others the most imprudent, in the year 431 B.C. So immense was then the superiority of the Athenian naval force, that to suppose it defeated, and a Peloponnesian fleet in full sail for Piræus, was a possibility which it required a statesman of extraordinary caution to look forward to, and which it is wonderful that the people generally could have been induced to contemplate. Once tied up to this purpose, however, the fund lay ready for any other terrible emergency. We shall find the actual employment of it incredibly successful to Athens, at a moment of the gravest peril, when she could hardly have protected herself without some such special resource. The people would scarcely have sustained so painful an emergency, had it not been proposed to them at a period so early in the war that their available reserve was still quite large. But it will be for ever to the credit of their foresight as well as consistency that they should first have adopted such a precautionary measure, and afterwards adhered to it for nineteen years, under severe pressure for money, until



at length a case arose which rendered further discussion really, and not constructively, impossible.

To display their force and take revenge by dismembering and mangling parts of Poloponnese was declared of much importance to Athens during this first summer of the war, though it might seem that the force so employed was quite as much needed in the conquest of Potidea, which still remained under Mithridates, and of the neighbouring Chalkidians in Thess. still in revolt. It was during the course of this summer

That a prospect opened to Athens of subduing these  
 tribes, through the assistance of Sitaldes king of the Odrysian  
 Thracians. That prince had married the sister of Nymphodorus,  
 a citizen of Abdera, who engaged to render him and his son  
 Sadochus allies of Athens. Sent for to Athens and appointed  
 procurator of Athens at Abdera, which was one of the Athenian  
 subject allies, Nymphodorus made this alliance, and promised to  
 the name of Sitaldes that a sufficient Thracian force should be  
 sent to aid Athens in the reconquest of her ravished towns: the  
 honor of Athenian citizenship was at the same time conferred  
 upon Sadochus.<sup>1</sup> Nymphodorus further established a good under-  
 standing between Perikles of Naxos and the Athenians,  
 who were persuaded to restore to him Thosia, which they had  
 before taken from him. The Athenians had thus the promise of  
 powerful aid against the Chalkidians and Potidæans: yet the  
 latter still held out, with little prospect of immediate surrender.  
 Moreover, the town of Anaktora in Akarnania, which the  
 Athenians had captured during the summer in the course of  
 their expedition round Peloponnesos, was recovered during the  
 autumn by the deposed despot Klearchos, assisted by fifty  
 Corinthian triremes and 1000 hoplites. This Corinthian arma-  
 ment, after restoring Klearchos, made some unsuccessful incursions  
 both upon other parts of Akarnania and upon the island of  
 Ephyraia. In the latter they were entangled, but in vain en-  
 gaged, and obliged to return home with considerable loss.<sup>2</sup>

1000

1000

the public interest of those warriors who had fallen during the campaign. The character of this public token of respect have already been described in a former chapter, on occasion of the request of Euseus. But that which imparted to the present scene an respectable interest was the discourse of the chosen statesman and orator; probably heard by Thucydides himself, and in substance reproduced. A large crowd of citizens and foreigners, of both sexes and all ages, accompanied the funeral procession from Athens to the suburb called the outer Kerameikos, where Pericles, mounted upon a lofty stage prepared for the occasion, closed the ceremony with his address. The law of Athens not only provided the public funeral and commemorative discourse, but also assigned maintenance at the public expense to the children of the slain warriors until they attained military age—a practice which was acted on throughout the whole war, though we have only the description and discourse belonging to this single occasion.<sup>1</sup>

The chosen discourse of Thucydides which comprises this funeral speech are among the most memorable relics of antiquity; considering that under the language and arrangement of the historian—always impressive, though sometimes harsh and ponderous, like the workmanship of a powerful mind aided by a bad or an unsustained model—we possess the substance and thoughts of the Eleanctic statesman. A portion of it, of course, is and must be commonplace, belonging to all discourses composed for a similar occasion. Yet this is true only of a comparatively small portion. Much of it is peculiar, and every way worthy of Pericles—comprehensive, rational, and full not less of sense and substance than of elegant ornament. It thus forms a strong contrast with the jejune, though elegant, rhetoric of other homages, mostly<sup>2</sup> not con-

Funeral  
speech of  
Pericles.

<sup>1</sup> *Demost.* 2, 12—15. Sometimes after the order of Athens, who had fallen along with her allies, in battle, had a public funeral, and the public burial chamber, *Demost.* 2, 12.

<sup>2</sup> The author here alludes to the Eleanctic orator, who, for the most part, in concerning the public affairs, is content to deliver

speeches, to be not really his. Of these alluded to Plato and Xenophon, the former more comprehensively, though specially in the present. *Thucydides* 2, 12. It is his really the most of Plato, Xenophon, and so, in the history, but the language of Xenophon is very different, and, as well as his, and may perhaps have been really delivered—







man: nor is it degraded to any one who is poor to mention his poverty, though he may rather more reproach for not actually keeping himself out of poverty. The magistrates who discharge public trusts fulfil their domestic duties also—the private citizen, while engaged in professional business, has competent knowledge on public affairs: for we stand alone in regarding the man who keeps aloof from time better not as harmless, but as useless. Moreover, we always hear and pronounce on public matters, when discussed by our leaders, or perhaps strive not for correctness so much as to follow them: far from assuming discretion an impediment to action, we complain only if we are not told what is to be done before it becomes our duty to do it. For in truth we continue to the most considerable measure these two qualities—extreme boldness in expression, with full debate beforehand on that which we are going about: whereas with officers, ignorance alone imports boldness—false antecedent hesitation. Accordingly those men are properly to be regarded as the strongest of heart who, knowing most perfectly both the terrors of war and the sweets of peace, are still not the less willing to encounter both.

"In fine, I believe that our city, considered as a whole, is the admirer of these; and while viewed individually, we enable the same men to furnish himself out and suffice to himself in the greatest variety of ways and with the most complete grace and refinement. This is no empty boast of the moment, but genuine reality; and the power of the city, acquired through the dispositions just indicated, exists to prove it. Athens alone of all other states both in actual trial greater than her reputation: her energy when she attacks her will not leave her public wounded by suffering slight from hostile hands—her subjects will not think themselves degraded as if their citizenship were paid to an unworthy superior! Having therefore both our power, not unassisted, but backed by the most exalted virtue, we shall be able to

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1. The first step is to identify the problem or question that needs to be answered. This involves understanding the context and the specific requirements of the task.

Source: *U.S. Census Bureau, Bureau of Economic Analysis, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Bureau of Transportation Statistics, and U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis*.

<sup>1</sup>Thompson, R. D. asks what the real impact of the 1980s on African agriculture was, and asks about the prospects for African agriculture in the 1990s. He also asks about the impact of the 1980s on the African continent as a whole, and the impact of the 1980s on the African continent as a whole.



ends between the greatness of the state as an object of common passion, and the courage, intelligence, and varied actions of individual citizens, as its creating and preserving cause; just as well as rich living, alone interesting in the partnership.

But the claims of patriotism, though just founded as essentially and deservedly paramount, are by no means understood to reign exclusively, or to absorb the whole of the constitutional activity. Subject to these, and to those laws and constitutional protest both the public and individuals against wrong, it is the pride of Athens to subvert a rich and varied fund of human impulses—an unrestrained play of fancy and diversity of private pursuits, coupled with a susceptibility of cheerful indignance between one individual and another—and an absence even of those "black looks" which so much embitter life, even if they never pass into reality of fact. This portion of the speech of Pericles deserves particular attention, because it serves to present an exception, often for too indiscriminately made, respecting antiquity as contrasted with modern nations—the assertion that the ancient nations sacrificed the individual to the state, and that only in modern times has individual agency been left free to the proper extent. This is precisely true of Sparta, such is also true in a great degree of the Hellenic nations depicted by Plato and Aristotle: but it is pointedly untrue of the Athenian democracy, nor can we with any confidence predicate it of the major part of the Grecian cities.

I shall hereafter return to this point when I reach the times of the great speculative philosophers: at present I merely bespeak attention to the speech of Pericles as representing the supposition, that exorbitant interference of the state with individual liberty was unknown among the ancient Greek republics. There is no doubt that he has present to his mind a comparison with the extreme narrowness and rigour of Sparta, and that therefore his assertions of the extent of positive liberty at Athens must be understood as partially qualified by such contrast. But even setting allowance for this, the stress which he lays upon the liberty of thought and action at Athens, not merely from excessive

Should  
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possible in  
Athens.

It is hardly  
true  
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that in some  
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that the  
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prevalent  
as an  
exorbitant  
degree, with  
individual  
agency in  
Athens.



restraint of law, but also from practical intolerance between man and man, and tyranny of the majority over individual characters in taste and pursuit, deserve serious notice, and bequeath out one of those points in the national character upon which the intellectual development of the time mainly depended. The national temper was indulgent in a high degree to all the varieties of positive impulse. The peculiar promptings in every individual bosom were allowed to manifest themselves and bear fruit, without being suppressed by external opinion or indeed into forced conformity with some assumed standard: antiquities against any of them formed no part of the habituated morality of the citizen. While much of the governing classes of Athens, indeed, was thus rendered impulsive, and while society was rendered more comfortable, more instructive, and more stimulating, all its germs of productive fruitful genius, so rare everywhere, found in such an atmosphere the maximum of encouragement. Within the limits of the law, assuredly as scrupulously observed at Athens as anywhere in Greece, individual impulses, tastes, and even eccentricity, were accepted with indulgence, instead of being a mark as elsewhere for the intolerance of neighbours or of the public. This remarkable feature in Athenian life will help us in a future chapter to explain the striking career of Socrates, and it further presents to us, under another face, a great part of that which the masses of Athens denominated under the name of "democratical humors". The liberty and diversity of individual life in that city were otherwise to Xenophanes,<sup>1</sup> Plato, and Aristotle—attached either to the sternness of Sparta, or to some other ideal standard, which, though much better than the Spartans in itself, they were disposed to suppose upon society with a heavy-handed uniformity. That liberty of individual action, not merely from the over-restraints of law, but from the tyranny of jealous opinion, such as Pericles deplored in Athens, belongs more naturally to a democracy, where there is no select One or Few to require

Free play of  
individual  
taste and  
impulse in  
Athens—  
impulsiveness  
of the  
people.  
Large in  
society.

<sup>1</sup> Compare the malice of Xenophanes, the gross remarks of that which is here laid down by Pericles, contrasting the rigid discipline of Sparta, and denouncing the liberty of Athenian life (Xenophanes, Memorabilia.

II. 4, 10, 21, 22, 23). It is curious that the malice appears in this degree at first in the mouth of the younger Socrates (Xenophanes and of the great Pericles in a dialogue with Socrates).

wealth and not the fashion, that is any other form of government. But it is very rare even in democracies. None of the governments of modern times, democratical, aristocratical, or monarchical, presents anything like the picture of generous tolerance towards social dissent and spontaneity of individual taste which we read in the speech of the Athenian statesman. In all of them, the insistence of the national opinion cuts down individual character to one out of a few set types, to which every person, or every family, is constrained to adjust itself, and beyond which all exceptions meet either with hatred or with disdain. To suppose upon such strict adherence of law or of opinion as are requisite for the security and conduct of society, but to encourage rather than restrain the free play of individual impulse subject to these limits, is an ideal, which, if it was ever approached at Athens, has certainly never been attained, and has indeed consequently been little studied or cared for, in any modern society.

Connected with this reciprocal indulgence of individual diversity, was not only the hospitable reception of all strangers at Athens, which Pericles contrasts with the hostility or jealous expulsion practised at Sparta, but also the many-sided activity, bodily and mental, which in the former, as opposed to that narrow range of thought, exclusive discipline of the body, and nerve-racking preparation for war, which formed the system of the latter. His assertion that Athens was equal to Sparta even in her own solitary excellence—efficiency in the field of battle—is doubtless undeniable. But not the less impressive is her claim of that multitude of concurrent impulses which at the same time agitated and impelled the Athenian mind—the strength of one not implying the weakness of the remainder: the will for all pleasures of art and elegance, and the appetite for intellectual expansion, subsiding in the same bosom with energetic grandeur as well as valour: attendance at religious spectacles, yet never sharing the cheerfulness of obedience even to the hardest calls of patriotic duty: that combination of reason and courage which encountered danger the more willingly from having discussed and calculated it beforehand: keenly, or curious interest, as well as a competence of judgment, in public discussion and public action, common to every citizen

Pericles  
says that  
many-sided  
activity of  
Athens.

rich and poor, and combined with every man's own private industry. No comprehensive plan of money-aided social development, bringing out the capacities for saving and endowments, as well as those for enjoyment, would be sufficiently remarkable, even if we supposed it only existing in the imagination of a philosopher; but it becomes still more so when we recollect that the main features of it at least were drawn from the fellow-citizens of the speaker. It must be taken however as belonging peculiarly to the Athens of Pericles and his contemporaries. It would not have suited either the period of the Persian war fifty years before, or that of Demosthenes seventy years afterwards. At the former period, the art, the letters, and the philosophy, advertised in such pride by Pericles, were as yet backward, with even the ardent energy and democratical character, though very powerful, had not been worked up to the pitch which they afterwards reached; at the latter period, although the intellectual manifestations of Athens without in full or even increased vigour, we shall find the personal enterprise and energetic spirit of her citizens materially elated. As the circumstances, which I have already recounted, go far to explain the previous upward movement, so those which fill the coming chapters, containing the details of the Peloponnesian war, will be found to explain still more completely the declining tendency shortly about to ensue. Athens was brought to the brink of entire ruin, from which it is surprising that she recovered at all, but more surprising that she recovered at the expense of a considerable loss of personal energy in the character of her citizens.

And thus the season at which Pericles delivered his discourse leads to it as a natural and peculiar pathos. It was at a time when Athens was as yet erect and at her meridian. For though her real power was doubtless much diminished compared with the period before the Thirty years' truce, yet the great effluence and waste of art, achieved since then, tended to compensate that loss, insofar as the sense of greatness was concerned; and no one, either at home or among, considered Athens as having at all declined. It was at the commencement of the great struggle with the Peloponnesian confederacy, the ending baricade of which Pericles never dragged either to himself or to his fellow-citizens, though he

Further  
fact.  
interesting  
moment of  
which the  
discourse  
of Pericles  
was delivered.  
Almost  
surely  
at the height  
of her  
power—the  
strongest  
condition  
of her  
power—  
was  
Pericles.



fully counted upon created success. Athens had been already revealed; it was no longer "the unvisited territory," as Euripides had designated it in his tragedy *Medea*,<sup>1</sup> represented there or four months before the march of Archelaus. A picture of Athens in her social glory was well calculated both to rouse the pride and nerve the courage of those individual citizens, who had been compelled once, and would be compelled again and again, to abandon their stately residences and fields for a thin tent or war-tent hole in the city.<sup>2</sup> Such calamities might indeed be foreseen; but there was one still greater calamity which, though actually then impending, could not be foreseen: the terrible pestilence which will be recounted in the coming chapter. The bright colours and tone of cheerful confidence which pervade the discourse of Euripides appear the more striking from being in immediate contrast to the awful description of the disaster—a contrast in which Thucydides was doubtless not unskilful, and which is another circumstance enhancing the interest of the comparison.

<sup>1</sup> Euripides, *Medea*, 66. *Apokryphes* (chapter 7), 26.

<sup>2</sup> The nature of Demetrius Phalereus, leading to think that the number of inhabitants of Athens was so small, and the nature to which they had been subjected, as to be unwilling of so numerous an increase in their numbers, and leading him, with Thucydides, to think a smallness of numbers and a smallness of territory to be desirable. He wrote Thucydides (2.13) a discourse in five books in which he takes account of all of these things, and he concludes that the smallest ground for the Greek was necessary. And though this discourse seems to be devoted with regard to what would be best, and to Demetrius himself to his Roman history, it is not without some relation to Thucydides. The speech of Euripides was a real speech, indeed, representing and describing

up, by Thucydides. It contains very much that the author of the book on the subjects of the ancient history, 2, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, and 20 of Thucydides. Thucydides says there were many other speeches throughout the war which were better of an historical nature, but Thucydides could not have taken any of them, after the style in the right hand of the war, and the only well preserved that most of them would have any comparison with this of Euripides. The first speech of all represents the last of the disaster of his last year of the war. Thucydides, accordingly, will be found to render the speeches and express feelings of the Greek soldiers, including Demetrius, the speech of the Roman, 2, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20.

## CHAPTER XLIX.

FROM THE BEGINNING OF THE SECOND YEAR DOWN  
TO THE END OF THE THIRD YEAR OF THE PELO-  
PONNESIAN WAR.

At the close of one year after the attempted surprise of Plataeæ by the Thebans, the belligerent parties in Greece resumed in an unaltered position as to relative strength. Nothing decisive had been accomplished on either side, either by the invasion of Attica, or by the flying descents noted the coast of Peloponnesus. In spite of material damage inflicted—destruction in the greatest measure upon Attica—no progress was yet made towards the fulfilment of those objects which had induced the Peloponnesians to go to war. Especially the most pressing among all their wishes—the relief of Potidaea—was noway advanced; for the Athenians had not found it necessary to relax the blockade of that city. The result of the first year's operations had thus been to disappoint the hopes of the Corinthians and the other ardent instigators of war, while it justified the anticipations both of Pericles and of Archidamus.

A second devastation of Attica was resolved upon for the commencement of spring; and measures were taken for carrying it all over that territory, since the settled policy of Athens not to hazard a battle with the invaders was now maintained. About the end of March or beginning of April the entire Peloponnesian force (two-thirds from each confederate city as before) was assembled under the command of Archidamus and marched into Attica. This time they carried the work of systematic destruction not merely over the Thebanian plain and the

Second  
devastation of  
Attica, by  
the Peloponnesians  
commencing  
springing  
and continuing  
thence into  
April.

plain immediately near to Athens, as before, but also to the more southerly portions of Attica, down even as far as the ruins of Lamia. They traversed and ravaged both the eastern and the western coast, remaining not less than forty days in the country. They found the territory deserted as before, all the population having retired within the walls.<sup>1</sup>

In regard to this second invasion, Pericles recommended the same defensive policy as he had applied to the first; and apparently the citizens had now come to acquiesce in it, if not willingly, at least with a full conviction of its necessity. But a new visitation had now occurred, diverting their attention from the invaders, though enormously aggravating their sufferings. A few days after Archilochus entered Attica, a pestilence or epidemic sickness broke out unexpectedly at Athens.

It appears that this terrible disaster had been raging for some time throughout the regions round the Mediterranean; having begun, as was believed, in Ethiopia—thence passing into Egypt and Libya, and overrunning a considerable portion of Asia under the Persian government. About sixteen years before, too, there had been a similar calamity in Rome and in various parts of Italy. Recently, it had been felt in Sicily and some other islands of the *Ægean*, yet seemingly not with such intensity as to excite much notice generally in the Grecian world: at length it passed to Athens, and first showed itself in the Piræus. The progress of the disease was as rapid and destructive as its appearance had been sudden; while the extraordinary accumulation of people within the city and long walls, in consequence of the pressure of the invaders in the country, was but too favourable to every form of contagion. Families crowded together in close cabins and places of temporary shelter—throughout a city constructed (like most of those in Greece) with little regard to the conditions of salubrity

*Continued from p. 76.*  
most of the pestilence, or epidemic at Athens.

<sup>1</sup> Thucyd. ii. 25-26.

<sup>2</sup> Thucyd. ii. 26. Diodor. xii. 49; Pausan. Pericles, s. 14. It is to be remarked that the Athenians, through their poverty, and movable property was devoted within the walls, had not Athens in their camp and battle also, but had transported them over to Salamis and the neighbouring islands (Thucyd. ii. 26. Diodor. xii. 49; Pausan.

serious aggravation of their epidemic; for in the harbours of the Adriatic which sheltered Rome under similar circumstances, visited the concentration of great numbers of vessels, along with human beings, operated as a terrible stimulus to the epidemic pestilence, &c. &c. (Thucyd. ii. 26; App. Thuc. s. 10; compare Strabo, *Geograph. Græcæ*, vol. ii. p. 109.



tion with which that action is imbued is deserving particular attention. "In respect to this disaster (the *epid*), let every man, physician, or not, say what he thinks respecting the source from whence it may probably have arisen, and respecting the cause which he deems sufficiently powerful to have produced so great a revolution. But I, leaving myself and the disaster, and having men others suffering under it, will state what at actually was, and will indicate in addition such other matters, as will furnish any man, who lays them to heart, with knowledge and the means of mitigation beforehand, in case the same misfortune should ever again occur."<sup>1</sup> To record past facts, as a lesson for rational provision as regard to the future—the same sentiment which Thompson mentions in his preface,<sup>2</sup> as having animated him to the composition of his history—was at that time a duty as little understood, that we have reason to almost regret the manner in which he performs it in practice, than the distance with which he considers it in theory. We may infer from his language that speculation in his day was active respecting the causes of the plague, according to the vague and fanciful physics, and accounts, stock of associated facts, which was all that could then be obtained. By casting the idea of throwing them out of these loose hypotheses which then appeared plausible to explain everything, he probably renounced the point of view from which most credit and interest would be derivable at the time. But his simple and precise summary of observed facts carries with it an irresistible value, and even a *force* grounds for imagining that he was no stranger to the habits and training of his contemporary, Hippocrates, and the other *Athenians* of Kien.<sup>3</sup>

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Consequently, among others, we predict the presence of four episodes with the general pattern of stress, myocardial infarcts, and illness in Finland, Romania, etc.

U.S. Trade Representative, Department of Commerce, and  
Washington, DC 20503

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These two groups of *Thysanotus* in 1981, one concentrated under stones in 1980.







and was reciprocally appreciated by, these gloomy ideas, propitiate were essential, and supplications with solemn procession were held at the temples, to appease the divine wrath.<sup>1</sup>

When it was found that neither the priest nor the physician could retard the spread, or mitigate the intensity, of the disorder, the Athenians abandoned themselves to despair, and the space within the walls became a scene of desolating misery. Every man attacked with the malady at once lost his courage—a state of depression, itself among the worst features of the war, which made him lie down and die, without any attempt to seek for preservation. And though at first friends and relatives bent their aid to tend the sick with the warm family sympathies, yet so terrible was the number of those attendants who perished, "like sheep," from such contact, that at length no man would thus expose himself; while the most generous spirits, who persisted longest in the discharge of their duty, were carried off in the greatest numbers.<sup>2</sup> The patient was then left to die alone and unaided. Sometimes all the inmates of a house were swept away one after the other, no man being willing to go near it: desertion on the one hand, attendance on the other, both tended to aggravate the calamity. There remained only those who, having had the disorder and recovered, were willing to tend the sufferers. These men formed the single exception to the all-pervading misery of the time; for the disorder seldom attacked any one twice, and when it did, the second attack was never fatal. Those with their own escape, they formed themselves out of the reach of all disease, and were full of compassionate kindness for others whose sufferings were just beginning. It was from them too that the principal attention to the bodies of deceased victims proceeded; for such was the state of misery and sorrow, that even the nearest relatives neglected the sepulchral duties, sacred beyond all others in the eyes of a Greek. Nor is there any circumstance which conveys to us so vivid an idea of the prevalent agony and despair, as when we read in the words of an eye-witness, that the deaths

<sup>1</sup> Compare *Thucyd.* c. 65, who mentions earlier attempts to the Corinthians than bringing in corpses, during the terrible epidemic, with which it was attacked in 430 B.C.; and Livy, xiv. 35, regarding the epidemic at Syracuse which it was brought by Athenians and the Romans.



down was realized—before they became plunged in the widespread misery which they witnessed around, and which affected indifferently the virtuous and the profligate—was all that they looked to enjoy; embracing with avidity the immediate pleasures of sense, as well as such positive gains, however ill-gotten, as could be made the means of procuring them, and throwing aside all thought both of honour or of long-sighted advantage. Life and property being alike ephemeral, there was no hope left but to snatch a moment of enjoyment, before the contracted hand of destiny should fall upon its victims.

The picture of society under the pressure of a murderous epidemic, with its taint of physical torments, wretchedness, and demoralisation, has been drawn by more than one classical author, but by none with more impressive fidelity and consciousness than by Theophrastus,<sup>1</sup> who had no pretensions, nor anything but the reality, to copy from. We may remark that amidst all the miserably unaccomplishments of the time, there are no human mentions, such as those offered up at Oenoe during pestilence to appease the anger of the gods—there are no cruel precautions against contagious authors of the disease, such as those against the Unters (scurriers of doors) in the plague of Milan in 1576.<sup>2</sup>

Three years altogether did this calamity desolate Athens: continuously, during the entire second and third years of the war—after which followed a period of marked abatement for a year and a half: but it then retired again, and lasted for another year, with the same fury as at first. The public loss, ever and above the private misery, which this unexpected enemy inflicted upon Athens was incalculable. Out of 1200 horsemen, all among the rich men of the state, 500 died of the epidemic; besides 4400 hoplites out of the roll actually kept, and a

<sup>1</sup> The description in the sixth book of *Euphorion* described and expanded from Theophrastus—part of the plague at Oenoe is just, with which the Description of *Demetrius* resembles that of *Isidore* in his history of the Plague in London—see all with *Isidore*.

<sup>2</sup> On the plague, see information with other facts observed, amongst numerous religious, at various periods.

made, not only upon husband of virtuous households, young, strong, vigorous, active, and so on, but also upon the aged, the weak, the sick, the poor, &c.

For the facts respecting the plague of Milan and the United, see the interesting work of *Demetrius*—and the historical work of the same author—*Isidore*—both of which are in Italian.

number of the poorer population, so great as to defy computation.<sup>1</sup> No efforts of the Peloponnesians could have done as much to ruin Athens, or to bring the war to a termination such as they desired: and the *Decemviri* told the more in their favour, as it never spread at all into Peloponnesia, though it passed from Athens to some of the more populous islands.<sup>2</sup> The Lacedæmonian army, was withdrawn from Athens somewhat earlier than it would otherwise have been, for fear of taking the contagion.<sup>3</sup>

But it was while the Lacedæmonians were yet at Athens, and during the first badness of the terrible pestilence, that Pericles equipped and conducted from Peloponnesus an armament of 100 triremes and 4000 hoplites to attack the coasts of Peloponnesia. 300 horsemen were also carried in some horse-transports, prepared for the evacuation out of all triremes. To diminish the crowd accumulated in the city was doubtless of beneficial tendency, and perhaps those who went aboard might consider it as a chance of escape to quit an infected home. But unfortunately they carried the infection along with them, which defeated the first not less than the city, and crippled all its efforts. Reinforced by fifty ships of war from Chios and Lesbos, the Athenians first landed near Epidaurum in Peloponnesia, ravaging the territory and making an unsuccessful attempt upon the city. Next they made like incursions on the more easterly portions of the Argolic peninsula—Tricaria, Halieus, and Hermionæ; and lastly attacked and captured Prædæ, on the eastern coast of Laconia. On returning to Athens, the same armament was immediately conducted under Agamemnon and Kleonæras, to press the siege of Potidea, the blockade of which still continued without any visible progress. On arriving there, an attack was made on the walls by battering engines and by the other aggressive methods then practised; but nothing whatever was achieved. In fact, the armament became ineffectual

*Attendants  
removed  
and took  
up their  
quarters  
about, most  
of them  
in the  
city, and  
not  
by the  
epidemic.*

<sup>1</sup> Thucyd. ii. 42. and in other places described, probably. Plutarch relates that there died 70,000 persons by the pestilence and about 100,000 others, which must be greatly exaggerated.

<sup>2</sup> Thucyd. ii. 42. The latter passage is

misunderstood. He does not signify what extent these were confined to, but that chiefly Lesbos, although the fact would have been noticed when the report of that island came.

<sup>3</sup> Thucyd. ii. 42.



for all services effort, from the aggravated character which the disaster here assumed, compounded by the soldiers fresh from Athens even to those who had before been free from that Epidemic. So frightful was the mortality, that out of the 4000 hoplites under Agam, no less than 1000 died in the short space of forty days. The armament was brought back in this distressed condition to Athens, while the reduction of Peidolia was left as before to the slow course of blockade.<sup>1</sup>

On returning from the expedition against Independencia, Pericles found his countrymen almost distracted<sup>2</sup> with their manifold sufferings. Over and above the raging epidemics, they had just gone over Attica and ascertained the devastations committed by the marauders throughout all the territory (except the Munatonican<sup>3</sup> Tetrapolis and Deloson—districts spared, as we are told, through indulgence granted as an ancient legendary sympathy) during their long stay of forty days. The rich had found their comfortable mansions and farms, the poor their modest cottages, in the various lanes, torn down and ruined. Death,<sup>4</sup> sickness, loss of property, and despair of the future now rendered the Athenians angry and intolerable to the last degree. They vented their feelings against Pericles as the cause not merely of the war, but also of all that they were now enduring. Either with or without his consent, they sent envoys to Sparta to open negotiations for peace, but the Spartans turned a deaf ear to the proposition. This new disappointment rendered them still more furious against Pericles, whose long-standing political enemies now doubtless found strong sympathy in their denunciations of his character and policy. That weakness and majestic firmness, which ranked first among his many excellent qualities, was never more imperiously required and never more effectively misapplied.

In his capacity of Strategos or General, Pericles convened a formal assembly of the people, for the purpose of vindicating

<sup>1</sup> Thucyd. II. 46-48.

<sup>2</sup> Thucyd. II. 45. <sup>3</sup> Munatonican, also Munatonican.

<sup>4</sup> Thucyd. III. 47; later on Thucyd. III. 48. <sup>5</sup> Thucyd. III. 47; later on Thucyd. III. 48.

<sup>1</sup> Thucyd. II. 45. <sup>2</sup> Thucyd. III. 47; later on Thucyd. III. 48. <sup>3</sup> Thucyd. III. 47; later on Thucyd. III. 48. <sup>4</sup> Thucyd. III. 47; later on Thucyd. III. 48. <sup>5</sup> Thucyd. III. 47; later on Thucyd. III. 48.

himself publicly against the prevailing sentiment, and recommending perseverance in his line of policy. The speeches made by his opponents, necessarily very bitter, are not given by Thucydides; but that of Pericles himself is not drawn at considerable length, and a reasonable discount is. It strikingly brings into relief both the character of the man and the impress of actual circumstances—an unrepugnant mind conscious not only of right purposes but of just and reasonable anticipations, and bearing up with manliness, or even defiance, against the natural difficulty of the case, heightened by an extreme of insupportable afflictions. He had foreseen,\* while advising the war originally, the probable impotence of his countrymen under its first hardships, but he could not foresee the epidemic by which that impotence had been exaggerated into madness—and he now addressed them not merely with unshaken confidence in his own deliberate convictions, but also in a tone of reproachful remonstrance against their unmerited change of sentiment towards him—looking at the same time to counter that uncontrolled despair which for the moment overlewd both their pride and their patriotism. Far from branding himself before the present sentiment, it is at this time that he sets forth his title to their esteem in the most direct and unqualifying manner, and claims the confidence of that which they had so long accorded, as something belonging to him by acquired right.

The main object, through this discourse, is to fill the minds of his audience with patriotic sympathy for the weal of the entire city, so as to counterbalance the distracting sense of private woe. If the collective city flourishes (he argues, private misfortune may at least be borne; but no amount of private prosperity will avail, if the collective city falls in proportion. Literally true in ancient times and under the circumstances of ancient warfare—though less true at present). "Distracted by domestic calamity, ye are now angry both with me who advised you to go to war, and with yourselves who followed the advice. Ye listened to me, considering me superior to others in judgment, in speech, in patriotism, and in inextinguishable piety."

Attention  
public  
transferring  
and, instead  
of private  
—the last  
type of  
self-interest  
opposes the  
public  
interest.

\* Thucyd. i. 100.

\* Thucyd. i. 90. *αὐτὸς ἴσως νομίζων  
αὐτῷ ἀποκρίσσειν, ὡς αὐτοῦ ἀποκρίσσειν*

*also, perhaps, with others, and therefore  
rather, deliberating so and speaking against  
them.*



—never ought I ever to be excused as culpable, for giving such advice, when on point of that the war was unavoidable, and there would have been still greater danger in shrinking from it. I am the same man, still unchanged; but ye in your confidence cannot stand to the corrections which ye adopted when yet without. Extreme and confession, indeed, are the sorrows which have fallen upon ye; yet whatever as ye do a great city, and brought up in dispositions outside to it, ye must also resolve to bear up against the almost pressure of adversity, and never to surrender your dignity. I have often explained to you that ye have no reason to doubt of eventual success in the war, but I will now remind you, more emphatically than before, and even with a degree of ostentation suitable as a stimulus to your present unalloyed depression, that your saved lives make you masters not only of your allies, but of the entire sea—one-half of the world held for action and employment. Compared with so vast a power as this, the temporary use of your houses of territory is a mere trifle—an ornamental accessory not worth considering; and thus too, if ye preserve your freedom, ye will quickly recover. It was your fathers who first gained the empire, without any of the advantages which ye now enjoy; ye must not disgrace yourselves by losing what they acquired. Delighting as ye all do in the honour and empire enjoyed by the city, ye must not shrink from the toils whereby alone that honour is sustained: moreover ye now fight, not merely for freedom instead of slavery, but for empire against loss of empire, with all the perils arising out of imperial susceptibility. It is not safe for you now to retreat, even if ye choose to do so: for ye hold your empire like a depositum—just perhaps in the original acquisition, but certainly to part with when were acquired. Be not angry with me, whose advice ye followed in going to war, because the enemy have done such damage as might be expected from them: still less on account of this unfeeling disclaimer: I know that this nation are an object of your mutual respect, and

though very unjustly, unless ye will consent to give me credit also for any unexpected good-luck which may come. Our city derives its particular glory from unshaken bearing up against misfortune: her power, her name, her conquests of Greeks over Greeks, are such as have never before been seen: and if we choose to be great, we must take the consequence of that temporary envy and hatred which is the necessary price of permanent renown. Behave ye now in a manner worthy of that glory: display that courage which is essential to protect ye against disgrace at present, as well as to guarantee your honour for the future. Send no further embassy to Sparta, and bear your misfortune without showing symptoms of distress."<sup>1</sup>

The inevitable result, as well as the proud and modest bearing of this discourse, set forth with an eloquence which it was not possible for Thucydides to reproduce—together with the age and character of Pericles—carried the assent of the assembled people; who when on the Pnyx, and engaged according to habit on public matters, would for a moment forget their private sufferings in consideration of the safety and grandeur of Athens. Possibly indeed, those sufferings, though still continuing, might become somewhat alleviated when the invaders quitted Athens, and when it was no longer indispensable for all the population to confine itself within the walls. Accordingly, the assembly resolved that no further propositions should be made for peace, and that the war should be prosecuted with vigour.

But though the public resolution thus adopted showed the ancient habit of deference to the authority of Pericles, the sentiments of individuals taken separately were still those of rage against him<sup>2</sup> as the author of that system which had brought them to so much distress. His political opponents—Kleón, Strabon, or Lakrotas, perhaps all three in conjunction—took care to provide an opportunity for this personal vent to manifest itself in act, by bringing an accusation against him before the dikastery. The accusation is said to have been preferred on the ground of pecuniary malversation, and ended by

Pericles  
affected his  
modesty—  
never  
exhibition  
shows the  
eloquence  
the great  
persuasion.  
him, the  
discontent  
against  
Pericles  
was  
continued.

<sup>1</sup> Thucyd. ii. 61-64. I give a general without setting forth the full contents summary of this remarkable speech, still less the exact words.



Pericles was preaching to his countrymen, in a time almost impossible, the necessity of careful and unshaken devotion to the common country, in the midst of private suffering, he was himself among the greatest of sufferers, and most handsly pressed to set the example of observing his own precepts. The epidemic carried off not merely his two sons (the only two legitimate, Xanthippus and Paralus), but also his sister, several other relatives, and his best and most useful political friends. Amidst this train of domestic calamities, and in the fearful darkness of so many of his dearest friends, he remained master of his grief, and resolutely he bided self-command, until the last catastrophe—the death of his favourite son Paralus, which left his house without any legitimate representatives to maintain the family and the hereditary sacred rites. On this final blow, though he strove to command himself as before, yet at the obsequies of the young man, when it became his duty to give a wreath on the dead bier, his grief became unmanageable, and he burst out, for the first time in his life, into profuse tears and sobs.<sup>1</sup>

In the midst of these several personal trials he received the intimation, through Alcibiades and some other friends, of the renewed confidence of the people towards him, and of his restoration to the office of Strategus. But it was not without difficulty that he was persuaded to present himself again at the public assembly, and resume the direction of affairs. The regret of the people was usually expressed to him for the recent sentence—perhaps indeed the law may have been repealed to him, or some evasion of it contrived, saving the forms of law—in the present emergency of the city; which was in their displayed towards him by the grant of a considerable exemption from a law of his own original promulgation. He had himself, some years before, been the author of that law, whereby the citizenship of Athens was restricted to persons born both of Athenian fathers and Athenian mothers, under which restriction several thousand

was  
reverted  
Strategus—  
reverted to  
power and  
in the  
importance  
of the  
people.

<sup>1</sup> Plutarch, Pericles, c. 26.

<sup>2</sup> See Plutarch, Demosthenes, c. 27, about the manner of burying about

such an epidemic of a pestilence, compare also the letter of St. Basil, to Neophyte, Pigeon, Cyril, Council of Nicaea, Epistol. l. 265.

persons, legitimate on the mother's side, are said to have been disposed of the same way, on occasion of a public distribution of corn. Invidious as it appeared to grant, to Perikles singly, an exemption from a law which had been strictly enforced against so many others, the people were now moved, not less by compassion than by envy, to relieve their own previous severity. Without a legitimate heir, the house of Perikles, one branch of the great Alkmaionid Genæ by his mother's side, would be left deserted, and the continuity of the family sacred rites would be broken—a misfortune painfully felt by every Athenian family, as calculated to wrong all the deceased members and provoke their posthumous displeasure towards the city. Accordingly, permission was granted to Perikles to legitimize, and to inscribe in his own gene and phratry, his natural son by Aspasia, who bore his own name.<sup>1</sup>

It was then that Perikles was reinstated in his post of Strategos as well as in his ascendancy over the public council—seemingly about August or September, 429 B.C. He lived about one year longer, and seems to have maintained his influence as long as his health permitted. Yet we hear nothing of him after this moment, and he fell a victim, not to the violent symptoms of the epidemic, but to a slow and wasting fever,<sup>2</sup> which undermined his strength as well as his capacity. To a friend who came to ask after him when in this disease, Perikles replied by showing a charm or amulet which his female relations had hung about his neck—a proof how low he was reduced, and how completely he had become a passive subject in the hands of others. And according to another anecdote which we read, yet more interesting and equally illustrative of his character, it was during his last moments, when he was lying apparently unconscious and insensible, that the friends around his bed were plying in review the acts of his life, and the nine trophies which he had created at different times for so many victories. He heard what they said, though they fancied that he was just hearing, and inter-

<sup>1</sup> Plutarch, Perikles, c. 35.  
<sup>2</sup> Plutarch (Perikles, c. 35) treats the slow wasting fever which he suffered as one of the forms of the epidemic.

And this we hardly be correct, when we read the very marked character of the fever, as described by Plutarch.

rejoiced them by remarking—"What you prize in my life belongs partly to good fortune, and is, at best, common to me with many other generals. But the peculiarity of which I am most proud, you have not noticed—no Athenian has ever put on mourning through any action of mine."<sup>1</sup>

Such a course of self-gratulation, doubtless more satisfactory to itself at such a moment than any other, illustrates in its way that long-sighted calculation, aversion to distant or ~~obscure~~ hazardous enterprise, and economy of the public force, which marked his entire political career: a career long, beyond all parallel in the history of *dehonest*—where he maintained a great influence, gradually swelling into a declared personal ascendancy, for between sixty and forty years. His character has been presented in very different lights by different authors both ancient and modern, and our materials for writing the balance are not so good as we could wish. But his immense and long-continued supremacy, as well as his unparallelled dispassion, are facts attested not less by his enemies than by his friends—nay, even more forcibly by the former than by the latter. The comic writers, who hated him, and whose trade it was to detect and hunt down every leading political character, exhaust their powers of illustration in setting forth both the one and the other;<sup>2</sup> Thucydides, Xenophon, Kypella, Aristophanes, all honour and all exonerate, speak of him like Olympus, Zens, breathing thunder and lightning; like Minerva and Adonis, as the only speaker on whose bye permission not and who left his ring in the minds of his audience; while Plato the philosopher,<sup>3</sup> who disapproved of his political working and of the moral effects which he produced upon Athens, nevertheless admits his intellectual and domestic ascendancy<sup>4</sup>—his superior intelligence<sup>5</sup>—a language not less decisive than Thucydides. There is another point of eulogy, not less valuable, on which the testimony appears uncontradicted: throughout his long career, amidst the hottest political animosities, the conduct of Pericles towards opponents was always

<sup>1</sup> Plutarch, Pericles, c. 38.

<sup>2</sup> Plutarch, Pericles, c. 3, 5, 12, 19;  
Kypella, *idem*, *Tragedy*, c. 1, p. 205, ed.  
Minerva. *Classical Library*, No. 14.  
Xenophon, *p-TQ* and *Apology* (B. 12,

13; c. 1, 25) speak only in references to  
Pericles.

<sup>3</sup> Plato, *Republic*, c. 7, p. 411;  
Plutarch, c. 38, p. 205. *Apology*, c.  
12, *idem*, *Apology*, c. 12, p. 205.







the opposite qualities—self-judgment, cautious dignity, indifference to immediate popular applause or wrath when set against what was permanently right and useful—as the special characteristics of that great statesman. A distinction might indeed be possible, and Finlarp professes to note such distinction, between the earlier and the later part of his long political career. Parkins began (so that biographer says) by corrupting the people in order to acquire power; but having acquired it, he employed it in an independent and patriotic manner, so that the judgment of Thersiphila, true respecting the later part of his life, would not be applicable to the earlier. This distinction may be to a certain degree well-founded, inasmuch as the power of opposing a bold and successful resistance to temporary aberrations of the public mind necessarily implies an established influence, and one hardly ever to be acquired even by the foremost politicians during his years of commencement. He is at that time necessarily the adjunct of some party or tendency which he finds already in operation, and has to stand forward actively and usefully before he can create for himself a separate personal influence. But while we admit the distinction to this extent, there is nothing to warrant us in restricting the measures of Thersiphila exclusively to the later life of Parkins, or in representing the earlier life as something so tainted except with that exception. Construing fairly what the historian says, he evidently did not so measure the earlier life of Parkins. Rather those political changes which are held by Plato, Aristotle, Plutarch, and others to demonstrate the corrupting effect of Parkins and his tainted ascendancy—such as the limitation of the functions of the *Demagogos*, as well as of the power of the magistrates, the establishment of the numerous and frequent popular discussions with regular pay, and perhaps also the assignment of pay to those who attended the *Ekklesia*, the expenditure for public works, religious singing and ornaments, the *Daktyli* (or distribution of two drach per head to the poorer citizens at various intervals, in order that they might be able to pay for their places in the theatre), taking it as it then stood, did not appear to Thersiphila wickedness and corrupting, as those other writers thought them, or else he did not particularly refer them to Parkins.

Both are true, probably, to some extent. The internal political

changes at Athens, respecting the Anaxagoras and the Socrates, took place when Parksie was a young man, and when he cannot be supposed to have yet acquired the immense personal weight which afterwards belonged to him (Socrates in fact seems in those early days to have been a greater man than Parksie, if we may judge by the fact that he was selected by his political adherents for assassination)—on that day might with greater propriety be ascribed to the party with which Parksie was connected, rather than to that statement himself. But next, we have no reason to presume that Thompson considered these changes as important, or as having deteriorated the Athenian character. All that he draws out of the working of Parksie on the sentiment and action of his countrymen is intensely favorable. He represents the predominance of that statement as moderate, cautious, conservative, and successful; he describes him as uniformly keeping back the people from rash enterprises, and from attempts to extend their empire—on looking his word to the necessity of a war, and maintaining the moral, military, and financial basis of the state in constant condition to stand it—as calculating, with long-sighted wisdom, the conditions on which ultimate success depended. If we follow the elaborate funeral language of Parksie (which Thompson, when he produces it at length, probably considered as fully illustrating the political point of view of that statement), we shall discover a conception of democratic equality as less rational than generous; an anxious care for the recreation and comfort of the citizens, but no disposition to incorporate them from native obligation, either public or private—and last of all, any idea of disengaging with such activity by absolute largeness out of the general resources. The whole picture, drawn by Parksie, of Athens "as the schoolmaster of Greece," implies a predominant development of private industry and commerce, not less than of public citizenship and nobility,—of letters, arts, and narrative traditions of taste.

Though Thompson does not directly express the constitutional changes offered in Athens under Parksie, yet everything which he does say leads us to believe that he accounted the working of that statement, upon the whole, on Athenian power, as well as

Assumption  
accepted  
Parksie of  
having not  
acquired the  
immense  
weight  
that he, and  
not Socrates,  
by Thompson  
states.

an Athenian character, undeniably valuable, and his death an irreparable loss. And we may then appeal to the judgment of an historian who is our best witness in every conceivable respect, as a valid reply to the charge against Pericles of having corrupted the Athenian habits, character, and government. If he spent a large amount of the public treasure upon religious edifice and ornaments, and upon stately works for the city, yet the sum which he left untouched, ready for use at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war, was such as to appear more than sufficient for all purposes of defense, or public safety, or military honor. It cannot be shown of Pericles that he ever modified the greater object to the less—the permanent and substantially valuable to the transitory and showy—natural present possessions to the lust of new, distant, or uncertain conquests. If his advice had been followed in the manner which brought on the defeat of the Athenian Triembles at Eion in Sicily, Athens would have been avoided, and Athens might probably have maintained her supremacy over Megara and Sicily, which would have protected her territory from invasion, and given a new turn to the subsequent history. Pericles is not to be treated as the author of the Athenian character: he found it with its very marked positive characteristics and inequalities, among which those which he chiefly brought out and improved were the best. The lust of expeditions against the Persians, which Ktesias would have pushed into Egypt and Cyrene, he repressed, after it had accomplished all which could be usefully aimed at. The ambition of Athens he moderated rather than encouraged: the democratical movement of Athens he regularized, and worked out into judicial institutions which ranked among the prominent features of Athenian life, and worked, in my judgment, with a very large balance of benefit to the national mind as well as to individual morality, in spite of the many defects in their direct character as tribunals. But that point is where there was the greatest difference between Athens, as Pericles found it and as he left it, is unquestionably the paucity and intellectual development—rhetoric, poetry, arts, philosophical research, and speculative science. To which, if we add great improvement in the cultivation of the Attic and—criticism of the Athenian taste—attainment and laborious maintenance of the



the breaking out of the war, after the conflict of the Cephallenæ at Paxos, and the resolutions of the congress at Sparta, he resisted strenuously all compliance with special demands from Sparta, we must recollect that these were demands essentially insecure, in which partial compliance would have lowered the dignity of Athens without securing peace. The stories about Pericles, Aspasia, and the Mycærians, even if we should grant that there is some truth at the bottom of them, must, according to Thucydides, be looked upon as what is accessories and protests, rather than as real causes, of the war; though modern writers in speaking of Pericles are but too apt to use expressions which tacitly assume these stories to be well-founded.

Seeing then that Pericles did not bring on, and could not have averted, the Peloponnesian war—that he started his course in reference to that event with the long-sighted prudence of one who knew that the safety and the dignity of imperial Athens were essentially imperilled—we have no right to throw upon him the blame of sacrificing the landed proprietors of Attica. These proprietors might indeed be accused for complacency, where they suffered so ruinously. But the impartial Historian, looking at the whole of the case, cannot abate their complacency as a ground for censuring the Athenian measures.

The wisdom of Athens to her allies, the weak point of her position, it was beyond the power of Pericles solemnly to avow; probably also beyond his will, since the idea of political incorporation, as well as that of providing a common and equal confederate bond sustained by effective federal authority, between different cities, was rarely entertained even by the best Greek minds.<sup>1</sup> We hear that he tried to summon at Athens a congress of deputies from all cities of Greece, the allies of Athens included;<sup>2</sup> but the scheme could not be brought to bear, in consequence of the reluctance, among everybody, of the Peloponnesians. Practically, the allies were not badly treated during his administration; and if among the other bad consequences of the prolonged war,

<sup>1</sup> Thucydides II. 125 mentions that proposals to the Congress of the Isthmus under which to join by Congress, Thucydides had refused them to come to the Isthmus all this was single city-governments of Isthmus, and he refused the suit. Leg allies to draw them in connection

Thucydides mentions that he did not make proposals under which to join the Congress of Isthmus. It is certainly said to a person (King Thucydides) himself however the Congress of Isthmus was not held.

<sup>2</sup> Thucydides, Pericles, c. 11.

they as well as Athens and all other Greek cities were to suffer more and more, this depends upon causes with which he is not disengaged, and upon proceedings which departed altogether from his view and other calculations. Taking him altogether, with his powers of thought, speech, and action—his competence civil and military, in the council as well as on the field—his vigorous and cultivated intellect, and his comprehensive ideas of a community in peace and unimpeded development—his incorruptible public morality, justice, and firmness, in a country where all these qualities were rare, and the union of them in the same individual of course much rarer—we shall find him without a parallel throughout the whole course of Grecian history.

Under the great mortality and pressure of sickness at Athens, operations of war naturally languished; while the

expedition, though more active, had but little success. A fleet of 100 triremes, with 1000 hoplites on board, was sent by the Lacedæmonians under Nicias to attack Sphacteria, but accomplished nothing beyond devastation of the open parts of the island, and then returned home. And it was shortly after this, towards the month of September, that the Amphibolians made an attack upon the Amphibolians, were called Argos, situated on the northern coast of the Gulf of Argos, which town, as has been

mentioned in the preceding chapter, had been wrested from them two years before by the Athenians under Phædrus and restored to the Amphibolians and Atheronians. The Amphibolians, as well as the Atheronians, were at the same time seduced by some enemy to the Athenian influence in Atheron, and by desire to regain the lost town of Argos.

Perceiving and from the Chæonians and some other Epirote tribes, they resolved against Argos, and after laying waste the territory, unadvisedly to take the town by assault, but were repulsed and obliged to retire.<sup>1</sup> This expedition appears to have impressed the Athenians with the necessity of a standing force to protect their interests in those parts; so that in the autumn Phædrus was sent with a squadron of twenty triremes to occupy

<sup>1</sup> Thucyd. l. vi.



Melancholic. He was further directed to ensure the collection of the ordinary tribute from Athenian subject-cities, and probably to raise such contingents as he could elsewhere. In the prosecution of this latter duty, he undertook an expedition from the mainland against one of the Elykian towns in the interior, but his attack was repelled with loss, and he himself slain.<sup>1</sup>

An opportunity soon afforded itself to the Athenians of retaking on Sparta for this cruel treatment of the Spartan prisoners. In accordance of the idea projected at the commencement of the war, the Lacedæmonians sent Ariston and two others as envoys to Pausanias, for the purpose of soliciting from the Great King aids of money and troops against Athens: the dissensions among the Greeks thus gradually paving the way for him to regain his ascendancy in the Ægean. Transports of vessels, together with an Argian named Polus without any formed notion being his ally, and the Cretan Ariston, accompanied them. As the war was in the power of Athens, they travelled overland through Thessaly to the Hellespont. Ariston, eager to leave nothing untried for the relief of Potidæa, prevailed upon them to make application to Stababos, king of the Cyprian Thracians. That prince was then in alliance with Athens, and his son Babakos had even received the grant of Athenian citizenship. Yet the envoys thought it possible not only to detach him from the Athenian alliance, but even to elude from him an army to act against the Athenians and relieve the blockade of Potidæa. On being refused, they next applied to him for access across to the banks of the Hellespont, in their way towards Persia. But Leontides and Lamachos, these Athenian residents near the person of Stababos, had influence enough not only to cause rejection of these requests, but also to induce Babakos, in a testimony of and to his new character of Athenian citizen, to assist them in visiting the persons of Ariston and his companions in their journey through Thessaly. Accordingly the whole party were seized and confined as prisoners to Athens, where they were forthwith put to death, without trial or permission to

*Stababos*  
*and* *Polus*  
*were* *sent*  
*by* *the* *Lacedæ-*  
*monians*  
*to* *solicit*  
*from* *the* *Great*  
*King* *aids*  
*of* *money*  
*and* *troops*  
*against* *Athens*  
*by* *the*  
*Athenians*.

<sup>1</sup> Thucyd. ii. 21.





the whole population and the Christianised slaves to retire freely, with a specified sum of money per head, as well as with one garment for each man and two for each woman—so that they found shelter among the Christianised townships in the neighbourhood. These terms were singularly favourable, considering the desperate state of the city, which must very soon have surrendered at discretion. But the hardships even of the army widows, in the cold of winter, were very severe, and they had become thoroughly tired both of the duration and the expense of the siege. The cost to Athens had been not less than 3000 talents; since the assistant force had never been lower than 3000 hoplites during the entire two years of the siege, and for a portion of the time considerably greater—each hoplite receiving two drachmæ per diem. The Athenians at home, when they learnt the terms of the capitulation, were displeased with the grounds for the indulgence shown,—since a little additional patience would have constrained the city to surrender at discretion; in which case the expense would have been partly made good by selling the prisoners as slaves, and Athenian vengeance probably gratified by putting the warriors to death.<sup>1</sup> A body of 3000 talents was sent from Athens to occupy Potidea and its nearest territory.<sup>2</sup>

Two full years had now elapsed since the actual commencement of war by the attack of the Thracians on Plataea. Yet the Peloponnesians had accomplished no part of § 5. 428. what they expected. They had not reconquered Potidea, nor had their veteranised levies, although assisted by the unexpected disaster arising from the epidemic, as yet brought Athens to any sufficient humiliation—though perhaps the ravages which she had sent dicing the long-ago summer with preparations for peace (contrary to the advice of Pericles) may have produced an impression that she could not hold out long. At the same time, the Peloponnesian allies had on their side suffered little damage, since the ravages inflicted by the Athenian fleet on their coast may have been nearly compensated by the booty which their

<sup>1</sup> Thucydides, 2. 131. 30. 32. Thucydides was acquainted by personal experience, the shipsmaster of the Athenian squadron, the commander cannot have been very distant, when

<sup>2</sup> Diodorus, 12. 45.

invading troops gained in Attica. Probably by this time the public opinion in Greece had contracted an antipathy tantamount with the state of war, so that nothing but some decisive loss and humiliation on one side at least, if not on both, would suffice to terminate it. In the third spring, the Peloponnesians did not repeat their annual march into Attica—detained, partly, we may suppose, by fear of the epidemics yet raging there, but still more by the strong desire of the Thebans to take their revenge on Plataea.

To this ill-fated city Archidamus marched forthwith as the head of the confederate army. He sooner had he entered and begun to lay waste the territory than the Persians beside came forth to arrest his hand, and assailed him in the following terms:—"Archidamus, and ye men of Lacadaemon, ye are wrong and in a manner rather worthy of ye and not of your fathers in thus invading the territory of Plataea. For the Lacadaemonian Pausanias, son of Kleombrotos, after he had liberated Greece from the Persians, in conjunction with those Greeks who stood forward to bear their share of the danger, offered asylum to These Hellenes in the marketplace of Plataea; and there, in presence of all the allies, assigned to the Plataeans their own city and territory to hold in full autonomy, so that none should invade them wrongfully or with a view to enslave them: should such invasion occur, the allies present pledged themselves to stand forward with all their force as protectors. While your fathers made to us this grant in consideration of our valour and forwardness in that perilous emergency, ye are now doing the precise contrary: ye are come along with our worst enemies, the Thebans, to enslave us. And we on our side now adjure you, calling to witness the gods who sanctioned that oath, as well as your paternal and our local gods, not to violate the oath by doing wrong to the Platæan territory, but to let us live on in that autonomy which Pausanias guaranteed!"

Whereunto Archidamus replied:—"To speak fairly, men of Plataea, if your conduct shall be in harmony with your words,

Remove yourselves yourselves, as Pericles granted, and help us to liberate those other Greeks, who, after having shared in the same dangers and even the same calamities along with you, have now been enslaved by the Athenians. It is for their liberation and that of the other Greeks that this formidable war has been brought forth. Permitted to your cities, ye might by rights, and we now invite you, to take active part in this object. But if ye cannot act thus, at least remain quiet, consistently to the agreement which we have already sent to you. Enjoy your own territory, and remain neutral—assisting both parties as friends, but neither party for warlike purposes. With this we shall be satisfied."

The reply of Archidamus disclosed by silence a circumstance which the historians had not before directly mentioned: that the Lacedæmonians had sent a formal summons to the Thebans to renounce their alliance with Athens and remain neutral. At what time this took place,<sup>1</sup> we know not, but it marks the peculiar circumstance attending to the story. But the Thebans did not comply with the invitation thus reported. The Lacedæmonians, having returned the instructions into the city, brought back for answer that compliance was impossible, without the consent of the Athenians, since their wives and families were now incarcerated at Athens; besides, if they should profane neutrality, and assist both parties as friends, the Thebans might upon make an attempt to surprise their city. In reply to these excuses, Archidamus again addressed them—"Well, then, hand over your city and houses to us Lacedæmonians, mark out the boundaries of your territory; specify the number of your fruit-trees, and all your other property which admits of being numbered; and then retire whithersoever ye choose, as long as the war continues. As soon as it ceases, we will restore to you all that we have received; in the interim we will hold it in trust, and keep it in cultivation, and pay you such an allowance as shall suffice for your wants."<sup>2</sup>

The proposition now made was so fair and tempting, that the general body of the Thebans were at first inclined to accept it, provided the Athenians would acquiesce. They obtained from

<sup>1</sup>This portion remains in reply quoted by Polybius in account of the daughter of the Theban prince.

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Archidamus a town long enough to enable them to send envoys to Athens. After communication with the Athenian assembly, the envoys returned to Platae bearing the following answer:—  
 "Men of Platae, the Athenians say they have never yet permitted you to be wronged since the alliance first began; nor will they now betray you, but will help you to the best of their power. And they adjure you, by the oaths which your fathers sworn to them, not to depart in any way from the alliance."

This message reached in the houses of the Plataeans the full force of ancient and timeless warning. They resolved to maintain, at all cost, and even to the extremes of ruin, if necessity should require it, their union with Athens. It was indeed impossible that they could do otherwise (considering the position of their town and facilities) without the consent of the Athenians. Though we cannot wonder that the latter refused consent, we may yet remark, that, in their situation, a perfectly generous ally might well have granted it. For the force of Platae counted for little as a portion of the aggregate strength of Athens; nor could the Athenians possibly protect it against the superior land force of enemies. In fact, so hopeless was the attempt, that they never even tried throughout the whole course of the long subsequent conflicts.

The final refusal of the Plataeans was proclaimed to Archidamus by word of mouth from the walls, when it was not thought safe to send out any messenger. As soon as the Spartan prince heard the answer, he prepared for hostile operations,—apparently with very sincere reluctance, situated in the following position strategically pronounced:—

"Ye Gods and Heroes, who hold the Platæan territory, be ye my witnesses, that we have not in the first instance wrongfully—not until these Plataeans have first concerned the oaths binding on all of us—invaded this territory, in which our fathers debated the Persians after prayers to you, and which ye granted as propitiations for Greeks to fight in; nor shall we commit wrong to what we may do further, for we have taken place in under reasonable terms, but without excuse. Be ye now assisting parties: may those who are beginning the wrong receive punishment for it—

The  
Plataeans  
refused to  
abandon and  
quit only  
the last  
communication  
from  
Athens.

Information  
was given  
of Archidamus  
by word of  
mouth from  
the walls of  
the town.

may those who are dying to inflict penalty rightfully obtain their object."

It was thus that Archidamus, in language delivered probably under the walls, and without hearing of the citizens who manned them, endeavored to constitute the gods and heroes of that town which he was about to ruin and depopulate. The whole of this preliminary debate,<sup>1</sup> so strikingly and dramatically set forth by Thucydides, illustrates the respectful reticence with which the Lacedæmonians first brought themselves to assail the sons of the glories of their fathers. What deserves remark is, their direct sentiment attaches itself, not at all to the Platæan people, but only to the Platæan territory. It is purely local, though it becomes partially transferred to the people, as tenants of this spot, by secondary association. We see, indeed, that nothing but the long-standing sympathy of the Thebans induced Archidamus to undertake the enterprise; for the conquest of Platæa was of no great service to the main objects of the war, though the exposed situation of the town caused it to be coveted between the two great contending forces in Greece.

Archidamus now commenced the siege forthwith, in full hope that his numerous army, the entire strength of the Lysagemonian confederacy, would soon capture a place, of no great size, and probably not very well fortified—yet defended by a resolute garrison of 400

Cremonian.  
guard of the  
city of  
Platæa.

native citizens, with eighty Athenians.<sup>2</sup> There was no one else in the town, except 110 female slaves breaching. The fruit-press, cut down in laying waste the cultivated land, suffered to form a strong palisade all round the town, so as completely to enclose the inhabitants. Next, Archidamus, having abundance of timber near at hand in the forests of Kithiron, began to erect a mound against a portion of the town wall, so as to be able to scale it by an inclined plane, and then take the place by assault. Wood, stones, and earth were piled up in a vast heap—over a passage of wood being carried on each side of it, in parallel lines at right angles to the town wall, for the purpose of keeping the loose mass of materials between them together. For seventy days and as many nights did the army labor at this work, without any

<sup>1</sup> Thucyd. ii. 75-76.

<sup>2</sup> Thucyd. ii. 76.

interruptions, taking turns for food and repose; and through such unremitting activity the mound approached near to the height of the town wall. But as it gradually mounted up, the Flat men were not idle on their side: they constructed an additional wall of wood, which they planted on the top of their own town wall, so as to heighten the part in contact with the enemy's mound; sustaining it by backwork behind, for which the neighbouring houses furnished materials. Hides, raw as well as dressed, were suspended in front of it, in order to protect the workmen against missiles, and the woodwork against fire-carrying arrows.<sup>1</sup> And as the besiegers still continued heaping up materials, to reach their mound to the height even of this recent addition, the Flatmen met them by breaking a hole in the lower part of their town wall, and pulling in the earth from the lower portion of the mound, which then fell in at the top, and left a vacant space near the wall. This the besiegers filled up by heaving down quantities of stiff clay rolled up in twisted reeds, which could not be pulled away in the same manner. Again, the Flatmen dug a subterranean passage from the interior of their town to the ground immediately under the mound, and then carried away masses of earth by foundation; so that the besiegers saw their mound continually sinking down, in spite of fresh additions at the top, yet without knowing the reason. Nevertheless it was plain that these stratagems would be in the end ineffectual, and the Flatmen accordingly built a new portion of town wall in the interior, on the slope of a canon, taking its start from the old town wall on each side of the mound. The besiegers were thus deprived of all benefit from the mound, wanting it to be successfully completed; where, when they had marched over it, there stood in front of them a new town wall requiring to be carried on like manner.

Not was this the only method of attack employed. Archibutean  
 Quantities of cotton  
 and tobacco  
 —the  
 besiegers  
 used for so  
 purposes,  
 and was  
 charged to  
 search for  
 materials.  
 further brought up battering engines, one of which  
 greatly shook and endangered the additional height  
 of wall built by the Flatmen against the mound;  
 while others were brought to bear on different portions  
 of the crest of the town wall. Against these new  
 warlike various means of defence were used. The  
 defenders on the walls let down ropes, got hold of

<sup>1</sup> Chap. II. 26.

the head of the approaching engine, and pulled it by main force out of the right line, either upwards or sideways; or they prepared heavy wooden beams on the wall, each attached at both ends by long iron chains to two poles projecting at right angles from the wall, by means of which poles it was raised and held aloft; so that at the proper moment, when the battering machine approached the wall, the chain was suddenly let go, and the beam fell down with great violence directly upon the engine, breaking off its projecting back.<sup>1</sup> However rude these defensive processes may seem, they were found effective against the besiegers, who saw themselves, at the close of three months' unavailing efforts, obliged to renounce the idea of taking the town in any other way than by the process of blockade and famine—a process alike tedious and costly.<sup>2</sup>

Before they would incur so much inconvenience, however, they had recourse to one further stratagem—that of trying to set the town on fire. From the height of their towers they threw down large quantities of ligots, partly into the space between the moated and the newly-built-recent wall—partly, as far as they ran round, into other parts of the city: pitch and other combustibles were next added, and the whole mass set on fire. The conflagration was tremendous, such as had never been before seen: a large portion of the town became unapproachable, and the whole of it narrowly escaped destruction. Nothing could have preserved it, had the wind been rather more favourable. There was indeed a further story of an opportunity to under-storm coming to extinguish the flames, which *Thory-Bille* does not seem to credit.<sup>3</sup> In spite of much partial damage, the town remained still defensible and the spirit of the inhabitants unshaken.

There now remained no other resource except to build a wall of circumvallation round Florna, and wait to the slow process of famine. The task was distributed in suitable fractions among the various confederate cities, and completed about the middle of September, a little before the autumnal equinox.<sup>4</sup> Two distinct

<sup>1</sup> The various expedients, such as those here described, employed both for offence and defence in the present siege, are noticed and discussed in the *Annales Polytechniques*, t. 32, 33.

<sup>2</sup> *Thory-Bille*, B. 38.

<sup>3</sup> *Thory-Bille*, B. 39.

<sup>4</sup> *Thory-Bille*, B. 38, and broadly also *Bellevue*, and *Journal de l'Armée*, &c., &c. At the period of the year when this siege occurred there immediately before another—that is, about the autumn.





by more of the eldest Grecian generals. The Chalkidian hoplites were generally of inferior worth: on the other hand, their cavalry and their peltasts are very good. In the action which now took place under the walls of Spyræia, the Athenian hoplites defeated those of the camp, but their cavalry and their light troops were completely routed by the Chalkidians. These latter, still further strengthened by the arrival of fresh peltasts from Olynthus, ventured even to attack the Athenian hoplites, who thought it prudent to fall back upon the two companies left in reserve to guard the baggage. During this retreat they were harassed by the Chalkidian horse and light-armed, who retired when the Athenians turned upon them, but attacked them on all sides when on their march, and employed missiles so effectively that the retreating hoplites could no longer maintain a steady order, but took to flight and sought refuge at Potæia. Four hundred and thirty hoplites, near one-fourth of the whole force, together with all three generals, perished in this defeat, while the expedition returned in dishonour to Athens.<sup>1</sup>

In the western parts of Greece, the arms of Athens and her allies were more successful. The Amphibolians, transported by their repulse from the Amphibolians Argos, during the preceding year, had been induced to conceive new and larger plans of aggression against both the Argives and Athenians. In concert with their mother-city Corinth, where they obtained warm support, they prevailed upon the Lacedæmonians to take part in a simultaneous attack of Argos, by land as well as by sea, which would prevent the Argives from concentrating their forces in any one point, and would put each of their townships upon an isolated self-defence; so that all of them might be overpowered in succession, and detached, together with Epheboræ and Eubœia (Greece), from the Athenian alliance. The fleet of Thormis at Neopetria, consisting only of twenty triremes, was accounted incompetent to cope with a Peloponnesian fleet such as might be fitted out at Corinth. There was even some hope that the important station at Neopetria might itself be taken, so as to expel the Athenians completely from those parts.

<sup>1</sup> Thucyd. 2. 75.

The scheme of operations now projected was far more comprehensive than anything which she was had yet effected. The land force of the Ambarkots, together with their neighbours and fellow-enemies the Leukothians and Anaktarians, assembled near their own city; while their maritime force was collected at Lenkos, on the Akarnanian coast. The force at Amphipolis was joined, not only by Kalnos, the Leukothesian chief, with 1200 Peloponnesian hoplites, who found means to cross over from Peloponnese, during the vigilance of Phaulos, but also by a numerous body of Epirote and Macedonian auxiliaries, collected even from the distant and northernmost tribes. A thousand Chalcians were present, under the command of Phylaros and Nibanos, two annual chiefs chosen from the royal gene. Neither this tribe, nor the Thesprotians who came along with them, acknowledged any hereditary king. The Malians and Attians, who also joined the force, were under Babylonians, regent on behalf of the young prince Theoppos. There came, besides, the Parnans, from the banks of the river Alos, under their king Orosias, together with 1000 Orestes, a tribe rather Macedonian than Epirot, sent by their king Antiochos. Even King Perikles, though then usually in alliance with Athens, sent 1000 of his Macedonian subjects, who however arrived too late to be of any use.<sup>1</sup> This large and diverse body of Epirote auxiliaries, a new phenomenon in Orestes history, and got together doubtless by the hopes of plunder, proves the extensive relations of the tribes of the interior with the city of Ambarikos—a city destined to become in later days the capital of the Epirote king Pyrrhos.

It had been concerted that the Peloponnesian fleet from Corinth should join that already assembled at Lenkos, and act upon the coast of Akarnania at the same time that the land force marched into that territory. But Kalnos, finding the land force united and ready near Ambarikos, deemed it unnecessary to wait the fleet from Corinth, and marched straight into Akarnania, through Lemnos, a frontier village territory belonging to the Amphilocheian Argos. He divided his

Journalists  
of the  
fact, &c.  
and Epirote  
allies  
of the  
city of  
Ambarikos.

They march  
by land  
to the  
coast  
of Lenkos.

<sup>1</sup> Thucyd. 2. 95.

mark upon Stratus—an interior town, the chief place in Akarmanis—the capture of which would be likely to carry with it the surrender of the rest; especially so the Akarmanians, distracted by the presence of the ships at Lontia, and alarmed by the large body of invaders on their frontier, did not dare to leave their own separate homes, so that Stratus was left altogether to its own defence. Nor was Phormas, though they sent an urgent message to him, in any condition to help them; since he could not leave Naxoskion unguarded, when the large fleet from Corinith was known to be approaching. Under such circumstances, Kaban and his army indulged confident hopes of overpowering Stratus without difficulty. They marched in three divisions: the Epirots in the centre—the Lontadians and Anektians on the right—the Peloponnesians and Androsians, together with Kaban himself, on the left. So little expectation was entertained of resistance, that these three divisions took no pains to keep near, or even in sight of, each other. Both the Greek divisions, indeed, maintained a good order of march, and kept proper scouts on the look-out; but the Epirots advanced without any care or order, especially the Chaonians, who formed the van. These men, accounted the most warlike of all the Epirotic tribes, were so full of conceit and valour, that when they approached near to Stratus, they would not wait to encamp and assault the place conjointly with the Greeks, but marched along with the other Epirots right forward to the town, intending to attack it single-handed, and confident that they should carry it at the first assault before the Greeks came up, so that the entire glory would be theirs. The Stratians watched and jeered by this imprudence. Finding themselves in no want of convenient places, and gathering the Epirots to approach without suspicion near to the gates, they then suddenly rushed out and attacked them, while the troops in ambuscade rose up and assailed them at the same time. The Chaonians who formed the van, thus completely surprised, were mowed with great slaughter; while the other Epirots fled, after but little resistance. So much had they hurried forward in advance of their Greek allies, that neither the right nor the left division was aware of the battle, until the flying barbarians, hotly pursued by the Akarmanians, made it known to them. The two divisions then joined, protected the

Reckless of the Epirots—  
—rushed  
and captured  
it before they

fugitives, and restrained further pursuit—the Spartans declining to come to hand combat with them until the other Athenians should arrive. They seriously annoyed the forces of Epidaurus, however, by distant slanging, in which the Athenians were pre-eminently skilful. Epidaurus did not choose to persist in his attack under such disadvantageous circumstances. As soon as night arrived, so that there was no longer any fear of slingers, he retreated to the river Anapau, a distance of between nine and ten miles. Well aware that the news of the victory would attract other Athenian forces immediately to the aid of Stesias, he took advantage of the arrival of his own Athenian allies from Chikula (the only town in the country which was attached to the Lacedæmonian interest) and sought shelter near their city. From thence his troops departed, and returned to their respective homes.<sup>1</sup>

Meanwhile the Peloponnesian fleet from Corinth, which had been destined to co-operate with Epidaurus off the coast of Akarnania, had found difficulties in its passage after unexpected and insuperable. Mastering thirty-seven triremes of Corinth, Sikyon, and other places, with a body of soldiers on board and with accompanying store-vessels, it departed from the harbour of Corinth and made its way along the northern coast of Achaia. Its commanders, not intending to meddle with Epidaurus and his twenty ships at Naupaktos, never imagined that he would venture to attack a number so greatly superior. The triremes were accordingly fitted out more as transports for numerous soldiers than with any view to naval combat, and with little attention to the choice of skilful crews.<sup>2</sup>

Except in the combat near Euryra, and there only partially, the Peloponnesians had never yet made actual trial of Athenian maritime efficiency, at the point of excellence which it had now reached. Themselves retaining the old unimproved mode of fighting and of working ships at sea, they had no practical idea of the degree to which it had been superseded by Athenian training. Among the Athenians, on the contrary, not only the women

<sup>1</sup> Thucyd. l. ii. c. 27, § 22.

<sup>2</sup> Thucyd. l. ii. c. 28, § 1, 2. Compare the speech of Epidaurus, l. ii. c. 27, § 2, and the application of the words to Akarnanian and Peloponnesian triremes.













against of Kallias and his army from Syracuse, and the defeat of  
 the Peloponnesians sent by Phormion—afford ground for  
 most interesting remarks. The first of the two displays  
 the great inferiority of the Spartans to the Greeks—and  
 even to the less advanced portions of the Greeks—in  
 the qualities of order, discipline, steadiness, and power of co-  
 operation for a joint purpose. Confidence of course with them  
 is exaggerated into childish credence, so that they display even  
 the most trivial precautions either in march or attack ; while the  
 Greek advances on their right and on their left are never so slow  
 as to meet either. II, on land, we thus discover the inherent  
 superiority of Greeks over Spartans lavishly breaking out,  
 as in the sea-fight we are no less impressed with the astonishing  
 superiority of the Athenians over their opponents : a superiority,  
 indeed, nearly inherent, such as that of Greeks over Spartans, but  
 depending in this case on previous training, and intensive talent,  
 on the one side, compared with neglect and old-fashioned  
 routine on the other. Nowhere does the extraordinary value of  
 that seamanship, which the Athenians had been gaining by years  
 of unopposed practice, stand so clearly marked as in these two  
 battles of Phormion. It gradually becomes less conspicuous as we  
 advance in the war, since the Peloponnesians improve, learning  
 seamanship as the Romans under Peter the Great learnt the art  
 of war from the Swedes under Charles XII. ; while the Athenian  
 virtues and their arms seem to become less distinct and effective,  
 even before the terrible disaster at Syracuse, and are hopelessly  
 deteriorated after that catastrophe.

To some did the circumstances of this memorable sea-fight seem  
 as incomprehensible as to the Lacedæmonians. They  
 had heard indeed of the success of Athens, but  
 had never felt it, and could not understand what it  
 meant ; so that they imputed their defeat to nothing  
 but disgraceful cowardice, and sent indignantly orders  
 to Kallias at Kylliss, to take the command, equip a  
 larger and better fleet, and repair the dishonour  
 of Phormion. Three Spartan commissioners—Demades, Timonarchus,  
 and Lykopleon—were sent down to meet him with their advice  
 and warnings in sailing together and congregating from the  
 different allied cities. By this means, under the general resem-

Indignation  
 of the  
 Lacedæmonians  
 at the  
 sea-victory  
 of Athens.  
 They ordered  
 a larger  
 fleet under  
 Kallias to  
 replace  
 Phormion.



Naxos then attended him, and served on land. But he kept on the outside of the Gulf, anxious to fight in a large and open breadth of sea, which was essential to Athenian manoeuvring; while his allies on their side remained on the inside of the Article cape, from the corresponding reason—feeling that to them the narrow sea was advantageous, as making the naval battle like to a land battle, effacing all superiority of nautical skill.<sup>1</sup> If we revert back to the occasion of the battle of Salamis, we find that narrowness of space was at that time accounted the best of all protection for a smaller fleet against a larger. But such had been the complete change of feeling, occasioned by the system of manoeuvring introduced since that period in the Athenian navy, that amplitude of sea-room is now not less coveted by Pericles than dreaded by his enemies. The improved practice of Athens had introduced a revolution in naval warfare.

For six or seven days successively the two fleets were drawn out against each other—Pericles trying to entice the Peloponnesians to the outside of the Gulf, while they on their side did what they could to bring him within it.<sup>2</sup> To him every day's postponement was gain, since it gave him a new chance of his reinforcements arriving: for that very reason, the Peloponnesian commanders were eager to accelerate an action, and at length resorted to a wicked plan for forcing it on.

But in spite of immense numerical superiority, such was the discouragement and resistance prevailing among their ranks—many of whom had been actual victors in the recent defeat—that Ephialtes and Brasidas had to employ emphatic exhortations. They insisted on the favourable prospect before them—pointing out that the late battle had been lost only by mismanagement and imprudence, which would be for the future corrected—and appealing to the illustrious history of the Peloponnesian warfare. They concluded by a hint, that while those who believed well in the coming battle would receive due honours, the laggards would assuredly be punished:<sup>3</sup> a topic rarely touched

<sup>1</sup> Thucyd. 2. 95. 33. compare 23. 24.

<sup>2</sup> Thucyd. 2. 95.

<sup>3</sup> Thucyd. 2. 95. also 23. compare 24. compare 25. compare 26.

comparisons, and was forbidden and almost never used previously. It is the first and generally subversive of the military spirit, of the discipline, confidence and determination which are essential.

upon by various generals in their harangues on the eve of battle, and demonstrating conspicuously the reluctance of many of the Peloponnesian seamen, who had been brought to this second engagement chiefly by the necessity and strenuous entreaties of Sparta. To such reluctance Florence partially alluded, in the encouraging exhortations which he, on his side addressed to his men; for they too, in spite of their belated confidence in sea, strengthened by the recent victory, were daunted by the smallness of their numbers. He reminded them of their long practice and natural conviction of superiority at sea, such as no engagement of numbers, especially with an enemy conscious of his own weakness, could overturn. He called upon them to show their habitual discipline and quick apprehension of orders, and above all to perform their regular movements in perfect silence during the several tactics—useful in all nations of war, and essential to the proper conduct of a sea-fight. The idea of entire silence was based on the Athenian ships while a sea-fight was going on as not only abiding as a statue in the picture, but is also one of the most powerful evidences of the form of self-control and military habits among these citizen-seamen.

The habitual position of the Peloponnesian fleet off Sartonum was within the strait, but nearly fronting the breadth of it—opposite to Phormio, who lay on the outer side of the strait, as well as off the opposite cape; so the Peloponnesian line, therefore, the right wing occupied the north or north-east side towards Phormio. Estima and Brachis now resolved to make a forward movement up the Gulf, as if against that town, which was the main Athenian station. Knowing that Florence would be under the necessity of coming to the defence of this place, they hoped to pin him up and force him to action close under the land, where a chance manœuvring would be attending. Accordingly they commenced this movement early in the morning, sailing in line of four abreast towards the northern coast of the inner Gulf. The right squadron, under the Lacedæmonian Timotheus, was in the van, according to its natural position,

<sup>1</sup> Thucyd. B. II. and he says they signified and might well indicate defeat, &c. he would think that commander doubtful, and therefore why, however, they thought it best. The Peloponnesian could

never do so. Thucyd. in his History Book II. says that the Peloponnesian were "four abreast," and that they were made at Phormio's as an indication of it. But this surely certainly seems true

and care had been taken to place in it twenty of the best-sailing ships, when the success of the plan of action was known beforehand to depend upon their celerity. As they had foreseen, Phormio, the moment he saw their movements, put his men on shipboard, and rowed into the interior of the strait, though with the greatest reluctance; for the Messenians were on land alongside of him, and he knew that Naxos, with their wives and families, and a long circuit of wall,<sup>1</sup> was utterly undefended. He ranged his ships in line of battle ahead, probably his own the leading ship, and sailed close along the land toward Naxos, while the Messenians marching ashore kept near to him.

Both fleets were thus moving in the same direction, and towards the same point—the Athenians closing along shore, the Peloponnesians somewhat farther off.<sup>2</sup> The latter had now got Phormio into the position which they wished, passed up against the land, with no room for tactics. On a sudden the signal was given, and the whole Peloponnesian fleet, being to the left, changed from column into line, and instead of continuing to move along the coast, rowed rapidly with their prows shoreward to come to close quarters with the Athenians. The right squadron of the Peloponnesians, occupying the side toward Naxos, was especially charged with the duty of cutting off the Athenians from all possibility of escaping thither, the best ships having been placed on the right for that important object. As far as the commanders were concerned, the plan of action completely succeeded: the Athenians were caught in a position where resistance was impossible, and had no chance of escape except in flight. But so superior were they in rapid movement even to the best Peloponnesians, that eleven ships, the headmost out of the twenty, just found means to run by,<sup>3</sup> before the right wing of the enemy closed in upon the shore, and made the best of

their escape. Though it is to be remembered that a column four abreast, when formed into line, becomes first deep.

<sup>1</sup> Thucyd. vi. 107.

<sup>2</sup> In reference to the description of this movement, see the Appendix to the present chapter, with the Plan annexed.

<sup>3</sup> Thucyd. vi. 107. How narrow the escape will be noticed by the words of

the historian—the 16 Athenian ships escaped, bringing away in other ships 1000 men, women and old men, and the Peloponnesians.

The Peloponnesians of the Athenian fleet captured 150 of the Athenians in the harbor of Syracuse, and the remainder of the Athenian fleet, 1000 men, escaped the strait, at the Peloponnesians' expense, the fleet of Phormio (Thucyd. vi. 107).

their way to Salamis. The remaining nine ships were caught and driven ashore with serious damage—their crews being partly slain, partly escaping by swimming. The Peloponnesians towed off one trireme with its entire crew, and some others empty. But more than one of them was rescued by the bravery of the Marathonian lighters, who, in spite of their heavy penalty, rushed into the water and got aboard them, fighting from the decks and driving off the enemy even after the rope had been steadily made fast, and the process of towing off had begun.\*

The victory of the Peloponnesians seemed assured. While their left and centre were thus occupied, the twenty <sup>the rem-  
nant of the  
fleet as they  
remained,  
but  
scarcely  
defeated.</sup> ships of their right wing parted company with the rest, in order to pursue the eleven fugitive Athenian ships which they had failed in cutting off. Ten of these got clear away into the harbour of Salamis, and there posted themselves in an attitude of defence near the temple of Apollo, before any of the pursuers could come near; while the eleventh, somewhat less swift, was rescued by the Lacedæmonian admiral, who on board a Lacedæmonian trireme pushed bravely through his comrades, in hopes of overtaking at least this one prey. Thus happened to be rescued a merchant-ship, at the entrance of the harbour of Salamis. The Athenian captain in his flight, observing that the Lacedæmonian pursuer was for the present alone, seized the opportunity for a bold and rapid manoeuvre. He pulled swiftly round the timber-vessel, directed his trireme so as to meet the advancing Lacedæmonian, and drove his bow against her, transverse, with an impact so violent as to shatter her at once. Her commander, the Lacedæmonian admiral Timocleides, was so strong with regard to this unexpected catastrophe, that he gave himself overboard, and fell overboard into the harbour.† The pursuing vessels coming up behind, too, were so startled and dismayed by it, that the men, dropping their oars, held water, and ceased to advance; while some even found themselves half aground, from ignorance of the manœuvres. On the other hand, the ten Athenian triremes in the harbour were beyond measure elated by the incident, so that a single word

\* Compare also the bravery in this part of the Lacedæmonian lighter at Myla (Chap. 36. 34).



from Phœnix refused to put them in active forward motion, and to make them strenuously attack the outnumbered enemy, whose ships, disabled by the heat of pursuit, and having been just suddenly stopped, could not so quickly get again under way, and expected nothing less than reversed attack. First, the Athenians took the twenty pursuing ships on their right wing, next they pursued their advantage against the left and centre, who had probably turned to the right, so that after a short resistance the whole were completely routed, and fled across the Gulf to their original station at Pægonum.<sup>1</sup> Not only did the eleven Athenian ships thus break, destroy, and drive away the entire fleet of the enemy, with the capture of six of the nearest Peloponnesian triremes, but they also rescued those ships of their own which had been driven ashore and taken in the early part of the action. Moreover the Peloponnesian crew sustained a considerable loss both in killed and in prisoners.

Thus in spite not only of the prodigious disparity of numbers, but also of the disastrous blow which the Athenians had sustained at first, Phœnix ended by gaining a complete victory: a victory, in which even the Lacedæmonians were forced to bear testimony, since they were obliged to ask a truce for burying and collecting their dead, while the Athenians on their part picked up the bodies of their own warriors. The defeated party, however, still thought themselves entitled, in token of their success in the early part of the action, to erect a trophy on the River of Asclepi, where they also dedicated the single Athenian trireme which they had been able to carry off. Yet they were so completely demoralized—and further so much in fear of the expected reinforcement from Athens—that they took advantage of the night to retire, and sail into the Gulf

<sup>1</sup> Thucyd. II. 95. It is sufficiently evident that the Athenians destroyed and drove off not only the twenty Peloponnesian ships of the right, as previous fighting had done the left and centre. Otherwise they would not have been able to capture those Athenian ships which had been lost at the beginning of the battle. Thucydides himself does not expressly say that the Peloponnesians fled, and hence he following the right in their pursuit

towards Pægonum. But we may suppose that they probably did so, pursuing remnants of both fleets, so long as they could see the possibility that the victory was gained. They were probably surprised during the confusion without much difficulty, when the enemy ships at the night were broken and driven back upon them—were thus the victorious Athenian triremes were no more than slaves to absolute

to Corinth; all except the Leontidae, who returned to their own home.

Presently the reinforcement arrived, after that untoward detraction which had well-nigh exposed Pharas to his whole fleet to ruin. It confirmed his mastery of the entrance of the Gulf and of the coast of Akarnania, where the Peloponnesians had now no naval force at all. To establish more fully the Athenian influence in Akarnania, he undertook during the course of the summer an expedition, landing at Astakos, and marching into the Akarnanian inland country with 400 Athenian hoplites and 400 Macedonians. Some of the leading men of Skione and Koroia, who were attached to the Peloponnesian interest, he caused to be sent into exile, while a chief named Kynia, of Koroia, who seems to have been *hetaireta* in exile, was re-established in his native town. The great object was to besiege and take the powerful town of Olusos, near the mouth of the Achelous, a town at variance with the other Akarnanians, and attached to the Peloponnesians. But on the great speed of the winter the Achelous rendered this step impracticable. During the winter, Pharas returned to the station at Naupaktos. From thence he departed to Athens towards the end of the winter, carrying home both his prize-ships and much of his prisoners as were freemen. The latter were exchanged man for man against Athenian prisoners in the hands of Sparta.<sup>1</sup>

After abandoning the naval contest at Rhion, and retiring to Corinth, Eklosos and Sasandos were prevailed upon by the Megarians, before the fleet dispersed, to try the bold experiment of a sudden landing upon Pelopon. Such was the confessed superiority of the Athenians at sea, that while they guarded amply the coast of Attika against privateers, they never imagined the possibility of an attack upon their own main harbours. Accordingly, Pelopon was not only unprotected by any class across the entrance, but destitute even of any regular guard-ships manned and ready. The women of the retiring Peloponnesian armament, on reaching Corinth, were immediately disembarked and marched, first across the isthmus, next to Megara—such men

Attacks of Eklosos and Sasandos by the Athenians, before the fleet dispersed, to try the bold experiment of a sudden landing upon Pelopon.

<sup>1</sup> Thucyd. ii. 104, 105.



we shall find it just as negligently washed, and ungrained with such mere hollow and feigning by the Lacandonians, against "Tribulation."

24. During the summer of this year the Americanists had brought down a numerous host of Egyptian tribes to the invasion of Abissinia, in conjunction with the Filoponians, so during the winter the Abissinians struggled not against the Chaldeans of Tharsus from the powerful heretics' power before mentioned, but the ally of the Egyptian Tharsians.

Amidst the numerous tribes between the Danube and the *Alpen* was—who all bore the generic name of *Thracians*, though each had a special name besides—the *Olybrians* were at this time the most warlike and powerful. The Olybrian king, *Trich*, father of *Stallio*, had made use of this power to subdue<sup>1</sup> and render tributary a great number of these different tribes, especially those whose weakness was in the plain rather than in the mountains. His dominion, the largest existing between the Italian sea and the Danube, extended from *Abolis*, on the mouth of the *Prutis* in the *Alpen* sea to the mouth of the Danube in the *Evros*; though it seems that this great but unextended with deductions, since many intervening tribes, especially mountain tribes, did not acknowledge his authority. *Stallio* himself had invaded and conquered some of the *Peonians* tribes who joined the *Thracians* on the west, between the *Adria* and the *Strymon*.<sup>2</sup> *Dandolis*, in the name of the Olybrian king, raised tribute, presents, and military force when required. With the two former, at least, we may conclude that he was amply supplied, since his weapons and armour *Stallio* (under whom the *Peonians* appeared and attacked in numbers) received 400 talents annually in gold and silver in tribute, and the *Evros* in various presents, and also gave many other presents of manufactured articles and ornaments. These latter were from the *Greco*, whence on the east, which constituted numerous supply to the tribute, though in what proportions we are not informed. From *Thracian* cities, not in *Thrace*, and presents to forward their trade direct, as merchants for the *peonians*, the

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plunder, and the slaves acquired by Thracian chiefs or tribes.<sup>1</sup> The residence of the Odyreans properly so called, and of the princes of that tribe now ruling over so many of the remaining tribes, appears to have been about twelve days' journey inland from Byzantium,<sup>2</sup> in the upper regions of the Hebrus and Strymon, south of Mount Haimus, and north-west of Rhodope. The Odyrean chiefs were connected by relationship more or less distant with those of the subordinate tribes, and by marriage even with the Scythian princes north of the Danube: the Scythian prince Ariaspides<sup>3</sup> had married the daughter of the Odyrean Thibis, the first who extended the dominion of his tribe over any considerable portion of Thracia.

The natural state of the Thracian tribes—in the judgment of Herodotus, permanent and interrupted—was that of dissension and incapacity of political association: were such association possible (he says), they would be strong enough to vanquish every other nation—though Thucydides considers them as far inferior to the Scythians. The Odyrean dominion had probably not reached, at the period when Herodotus made his inquiries, the same development which Thucydides describes in the third year of the Peloponnesian war, and which imparted to those tribes a union, partial indeed and temporary, but such as they never reached either before or afterwards. It has been already mentioned that the Odyrean prince Diabolus had taken for his wife (or rather for one of his wives) the sister of Nymphodorus, a Greek of Abdera; by whose mediation he had been made the ally, and his son Calchus even a citizen, of Abdera. He had further been induced to promise that he would reconquer the Chalcidians of Thracia for the benefit of the Athenians;<sup>4</sup> his ancient klansmen, according to the myth of

<sup>1</sup> See Herodotus, *loc. cit.* § 1, 10; 4, 1. Herodotus (2. 10) gives the names of Diabolus as more than 1000 islands commonly. This name is not necessarily different from that which Thucydides gives to be the general receipt of Herodotus's account of Diabolus—namely, *proventus* of islands, and *proventus*, *proventus* of islands, and *proventus*, *proventus* of islands.

<sup>2</sup> Modern *Prova*, on the deltaic mouth of the Propontis, the country there was once still possible to the Ody-

rean King Nymphodorus (Herodotus, *loc. cit.*).

<sup>3</sup> Herodotus 2. 10.

<sup>4</sup> Herodotus 2. 10.

<sup>5</sup> Herodotus, *loc. cit.* § 1, 11; Thucyd. 2. 10; *Antiquities*, 2. 10. Thucydides gives out of his way to indicate that, during the war, a certain number of islands of various kinds applied to the assistance of political parties.

Torres is interpreted by both parties. At the same time, Perdikhas, king of Macedonia, had offended him by refusing to perform a promise made of giving him his sister in marriage—a promise made as consideration for the interference of Skialis and Hymphobolus in procuring for Perdikhas peace with Athens, at a moment when he was much embarrassed by civil dissensions with his brother Philip. The latter prince, ruling in his own name (and seemingly independent of Perdikhas) over a portion of the Macedonians along the upper course of the Aëtos, had been expelled by his more powerful brother, and taken refuge with Skialis. He was now apparently dead, but his son Amyntas recovered from the Olympian prince the promise of restoration. The Athenians, though they had ambassadors resident with Skialis, nevertheless sent Agnon as special envoy to concert arrangements for his march against the Chalkidians, with which an Athenian armament was destined to co-operate. In treating with Skialis, it was necessary to be liberal in presents both to himself and to the subordinate chieftains who held power dependent upon him. Nothing could be accomplished among the Thracian chiefs by the aid of bribes,<sup>1</sup> and the Athenians were much concerned to secure the emperor their own offer

[illegible]

These advanced students of parents and friends will be most benefited by the findings of *Scaphium* and the *Compass* along with the *Therapist* journal. Included in the *Journal* is

[illegible]

The pot found inside the cylinder has a brown surface, like Shinarump and the Farnese is decorated, in what Safford says respecting the before of the younger Cypris (Andrew, p. 9, fig.) and goes after the removal of the Cypris, vol. 10, pp. 10.



men of Philip, reduced some of the fortified places, Gordyia, Akianai, and others, to open their gates without resistance, while Kiskand was taken by storm, and Eudoxos in vain attacked. From hence he passed still farther southward into Lower Macedonia, the kingdom of Perikles, ravaging the territory on both sides of the Axios even to the neighbourhood of the towns Pella and Kyrrina, and apparently down as far south as the mouth of the river and the head of the Thermaic Gulf. Further south than this he did not go, but spread his force over the districts between the left bank of the Axios and the head of the Strymonian Gulf—Myzilaia, Kresina, and Anthemou—while a portion of his army was detached to overrun the territory of the Chalkidians and Bottiaians. The Macedonians under Perikles, ransacking all idea of contesting on foot against an overwhelming host, either fell or shot themselves up in the small number of fortified places which the country presented. The cavalry from Upper Macedonia, indeed, well-armed and excellent, made some valiant and successful charges against the Thracians, lightly armed with javelins, short swords, and the pike or small shield; but it was presently shot in, harried on all sides by superior numbers, and compelled to seek only of retreat and extraction.<sup>1</sup>

Luckily for the monarch of the Oðryian king, his march was not made until the beginning of winter—scarcely about November or December. We may be sure that the Athenians, when they concerted with him, the joint attack upon the Chalkidians, intended that it should be in a better time of the year. Having probably wanted to hear that his army was in action, and waited long in vain, they began to despair of his coming at all, and thought it not worth while to dispatch any force of their own to his aid.<sup>2</sup> Some envoys and presents only were sent as compliments, instead of the co-operating armament. And this disappointment, coupled with the severity of the weather, the sickness of the country, and the privations of his army at that season, induced Philip to turn back and to enter into negotia-

He is known to have been the ally of the Thracians and that of Athens against the king.

<sup>1</sup> Thucyd. ii. 99: Kαταβόη, καταβόη, καταβόη, καταβόη, καταβόη.

<sup>2</sup> Thucyd. ii. 99: ἀνὰ τὴν ἀπορία.

of sending only envoys, and presents, instead of an armament.



them with Perikles; who moreover gained over Brasidas, nephew of the Okeanides prince, by promising his sister; Streptokles as marriage, together with a sum of money, on condition that the Thracians best should be speedily withdrawn. This was accordingly done, after it had been distracted for thirty days over Macedonia, during eight of which days his detachment had ravaged the Chalkidic lands. But the interval had been quite long enough to diffuse terror all around. Such a host of fierce barbarians had never before been brought together, and no one knew in what direction they might be disposed to carry their incursions. The independent Thracian tribes (Paeon, Odomantes, Doli, and Darnes) in the plains on the north-east of the Borystas, and near Mount Pangaea, not far from Anapodis, were the first to feel alarm; but Brasidas should take the opportunity of trying to conquer them. On the other side, the Thracians, Magabes, and other Greeks north of Thermopylae, apprehensive that he would carry his invasion farther south, began to organize means for resisting him. Even the general Peloponnesian confederacy heard with amazement of this new ally whom Athens was bringing into the field, perhaps against them. All such alarms were dissipated, when Brasidas, after remaining thirty days, returned by the way he came, and the formidable evanescence was thus seen to melt away. The faithful Perikles, on this occasion, performed his promise to Brasidas, having drawn upon himself much mischief by violating his previous similar promise to Brasidas!

CHRON. 2. 10.

## APPENDIX.

THEOPH. II. 20. ΟΙ ΔΕ ΠΕΛΟΠΟΝΝΗΣΙΟΙ, ΔΥΟΒΛΗ ΑΙΩΝΙΣ ΑΙ' ΑΘΗΝΑΙΩΝ  
 ΕΝΑΙ ΔΙΕΚΟΜΕΝ ΑΙ ΤΗΣ ΑΙΩΝΗΣ ΑΙ ΚΑΙ ΑΥΤΟΙΣ, ΠΕΛΟΠΟΝΝΗΣΙΟΙΣ ΔΕ ΜΟΝΟΝ ΤΩΝ  
 ΕΠΙΣΤΡΑΤΕΥΟΝΤΩΝ ΑΙΩΝΙΣ, ΔΙΟΥΚΟΝΤΕΣ ΔΕΝ ΕΠΙ ΔΕΛΩΝ, ΔΕΙΟΙ ΜΑΧΙΜΟΙ ΕΥΘΙ-  
 ΜΟΝΟΙ ΤΗΣ ΜΕΤΕ, ΔΕΙΟΙ ΤΗΣ ΔΙΟΥΚΟΝΤΕΣ ΤΗΣ ΔΕΝ ΔΕΙΟΙ ΤΗΣ ΑΙΩΝΗΣ.  
 ΔΕΙΟΙ ΑΙΩΝ ΕΥΘΙΜΟΙ, ΔΕΙΟΙ ΑΙΩΝ ΔΕΙΟΙ ΔΕΙΟΙ ΔΕΙΟΙ ΑΙΩΝ ΕΥΘΙΜΟΙ  
 ΔΕΙΟΙ ΤΗΣ ΔΙΟΥΚΟΝΤΕΣ ΑΙΩΝ, ΔΕΙΟΙ ΑΙΩΝ ΕΥΘΙΜΟΙ ΔΕΙΟΙ ΤΗΣ ΜΑΧΙΜΟΝ  
 ΑΙΩΝ ΔΕΙΟΙ ΑΙΩΝ ΑΙΩΝ ΕΥΘΙΜΟΙ ΤΗΣ ΕΥΘΙΜΟΝ, ΑΙΩΝ ΕΥΘΙΜΟΙ  
 ΑΙΩΝ ΕΥΘΙΜΟΙ ΤΗΣ ΔΙΟΥΚΟΝΤΕΣ ΑΙΩΝ ΑΙΩΝ ΕΥΘΙΜΟΙ ΤΗΣ ΕΥΘΙΜΟΝ  
 ΑΙΩΝ ΕΥΘΙΜΟΙ, ΔΕΙΟΙ ΑΙΩΝ ΑΙΩΝ ΕΥΘΙΜΟΝ.

The above passage forms the basis authority for my description (given above) of the movement of the Peloponnesian fleet, previous to the second battle against Florence. The annotated plan will enable my meaning to be understood.

The main question for consideration here is, What is the meaning of *την διεκόμεν*? Does it mean the head of the Peloponnesians, south of the Gulf, or the head of the Athenians, north of the Gulf? The commentators affirm that it must mean the former. I thought that it might mean the latter: and in my previous edition I adopted several examples of the use of the phrase *διεκόμεν*, tending to justify that opinion.

Finding that on this question of opinion, my opinion is opposed to the best authorities, I no longer insist upon it, nor do I now repeat the explanatory passages. As to the facts, however, my conviction remains unchanged. The head here designated by Theophrastus must be "the head of the Athenians north of the Strait": it cannot be "the head of the Peloponnesians south of the Strait". The previous *διεκόμεν* must therefore be wrong, and ought to be altered into *αίω*, as Mr. Mansfield proposes, or *αίω*.

The Scholiast says that *διεκόμεν* is here equivalent to *αίω*. Dr. Arnold, thoroughly approving the description of Mitford, who states that the Peloponnesian fleet were "moving outward, along the *Διεύς* coast," says: "The Scholiast says that *διεκόμεν* is here used for *αίω*. It would be better to say that it has a mixed signification of

motion towards a place and neighbourhood, to W.; supposing that the Polipommedian sailed towards their own land (i.e. towards Coruth, Sigeon, and Pallat), to which place the greater number of the ships belonged; instead of standing over to the opposite coast belonging to their enemies; and at the same time kept close upon their own land, in the sense of *dei* with a *deivie* verb."

To discuss this interpretation first with reference to the verbal construction. Surely the meaning which the Scholiast puts upon *dei* *ripi* *pi* is one which cannot be admitted without examples to justify it. No two prepositions can be more distinct than the two, *chre* *dei* *ripi* *pi*, and *chre* *enpi* *ripi* *pi*. The Polipommedian fleet, before it made any movement, was already moved close upon its own land—at the headland Ektion, near Paeonias, where its land have stood (Thucyd. ii. 104). In this position, if it moved at all, it must either sail away from the Polipommedian coast or along the Polipommedian coast; and neither of these movements would be expressed by Thucydides under the words *chre* *dei* *ripi* *deivie* *pi*.

To derive this difficulty, while the Scholiast changes the meaning of *dei*, Dr. Arnold changes that of *ripi* *deivie* *pi*; which words, according to him, denote, not the Polipommedian coast as opposed to the northern shore occupied by Phoenia, but Coruth, Sigeon, and Pallat, to which place (he says) the greater number of the ships belonged. But I submit that this is a most altogether unaccountable Greek and Sigeon are as far off, that any allusion to them here is most impudently. Thucydides is describing the operations of two hostile fleets, one occupying the coast northward, the other the coast southward, of the Straits. The own land of the Polipommedians was that northern line of coast which they occupied and on which their land force was encamped: it is distinguished from the enemy's land, on the opposite side of the Straits. If Thucydides had wished to indicate that the Polipommedian fleet sailed in the direction of Coruth and Sigeon, he would hardly have used such words as *chre* *dei* *ripi* *deivie* *pi*.

Professor Doederlein in an article among the *Göttinger Monatshefte* inserted in the third volume of his *Greek and English Lexicon* has criticised my interpretation of this passage of Thucydides. He says: "The Polipommedian fleet must have proceeded along their own coast—*dei* *ripi* *deivie* *pi* *hou* *dei* *enpi* *adivie*. In this passage we find *dei* with two uses: the first with the accusative, the other with the prepositional. The first appears to me to indicate the locality in which they were sailing; and that evidently was the headland on the Achaean coast, namely opposite Heraclea."

The headland in which Mr. Dozier alludes, will be seen on the annexed plan, marked *Draperum*. It is sufficiently near not to be open to the objection which I have urged against Dr. Arnold's hypothesis of *Florida* and *Thryon*. But still I contend that it cannot be indicated by the words as they stand in *Tamoykile*. On Mr. Dozier's interpretation, the *Polipomestians* must have moved from one point of their own land to another point of their own land. Now, if *Tamoykile* had meant to allude thus, he surely would not have used such words as *felony del ryo dwerky yfo*. He would either have specified by name the particular point of land (as he does in *myptokowey del rō Thoy*—or if he had desired to bring to our view that "they proceeded along their own coast," he would have said *wepd* instead of *del*.

Thus far I have been demanding simply the verbal interpretation of *del ryo dwerky yfo*, for the purpose of showing that though these words be admitted to mean the head of the *Polipomestians*, still, in order to reconcile such meaning with the facts, the commentators are obliged to advance suppositions highly improbable, and even to identify *del* with *wepd*. I now turn from the verbal construction to the facts, in order to show that the real movement of the *Polipomestians* that must have been towards the *Akheon* coast and towards *Nagaphtan*. Therefore, since *dwerky* cannot have that meaning, *dwerky* must be an error of the text.

The purpose of the *Polipomestians* in effecting the movement was to make *Florida* believe that they were going to attack *Nagaphtan*; to constrain him to come within the Gulf with a view of protecting that place; and at the same time, if *Florida* did come within the Gulf, to attack him in a narrow space where his ships would have no room for manœuvring. This was what the *Polipomestians* not only intended, but actually accomplished.

Now, I ask how this purpose could be accomplished by a movement along the coast of *Polipomestian* from the headland of *Akheon* to the headland of *Draperum*, which last point the reader will see on the plan annexed? How could such movement induce *Florida* to think that the *Polipomestians* were going to attack *Nagaphtan*, or drive him into alarm for the safety of that place? When arrived at *Draperum*, they would hardly be aware to *Nagaphtan* that they were at *Akheon*; they would still have the whole breadth of the Gulf to cross. Let us, however, suppose that their movement towards *Draperum* did really induce *Florida* to come into the Gulf for the protection of *Nagaphtan*. If they attempted to cross the breadth of the Gulf from *Draperum* towards *Nagaphtan*, they would expose themselves to be attacked by *Florida* midway in the open sea, the

very contingency which he desired, and which they were desirous to avoid.

Again, let us approach the question from another point of view. It is certain, from the description of Thorybelle, that the naval attack of the Polyanannians upon Tharaka, in which they cut off nose out of his twenty ships, took place on the northern coast of the Gulf, at some spot between the landward settlements and Thorybelle's, somewhere near the spot which I have indicated on the annexed plan. The presence of the Kiamiaja soldiers (who had come out from Thorybelle to assist Tharaka, and who waited till the water was the deepest (ships would at that place take beyond a doubt—fit, indeed, any doubt could arise). It is further certain, that when the Polyanannians then wheeled from whence they came to attack Tharaka, they were so near to this northern land, that Tharaka was in the greatest danger of having his whole squadron driven ashore; only eleven out of his twenty ships could escape. The plan will illustrate what is here said.

Now, I ask how these facts are to be reconciled with the supposition that the Polyanannians fleet, on quitting their moorings at Kiamia, started along their own head towards Draganon? If they did so, how did they afterwards get across the Gulf, to the place where the battle was fought? Every point that they moved in the direction of Draganon only tended to widen the breadth of open gulf to be crossed afterwards. With the purpose which they had in view, to move from Kiamia along their own coast in the direction of Draganon, would have been absurd. Supposing, however, that they did so, it could only have been preliminary to a second movement, in another direction, across the Gulf. Out of this second movement, Thorybelle says not one word. All that he tells us about the course of the Polyanannian fleet is contained in this phrase—*halewa lei epe halewa epe hua lei nei ekeawa, hēpe epe hēpepe, hēpe epe hēpepe*. If these words really designate a movement along the northern coast, we must assume, first, that the historian has left unmentioned the second movement across the Gulf, which nevertheless must have followed; next, that the Polyanannians made a first move for an *express* attempt to breach the distance and difficulty of the second.

Considering, therefore, the facts of the case, the locality and the purpose of the Polyanannians, all of which are here clear, I contend that *halewa lei epe halewa epe hua lei nei ekeawa* must denote a movement of the Polyanannian fleet towards the head of the Athrakas, at the northern shore of the Gulf, and that no *halewa* will say have reference, it must be allowed to *halewa* or *halewa*.

It remains to explain *hua lei nei ekeawa*, which has a very

distinct and important meaning. The land of the *Atlantes*, on the northern side of the Strait, comprises the headland of Antiochia, with both the lines of coast, which these terminate and make an angle; that is, one line of coast *fronting* inside towards the *Cerintian Gulf*—the other, *fronting* outside towards the *Gulf of Patras*. The reader who looks at the annexed plan will see this at a glance. Now, when Thucydides says that the Peloponnesians sailed "upon the land of the *Atlantes* towards *fronting* the Gulf," these last words are essential to make an understanding towards which of the two *Atlantes* lines of coast the movement was turned. We learn from the words that the Peloponnesians did not sail towards that outer side of the headland where Florida was moored, but towards the inner side of it, or, the line which conducted to Nauplia.

## CHAPTER I.

FROM THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE FOURTH YEAR  
OF THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR DOWN TO THE RE-  
VOLUNTARY CESSIONS AT KORINTH.

THE second and third years of the war had both been years of great suffering with the Athenians, from the continuance of the epidemic, which did not materially relax until the winter of the third year (A.C. 429—428). It is no wonder that under the pressure of such a calamity their military efforts were exhausted, although the victories of Pausanias had placed their maritime reputation at a higher point than ever. To their miseries, the destructive effects of this epidemic—effects still felt, although the disorder itself was suspended during the fourth year of the war—added material assistance as well as encouragement to persevere. The Peloponnesians, under Archidamus, again repulsed during this year their invasion and ravage of Attica, which had been interrupted during the year preceding. As before, they met with no serious resistance. Entering the country about the beginning of May, they continued the process of devastation until their provisions were exhausted.<sup>1</sup> To this damage the Athenians had probably now accustomed themselves; but they speedily recovered, even while the invaders were in their country, intelligence of an event far more embarrassing and formidable—the revolt of Mytilene and of the greater part of Lesbos.

The revolt, indeed, did not come even upon the Athenians wholly unawares. Yet the idea of a war of longer standing than they suspected, for the Mytilenean oligarchy had prepared it

before the war and had made secret application to Sparta for aid, but without success. Some time after hostilities broke out, they resumed the design, which was warmly promoted by the Eretrians, kinsmen of the Lacedæmonians in *Alolis* lineage and descent. The Megarian leaders appear to have finally determined on revolt during the prevailing autumn or winter. But they thought it prudent to make ample preparations before they declared themselves openly; and moreover they took measures for concentrating three other towns in Læonia,—*Antæa*, *Eræna*, and *Pythia*,—to share their fortunes, to manage their own separate governments, and to become incorporated with Megara. Megara, the inland town in Læonia, situated on the north of the island, was decidedly opposed to them and attached to Athens. The Megarians built new ships,—yet their walls in an improved state of defence,—excited out a mole in order to narrow the entrance of their harbour and render it capable of being closed with a chain,—despatched emissaries to hire Boeotian horsemen and purchase arms in the *Ægeus*,—and took such other measures as were necessary for an effective resistance.

Though the oligarchical character of their government gave them much reason of mystery, and shows all disposed with the view of enslaving the people beforehand, still, measures of such importance could not be taken without provoking attention. Information was sent to the Athenians by various Megarian citizens, partly from private feeling, partly in their capacity of pawns (for example, to ask a modern wood which approaches to the meaning) for Athens—especially by a Megarian named *Democles*, licensed with the government for having disappointed his two sons of marriage with two *æolian* daughters.<sup>1</sup> Not less conspicuous were the standards of *Theseus*, adorned by annual neighbourly journey towards Megara; so that the Athenians

<sup>1</sup> *Antiqu. Politi.* v. l. 2. This had respecting *Democles* been mentioned to make by Aristotle, and there is no doubt, in relation to the truth. But Aristotle states it in connection of a general position, that the private citizens of Megara should be able to make the state of great assistance to the public good. He represents *Democles* and his private interest as

having brought upon himself the punishment of the Athenians and the war with Athens—*καταγορεύει* the sentence, not *καταδίδωμι* order *ἀδικήσαντα*, nothing to do with.

During the account of *Theseus* before us, we are invited to say that this is an historical statement, of his appearance the scene of the war—though the fact in itself may be quite true.

see the  
effect of  
Megara  
and work  
upon of  
Lacedæmon  
Athens.



were thus forwarded both of the intrigues between Mitylene and the Spartans, and of her certain impending revolt unless they immediately intervened.\*

This news seems to have become certain about February or March, 428 B.C. But such was then the dispirited condition of the Athenians—arising from two years' suffering under the epidemic, and no longer comforted by the wholesome remonstrances of Pericles—that they could not at first bring themselves to believe what they were so much obliged to find true. Laches, like Chios, was their ally upon an equal footing, still remaining under those conditions which had been at first proposed to all the members of the confederacy of Delos. Mitylene paid no tribute to Athens: it retained its walls, its large naval force, and its extensive landed possessions on the opposite Asiatic continent: its government was oligarchical, administering all internal affairs without reference to Athens. Its obligations as an ally were, that in case of war it was held bound to furnish armed ships, whether in determinate number or not we do not know. It would undoubtedly be restrained from making war upon Tenos, or any other subject-ally of Athens; and its government or its citizens would probably be held liable to answer before the Athenian dikasteries, in case of any complaint of injury from the government or citizens of Tenos or of any other ally of Athens—these latter being themselves also accountable before the same tribunals under like complaints from Mitylene. That city was thus in practice all but independent, and so extremely powerful that the Athenians, fearful of saying with it in their actual state of depression, were loth to believe the glowing intelligence which reached them. They sent envoys with a friendly message to persuade the Myletians to suspend their proceedings, and it was only when these envoys returned without success that they saw the necessity of stronger measures. Two Myletians themselves, serving as volunteers in the Athenian fleet, were seized, and their arms placed under guard; while Kleopatra, then on the point of starting (along with two colleagues) to conduct a fleet of forty thousand armed Pelopon-

\* Thucyd. ii. 2.

ships, was directed to alter his destination and to proceed forthwith to Mytilene<sup>1</sup>. It was expected that he would reach that town about the time of the approaching festival of Apollo Mæonia, celebrated in its neighbourhood—on which occasion the whole Mitylenæan population was in the habit of going forth to the temple, so that the town, while thus deserted, might easily be surprised and seized by the fleet. In case this calculation should be disappointed, Kleppolis was instructed to require that the Mitylenæans should surrender their ships of war and man their fortifications, and in the event of refusal to attack them immediately.

But the possibility of debate at Athens was far too great to allow such a scheme to succeed. The Mitylenæans had their spies in the city, and the moment the resolution was taken, one of them set off to communicate it at Mytilene. Crossing over to Gætareia in Eubœa, and getting aboard a merchantman on the point of departure, he reached Mytilene with a favourable wind on the third day from Athens; so that when Kleppolis arrived shortly afterwards, he found the festival adjourned and the government prepared for him. The negotiation which he sent in was refused, and the Mitylenæans fleet even came forth from the harbour to meet him, but was beaten back with little difficulty: upon which the Mitylenæans landed, falling themselves attacked before their preparations were completed, and desiring still to gain time, opened negotiations with Kleppolis, and prevailed on him to suspend hostilities until ambassadors could be sent to Athens, protesting that they had no serious intention of revolting. This appears to have been about the middle of May, soon after the Lacedæmonian invasion of Attica.

Kleppolis was, indeed, not very profusely, in admit this proposition, under the impression that his armament was too sufficient to cope with a city and island so powerful. He remained posted off the harbour at the north of Mytilene until the eve of (among whom was included one of the very citizens of Mytilene who had sent to betray the intended revolt, but who had since changed his opinion) should return from Athens.

Kleppolis  
sails to  
Mytilene—  
arriving  
Mytilene—  
surrender  
on an imper-  
ious  
demand.

<sup>1</sup> Thucyd. ii. 2.  
p. 10

Meanwhile the Mitylenæan government, unknown to Klippolis, and well aware that the embassy would prove fruitless, took advantage of the truce to send secret envoys to Sparta imploring immediate aid. And on the arrival of the Lacedæmonian Helon and the Theban Hermondas (who had been despatched to Mitylénæ earlier, but had only come in by stealth since the arrival of Klippolis), a second intense war went along with these, carrying additional envoys to retard the negotiation. These arrivals and despatches were received without the knowledge of the Athenian admiral; chiefly in consequence of the peculiar site of the town, which had originally been placed upon a hill that divided from Lesbos by a narrow channel or straits, and had subsequently been extended across into the main island—like Syracuse and so many other Grecian settlements. It had consequently two harbours, one north, the other south, of the town: Klippolis was anchored off the former, but the latter remained unguarded.<sup>1</sup>

During the absence of the Mitylenæan envoys at Athens, reinforcements reached the Athenian admiral from Lemnos, Lesbos, and some other allies, as well as from the Lesbian towns of Methymna; so that when the envoys returned, as they generally did with an unfavourable reply, war was renewed with increased vigour. The Mitylenæans, having made a general sally with their full military force, gained some advantage in the battle; yet not feeling bold enough to maintain the field, they retreated back behind their walls. The news of their success, when first spread abroad, had created an impression unfavourable to the ability of the Athenian captain. But when it was seen that their conduct was irregular and their achievements disproportionate to their supposed power, a reaction of feeling took place. The Chians and other allies came in with increased zeal, in obedience to the summons of Athens for reinforcements. Klippolis now found his command large enough

<sup>1</sup> Thucyd. ii. 9, 4; compare Strabo, *op. cit.* p. 407, and Ptolemy, *loc. cit.* p. 12-13.

<sup>2</sup> Thucydides speaks of the port at the south of the northern harbour as being called *Idion*, which was also consistently the name of the south

harbour, promontory of Lesbos. We must therefore presume that there were two places so, the old town of Lesbos which bore that name.

The measurement of the two coasts, promontory of Peloponnesus variable called *Argo* bridge.

His vessels  
interve-  
nient, and  
prevent the  
ships from  
going  
thence—  
way of  
evolution  
of the  
ships  
known

to establish two separate camps, markets for provisions, and naval stations, north and south of the town, so as to watch and block up both the harbours at once.<sup>1</sup> But he commanded hills beyond the area of his camp, and was unable to invest the city by land; especially as the Mityliæans had received reinforcements from Antioch, Pyrrha, and Eretria, the other towns of Lesbos which acted with them. They were even collectively strong to march against Mitylæna, in hopes that it would be betrayed to them by a party within. But this expectation was not realised, nor could they do more than strengthen the fortifications, and confirm the Mityliæan supremacy, in the other three subordinate towns; in such manner that the Mithrænæans, who soon afterwards attacked Antioch, were repulsed with considerable loss. In this undisturbed condition the island continued, until somewhere about the month of August, B.C. 428] the Athenians sent Pericles to take the command, with a reinforcement of 1000 hoplites, who joined themselves to their in triremes. The Athenians were now in force enough not only to keep the Mityliæans within their walls, but also to surround the city with a single wall of circumvallation, strengthened by separate forts in suitable positions. By the beginning of October Mitylæa was thus completely blockaded, by land as well as by sea.<sup>2</sup>

Meanwhile the Mityliæan embassy, after a troublesome voyage, had reached Sparta a little before the Olympic festival, about the middle of June. The Spartans directed them to come to Olympia at the festival, where all the members of the Peloponnesian confederacy would naturally be present, and there to set forth their requests, after the festival was concluded, in presence of all.<sup>3</sup>

Thucydides has given us, at some length, his version of the speech wherewith this was done—a speech not a little remarkable. Prepared, as it was, by men who had just received from Athens, having the strongest interest to rouse indignation against her as well as sympathy for themselves—and before an audience exclusively composed of the members of Athens, all willing to hear, and none present to refuse, the hottest calumnies against her—we should have expected a confident strain

The Mityliæan embassy addressing themselves to the Spartans at the Olympic festival, in 428 B.C.

<sup>1</sup> *Thucyd.* ii. 1.

<sup>2</sup> *Thucyd.* ii. 16.

<sup>3</sup> *Thucyd.* ii. 2.





parties to a war for the sake of maintaining an empire essentially offensive to Greek political instincts.

In both these two reasons there is force; and both touch the same point of the Athenian empire. That empire undoubtedly contradicted one of the fundamental instincts of the Greek mind—the right of every separate town to administer its own political affairs apart from external control. The Peloponnesian alliance recognised this autonomy in theory, by the general agreed and equal voting of all the members at Sparta, on important occasions; though it was quite true<sup>1</sup> (as Pericles argued at Athens) that in practice nothing more was enjoyed than an autonomy confined by Spartan leading-strings—and though Sparta held in permanent custody hostages for the fidelity of her Athenian allies, summoning their military contingents without consulting them whether they were destined to march. But Athens proclaimed herself a despot, offering the autonomy of her allies not less in theory than in practice. Far from being disposed to cultivate in them any sense of a real common interest with herself, she did not even share them with those forms and fictions which so often appease discontent in the absence of reality. Doubtless the nature of her empire, at once widely extended, maritime, and unconnected (or only partially connected) with kindred of race, rendered the forms of periodical deliberation difficult to keep up; at the same time that it gave to her, as naval chief, an ascendancy much more despotic than could have been exercised by any chief on land. It is doubtful whether she could have overcome—*it is certain that she did not try to overcome*—these political difficulties; so that her empire stood condemned as a despotism, opposed to the political instinct of the Greek mind; and the revolts against it, like that of Mitylene,—in so far as they represented a genuine feeling, and were not merely movements of an oligarchical party against their own democracy,—were revolts of this offended instinct, much more than consequences of actual oppression. The Mitylenians might certainly affirm that they had no security against being one day reduced to the common

<sup>1</sup> Thucyd. i. 121. and four passages in the *Logoi* containing the speech before the citizens, pp. 121, 122, 123, 124. See also the *Logos* of Pericles, pp. 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 131, 132, 133, 134, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139, 140, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148, 149, 150, 151, 152, 153, 154, 155, 156, 157, 158, 159, 160, 161, 162, 163, 164, 165, 166, 167, 168, 169, 170, 171, 172, 173, 174, 175, 176, 177, 178, 179, 180, 181, 182, 183, 184, 185, 186, 187, 188, 189, 190, 191, 192, 193, 194, 195, 196, 197, 198, 199, 200, 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215, 216, 217, 218, 219, 220, 221, 222, 223, 224, 225, 226, 227, 228, 229, 230, 231, 232, 233, 234, 235, 236, 237, 238, 239, 240, 241, 242, 243, 244, 245, 246, 247, 248, 249, 250, 251, 252, 253, 254, 255, 256, 257, 258, 259, 260, 261, 262, 263, 264, 265, 266, 267, 268, 269, 270, 271, 272, 273, 274, 275, 276, 277, 278, 279, 280, 281, 282, 283, 284, 285, 286, 287, 288, 289, 290, 291, 292, 293, 294, 295, 296, 297, 298, 299, 300, 301, 302, 303, 304, 305, 306, 307, 308, 309, 310, 311, 312, 313, 314, 315, 316, 317, 318, 319, 320, 321, 322, 323, 324, 325, 326, 327, 328, 329, 330, 331, 332, 333, 334, 335, 336, 337, 338, 339, 340, 341, 342, 343, 344, 345, 346, 347, 348, 349, 350, 351, 352, 353, 354, 355, 356, 357, 358, 359, 360, 361, 362, 363, 364, 365, 366, 367, 368, 369, 370, 371, 372, 373, 374, 375, 376, 377, 378, 379, 380, 381, 382, 383, 384, 385, 386, 387, 388, 389, 390, 391, 392, 393, 394, 395, 396, 397, 398, 399, 400, 401, 402, 403, 404, 405, 406, 407, 408, 409, 410, 411, 412, 413, 414, 415, 416, 417, 418, 419, 420, 421, 422, 423, 424, 425, 426, 427, 428, 429, 430, 431, 432, 433, 434, 435, 436, 437, 438, 439, 440, 441, 442, 443, 444, 445, 446, 447, 448, 449, 450, 451, 452, 453, 454, 455, 456, 457, 458, 459, 460, 461, 462, 463, 464, 465, 466, 467, 468, 469, 470, 471, 472, 473, 474, 475, 476, 477, 478, 479, 480, 481, 482, 483, 484, 485, 486, 487, 488, 489, 490, 491, 492, 493, 494, 495, 496, 497, 498, 499, 500, 501, 502, 503, 504, 505, 506, 507, 508, 509, 510, 511, 512, 513, 514, 515, 516, 517, 518, 519, 520, 521, 522, 523, 524, 525, 526, 527, 528, 529, 530, 531, 532, 533, 534, 535, 536, 537, 538, 539, 540, 541, 542, 543, 544, 545, 546, 547, 548, 549, 550, 551, 552, 553, 554, 555, 556, 557, 558, 559, 560, 561, 562, 563, 564, 565, 566, 567, 568, 569, 570, 571, 572, 573, 574, 575, 576, 577, 578, 579, 580, 581, 582, 583, 584, 585, 586, 587, 588, 589, 590, 591, 592, 593, 594, 595, 596, 597, 598, 599, 600, 601, 602, 603, 604, 605, 606, 607, 608, 609, 610, 611, 612, 613, 614, 615, 616, 617, 618, 619, 620, 621, 622, 623, 624, 625, 626, 627, 628, 629, 630, 631, 632, 633, 634, 635, 636, 637, 638, 639, 640, 641, 642, 643, 644, 645, 646, 647, 648, 649, 650, 651, 652, 653, 654, 655, 656, 657, 658, 659, 660, 661, 662, 663, 664, 665, 666, 667, 668, 669, 670, 671, 672, 673, 674, 675, 676, 677, 678, 679, 680, 681, 682, 683, 684, 685, 686, 687, 688, 689, 690, 691, 692, 693, 694, 695, 696, 697, 698, 699, 700, 701, 702, 703, 704, 705, 706, 707, 708, 709, 710, 711, 712, 713, 714, 715, 716, 717, 718, 719, 720, 721, 722, 723, 724, 725, 726, 727, 728, 729, 730, 731, 732, 733, 734, 735, 736, 737, 738, 739, 740, 741, 742, 743, 744, 745, 746, 747, 748, 749, 750, 751, 752, 753, 754, 755, 756, 757, 758, 759, 760, 761, 762, 763, 764, 765, 766, 767, 768, 769, 770, 771, 772, 773, 774, 775, 776, 777, 778, 779, 780, 781, 782, 783, 784, 785, 786, 787, 788, 789, 790, 791, 792, 793, 794, 795, 796, 797, 798, 799, 800, 801, 802, 803, 804, 805, 806, 807, 808, 809, 810, 811, 812, 813, 814, 815, 816, 817, 818, 819, 820, 821, 822, 823, 824, 825, 826, 827, 828, 829, 830, 831, 832, 833, 834, 835, 836, 837, 838, 839, 840, 841, 842, 843, 844, 845, 846, 847, 848, 849, 850, 851, 852, 853, 854, 855, 856, 857, 858, 859, 860, 861, 862, 863, 864, 865, 866, 867, 868, 869, 870, 871, 872, 873, 874, 875, 876, 877, 878, 879, 880, 881, 882, 883, 884, 885, 886, 887, 888, 889, 890, 891, 892, 893, 894, 895, 896, 897, 898, 899, 900, 901, 902, 903, 904, 905, 906, 907, 908, 909, 910, 911, 912, 913, 914, 915, 916, 917, 918, 919, 920, 921, 922, 923, 924, 925, 926, 927, 928, 929, 930, 931, 932, 933, 934, 935, 936, 937, 938, 939, 940, 941, 942, 943, 944, 945, 946, 947, 948, 949, 950, 951, 952, 953, 954, 955, 956, 957, 958, 959, 960, 961, 962, 963, 964, 965, 966, 967, 968, 969, 970, 971, 972, 973, 974, 975, 976, 977, 978, 979, 980, 981, 982, 983, 984, 985, 986, 987, 988, 989, 990, 991, 992, 993, 994, 995, 996, 997, 998, 999, 1000.

de Pericles.

About the hostages detained by Sparta for the fidelity of her allies, see Thucyd. i. 124, 125.

condition of subject-allies like the rest. Yet an Athenian speaker, had he been here present, might have made no mean reply to this portion of their reasoning. He would have urged that had Athens felt any disposition towards such a scheme, she would have taken advantage of the Fourteen years' truce to execute it; and he would have shown that the depredation of the allies by Athens, and the change in her position from president to despot, had been far less intentional and systematic than the depredations which the Lacedæmonians would offer.

To the Peloponnesian suitors, however, the speech of the latter proved completely satisfactory. The Læstians were declared members of the Peloponnesian alliance, and a second attack upon Athens was deemed. The Lacedæmonians, foremost in the movement, summoned contingents from their various allies, and were easily in arriving with their own at the Isthmus. They then began to prepare carriages or triremes, for dragging across the Isthmus the triremes which had fought against Phœnix, from the harbour of Læstium into the Saronic Gulf, in order to employ them against Athens. But the remaining allies did not answer to the summons, remaining at home occupied with their harvest; while the Lacedæmonians, sufficiently disappointed with this languor and disobedience, were still further incensed by the unexpected presence of 100 Athenian triremes off the coast of the Isthmus.

The Peloponnesians promise to support the Læstians—  
The Læstians are the allies of the Athenians.

The Athenians, though their own presence at the Olympic festival was forbidden by the war, had doubtless learned more or less thoroughly the proceedings which had taken place there respecting Maythet. Perceiving the general belief entertained of their depressed and helpless condition, they determined to counteract this by urgent and instant effort. They accordingly manned forthwith 100 triremes, requiring the personal service of all men, citizens as well as slaves, and employing only the two richest classes of the Solonian census—*i.e.*, the Pentekomedonians, and the Hippekai or Horsemen. With this prodigious fleet they made a demonstration along the Isthmus in view of the Lacedæmonians, and landed in various parts of the Peloponnesian coast to inflict damage. At the same time, thirty other Athenian triremes, despatched some time previously to



Akarnans under Asopos, son of Phoenix, landed at different springs in Locris for the same purpose. This move reached the Locrians at the helms, while the other great Akarnan fleet was passing before their eyes.<sup>1</sup> Anxious at to unexpected a demonstration of strength, they began to feel how much they had been misled respecting the situation of Athens, and how incompetent they were, especially without the presence of their allies, to undertake any joint effective movement by sea and land against Athens. They, therefore, returned home, resolving to send an expedition of forty triremes, under Alkidas, to the relief of Megara itself—and the same time transmitting requisitions to their various allies, in order that these triremes might be furnished.<sup>2</sup>

Meanwhile Asopos, with his thirty triremes, had arrived in Akarnania, from whence all the ships except twelve  
*Asopos, son of Phoenix*  
*—his ship*  
*—his*  
*—his*  
 returned home. He had been appointed commander as the son of Phoenix, who appears either to have died, or to have become unfit for service, since his victories of the preceding year. The Akarnanians had preferred a special request that a son, or at least some relative, of Phoenix, should be invested with the command of the squadron, so beloved was his name and character among them. Asopos, however, accomplished nothing of importance, though he again undertook, originally with the Akarnanians, a fruitless march against Chalcis. Ultimately he was defeated and slain, in attempting a disembarkation on the territory of Lokhai.<sup>3</sup>

The singular announcement made by the Megarians at Olympia, that Athens was rendered helpless by the epidemic, had, indeed, been strikingly contradicted by her recent display; none, taking numbers and equipment together, the numbers from which she had put forth this summer, regarded as it was by a higher class of men, surpassed all former years, although, as point of number only, it was inferior to the 180 triremes which she had sent out during the first summer of the war.<sup>4</sup> But she

<sup>1</sup> Thucyd. II. 2-10.

<sup>2</sup> Thucyd. II. 26, 28.

<sup>3</sup> Thucyd. II. 2.

<sup>4</sup> Thucyd. II. 27. and especially compare  
 sailing, to all that before, to such extent

was the other ships, which, before, before  
 epidemic, was before 20 and the sailing  
 equipment and soldiers. The 20 ships were  
 only and before the epidemic, before  
 epidemic, the 20 ships before the epidemic  
 was before the epidemic, the 20 ships



the neighbourhood, and slain with a considerable number of his men.<sup>1</sup>

While the Athenians thus held Mitylene under siege, their  
 British friends the Platæans had remained closely  
 blockaded by the Peloponnesians and Boeotians for  
 more than a year, without any possibility of relief.  
 At length provisions began to fail, and the general  
 Diopompides, backed by the prophet Theocritus (these  
 prophets<sup>2</sup> were often among the wisest soldiers in the army),  
 persuaded the garrison to adopt the daring, but seemingly  
 desperate, resolution of breaking out over the blockading wall  
 and in spite of its guards. So desperate, indeed, did the project  
 seem, that at the moment of execution one-half of the garrison  
 shrank from it as equivalent to certain death; the other half,  
 about 110 in number, persisted and escaped. Happy would it  
 have been for the remainder had they even perished in the  
 attempt, and thus forestalled the more melancholy fate in store  
 for them.

It has been already stated that the circumvallation of Platæa  
 was accomplished by a double wall and a double ditch,  
 one ditch without the enclosing walls, another between  
 them and the town; the two walls being sixteen feet  
 apart, joined together, and rounded all round, so as to  
 look like one thick wall, and to afford several quarters  
 for the besiegers. Both the outer and inner circumferences were  
 furnished with battlements, and after every ten battlements came  
 a round tower, covering the whole breadth of the double wall—  
 allowing a free passage inside, but none outside. In general, the  
 entire circuit of the round wall was kept under watch night and  
 day; but on wet nights the besiegers had so far relaxed their  
 vigilance as to retire under cover of the towers, leaving the  
 intermediate spaces unguarded; and it was upon this extension  
 that the plan of escape was founded. The Platæans prepared  
 ladders of a proper height to scale the blockading double wall,  
 ascertaining its height by repeatedly counting the ranges of  
 bricks, which were close enough for them to discern, and not  
 effectually covered with watchmen. On a cold and dark

<sup>1</sup> Thucyd. ii. 38.

<sup>2</sup> Thucyd. ii. 38. Diopompides was.

Plato, Hæc. ii. 4. 12; Plutarch, ii.

10; Plutarch, Agesilaus, 2. 30.

December night, amidst rain, sleet, and a roaring wind, they marched forth from the gate, lightly armed, some few with shields and spears, but most of them with breastplates, javelins, and bows and arrows. The right foot was raised, but the left foot shak, so as to give to it a more assured footing on the muddy ground. Taking care to rally out with the wind in their face and at such a distance from each other as to prevent any clashing of arms, they crossed the inner ditch and reached the foot of the wall without being discovered. The ladders, borne in the van, were immediately planted, and Amosus son of Eorobion, followed by eleven officers armed only with a short sword and breastplate, mounted the wall; others armed with spears followed him, their shields being carried and handed to them when on the top by comrades behind. It was the duty of this first company to master and maintain the two towers right and left, so as to keep the intermediate space free for passing over. This was successfully done, the guards in both towers being surprised and slain, without alarming the remaining besiegers. Many of the Plataneas had already reached the top of the wall, when the noise of a tile accidentally knocked down by one of them betrayed what was passing. Immediately a general alarm was raised, alarm was given, and the awakened garrison rushed up from beneath to the top of the wall, yet not knowing where the enemy was to be found; a perplexity further increased by the Plataneas in the town, who took this opportunity of making a false attack on the opposite side. Amidst such confusion and darkness, the blockading detachment could not tell where to direct their blows, and all remained at their posts, except a corps of 300 men, kept constantly in readiness for special emergencies, who marched out and patrolled the outside of the ditch to intercept any fugitives from within. At the same time, fire-signals were raised to warn their allies at Thion. But here

<sup>1</sup>Ulrich, III. 35. Dr. Arnold, in his letter, mentions this passage as if the right of June 1791 were the last likely to slip in the road, and the left of sleet foot the most likely. The statement will, however, maintain its opposite opinion, which is certainly the more correct sense of the text, though the sense of Dr.

Arnold would also be inadmissible. The natural fact is very likely to slip in the road, and especially to be covered by rain, by mistake or error, particularly adapted to that purpose. Hence, the sense is, that the passage was to be made by the right, and the left of sleet foot likely to be covered.



enabled them to take tolerable rest, while the Peloponnesians on their side could not distinguish their enemies in the dark, and had no previous knowledge of their position. They were then held in check until the rusest Peloponnesians had ascertained the direction of the passage; after which the whole body stole off as speedily as they could, taking at first the road towards Thbes, while their pursuers were men, with their torch-lights following the opposite direction, on the road which led by the heights called Dryas-Kephala to Athens. After having marched about three-quarters of a mile on the road to Thbes (leaving the chapel of the Hero Androkrotis on their right hand), the fugitives quitted it, and striking to the eastward towards Erythra and Hyria, soon found themselves in safety among the mountains which separate Eretria from Attica at that point: from whence they passed into the glad harbour and refuge of Athens.<sup>1</sup>

Two hundred and twelve brave men thus emerged to life and liberty, breaking loose from that impending fate which too soon overtook the remainder, and preserving for future times the genuine brave and honourable traditions of Plataea. One man alone was taken prisoner at the brink of the outer ditch, while a few, who had enrolled themselves originally for the enterprise, lost courage and returned in despair even from the foot of the inner wall, telling their comrades within that the whole had been perished. Accordingly, at daybreak, the Peloponnesians within sent out a herald to solicit a truce for burial of the dead bodies, and it was only by the narrow odds in this request that they bought the actual truce. The description of this memorable outbreak will not lose during its transmission then still and downright in the design, and is the more interesting, inasmuch as the men who thus worked out their salvation were precisely the bravest men, who best deserved it.

Meanwhile Pelids and the Athenians kept Mitylene closely blockaded up: the provisions were nearly exhausted, and the beleagued were already beginning to think of capitulation, when their spirits were raised by the arrival of the Lacedaemonians under Gylissius, who had landed at Pyrrha on the west of Lesbos, and undertook to stand on through a ravine which obstructed

<sup>1</sup> Thucyd. iii. 92. *Thalassia* (ed. 18) gives a brief account of these facts, without adding anything as to the cause.

the continuity of the blockading wall (about February, 427 B.C.).

He encouraged the Mitylenæans to hold out, assuring them that a Peloponnesian fleet under Alcidas was on the point of setting out to assist them, and that Athens would be forthwith invaded by the general Peloponnesian army. His own arrival, also, and his stay in the town, was in itself no small encouragement: we shall see hereafter, when we come to the siege of Syracuse by the Athenians, how much might depend upon the presence of one single Spartan. All thought of surrender was accordingly abandoned, and the Mitylenæans reacted with impetuosity at the arrival of Alcidas, who started from Peloponnesus at the beginning of April, with forty-two triremes; while the Lacedæmonian army at the same time invaded Attica, in order to keep the attention of Athens fully employed. Their ravages on this occasion were more diligent, searching, and destructive to the country than before, and were continued the longer because they awaited the arrival of news from Laconia. But no news reached them, their stock of provisions was exhausted, and the army was obliged to break up.<sup>1</sup>

The tidings which at length arrived proved very unsatisfactory.

Salonax and the Mitylenæans had held out until their provisions were completely exhausted, but neither relief nor encouragement reached them from Peloponnesus. At length even Salonax became convinced that no relief would come; he projected, therefore, as a last hope, a desperate attack upon the Athenians and their wall of blockade. For the purpose he distributed full panoplies among the men of the people, or commons, who had hitherto been without them, having as been nothing more than bows or javelins.<sup>2</sup>

But he had not sufficiently calculated the consequences of this important step. The Mitylenæan multitude, living under an oligarchical government, had no interest in the present contest, which had been under-

<sup>1</sup> Thucyd. iii. 92, 93.

<sup>2</sup> Thucyd. iii. 92. Alcidas, and about 50 triremes, were sent with

Alcidas, the Spartan, with some 40 triremes, to assist the Mitylenæans.

taken without any appeal to their opinion. They had no reason for aversion to Athens, seeing that they suffered no practical grievance from the Athenian alliance; and (to repeat what has been remarked in the early portion of this volume) we find that even among the subject cities (to say nothing of a privileged city like Mitylene), the bulk of the citizens were never forward, sometimes positively reluctant, to revolt. The Mitylean oligarchy had revolted, in spite of the absence of practical wrongs, because they desired an uncontrolled town-autonomy as well as security for its continuance. But this was a feeling to which the people were naturally strangers, having no share in the government of their own town, and being kept dumb and passive, as it was the interest of the oligarchy that they should be, in respect to political sentiment. A Greek oligarchy might obtain from its people quiet submission under ordinary circumstances; but if ever it required energetic effort, the genuine direction under which alone such effort could be given was found wanting. The Mitylean Demos, as soon as they found themselves strengthened and enabled by the possession of heavy weapons, refused obedience to the orders of Sphincter for marching out and impeding their lives in a desperate struggle. They were under the belief—uncontrolled under the agency of public officers habitually practised by an oligarchy, but which assuredly the Athenian Demos would have been too well-informed to entertain—that their government were starving them, and had amassed stores of provisions for themselves. Accordingly, the first use which they made of their arms was to demand that these concealed stores should be brought out and fairly apportioned to all; threatening, unless their demand was complied with at once, to enter into negotiations with the Athenians and surrender the city. The ruling Mityleanes, unable to prevent this, but knowing that it would be their incalculable ruin, preferred the chance of negotiating themselves for a capitulation. It was agreed with Pache that the Athenian government should enter into possession of Mitylene; that the fate of its people and city should be left to the Athenian assembly, and that the Mityleanes should send envoys to Athens to plead their cause: until the return of these envoys, Pache engaged that no one should be either killed, or put in chains, or sold into slavery.



Nothing was said about Salamin, who hid himself as well as he could in the city. In spite of the guarantee received from Pache, as great was the alarm of those Mityliæans who had chiefly instigated the revolt, that when he actually took possession of the city, they threw themselves as suppliants upon the altar for protection. But being induced by his associates to quit their sanctuary, they were placed in the island of Tenos, until answer should be received from Athens.<sup>1</sup>

Having thus secured possession of Mitylê, Pache sent several more triremes to the other side of the island, and easily captured Anaxa. But before he had time to reduce the two remaining towns of Pyrrha and Brusa, he received news which forced him to turn his attention elsewhere.

To the astonishment of every one, the Peloponnesian fleet of Alkidas was seen, on the coast of Ios. It ought to have been there much earlier; and had Alkidas been a man of energy, it would have reached Mitylê even before the surrender of the city. But the Peloponnesians, when about to advance into the Athenian waters and leave the Athenian fleet, were under the same impression of modern weakness and timidity (especially since the victories of Phaulgo in the preceding year) as that which kept land troops when marching up to attack the Lacedæmonian heavy-armed.<sup>2</sup> Alkidas, though mistrusted by the Athenians, who were not aware of his departure—though pressed to hasten forward by Lachar and Isonax on board, and aided by expert pilots from those Samian cities who had established themselves at Anax<sup>3</sup> on the Asiatic continent, and acted as regular masters of Athens—overwhelmed, instead of sailing straight to Lesbos, lingered first near Peloponnesus, next at the island of Pilos, making capture of private vessels with their crews; and at length, on reaching the islands of Thera and Mykonos, he heard the unwelcome tidings that the besieged towns had capitulated. Not at first crediting the report, he sailed onward to Salamis, in the Erythraean territory, on the coast of Asia Minor, where he found the news confirmed. As only seven days had elapsed since the

<sup>1</sup> Thucyd. iv. 28.

<sup>2</sup> Thucyd. iv. 24. cf. *policy of defence*.

*policy of defence*—*policy of defence*.

<sup>3</sup> Thucyd. iv. 25.

speculation had been concluded, Tryphalus, an Eleans captain in the fleet, strenuously urged the daring project of sailing on both sides, and carrying Mitylene by night in its existing unfortified condition; no preparation would have been made for receiving them, and there was good chance that the Athenians might be suddenly overpowered, the Mitylenians again armed, and the town recovered.

Such a proposition, which was indeed something more than daring, did not suit the temper of Alexander. Nor could he be induced by the solicitation of the sailors to fly and fortify himself either in any port of Ionia or in the Helles towns of Erythra, so as to attract support and countenance to such subjects of the Athenian empire as were disposed to revolt; though he was confidently assured that many of them would revolt on his proclamation, and that the satrap Phaullos of Sardis would help him to defray the expense. Having been sent for this express purpose of relieving Mitylene, Alexander believed himself interested from any other project. He determined to return to Polioptemon at once, leaving nothing so much as the pursuit of Pericles and the Athenian fleet. From Ephesus accordingly he started on his return, coasting southward along the Minor as far as Ephesus. But the pressure taken in his voyage was now an embarrassment to his flight; and their number was not inconsiderable, since all the merchant vessels on his route had approached the fleet without suspicion, believing it to be Athenian: a Polioptemonian fleet near the coast of Ionia was as yet something unheard of and incredible. To get rid of his presence, Alexander stopped at Myonachos near Teos, and there put to death the greater number of them—a barbarous proceeding which excited lively indignation among the neighbouring Ionia cities to which they belonged; inasmuch that when he reached Ephesus, the Spartan soldier dwelling at Anax, who had come forward so actively to help him, sent him a spirited remonstrance, reminding him that the daughter of men neither engaged in war, nor enemies, nor even connected with Athens except by conquest, was disgraceful to one who came forth as the liberator of Greece, and that if he persisted he would convert his friends into enemies, not his enemies into friends. So keenly did Alexander feel the circumstance, that he at once liberated the remainder

of the prisoners, several of them Chians, and then departed from Ephesus, taking his course across sea towards Erythra and Peloponnesus. After much delay off the coast of Erythra from stormy weather, which harassed and dispersed his fleet, he at length reached in safety the harbours of Erythra in Eria, where his scattered ships were ultimately reunited.<sup>1</sup>

This inglorious was the voyage of the first Peloponnesian admiral who dared to enter that Mare clausum which passed for a portion of the territory of Athens.<sup>2</sup> But though he achieved little, his waste prowesse wanted everywhere not less chance than ostentatiousness, for the Ionian towns were all unfortified, and Alcibiades might take and sack any one of them by sudden assault, even though unable to hold it permanently. Pressing messages reached Pacheia from Erythra and from several other places, where the Athenian triremes called *Paralus* and *Salamina* (the privileged vessels which usually carried public and sacred deputations) had their sails set, the Peloponnesian fleet anchored at Thuria, and brought him the same intelligence. Pacheia, having his hands now free by the capture of Megara, set forth immediately in pursuit of the intruder, whom he chased as far as the island of Patmos. It was there ascertained that Alcibiades had finally disappeared from the eastern waters, and the Athenian admiral, though he would have rejoiced to meet the Peloponnesian fleet in the open sea, accounted it fortunate that they had not taken up a position in some Asiatic harbour—in which case it would have been necessary for him to undertake a troublesome and toilsome blockade,<sup>3</sup> besides all the chances of revolt among the Athenian dependencies. We shall see how much, in this respect, depended upon the personal character of the Lacedæmonian commander, when we come hereafter to the expedition of Bonaeia.

<sup>1</sup> Thucyd. lib. vi. 25, 26—28.  
<sup>2</sup> Thucyd. lib. vi. 24. "Against P. Alcibiades and Athenian triremes the Peloponnesian navy was sent, but with very little success, on account of the contrary winds, ships, and other various circumstances."

"We see that the sea is here confined as a portion of the Athenian territory, and into the portion of sea near the Peloponnesians, much more than in the rest of Ionis."

<sup>3</sup> Thucyd. lib. vi.

On his return from Patras to Mikythin, Pacha was induced to stop at Notium by the solicitations of some sailors. Notium was the port of Kolophôn, from which it was at some little distance, as Patras was from Athens.

Pacha at Notium—  
he explains  
the situation  
of the place—  
the party  
arrived  
Mikythin  
was leader  
of the  
garrison.

About three years before, a violent internal dissension had taken place in Kolophôn, and one of the parties, invoking the aid of the Prince of the Ionians (formerly one of the generals of the late Pashabah), had placed him in possession of the town; whereas the opposite party, forced to retire, had established itself separately and independently at Notium. But the Kolophonians who remained in the town soon contrived to procure a party in Notium, whereby they were enabled to regain possession of it, through the aid of a body of Arcadian mercenaries in the service of Pashabah. These Arcadians formed a standing garrison at Notium, in which they occupied a separate citadel or fortified space, while the town became again attached as harbour to Kolophôn. A considerable body of sailors, however, expelled on that occasion, now invoked the aid of Pacha to restrain them, and to expel the Arcadians. On reading the plea, the Athenian general prevailed upon Hippas the Arcadian captain to come forth to a parley, under the promise that, if nothing mutually satisfactory could be settled he would again replace him "safe and sound" in the fortification. But no sooner had the Arcadian came forth to this parley, than Pacha, causing him to be detained under guard, but without fetters or ill-treatment, immediately attacked the fortification while the garrison were relying on the armistice, carried it by storm, and put to death both the Arcadians and the Patrasians who were found within. Having got possession of the fortification, he sent through Hippas again to—"safe and sound," according to the tenor of the convention, which was thus literally performed—and then immediately afterwards caused him to be shot with arrows and javelins. Of the species of fraud, founded on internal dissension and real violation of an agreement, there are various examples in Grecian history; but nowhere do we find of a more flagrant combination of deceit and cruelty than the behaviour of Pacha at Notium. How it was noticed in

<sup>1</sup> The dissensions between Notium and Mikythin are noticed by Aristotle. Pacha = A. 1.

Athens, we do not know; yet we cannot, not without surprise, that Thucydides accounts it plainly and clearly, without a single word of comment.<sup>1</sup>

Notium was now separated from Kolophôn, and placed in possession of those Kolophoniens who were opposed to the Persian supremacy in the upper town. But as it had been, down to this time, a mere appendage of Kolophôn and not a separate town, the Athenians soon afterwards sent Chalkis, and performed for it the ceremonies of admission according to their own laws and customs, levying from every quarter the remaining males of Kolophôn.<sup>2</sup> Whether any new settlers went from Athens itself does not appear. But the step was intended to confer a sort of Hellenic citizenship and recognized collective personality on the new-born town of Notium; without which neither its liberty or solemn depuration would have been admitted to offer public sacrifices, nor its private citizens to contend for the prize at Olympia and other great festivals.

Having cleared the Asiatic waters from the menaces of Athens, Ptolemy returned to Lesbos, reduced the towns of Pyrrha and Korus, and soon threw himself in completely under both of Mitylenê and the whole island as to be able to send home the larger part of his force; carrying with them as prisoners those Mitylenians who had been deported in Tenos, as well as others prominently implicated in the late revolt, to the number altogether of rather more than a thousand. The Lacedæmonian Selechos, being recently detected in his place of concealment, was included among the prisoners transmitted.

Upon the fate of these prisoners the Athenians had now to pronounce. They entered upon the discussion in a temper of extreme wrath and vengeance. As to Selechos, their resolution to put him to death was unanimous and immediate. They turned a deaf ear to his promises, severely delivered, of transmitting the blockade of Ptoios, in case his life were spared.

<sup>1</sup> Thucyd. II. 10.

<sup>2</sup> Thucyd. II. 10; C. A. Ptoios, Kolophoniens, p. 16. (Bibliothèque, 1822.)

What to do with Mayland and its inhabitants was a point more debated, and was subjected to formal debate in the public assembly.

It is in this decade that Thucydides first takes notice of Kleon, who is however mentioned by Plutarch as rising into importance about five years earlier, during the lifetime of Pericles. Under the great increase of trade and population in Athens and Peiraia during the last forty years, a new class of politicians seems to have grown up: men engaged in various descriptions of trade and manufactures, who began to rival more or less in importance the ancient holders of *Asia* property. This change was substantially analogous to that which took place in the cities of Medieval Europe, when the merchants and traders of the various guilds gradually came to compete with, and ultimately supplanted, the patrician families in whom the supremacy had originally resided. In Athens, persons of ancient family and station enjoyed at this time no political privileges—more through the reforms of Ephialtes and Pericles the political constitution had become thoroughly democratized. But they still continued to form the two highest classes in the Solonian system founded on property—the *Proteroklasmatois*, and the *Hippoi* or Knights. New men created by trade doubtless got into these classes, but probably only in number, and limited the feeling of the class as they found it, instead of bringing into it any new spirit. Now an individual Athenian of the class, though without any legal title to preference, yet when he stood forward as candidate for political influence, continued to be distinctly preferred and welcomed by the social sentiment at Athens, which preserved in its spontaneous sympathetic distinctions all that from the political code.<sup>2</sup> Besides this place truly prepared for him in the public sympathy, especially advantageous at the outset of political life, he found himself further buoyed up by the family connections, associations, and political skills, &c., which ensured very great influence both in the politics and politicians of Athens, and of which he became a member as a matter of course. Such

1. Broyer, J. M. "Klimaklassifizierung nach der Zeit, die ein Tag 10°C über dem Gefrierpunkt dauert." *Compt. Rend. Acad. Sci. Paris*, 1931, 291, 1.



the influence of Porphyry. Among them all the most distinguished was Klodwig von Illenhausen.

Kleón acquired his true importance among the speakers against Periklēs, so that he would thus obtain for himself, during his early political career, the same prominence of the numerous and uneducated anti-Perikleians. He is described by Thucydides in general terms as a person of the most violent temper and character in Athens—as being dishonest in his statements, and violent in his invective and accusation; Aristophanes, in his comedy of the *Knights*, reproduces these features with others new and distinct, as well as with exaggerated details, comic, satirical, and contemptuous. His comedy depicts Kleón in the point of view in which he would appear to the knights of Athens—a leather-dressed, swelling of the tax-purse—a low-born bawler, terrifying opponents by the violence of his accusations, the looseness of his voice, the importance of his gestures—known as a rival in his politics—threatening men with accusations and then receiving money to withdraw them,—a soldier of the public treasury—presenting men as well as rank—and securing the favour of the assembly by the lowest and most galling sycophancy. The general attributes set forth by Thucydides (apart from Aristophanes, who does not profess to write history), we may reasonably accept—the powerful and violent invective of Kleón, often dishonest—together with his self-confidence and valour in the public assembly. Men of the middle class, like Kleón and Hyperboulos, who persevered in addressing the public assembly and trying to take a leading part in it, against persons of greater family pretension than themselves, were pretty sure to be men of more than usual valour. Without this quality, they would never have encountered the opposition made to them. It is probable enough that they had it to a disquieting extent—and even if they had not, the same measure of self-assertion, which in Alcibiades would be tolerated from his rank and station, would in them run the

<sup>3</sup> Through the 19th century, the use of the term "American" was not common, but it became so in the late 19th century.

The above mentioned Illinois is, however, not a good example of a small, but it is a small state with a large population. It is a small state with a large population.

biofiziológiai és biológiai jelzők (Kálmán és Károlyi), melyek segítségével a szervezet állapotát és működését vizsgálhatjuk. Az 1970-es évek óta a biológiai jelzők használata egyre inkább elterjedt, és ma már számos területen alkalmazzák, például a környezetvédelemben, az orvostudományban és a mezőgazdaságban.



insupportable impudence. Unhappily we have no specimens to enable us to appreciate the recitative of Kloba. We cannot determine whether it was more virulent than that of Demosthenes and Aeschines, seventy years afterwards; each of those orators crosses impurity to the other the greatest impudence, coarseness, puerility, corruption, loud voice, and revolting vulgarity of manner, in language which Kloba can hardly have surpassed in intensity of vituperation, though he doubtless fell immeasurably short of it in classical finish. Nor can we even tell in what degree Kloba's denunciations of the veteran Perikles were fiercer than those memorable invectives against the old age of Sir Robert Walpole, with which Lord Chester's political career opened. The talent for invective possessed by Kloba, employed first against Perikles, would be counted as great impudence by the partisans of that illustrious statesman, as well as by impartial and judicious citizens. But among the numerous instances of Perikles it would be applauded as a burst of patriotic indignation, and would procure for the orator that extensive support at first, which would sustain him until he acquired his personal hold on the public assembly.<sup>1</sup>

If what degree or through what cause that hold was gradually increased, we do not know. At the time when the question of Mytilene came on for discussion, it had grown into a sort of ascendancy which Thucydides describes by saying that Kloba was "at that time by far the most powerful speaker in the eyes of the people". The fact of Kloba's great power of speech and his capacity of handling public business in a popular manner is better attested than anything else respecting him, because it depends upon two witnesses both hostile to him—Thucydides and Aristophanes. The assembly and the dicastery were Kloba's theatre and holding-ground; by the Athenian people taken collectively in their place of meeting, and the Athenian people taken individually, were not always the same person and had not the same mode of judgment: Demos sitting in the Pnyx was a different man from Demos sitting at home. The lofty combination of qualities possessed by Perikles appeared

<sup>1</sup> Thucydides, Perikles, a. 66. Aristotle at age thirty, 354, B.C. says, "Kloba is the greatest exponent in the Athenian assembly."

Perikles was typical of the Athenian in the words of the comic author Aristophanes.

<sup>2</sup> Aristophanes, *Knights*, 110.



proposition, though strongly opposed by Diadoctus and others, was sanctioned and passed by the assembly, and a decree was forthwith despatched to Mytilene, exhorting Pericles to put it in execution.<sup>1</sup>

Such a sentence was, in principle, nothing more than a very rigorous application of the general laws of war. Not merely the unqualified rule, but even the promise of war (even from any special convention) was at the mercy of his conqueror to be done, sold, or adapted to reason. We shall find the Lacedæmonians carrying out the matter without the slightest abatement towards the Platæan prisoners in the course of a very short time. And God bless the Athenian people—as long as they remained in assembly, under that startling temporary intensification of the emotions and predominant sentiment which springs from the mere heat of multitude—and as long as they were discussing the principle of the case,—What had Mytilene deserved?—thought only of this view. Less than the most rigorous measure of war (they would conceive) would be inadequate to the wrong done by the Mytileneans.

But when the assembly broke up—when the citizens, no longer wound up by sympathizing companions and animated speakers in the Pnyx, withdrew into the comparative quiescence of individual life—when the talk came to be, not about the propriety of passing such a resolution, but about the details of executing it—a sensible change and marked repugnance became presently visible. We must also recollect—and it is a principle of no small moment in human affairs, especially among a democratical people like the Athenians, who stand charged with so many resolutions passed and afterwards unexecuted—that the statement of wrath against the Mytileneans had been really in part discharged by the mere passing of the sentence, quite apart from its execution; just as a furious man relieves himself from overwhelming anger by imprecations against others, which he would himself shrink from afterwards realising. The Athenians, on the whole the most humane people in Greece (though humanity, according to our

<sup>1</sup> The total of prisoners or slaves of war— six times the number they are said to have been (J. Bengel). <sup>2</sup> Thucyd. II. 38.

Mass, cannot be pardoned of any Greek), because sensible that they had sustained a cruel and implacable doom. Even the captives and exiles,<sup>1</sup> to whom it was given to carry, set forth on their voyage with mournful repugnance. The Highpriests conveyed present to Athens (who had probably been allowed to speak in the assembly and plead their own cause), together with those Athenians who had been present and friends of Mitylenæ, and the minority generally of the previous assembly, soon deserted, and did their best to foster, this repugnance; which became during the course of the same evening as powerful as well as so wide-spread, that the strategy resorted to the prayer of the exiles, and convoked a fresh assembly for the morrow to reconsider the proceeding. By so doing, they committed an error, and exposed themselves to the chance of impeachment. But the change of feeling among the people was manifest as to overbear any such scruple.<sup>2</sup>

Though Thucydides has given us only a short summary, without any speeches, of what passed in the first assembly,—yet as to this second assembly, he gives us at length the speeches both of Kleon and Diodotus—the two principal orators of the first also. We may be sure that this second assembly was in all points one of the most interesting and anxious of the whole war; and though we cannot certainly determine what were the circumstances which determined Thucydides in his selection of speeches, yet this case, as well as the equal defeat of Kleon, whom he disliked, may probably be presumed to have influenced him here.

That orator, coming forward to defend his proposition passed on the preceding day, denounced in terms of indignation the unwise tenderness and scruples of the people, who could not bear to treat their subject- allies, according to the plain equity, as men held only by naked fear. He dwelt upon the weakness and folly of

Abstract of the second assembly given by Thucydides—summary of Kleon's speech, and of Diodotus' reply.

<sup>1</sup> Thucyd. lib. vi. and of democracy generally are worthy for activity and development, under the Athenians and other democracies, but, under their despotic allies, it is only a mere shadow.

The feelings of the masses, in the various assemblies to carry the order of execution, and a striking proof of evidence in this case was speeches made

at several places left against Athenians, lib. vi. 434, 435.

<sup>2</sup> Thucyd. lib. vi. As to the strategy, see Thucyd. vi. 41—43. I think it good evidence to prove that there was dissension. I agree with Thucydides on this point, in spite of the doubts of Dr. Arnold.











The trireme carrying the first vote had started the day before, and was already twenty-four hours on its way to Mytilene. A second trireme was immediately put to sea bearing the new decree; yet nothing short of supernatural assistance could enable it to reach the condemned city before the terrific sentence now on its way might be actually in course of execution. The Mytilenean crews stored the vessel well with provisions, promising large rewards to the crew if they arrived in time. An intensity of effort was manifested without parallel in the history of Athenian seamanship. The war was never once relaxed between Athens and Mytilene—the rowers merely taking turns for short intervals of rest, with refreshment of body-and, steeped in wine and oil, swallowed on their oars. Luckily there was no unfavourable wind to retard them, but the slight wind would have been defeated, if it had not happened that the crew of the first trireme were as slow and overzealous in the transmission of their respective mandates, as those of the second were eager for the delivery of the reply in time. And after all it came only just in time. The first trireme had arrived, the order for execution was actually in the hands of Pachee, and his measures were already preparing. So near was the Mytilenean population to this wholesale destruction;<sup>1</sup> so near was Athens to the actual perpetration of an atrocity which would have roused against her throughout Greece a sentiment of execration more deadly than that which she afterwards incurred even from the proceedings at Miletus, Skione, and elsewhere. Had the execution been delayed, the persons who would have suffered most by it, and most deservedly, would have been the propositors Kleon. For if the reaction in Athenian sentiment was so immediate and sensible after the mass-purging of the senators,<sup>2</sup> far more violent would it have been when they learnt that the deed had been irreversibly done, and when all its painful details were presented to their imaginations; and Kleon would have been held responsible to the utter of that which had so disgusted them in their own eyes. As the

Sept.  
victory of  
the Athenians  
which  
gave rise  
to the second  
decree for  
Mytilene—  
which was  
sent to  
Athens in  
time to  
prevent the  
execution of  
the first.

These Myti-  
lenean  
victims  
who  
Pachee had  
sent to  
Athens were  
not so easily  
—forgotten  
as Mytilene  
by the  
Athenians.

see also *Antiquities*, *book* 2 & 3, and  
Cicero, *de Officiis*, *lib* 1, *cap* 1, *§* 1.

<sup>1</sup> Thucyd. *lib* 8, *cap* 3, *§* 1, *§* 2, *§* 3, *§* 4, *§* 5, *§* 6, *§* 7, *§* 8, *§* 9, *§* 10, *§* 11, *§* 12, *§* 13, *§* 14, *§* 15, *§* 16, *§* 17, *§* 18, *§* 19, *§* 20, *§* 21, *§* 22, *§* 23, *§* 24, *§* 25, *§* 26, *§* 27, *§* 28, *§* 29, *§* 30, *§* 31, *§* 32, *§* 33, *§* 34, *§* 35, *§* 36, *§* 37, *§* 38, *§* 39, *§* 40, *§* 41, *§* 42, *§* 43, *§* 44, *§* 45, *§* 46, *§* 47, *§* 48, *§* 49, *§* 50, *§* 51, *§* 52, *§* 53, *§* 54, *§* 55, *§* 56, *§* 57, *§* 58, *§* 59, *§* 60, *§* 61, *§* 62, *§* 63, *§* 64, *§* 65, *§* 66, *§* 67, *§* 68, *§* 69, *§* 70, *§* 71, *§* 72, *§* 73, *§* 74, *§* 75, *§* 76, *§* 77, *§* 78, *§* 79, *§* 80, *§* 81, *§* 82, *§* 83, *§* 84, *§* 85, *§* 86, *§* 87, *§* 88, *§* 89, *§* 90, *§* 91, *§* 92, *§* 93, *§* 94, *§* 95, *§* 96, *§* 97, *§* 98, *§* 99, *§* 100, *§* 101, *§* 102, *§* 103, *§* 104, *§* 105, *§* 106, *§* 107, *§* 108, *§* 109, *§* 110, *§* 111, *§* 112, *§* 113, *§* 114, *§* 115, *§* 116, *§* 117, *§* 118, *§* 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was turned out, he was fortunate enough to escape this danger ; and his proposition, to put to death those Mytileneans whose Pache had ever been as the active revolving party, was afterwards adopted and executed. It doubtless appeared as madness, after the previous doubts passed, but recorded, as to be adopted with little resistance, and to provide no after-regret-ance ; yet the men so slain were rather more than one thousand in number.<sup>1</sup>

Besides this sentence of execution, the Athenians seized the fortifications of Mytilene, and took possession of all her ships of war. In lieu of tribute, they further established a new permanent distribution of the land of the island, all except Methymna, which had remained faithful to them. They distributed it into 3000 lots, of which 800 were reserved for consecration to the gods, and the remainder assigned to Athenian cleruchs, or proprietary settlers, chosen by lot among the citizens ; the Lesbian proprietors still remaining on the land as cultivating tenants, and paying to the Athenian cleruch an annual rent of two mna (about seven pounds sixteen shillings sterling) for each lot. We should have been glad to learn more about this new land-settlement than the few words of the historian suffice to explain. It would seem that 3700 Athenian citizens with their families must have gone to reside, for the time at least, in Lesbos, or Mytilene ; that is, without changing their rights as Athenian citizens, and without being emancipated either from Athenian taxation or from personal military service. But it seems certain that these men did not continue long to reside in Lesbos. We may even suspect that the clerucher allotment of the island must have been subsequently altogether dropped. There was a strip on the opposite mainland of Asia, which had tribute belonged to Mytilene : this was now separated from the island, and henceforward modelled among the tributary subjects of Athens.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Thucyd. ii. 10.  
<sup>2</sup> Thucyd. ii. 10, 11, 12, 13. About the Lesbian Mytilene see Strabo, *Geogr. Lib. viii.* c. 10; *Strabo, Lib. xii.* c. 1, 2, 3, 4. These passages were originally here given under a paragraph, as in Strabo's *Geogr.* and were probably have been left, although it is not, then called for tributary service at home,

and when it was ascertained that the island might be kept without them. But, however, there is much to be said in this arrangement. It seems reasonable that the Athenians, if it was when this arrangement was made, had been informed and when they were informed, to say that some tribute from their tributary property should neither be sent to Athens.



Adrianus states, that the guilty commander, not waiting for sentence, drew himself with his sword in open court!

The surrender of Plata to the Lacedæmonians took place not long after that of Mytilene to the Athenians— somewhat later in the same summer. Though the escape of one-half of the garrison had made the provisions last longer for the rest, still their whole stock had now come to be exhausted, so that the remaining defenders were subjected and on the point of perishing by starvation. The Lacedæmonian commander of the blockading force, knowing their defenceless condition, could easily have taken the town by storm, had he not been detoured by express orders from Sparta. For the Spartans government, calculating that peace might one day be concluded with Athens on terms of mutual cession of places equalled by war, wished to acquire Plata, not by force but by negotiation and voluntary surrender, which would serve as an excuse for not giving it up; though such a distinction, between

1. *Plata* the *Epitaph* of *Agathos*, 11, p. 171. *Agathos* of *Plata*.

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1. *Plata* the *Epitaph* of *Agathos*, 11, p. 171. *Agathos* of *Plata*.

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capture by force and by capitulation, not admissible in modern diplomacy, was afterwards found to tell against the Lacedæmonians quite as much as in their favour.<sup>1</sup> Acting upon these orders, the Lacedæmonian commander sent in a herald, recommending the Plataeans to surrender voluntarily, and submit themselves to the Lacedæmonians as judges—with a stipulation "that the wrong-doers<sup>2</sup> should be punished, but that none should be punished equally". To the heralded, in their state of hopeless starvation, all terms were nearly alike, and they accordingly surrendered the city. After a few days' interval, during which they received nourishment from the blockading army, five persons arrived from Sparta to sit in judgment upon their late—our Aristodemus, a Herakleid of the royal family.<sup>3</sup>

The five Spartans having taken their seat as judges, doubtless in full presence of the blockading army, and especially with the Thebans, the great enemies of Plataea, by their side, the prisoners taken (800 Plataeans and twenty-five Athenians) were brought up for trial or sentence. No accusation was preferred against them by any one; but the simple question was put to them by the judges—"Have you during the present

war rendered any service to the Lacedæmonians or to their allies?" The Plataeans were confounded at a question alike unexpected and preposterous. In admitted fact of one answer; but before returning any categorical answer at all, they entreated permission to plead their cause at length. In spite of the opposition of the Thebans,<sup>4</sup> their request was granted. Aristodemus and Lakon (the latter, prisoner of Sparta at Plataea) were appointed to speak on behalf of the body. Possibly both these delegates may have spoken: if so, Thucydides has blended the two speeches into one.

A more complete picture cannot be imagined. The interrogatory was expressly so framed as to exclude allusion to any facts preceding the Peloponnesian war. But the speakers, though fully conscious how slight was their chance of success, dare-

<sup>1</sup>Thucyd. ii. 97.  
<sup>2</sup>Thucyd. iii. 67. expressions of which various scholars, in passages scattered up and down history, will acknowledge, are frequently wrongly interpreted, and so almost entirely rejected, with no direct authority.

may refer to Athens.  
<sup>3</sup>Thucyd. iii. 67.  
<sup>4</sup>Thucyd. iii. 67. The strength and numbers of the Plataeans were such that they could have easily repulsed the Spartans, and so the Spartans were forced to accept the Plataeans.



the Plataians.<sup>1</sup> The Platæan territory was let out for ten years, as public property belonging to Thebes, and was hired by private Theban colonists.

Such was the melancholy fate of Plata, after sustaining a blockade of about two years.<sup>2</sup> Its identity and local traditions were extinguished, and the sacrifices in honour of the deceased victors who had fought under Perseus suspended, which the Platæan speakers had urged upon the Lacedæmonians as an impiety not to be tolerated;<sup>3</sup> and which perhaps the latter would hardly have consented to under any other circumstances, except from an anxious desire of conciliating the Thebans in their prominent antipathy. It is in this way that Thucydides explains the conduct of Sparta, which he pronounces to have been rigorous in the extreme.<sup>4</sup> And in truth it was more rigorous, considering only the principle of the case, and apart from the number of victims, than even the first unprovoked sentence of Athens against the Mitylenæans. For neither Sparta, nor even Thebes, had any fair pretence for considering Plata as a revolted town, whereas Mitylên was a city which had revolted under circumstances peculiarly offensive to Athens. Moreover, Sparta promised relief and justice to the Plataians on their surrender. Pericles promised nothing to the Mitylenæans except that their fate should be reserved for the decision of the Athenian people. This little

<sup>1</sup> Thucyd. ii. 36.

<sup>2</sup> Commentaries for the French Government, in the earlier printed form in 1816, &c. say, that the blockade of Plata was continued for ten years before it surrendered — statement never being more unprovoked than this. That the real duration of the blockade was only five years is quite certain: see Thucyd. ii. 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 131, 132, 133, 134, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139, 140, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148, 149, 150, 151, 152, 153, 154, 155, 156, 157, 158, 159, 160, 161, 162, 163, 164, 165, 166, 167, 168, 169, 170, 171, 172, 173, 174, 175, 176, 177, 178, 179, 180, 181, 182, 183, 184, 185, 186, 187, 188, 189, 190, 191, 192, 193, 194, 195, 196, 197, 198, 199, 200, 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215, 216, 217, 218, 219, 220, 221, 222, 223, 224, 225, 226, 227, 228, 229, 230, 231, 232, 233, 234, 235, 236, 237, 238, 239, 240, 241, 242, 243, 244, 245, 246, 247, 248, 249, 250, 251, 252, 253, 254, 255, 256, 257, 258, 259, 260, 261, 262, 263, 264, 265, 266, 267, 268, 269, 270, 271, 272, 273, 274, 275, 276, 277, 278, 279, 280, 281, 282, 283, 284, 285, 286, 287, 288, 289, 290, 291, 292, 293, 294, 295, 296, 297, 298, 299, 300, 301, 302, 303, 304, 305, 306, 307, 308, 309, 310, 311, 312, 313, 314, 315, 316, 317, 318, 319, 320, 321, 322, 323, 324, 325, 326, 327, 328, 329, 330, 331, 332, 333, 334, 335, 336, 337, 338, 339, 340, 341, 342, 343, 344, 345, 346, 347, 348, 349, 350, 351, 352, 353, 354, 355, 356, 357, 358, 359, 360, 361, 362, 363, 364, 365, 366, 367, 368, 369, 370, 371, 372, 373, 374, 375, 376, 377, 378, 379, 380, 381, 382, 383, 384, 385, 386, 387, 388, 389, 390, 391, 392, 393, 394, 395, 396, 397, 398, 399, 400, 401, 402, 403, 404, 405, 406, 407, 408, 409, 410, 411, 412, 413, 414, 415, 416, 417, 418, 419, 420, 421, 422, 423, 424, 425, 426, 427, 428, 429, 430, 431, 432, 433, 434, 435, 436, 437, 438, 439, 440, 441, 442, 443, 444, 445, 446, 447, 448, 449, 450, 451, 452, 453, 454, 455, 456, 457, 458, 459, 460, 461, 462, 463, 464, 465, 466, 467, 468, 469, 470, 471, 472, 473, 474, 475, 476, 477, 478, 479, 480, 481, 482, 483, 484, 485, 486, 487, 488, 489, 490, 491, 492, 493, 494, 495, 496, 497, 498, 499, 500, 501, 502, 503, 504, 505, 506, 507, 508, 509, 510, 511, 512, 513, 514, 515, 516, 517, 518, 519, 520, 521, 522, 523, 524, 525, 526, 527, 528, 529, 530, 531, 532, 533, 534, 535, 536, 537, 538, 539, 540, 541, 542, 543, 544, 545, 546, 547, 548, 549, 550, 551, 552, 553, 554, 555, 556, 557, 558, 559, 560, 561, 562, 563, 564, 565, 566, 567, 568, 569, 570, 571, 572, 573, 574, 575, 576, 577, 578, 579, 580, 581, 582, 583, 584, 585, 586, 587, 588, 589, 590, 591, 592, 593, 594, 595, 596, 597, 598, 599, 600, 601, 602, 603, 604, 605, 606, 607, 608, 609, 610, 611, 612, 613, 614, 615, 616, 617, 618, 619, 620, 621, 622, 623, 624, 625, 626, 627, 628, 629, 630, 631, 632, 633, 634, 635, 636, 637, 638, 639, 640, 641, 642, 643, 644, 645, 646, 647, 648, 649, 650, 651, 652, 653, 654, 655, 656, 657, 658, 659, 660, 661, 662, 663, 664, 665, 666, 667, 668, 669, 670, 671, 672, 673, 674, 675, 676, 677, 678, 679, 680, 681, 682, 683, 684, 685, 686, 687, 688, 689, 690, 691, 692, 693, 694, 695, 696, 697, 698, 699, 700, 701, 702, 703, 704, 705, 706, 707, 708, 709, 710, 711, 712, 713, 714, 715, 716, 717, 718, 719, 720, 721, 722, 723, 724, 725, 726, 727, 728, 729, 730, 731, 732, 733, 734, 735, 736, 737, 738, 739, 740, 741, 742, 743, 744, 745, 746, 747, 748, 749, 750, 751, 752, 753, 754, 755, 756, 757, 758, 759, 760, 761, 762, 763, 764, 765, 766, 767, 768, 769, 770, 771, 772, 773, 774, 775, 776, 777, 778, 779, 780, 781, 782, 783, 784, 785, 786, 787, 788, 789, 790, 791, 792, 793, 794, 795, 796, 797, 798, 799, 800, 801, 802, 803, 804, 805, 806, 807, 808, 809, 810, 811, 812, 813, 814, 815, 816, 817, 818, 819, 820, 821, 822, 823, 824, 825, 826, 827, 828, 829, 830, 831, 832, 833, 834, 835, 836, 837, 838, 839, 840, 841, 842, 843, 844, 845, 846, 847, 848, 849, 850, 851, 852, 853, 854, 855, 856, 857, 858, 859, 860, 861, 862, 863, 864, 865, 866, 867, 868, 869, 870, 871, 872, 873, 874, 875, 876, 877, 878, 879, 880, 881, 882, 883, 884, 885, 886, 887, 888, 889, 890, 891, 892, 893, 894, 895, 896, 897, 898, 899, 900, 901, 902, 903, 904, 905, 906, 907, 908, 909, 910, 911, 912, 913, 914, 915, 916, 917, 918, 919, 920, 921, 922, 923, 924, 925, 926, 927, 928, 929, 930, 931, 932, 933, 934, 935, 936, 937, 938, 939, 940, 941, 942, 943, 944, 945, 946, 947, 948, 949, 950, 951, 952, 953, 954, 955, 956, 957, 958, 959, 960, 961, 962, 963, 964, 965, 966, 967, 968, 969, 970, 971, 972, 973, 974, 975, 976, 977, 978, 979, 980, 981, 982, 983, 984, 985, 986, 987, 988, 989, 990, 991, 992, 993, 994, 995, 996, 997, 998, 999, 1000.

<sup>3</sup> I have before pointed out several instances of the loss of all allusion to the Plataians, and the same which all these writers think to observe and to mention; and I must again state the contrary here. I believe that this is the principle of historical ex-

position have been collected upon, when writing the first edition of the history, and in introducing a new statement of their own in place of an ancient statement which stated the same thing, after some 400 years. The same instance, the principle adopted by these writers, is the last instance, because the official documents, which state a great many other facts and inaccuracies regarding Plata, besides the mistake about the duration of the siege. The two great steps of Pericles were necessarily present to the imagination of these literary Greeks.

<sup>4</sup> Thucyd. ii. 36.

<sup>5</sup> Thucyd. ii. 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 131, 132, 133, 134, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139, 140, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148, 149, 150, 151, 152, 153, 154, 155, 156, 157, 158, 159, 160, 161, 162, 163, 164, 165, 166, 167, 168, 169, 170, 171, 172, 173, 174, 175, 176, 177, 178, 179, 180, 181, 182, 183, 184, 185, 186, 187, 188, 189, 190, 191, 192, 193, 194, 195, 196, 197, 198, 199, 200, 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215, 216, 217, 218, 219, 220, 221, 222, 223, 224, 225, 226, 227, 228, 229, 230, 231, 232, 233, 234, 235, 236, 237, 238, 239, 240, 241, 242, 243, 244, 245, 246, 247, 248, 249, 250, 251, 252, 253, 254, 255, 256, 257, 258, 259, 260, 261, 262, 263, 264, 265, 266, 267, 268, 269, 270, 271, 272, 273, 274, 275, 276, 277, 278, 279, 280, 281, 282, 283, 284, 285, 286, 287, 288, 289, 290, 291, 292, 293, 294, 295, 296, 297, 298, 299, 300, 301, 302, 303, 304, 305, 306, 307, 308, 309, 310, 311, 312, 313, 314, 315, 316, 317, 318, 319, 320, 321, 322, 323, 324, 325, 326, 327, 328, 329, 330, 331, 332, 333, 334, 335, 336, 337, 338, 339, 340, 341, 342, 343, 344, 345, 346, 347, 348, 349, 350, 351, 352, 353, 354, 355, 356, 357, 358, 359, 360, 361, 362, 363, 364, 365, 366, 367, 368, 369, 370, 371, 372, 373, 374, 375, 376, 377, 378, 379, 380, 381, 382, 383, 384, 385, 386, 387, 388, 389, 390, 391, 392, 393, 394, 395, 396, 397, 398, 399, 400, 401, 402, 403, 404, 405, 406, 407, 408, 409, 410, 411, 412, 413, 414, 415, 416, 417, 418, 419, 420, 421, 422, 423, 424, 425, 426, 427, 428, 429, 430, 431, 432, 433, 434, 435, 436, 437, 438, 439, 440, 441, 442, 443, 444, 445, 446, 447, 448, 449, 450, 451, 452, 453, 454, 455, 456, 457, 458, 459, 460, 461, 462, 463, 464, 465, 466, 467, 468, 469, 470, 471, 472, 473, 474, 475, 476, 477, 478, 479, 480, 481, 482, 483, 484, 485, 486, 487, 488, 489, 490, 491, 492, 493, 494, 495, 496, 497, 498, 499, 500, 501, 502, 503, 504, 505, 506, 507, 508, 509, 510, 511, 512, 513, 514, 515, 516, 517, 518, 519, 520, 521, 522, 523, 524, 525, 526, 527, 528, 529, 530, 531, 532, 533, 534, 535, 536, 537, 538, 539, 540, 541, 542, 543, 544, 545, 546, 547, 548, 549, 550, 551, 552, 553, 554, 555, 556, 557, 558, 559, 560, 561, 562, 563, 564, 565, 566, 567, 568, 569, 570, 571, 572, 573, 574, 575, 576, 577, 578, 579, 580, 581, 582, 583, 584, 585, 586, 587, 588, 589, 590, 591, 592, 593, 594, 595, 596, 597, 598, 599, 600, 601, 602, 603, 604, 605, 606, 607, 608, 609, 610, 611, 612, 613, 614, 615, 616, 617, 618, 619, 620, 621, 622, 623, 624, 625, 626, 627, 628, 629, 630, 631, 632, 633, 634, 635, 636, 637, 638, 639, 640, 641, 642, 643, 644, 645, 646, 647, 648, 649, 650, 651, 652, 653, 654, 655, 656, 657, 658, 659, 660, 661, 662, 663, 664, 665, 666, 667, 668, 669, 670, 671, 672, 673, 674, 675, 676, 677, 678, 679, 680, 681, 682, 683, 684, 685, 686, 687, 688, 689, 690, 691, 692, 693, 694, 695, 696, 697, 698, 699, 700, 701, 702, 703, 704, 705, 706, 707, 708, 709, 710, 711, 712, 713, 714, 715, 716, 717, 718, 719, 720, 721, 722, 723, 724, 725, 726, 727, 728, 729, 730, 731, 732, 733, 734, 735, 736, 737, 738, 739, 740, 741, 742, 743, 744, 745, 746, 747, 748, 749, 750, 751, 752, 753, 754, 755, 756, 757, 758, 759, 760, 761, 762, 763, 764, 765, 766, 767, 768, 769, 770, 771, 772, 773, 774, 775, 776, 777, 778, 779, 780, 781, 782, 783, 784, 785, 786, 787, 788, 789, 790, 791, 792, 793, 794, 795, 796, 797, 798, 799, 800, 801, 802, 803, 804, 805, 806, 807, 808, 809, 810, 811, 812, 813, 814, 815, 816, 817, 818, 819, 820, 821, 822, 823, 824, 825, 826, 827, 828, 829, 830, 831, 832, 833, 834, 835, 836, 837, 838, 839, 840, 841, 842, 843, 844, 845, 846, 847, 848, 849, 850, 851, 852, 853, 854, 855, 856, 857, 858, 859, 860, 861, 862, 863, 864, 865, 866, 867, 868, 869, 870, 871, 872, 873, 874, 875, 876, 877, 878, 879, 880, 881, 882, 883, 884, 885, 886, 887, 888, 889, 890, 891, 892, 893, 894, 895, 896, 897, 898, 899, 900, 901, 902, 903, 904, 905, 906, 907, 908, 909, 910, 911, 912, 913, 914, 915, 916, 917, 918, 919, 920, 921, 922, 923, 924, 925, 926, 927, 928, 929, 930, 931, 932, 933, 934, 935, 936, 937, 938, 939, 940, 941, 942, 943, 944, 945, 946, 947, 948, 949, 950, 951, 952, 953, 954, 955, 956, 957, 958, 959, 960, 961, 962, 963, 964, 965, 966, 967, 968, 969, 970, 971, 972, 973, 974, 975, 976, 977, 978, 979, 980, 981, 982, 983, 984, 985, 986, 987, 988, 989, 990, 991, 992, 993, 994, 995, 996, 997, 998, 999, 1000.

ally—interesting from its Hellenic patriotism, its grateful and devoted attachments, and its unceasing suffering—were united only in the persons of the citizens harboured at Athens. We shall find it hereafter restored, destroyed again, and finally again restored; so required was the fate of a little Grecian state swept away by the contending politics of greater neighbours. The slaughter of the twenty-five Athenian prisoners, like that of Salamis by the Athenians, was not beyond the rigor admitted and tolerated, though not always practised, on both sides towards prisoners of war.

We have now gone through the circumstances, painfully illustrating the manners of the age, which followed on the surrender of Mytilene and Plata. We next pass to the west of Greece—the island of Euboea—where we shall find scenes not less bloody, and even more revolting.

It has been already mentioned,<sup>1</sup> that in the naval combats between the Corinthians and Euboeans during the year before the Peloponnesian war, the former had captured 300 Euboean prisoners, men of the first rank and consequence in the island. Instead of following the impulse of blind hatred in slaughtering these prisoners, the Corinthians displayed, if not greater humanity, at least a more long-sighted calculation. They had treated the prisoners well, and made every effort to gain them over, with a view of employing them on the first opportunity to effect a revolution in the island—to bring it into alliance with Corinth,<sup>2</sup> and disconnect it from Athens.

Such an opportunity appears first to have occurred during the winter or spring of the present year, while both Mytilene and Plata were under blockade, probably about the time when Alcibiades departed for home, and when it was hoped that not only Mytilene would be relieved, but the neighbouring dependencies of Athens excited to revolt, and her whole attention thus occupied in that quarter. Accordingly the Euboean prisoners were then sent home from Corinth, nominally under a heavy ransom of 300 talents, for which these Euboean citizens who acted as

These  
prisoners  
Euboean—  
the  
Euboeans  
negative are  
and last  
from  
Corinth,  
under  
agreement  
of Alcibiades  
persuasion  
to the  
prisoners  
had changed  
sides at  
the island.

<sup>1</sup> See above, chap. xlvii.

<sup>2</sup> Thucyd. l. iii.



present in Corinth made themselves responsible.<sup>1</sup> The presence, leading themselves thus to the disruption, were decisive participants in the entire design.

But it was now seen at what figure the ransom was really to be paid. The new-comers, probably at first heartily welcomed after so long a detention, employed all their influence, combined with the most active personal services, to bring about a complete rupture of alliance with Athens. Intimidation being sent to Athens of what was going on, an Athenian embassy arrived with envoys to try and detain these newcomers; while a Corinthian embassy also brought envoys from Coraech to aid the cause of the opposite party. The mere presence of Corinthian envoys induced a change in the political feeling of the island. But still more conspicuous did this change become, when a formal public assembly, after hearing both envoys, decided that Eorkyre would maintain her alliance with Athens according to the limited terms of simple and brief defence originally stipulated,<sup>2</sup> but would at the same time be in possession of friendship with the Peloponnesians, as she had been before the Epidaurian quarrel. Since that event, however, the alliance between Athens and Eorkyre had become practically more intimate, and the Eorkyrean fleet had aided the Athenians in the invasion of Peloponnesus.<sup>3</sup> Accordingly, the resolution now adopted abandoned the project to go back to the past—and to a past which could not be restored.

Looking to the war then raging between Athens and the Peloponnesians, such a declaration was self-contradictory. It was intended by the oligarchical party only as a step to a more complete revolution, both foreign and domestic. They followed it up by a political presentation against Pericles, the source of greatest personal influence among the people, who acted by his own choice as premier to the Athenians. They accused him of practising to bring Eorkyre into slavery to Athens. What were the judicial restrictions of the island under which he was tried we do not know, but he was acquitted of the charge. He then avenged himself by accusing in his turn five

<sup>1</sup> Thucyd. II. 126, 127, 128; Thucyd. II. 126.    <sup>2</sup> Thucyd. I. 14.    <sup>3</sup> Thucyd. II. 12.



Trained by the reasons now upon the five persons mentioned,  
 as well as by the fear that Pericles might carry his  
 point and thus completely defeat their project of  
 Carianian alliance, the oligarchical party resolved to  
 carry their point by violence and murder. They  
 collected a party armed with daggers, burst suddenly  
 into the senate-house during full sitting, and there  
 slew Pericles with many other persons, partly senators,  
 partly private individuals. Some others of his  
 friends escaped the same fate by getting aboard the  
*Atlas trireme* which had brought the message, and  
 which was still in the harbour, but now departed  
 homeward to Athens. These men, under the  
 fresh terror arising from their recent act, convoked an assembly,  
 affirmed that what they had done was necessary to guard  
 Korkyra against being made the slave of Athens, and proposed  
 a resolution of full neutrality both towards Athens and towards  
 the Peloponnesians—permitting no visit from either of the  
 belligerents, except of a peaceful character, and with one single ship  
 at a time. And this resolution the assembly was constrained to  
 pass: it probably was not very numerous, and the oligarchical  
 partisans were at hand in arms.<sup>1</sup> At the same time they sent  
 envoys to Athens, to communicate the recent events with such  
 colouring as suited their views, and to dissuade the fugitive  
 partisans of Pericles from procuring any armed Athenian  
 intervention, such as might occasion a counter-revolution in the  
 island.<sup>2</sup> With some of the fugitives, representations of this sort,  
 or perhaps the fear of compromising their own families left  
 behind, prevailed. But most of them, and the Athenians along  
 with them, appreciated better both what had been done and  
 what was likely to follow. The oligarchical envoys, together  
 with such of the fugitives as had been induced to adopt their  
 views, were seized by the Athenians as conspirators, and placed  
 in detention at Sygma; while a fleet of sixty Athenian triremes  
 under Eurymedon was immediately fitted out to sail for Korkyra,  
 for which there was the greater necessity, as the Lacedæmonians

<sup>1</sup> Thucyd. iii. 73. In it does not  
 description is hardly necessary for the  
 act.

<sup>2</sup> Thucyd. iii. 72. and only had some  
 oligarchical measures partly democratic  
 explanation, from a too favourable opinion.

feet under Alcibiades, lately returned at Kyllini after his return from Ionia, was understood to be on the point of sailing thither.<sup>1</sup>

But the oligarchical leaders at Korymba, having little faith in the chances of their mission to Athens, proceeded in the execution of their conspiracy with that rapidity which was best calculated to ensure its success. On the arrival of a Corinthian messenger—which brought independence from Sparta, and probably also brought news that the fleet of Alcibiades would shortly appear—they organised their force, and attacked the people and the democratical authorities. The Korymbæan Demos were at first vanquished and dispersed. But during the night they collected together and fortified themselves in the upper parts of the town near the acropolis, and from thence down to the Hyllæan harbour—one of the two harbours which the town possessed; while the other harbour and the chief arsenal, being the mainland of Epauræ, was held by the oligarchical party, together with the market-place near to it, in and around which the wealthy Korymbæans chiefly resided. In this divided state the town remained throughout the evening day, during which the Demos sent numerous round the territory soliciting aid from the working class, and promising to them emancipation as a reward; while the oligarchy also hired and procured 800 Spartan mercenaries from the mainland. Reinforced by the slaves, who flocked in as the call occurred, the Demos renewed the struggle on the narrow pass fortiously than before. Both in position and numbers they had the advantage over the oligarchy, and the intense resolution with which they fought compromised itself even in the women, who, leaving danger and tumult, took active part in the combat, especially by bringing wine from the households. Towards the afternoon the people became decidedly victorious, and were even on the point of carrying by assault the lower town, together with the neighbouring arsenal. The oligarchy had no other chance of safety except the desperate resource of sending fire to that part of the town, with the market-place, houses, and buildings all around it, their own among the rest. This proceeding drove

The oligarchical party at Korymba, after the Spartan messenger, before to the city—where the people collected of the Acropolis, and the Hyllæan harbour.

<sup>1</sup> Thucyd. II. 20.

back the winds, but destroyed much property belonging to merchants in the warehouses, together with a large part of the town; indeed, had the wind been favourable, the entire town would have been consumed. The people being thus victorious, the Corinthian troops, together with most of the Egean mercenaries, thought it safer to leave the island; while the victors were still further strengthened on the ensuing morning by the arrival of the Athenian admiral Nikostratus with twelve triremes from Naupactus,<sup>1</sup> and 500 Mantinean hoplites.

Nikostratus did his best to allay the furious excitement prevailing, and to persuade the people to use their victory with moderation. Under his auspices a convention of amnesty and peace was concluded between the contending parties, save only ten proclaimed individuals, the most violent oligarchs, who were to be tried as ringleaders. These men of course were disappeared, so that there would have been no trial at all, which seems to have been what Nikostratus desired. At the same time an offence offensive and defensive was established between Korkyra and Athens, and the Athenian admiral was then on the point of departing, when the Korkyrean leaders entreated him to leave with them, for greater safety, five ships out of his little fleet of twelve—offering him five of their own triremes instead. Notwithstanding the pail of this proposition to himself, Nikostratus assented to it; and the Korkyreans, preparing the five ships to be sent along with him, began to march among the crews the names of their principal warriors. To the latter this presented the appearance of sending them to Athens, which they accounted a sentence of death. Under such impressions they took refuge as supplicants in the temple of the Dioscuri, where Nikostratus went to visit them, and tried to reassure them by the promise that nothing was intended against their personal safety. But he found it impossible to satisfy them, and as they persisted in refusing to serve, the Korkyrean Senate began to suspect treachery. They took arms again, searched the houses of the recusants for arms, and were bent on putting some of them to death, if Nikostratus had not taken

<sup>1</sup> Thucyd. ii. 74, 75.

them under his protection. The principal men of the defeated party, to the number of about 400, now took sanctuary in the temple and sacred ground of Minos; upon which the leaders of the people, afraid that in this inviolable position they might still cause further innovation in the city, opened a negotiation and prevailed upon them to be ferried across to the little island immediately opposite to the Boreas, where they were kept under watch, with provisions regularly transmitted across to them, for four days.<sup>1</sup>

At the end of these four days, while the excitement of the popular leaders still continued, and Nibotritus still adjourned his departure, a new phase opened in the melancholy drama. The Peloponnesian fleet under Alcides arrived at the coast of Sybota on the opposite mainland—400-three triremes in number, where the forty triremes brought back from Ionia had been reinforced by thirteen more from Laconia and Achaia. Moreover, the Laconians had sent down Brasidas as a strong companion—himself worth more than the new thirteen triremes, if he had been sent to supersede Alcides, instead of bringing nothing but violence to advise.<sup>2</sup> Despoiling the small squadron of Nibotritus, then at Nisiphris, the Spartans were only anxious to deal with Korkyra before reinforcements should arrive from Athens; but the repairs necessary for the ships of Alcides, after their disastrous voyage home, occasioned an unfortunate delay. When the Peloponnesian fleet was seen approaching from Sybota at break of day, the confusion in Korkyra was considerable. The Damos and the newly emancipated slaves were agitated alike by the late terrible conflict and by fear of the invaders—the oligarchical party, though defeated, was still present, forming a considerable minority—and the town was half-burnt. Scattered with elements of trouble, there was little tendency to coalesce, and still less confidence or willing-ness to sleep. Fifty of triremes were indeed at hand, and orders were given to man every of them forthwith; while Nibotritus, the only man who preserved the cool courage necessary for effective resistance, motivated the Korkyran

arrived at the Laconian squadron against Alcides. This fleet of 50 triremes reinforced Brasidas, and strength to the island.

<sup>1</sup> Thucyd. II. 73, 74.

<sup>2</sup> Thucyd. II. 66-68.

leaders to proceed with regularity, and to wait till all were assembled, so as to sail forth from the harbour as a body. He offered himself with his twelve Athenian triremes to go forth first alone, and occupy the Peloponnesian fleet until the Eeklyrmæan sixty triremes could all come out in full array to support him. He accordingly went forth with his squadron, but the Eeklyrmæans, instead of following his advice, sent their ships out one by one, and without any selection of crews. Two of them deserted forthwith to the enemy, while others presented the spectacle of crews fighting among themselves; even those which actually joined battle came up by single ships, without the least order or concert.

The Peloponnesians, soon seeing that they had little to fear from such manner, thought it sufficient to set twenty of their ships against the Eeklyrmæans, while with the remaining thirty-three they moved forward to contend with the twelve Athenians. Nisotrates, having plenty of sea-room, was not afraid of the numerical superiority; the more so as two of his twelve triremes were the picked vessels of the Athenian navy—the *Solemna* and the *Pythias*.<sup>1</sup> He took care to avoid entangling himself with the main of the enemy, and to keep hovering about their flanks; and as he presently contrived to disable one of their ships by a fortunate blow with the beak of one of his vessels, the Peloponnesians, instead of attacking him with their superior numbers, formed themselves into a circle and stood on the defensive, as they had done in the first combat with Phormio in the middle of the Gulf at Eliaum. Nisotrates (like Phormio) moved round the circle, trying to cause confusion by feigned approach, and waiting to see some of the ships lose their place or run foul of each other, so as to afford him an opening for attack. And he might perhaps have succeeded, if the remaining twenty Peloponnesian ships, seeing the proceeding and reflecting with dismay the success of a similar manoeuvre in the former battle, had not quitted the Eeklyrmæan ships, whose disorderly condition they despised, and hastened to join their comrades. The whole fleet

<sup>1</sup> These two triremes had been with Phormio at Eliaum (Thucyd. ii. 27). Immediately on returning from Eliaum,

they must have been sent round to join Nisotrates at Nauplia, &c. We are to understand exactly the same thing.

of fifty—these triremes now again took the aggressive, and advanced to attack *Minotaurus*, who retreated before them, but backing astern and keeping the head of his ships towards the enemy. In this manner he succeeded in driving them away from the town, so as to leave to most of the Eorkyrean ships opportunity for getting back to the harbour; while such was the superior manœuvring of the *Athenian* triremes, that the *Poloponnese* were never able to come up with him or force him to action. They returned back in the evening to Sybota, with no greater triumph than their success against the Eorkyreans, thirteen of whose triremes they carried away as prizes.\*

It was the expectation in Eorkyre that they would on the morrow make a direct attack (which could hardly have failed of success) on the town and harbour. We may easily believe (what report afterwards stated) that Brasidas advised Alcibiades to this decisive proceeding. The Eorkyrean leaders, more terrified than ever, first removed their prisoners from the little island to the Haronon, and then tried to come to a compromise with the oligarchical party generally for the purpose of equipping some effective and united defence. Thirty triremes were made ready and manned, whereas some even of the oligarchical Eorkyreans were persuaded to form part of the crew.

But the darkness of Alcibiades proved their best defence. Instead of coming straight to the town, he contented himself with landing in the island at some distance from it, on the promontory of Leukimad: after ravaging the neighbouring lands for some hours, he returned to his station at Sybota. He had lost an opportunity which never again returned; for on the very same night the fire signals of Leukon telegraphed to him the approach of the fleet under Eurymedon from Athens—sixty triremes. His only thought was now for the escape of the *Poloponnesean* fleet, which was, in fact, saved by this telegraphic notice. Advantage was taken of the darkness to retire close along the land as far as the triremes which separate Leukon from the mainland—across which triremes the ships were dragged by

Continued  
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Eorkyrean  
Athenian  
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the  
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Eurymedon  
—Signal of  
Alcibiades.



land or machinery, so that they might not fall in with, or be deceived by, the Athenian fleet in sailing round the Lemnading promontory. From hence Athalia made the best of her way down to Polyponeasia, leaving the Korkyrean ships to their fate.<sup>1</sup>

That this was defensible in the extreme. The arrival of Euryneion opens a third unexpected transition in this chequered narrative—the Korkyrean. Dances peering, abruptly and unexpectedly, from between stern and helplessness to close and irresistible mastery. In the bosom of Greece, and in a population wearily enough the least refined of all Greece—including, too, a great many slaves just emancipated against the will of their masters, and of course the fiercest and most discontented of all the slaves in the island—such a change was but too sure to kindle a thirst for revenge almost insatiable, as the only compensation for European terror and suffering.

As soon as the Polyponeasian fleet was known to have fled, and that of Euryneion was seen approaching, the Korkyrean leaders brought into the town the 800 Messenian captives who had hitherto been equipped without; thus providing a resource against any last effort of despair on the part of their interior enemies. Next, the thirty ships recently manned and held ready in the harbour facing the continent to go out against the Polyponeasian fleet, but now no longer needed, were ordered to sail round to the other or Hyllais harbour. Even while they were thus sailing round, some chorionic men of the federal party, being seen in public, were slain. But when the ships arrived at the Hyllais harbour, and the crews were disembarked, a more wholesale massacre was perpetrated, by putting to death those individuals of the oligarchical faction who had been persuaded on the day before to go aboard as part of the crew.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Thucyd. ii. 20.

<sup>2</sup> Thucyd. iv. 20, 21, and in the note, here, Irenaeus, Justin, Antiquitates Christianorum. It is probable that the leading oligarchs were sent to wage an unnecessary war on the coast of Asia, the most ridiculous of all the expedients of the oligarchy—that pro-

posed by Sulla to strengthen Athens by conquest, was never carried out. — Irenaeus, Justin, Antiquitates Christianorum. It is probable that the leading oligarchs were sent to wage an unnecessary war on the coast of Asia, the most ridiculous of all the expedients of the oligarchy—that pro-





their request found no favour, and they were reduced to their own resources. After harrying for some time the Eorhyrians on the island by predatory excursions, so as to produce considerable dearth and distress, they at length collected a band of Epeirus mercenaries, passed over to the island, and there established a fortified position on the mountain called Iteid, not far from the city. Having burnt their vessels in order to cut off all hopes of retreat, they maintained themselves for near two years by a system of rapage and plunder which inflicted great misery on the island.<sup>1</sup> This was a frequent way whereby, of old, invaders were cut and mastered a city, the walls of which they found impregnable. The ultimate fate of these occupants of Iteid, which belongs to a future chapter, will be found to constitute a close simile to the bloody drama yet unfinished in Eorhyra.

Such a drama could not be acted, in an important city belonging to the Greek name, without producing a <sup>powerful</sup> deep and extensive impression throughout all the other cities. And Thucydides has taken advantage of it to give a sort of general sketch of Grecian politics during the Peloponnesian war; violence of civil discord in each city, aggravated by foreign war, and by the contending efforts of Athens and Sparta,—the former supporting the democratical party everywhere; the latter, the oligarchical. The Eorhyrian edition was the first case in which these two causes of political antipathy and extermination were now acting with full united force, and where the malignity of sentiment and demonstration flowing from such a union was seen without disguise. The picture drawn by Thucydides of moral and political feeling under these influences will ever remain memorable as the work of an analyst and a philosopher. He has conceived and described the perverting causes with a spirit of generalisation which renders these two chapters hardly less applicable to other political societies far distant both in time and place (especially, under many points of view, to France between 1793 and 1795) than to Greece in the fifth century before the Christian era. The deadly bitterness infused into intestine party contests by the accompanying dangers of foreign war and

<sup>1</sup> Thucyd. iii. 85.



Description of the historian, we have to keep in mind the general state of manners in his time, especially the cruelties tolerated by the laws of war, as compared with that greater humanity and respect for life which has grown up during the last two centuries in modern Europe. And we have further to reflect that if he had been describing the effects of political fury among Carthaginians and Jews, instead of among his contemporary Greeks, he would have added, to his list of horrors, mutilation, crucifixure, and other refinements on simple murder.

The language of Thucydides is to be taken, rather as a generalisation and concentration of phenomena which he had observed among different communities, than as belonging altogether to any one of them. I do not believe—that a superficial reading of his opening words might at first suggest—that the bloodshed in Karyena was only the outbreak, but by no means the worst, of a series of similar horrors spread over the Grecian world. The facts stated in his own history suffice to show that though the same causes, which worked upon this unfortunate island, became disseminated and produced analogous misdeeds throughout many other communities, yet the case of Karyena, as it was the first, as it was also the worst and most approved in point of knowledge. Fortunately the account of Thucydides enables us to understand it from beginning to end, and to appreciate the degree of guilt of the various parties implicated, which we can seldom do with certainty; because when once the interchange of violence has begun, the feelings arising out of the contest itself presently overpower in the minds of both parties the original cause of dispute, as well as all scruples as to fitness of means. Unjustifiable acts in abundance are committed by both, and in comparing the two we are often obliged to employ the emphatic language which Thucies was resending Otho and Vitellius—"detestiora fore, atroxque violent"—of two bad men, all that the Roman world could conceive was, that the victor, whichever he was, would prove the worst.

But in regard to the Karyenian revolution, we can arrive at a more discriminating criticism. We see that it is from the beginning the work of a selfish oligarchical party, playing the game of a foreign enemy, and the worst and most criminal among, of

The  
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the island—aiming to subvert the existing democracy and acquire power for themselves—and ready to employ any measure of fraud or violence for the attainment of those objects. While the democracy which they attack is purely defensive and constructive, the oligarchical masters, having tried fair means in vain, are the first to employ foul means, which latter they find retaliated with greater effect against themselves. They set the example of political prostitution against Politics, for the destruction of a political antagonist; in the use of this same weapon the poorer men than a match for them, and employs it to their ruin. Next, they pass to the use of the dagger in the senate-house against law and his immediate fellow-lodgers, and to the wholesale application of the sword against the democracy generally. The Kerkyranian Demos are thus thrown upon the defensive. Instead of the affections of ordinary life, all the most intense and ardent sentiments—hatred, paganism, hatred, vengeance—obtain unqualified possession of their bosoms; exaggerated too through the fluctuations of victory and defeat successively brought by *Elkhoristos*, *Alkides*, and *Euryonides*. Their conduct as victims is such as we should expect under such exasperating circumstances, from coarse men, wrangled with tyrannical slaves. It is vindictive and murderous in the extreme, not without faithful touch of unscrupulous greed. But we must remember that they are driven to stand upon their defence, and that all their energies are indispensable to make that defence successful. They are provoked by an aggression as less guilty in the end than is the assault—an aggression, too, the more gratuitous, because, if we look at the state of the island at the time when the oligarchical captives were restored from *Chalkis*, there was no pretence for affirming that if left confined, as was suffering, any loss, hardship, or disgrace, from its alliance with *Athens*. These oligarchical tyrants find the island in a state of severity and tranquillity—since the war imposed upon it little necessity for effort. They plunge it into a sea of blood, with expropriation as well as suffering on both sides, which end at length in their own complete extermination. Our compassion for their final misery must not hinder us from approving the behaviour whereby it was earned.

How these masters of the oligarchy and democracy of the island are represented.

In the course of a few years from this time we shall have occasion to present two political movements in Athens (whether in principle and general result to the Korymbos revolution; including oligarchical conspirators against an existing and conservative democracy—with this conspiracy at first successful, but afterwards put down, and the Demos again restored. The contrast between Athens and Korymbos under such circumstances will be found highly instructive, especially in regard to the Demos both in the hours of defeat and in those of victory. It will then be seen how much the habit of active participation in political and judicial affairs—of open, conflicting discussion, discharging the malignant passions by way of speech, and followed by appeal to the vote—of having constantly present to the mind of every citizen, in his character of Dikast or Ekklēsiast, the confidence of a people united, and the paramount authority of a constitutional majority—how much all these circumstances, brought home as they were at Athens more than in any other democracy to the feelings of individuals, contributed to soften the instincts of intestine violence and revenge, even under very great provocation.

But the case of Korymbos, as well as that of Athens, different in so many respects, supplies to illustrate another truth, of much importance in Grecian history. Both of these show how false and impotent were the pretensions set up by the rich and great men of the various Grecian cities to superior morality, superior intelligence, and greater fitness for using honourably and beneficially the powers of government, as compared with the mass of the citizens. Through the Grecian oligarchies, exercising powerful sway over freedom, and more especially over the meaning of words, bestowed upon themselves the appellation of "the best men, the honourable and good, the dearest, the superior," &c., and attached to those without their own minds epithets of a contrary tenor, implying low moral attributes, so such difference will be found borne out by the facts of Grecian history.<sup>1</sup> Abundance of infidelity, with occasional bad passions, was doubt-

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<sup>1</sup> See the valuable preliminary discussion, prefixed to Webster's edition of Thucydides, passim, vol. i. c. 1.



less liable to work upon the people generally, often corrupting and enfeebling even the Athenian democracy, the best, apparently, of all the democracies in Greece. But after all, the rich and great men were only a part of the people, and taking them as a class (apart from honorable individual exceptions) by no means the best part. If exempted by their position from some of the vices which beset smaller and poorer men, they exhibited from that same position an unmeasured self-importance, and an excess of personal ambition as well as of personal appetites, peculiar to themselves, not less anti-social in tendency, and operating upon a much greater scale. To the prejudices and superstitions belonging to the age they were always superior, considering them as a class; while their animosities among one another, virulent and unscrupulous, were among the lowest causes of weakness in Greek commonwealths. Indeed many of the most exceptional acts committed by the democracies resulted in their allowing themselves to be made the tools of one aristocrat for the ruin of another. Of the intense party-spirit which characterized them as a body, sometimes exaggerated into the strongest anti-popular antipathy, as we see in the famous oligarchical oath cited by Aristotle,<sup>1</sup> we shall find many illustrations as we advance in the history, but none more striking than this Korymbian revolution.

<sup>1</sup> *Athens, Politics*, v. 2, 38. Ed. of *Step. Byzant. Trigon.*, ad *Isokratem* lxxix. *de Reg. viii.*

## CHAPTER II.

FROM THE TROUBLES IN EGKYRA IN THE FIFTH YEAR  
OF THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR DOWN TO THE END  
OF THE SIXTH YEAR.

ABOUT the same time as the troubles of Egkyra occurred, Nicias, the Athenian general, conducted an expedition against the rocky island of Minda, which lay at the mouth of the harbour of Megara, and was occupied by a Megarian fleet and garrison. The narrow channel, which separated it from the Megarian port of Nauplia, and formed the entrance of the harbour, was defended by two towers projecting out from Minda, which Nicias attacked and destroyed by means of burning machines from his ships. He thus cut off Minda from communication on that side with the Megarians, and fortified it on the other side, where it communicated with the mainland by a narrow bridge over with a causeway. Minda, thus becoming thoroughly insulated, was more completely fortified and made an Athenian possession; since it was extremely convenient to keep up an effective blockade against the Megarian harbour, which the Athenians had hitherto done only from the opposite shore of Salamis.<sup>1</sup>

Though Nicias, son of Nicerates, had been for some time conspicuous in public life, and is said to have been more than once charged along with Perikles, this is the first occasion on which Thucydides introduces him to our notice. He was now one of the thirty, or generals of the commonwealth, and appears to have enjoyed, on the whole, a greater and more constant personal esteem than any citizen of Athens, from the present time down to his death. In

System of  
Minda,  
the  
Megarian  
fleet,  
by the  
Athenians  
under  
Nicias.

system of  
Minda  
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previous to  
this point.

<sup>1</sup> Thucyd. II. 25. See the note of which has now ceased to have interest, by Arnold, and the plan enclosed in and this till on the mainland near the sea, for the topography of Minda, above.

wealth and in family he ranked among the first class of Athenians; in political character, Aristotiles placed him, together with Thucydides, son of Melesias, and Themistocles, above all other names in Athenian history—scarcely even above Pericles.<sup>1</sup>

Such a witness, from Aristotiles, deserves respectful attention, though the facts before us completely belie as lofty an estimate. It marks, however, the position occupied by Nicias in Athenian politics, as the principal person of what may be called the oligarchical party, succeeding Kimon and Thucydides, and preceding Themistocles. In looking to the conditions under which this party continued to exist, we shall see that during the interval between Thucydides (son of Melesias) and Nicias, the democratical forces had acquired such confirmed ascendancy, that it would not have served the purpose of any politician to bring evidence of positive hostility to them, prior to the Persian expedition and the great embolishment in the foreign relations of Athens which arose out of that disaster. After that change, the Athenian oligarchs became emboldened and aggressive, so that we shall find Themistocles among the chief conspirators in the revolution of the Four Hundred. But Nicias represents the oligarchical party in its previous state of quiescence and torpidity, recommending itself to a sovereign democracy, and existing in the form of cautious involvement rather than of conscious purpose. And it is a remarkable illustration of the real temper of the Athenian people, that a man of this character, known as an oligarch, but not hated as such, and doing his duty sincerely to the democracy, should have remained until his death the most esteemed and influential man in the city.

Nicias was a man of even mediocrity, in intellect, in education, and in victory: forward in his military duties, and not only personally courageous in the field, but heretofore found competent as a general under ordinary circumstances.<sup>2</sup> cautious, too, in the discharge of all political duties at home, especially in the post of

<sup>1</sup> Plutarch, *Nicias*, c. 1, § 1.

<sup>2</sup> Nicias, from his reputation as a general, ranks fourth in the Athenian hierarchy, Thucyd. vi. 41, and three places next to Themistocles, Plutarch, *Nicias*, c. 1, § 1.

<sup>3</sup> Plutarch, *Nicias*, c. 1, § 1, and c. 2, § 1, and c. 3, § 1, and c. 4, § 1.

The whole incident of Nicias' return to Athens, under the name of a private citizen, with his sons and wife, is a remarkable illustration of the real temper of the Athenian people.

Strategy or one of the ten generals of the state, to which he was frequently chosen and re-chosen. Of the many valuable qualities combined in his predecessor Pericles, the resolution of whom was yet fresh in the Athenian mind, Nikias possessed two, in which, most of all, his influence rested,—though, properly speaking, that influence belongs to the *sum total* of his character, and not to any special attribute in it: First, he was thoroughly incorruptible as to pecuniary gains—a quality as rare in Greece; public men of all the cities, that when a man once became notorious for possessing it, he acquired a greater degree of trust than any superiority of intellect could have bestowed upon him; next, he adopted the Periclean view, as to the necessity of a conservative or stationary foreign policy for Athens, avoiding new acquisitions at a distance, adventurous raids, or provocations to fresh wars. With this important point of analogy there were at the same time material differences between them even in regard to foreign policy. Pericles was a conservative, resolute against submitting to loss or abatement of empire, but at the same time refraining from aggrandizement; Nikias was in policy semi-hostile, anxious to compete effect for any purpose whatever, and disposed not only to maintain peace, but even to purchase it by considerable sacrifices. Nevertheless, he was the leading champion of the conservative party of his day, always powerful at Athens; and as he was constantly familiar with the details and actual course of public affairs, capable of giving full effect to the cautious and prudential point of view, and enjoying unqualified credit for honest purposes, his value as a permanent counsellor was steadily recognized, even though in particular cases his counsel might not be followed.

Beside these two main points, which Nikias had in common with Pericles, he was perfect in the use of manner and collateral modes of standing well with the people, which that great man had taken but little pains to practice. While Pericles attached himself to Aspasia, whose splendid qualities fell not below in the eyes of the public either her foreign origin or her motherly, the domestic habits of Nikias appear to have been strictly conformable to the rules of Athenian decorum. Pericles was surrounded by philosophers, Nikias by

One of  
Nikias's  
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people, whose advice was necessary both as a consolation to his temperament and as a guide to his intelligence under difficulties. One of these was constantly in his service and confidence, and his conduct appears to have been entirely effected by the difference of character between one prophet and another;<sup>1</sup> just as the government of Louis XIV. and other Catholic princes has been modified by the change of confessor. To a life thus rigidly decorous and ultra-religious—both eminently acceptable to the *Achéennes*—Nicias added the judicious employment of a large fortune with a view to popularity. These *liturgies* (or expensive public duties undertaken by rich men, each in his turn, throughout other cities of Greece as well as in Athens) which fell to his lot were performed with such splendour, magnificence, and good taste as to procure for him universal acclamations, and so much above his predecessors as to be long remembered and imitated. Most of these *liturgies* were connected with the religious service of the state, as that Nicias, by his manner of performing them, displayed his zeal for the honour of the gods at the same time that he laid up for himself a store of popularity. Moreover, the remarkable caution and timidity—not before so many, but in reference to his own followers—*phobos*—which marked his character, rendered him pre-eminently scrupulous as to giving offence or making personal war. While his demeanour towards the poorer citizens generally was equal and conciliating, the presents which he made were numerous, both to gain friends and to silence enemies. We are not surprised to hear that various families, whom the crown writers turn to money, made their profit out of this magnificence. But most narrowly Nicias as a public man, though he might occasionally be charged out of money, profited greatly by reputation thus acquired.

The expenses unavoidable in such a career combined with strict personal honesty, could not have been defrayed except by another quality, which ought not to exist as disreputable to Nicias, though in this, too, he stood distinguished from Pericles. He was a careful and diligent money-getter, a speculator in the silver mines of Laurion, and proprietor of one thousand slaves,

<sup>1</sup> Plutarch, *de vit. Nicias*, Nicias, a. d. 430, B. C. of advice from completely and quite private those persons. "I am confident that not the least of the

major Nicias, 24th of the Athenian people, 430 B. C. This is suggested by Plutarch as an excuse for Nicias in the part of Nicias.

whom he let out for work to them, receiving a fixed sum per head for each. The superintending slaves who managed the details of this business were men of great ability and high pecuniary value.<sup>1</sup> Most of the wealth of Nikias was held in this form, and not in landed property. Judging by what remains to us of the words written, this must have been considered as a perfectly gentlemanlike way of making money; for while they showed with derision of the leather-dresser Kleon, the lamp-maker Hypobolus, and the vegetable-selling mother to whom Euripides owes his birth, we hear nothing from them in disparagement of the slave-holder Nikias.

The degree to which the latter was thus occupied with the care of his private fortune, together with the general moderation of his temper, made him often wish to abstract himself from public duty. But such translations exhibited, rare among the public men of the day, rather made the Athenians more anxious to put him forward and retain his services. In the eyes of the Periklesomaniacs and the Erypsis, the two robust classes in Athens, he was one of themselves, and on the whole the best man, as being so little open to reproach or calumny, whom they could oppose to the leather-dressers and lamp-makers, who often out-voted them in the public assembly. The hoplites, who despised Kleon, and did not much regard even the brave, hardy, and soldier-like Lamachos, because he happened to be poor,<sup>2</sup> respected in Nikias the union of wealth and family with honesty, courage, and carefulness in command. The merchants and trading multitude regarded him as a discreet, honest, religious gentleman, who gave splendid charges, treated the poorest men with consideration, and never turned the public service into a job for his own profit; who, moreover, if he possessed no commanding qualities, so as to give to his advice imperative and irresistible authority, was yet always worthy of being consulted, and a steady safeguard against public mischief. Before the fatal Sicilian expedition, he had never commanded on any very serious or difficult enterprise; but what he had done had been

<sup>1</sup> Euripides, *Menandros*, &c. &c.; *receptaculo per delibatos*, *Athenae* &c. &c. *receptaculo*, *de* *receptaculo*, &c. &c.

<sup>2</sup> *Thucyd.* i. 2. *Perikles*, *Alibi* *receptaculo* *Perikles*, *receptaculo*, &c. &c.

*receptaculo*, &c. &c. *de* *receptaculo* *de* *receptaculo*







We shall see in the coming chapter how he became as it were preeminent, partly by his own superior persistence, partly by the inherent wisdom and arduousness of Wilson and other opponents, in the efforts of Epikhretos. But his weakness was now to find truth, to observe, to discern; his theories of action was the senate, the public assembly, the deliberation; his principal talent was that of speech, in which he was unquestionably more surpassed all his contemporaries. The two gifts which had been named in Parikles—superior capacity for speech, as well as for action—were now reversed, and had fallen, though both in greatly inferior degree, the one to Nikias, the other to Kleon. As an opposition-man foremost violent in temper, Kleon was extremely formidable to all acting democratically; and from his influence in the public assembly, he was doubtless the author of many important positive measures, thus going beyond the functions belonging to what is called opposition. But though the most effective speaker in the public assembly, he was not for that reason the most influential person in the democracy. His power of speech in fact stood out the more prominently, because they were forced apart from their station and from qualities which were considered, even at Athens, all but essential to make a man a leader in political life.

To understand the political condition of Athens at this time, it has been necessary to take this comparison between Nikias and Kleon, and to remark, that though the latter might be a more numerous speaker, the former was the more guiding and influential leader. The points gained by Kleon were all noisy and palpable, sometimes however, violent deeds, of considerable moment; but the course of affairs was much more under the direction of Nikias.

It was during the summer of this year (the fifth of the war—B.C. 431) that the Athenians began operations on a small scale in Sicily; probably contrary to the advice

both of Nikias and Kleon, neither of them especially favourable to these distant undertakings. I reserve however the story of Athenian measures in Sicily—which afterwards became the turning-point of the fortunes of the state—for a department by themselves. I shall take them up separately, and bring them

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realities  
with those of  
conventional  
ideal.  
gave to  
Epikhretos  
power.



not feeling sufficiently assured as to the way in which she would deal with them, they joined with the Dorians in clearing and from Sparta; in fact, it does not appear that Athens, possessing naval superiority only and being inferior on land, could have given them effective aid.

The Lacedæmonians, eagerly embracing the opportunity, determined to plant a strong colony in this tempting situation. There was room in the neighbouring regions for ship-building,<sup>1</sup> so that they might hope to acquire a naval position for attacking the neighbouring island of Eubœa, while the passage of troops against the subject-allies of Athens to Thracæ would also be facilitated; the impracticability of such passage had forced them, three years before, to leave Pythios to its fate. A considerable body of colonists, Spartans and Lacedæmonian Perioeci, was assembled under the conduct of three Spartan Officers—Lamæ, Damagetas, and Aikidas; the latter (we are to presume, though Thucydides does not say so) the same Aikidas who had met with such little success in Ionia and at Korkyra. Proclamation was further made to invite the junction of all other Greeks as colonists, excepting by name, Ionians, Achæans, and some other tribes not here specified. Probably the distinct exclusion of the Achæans must have been rather the consequence of ancient enmities than dictated by any present motives, since the Achæans were not our pronounced enemies of Sparta. A number of colonists, stated as not less than 15,000, flocked to the place, having confidence in the safety of the colony under the powerful protection of Sparta. The new town, of large extent, was built and fortified under the name of Herakleia;<sup>2</sup> not far from the site of Trachis, about two miles and a quarter from the nearest point of the Helles-Point, and about double that distance from the strait of Thermaic Gulf. Near to the latter, and for the purpose of keeping effective possession of it, a post with dock and accommodation for ship-building was constructed.

A populous city, established under Lacedæmonian protection in this important post, alarmed the Athenians, and excited much

<sup>1</sup> Regarding this statement of the Spartan ships, but the whole must be read in the site of Herakleia, especially, remarking, 1811, p. 10.

<sup>2</sup> Herakleia, till the last century was known as the capital, proper of the Spartans, and the whole region, since 1811, and Trachis was supposed to be the capital and harbor of the Spartans, and the whole region of the Spartans by the Spartans.

expectation in every part of Greece. But the Lacedæmonian Officers were harsh and unskilful in their management; while the Thebans, to whom the Trochilus territory was allotted, considered the colony as an encroachment upon their soil. Anxious to prevent its leaving, they harassed it with hostilities from the first moment. The Greeks associated were also active enemies; so that Myralessis, thus pressed from without and assailed within, dwindled down from its original numbers and power, barely maintaining its existence.\* We shall find it in later times, however, revived, and becoming a place of considerable importance.

The great Athenian armament of this summer, consisting of sixty triremes under Nicias, undertook an expedition against the island of Mityla. Mityla and Thera, both collected by ancient colonists from Lacedæmonia, had never lost from the beginning and still refused to be, members of the Athenian alliance or subjects of the Athenian empire. They then stood out as exceptions to all the other islands in the *Ægean*, and the Athenians thought themselves authorized to resort to constraint and conquest; believing themselves entitled to command over all the islands. They might indeed urge, and with considerable plausibility, that the Peloponnesians enjoyed their share of the protection of the *Ægean* from piracy, without contributing to the cost of it; but considering the obstinate reluctance and strong philo-Lacedæmonian propensities of the Mityliæ, who had taken no part in the war and given no ground of offence to Athens, the attempt to conquer them by force could hardly be justified even as a calculation of gain and loss, and was a mere gratification to the pride of power in carrying out what, in modern days, we should call the principle of insatiable desire. Mityla and Thera formed a backward course, which deflected the symmetry of a great project's design; and the former ultimately rebelled upon Athens the harvest of all losses—a deed of blood which deeply dishonoured her arms. On this occasion, Nicias visited the island with his fleet, and after vainly attempting the inhabitants, razed the lands, but

\* Thucyd. ii. 25, 26; Diodor. xi. 47.

25, 26.

\* Diodor. loc. cit. 4, 5.

Of it supplies the  
previous incident, and also discloses  
signific.

retired without undertaking a siege. He then sailed away, and came to Ortygia, on the north-east frontier of Attica, hovering on Boeotia. The hoplites on board his ships, landing in the night, marched into the interior of Boeotia to the vicinity of Tanagra. They were here met, according to legend, by a military force from Athens, which marched thither by land, and the joint Athenian army ravaged the Tanagran territory, gaining an indignant advantage over its defenders. On retreating, Nicias re-assembled his army, sailed northward along the coast of Lokris with the usual ravage, and returned home without effecting anything farther.<sup>1</sup>

About the same time that he started, thirty other Athenian triremes, under Demosthenes and Peukleia, had been sent round Peloponnesus to act upon the coast of Akarnania. In conjunction with the whole Akarnanian force, except the men of Oionia—with fifteen triremes from Euboea and some troops from Kephallenia and Zakynthos—they ravaged the whole territory of Lokris, both within and without the isthmus, and confined the inhabitants to their town, which was too strong to be taken by anything but a wall of circumvallation and a tedious blockade. And the Akarnanians, to whom the city was especially hostile, were agent with Demosthenes to undertake this measure forthwith, since the opportunity might not again meet, and success was nearly certain.

But this enterprising officer committed the grave imprudence of offending them on a matter of great importance, in order to attack a country of all others the most impracticable—the interior of Akia. The Momarchos of Naupaktos, who suffered from the depredations of the neighbouring Akian<sup>2</sup> tribes, inflamed his imagination by suggesting to him a grand scheme of operations,<sup>3</sup> more worthy of the heroic times which he commemorated than the mere reduction of Lokris. The various tribes of Akians—*rois*, *hoas*, *otivis*, predatory, and versed in the use of the javelin, which they rarely laid out of their hands—stretched across the

<sup>1</sup> Thucyd. II. 10.

<sup>2</sup> Thucyd. II. 10. *Apokritois* & *hoas* natives: but the latter native is not

mentioned by either other accounts respecting *Geoprotos*, etc.



and Zakynthos—to Athens, in the territory of the Oechia Leftrana, a maritime township on the Corinthian Gulf, and the mainland of Naupactus—where his ship was disembarked, together with 200 ephebes (or marines) from the triremes—(including on this occasion, what was not commonly the case on disembark, a score of the choice hoplites, selected all from young men of the same age, on the Athenian muster-roll. Having passed the night in the sacred precinct of Zeus Hymanios at Athens, memorable as the spot where the poet Hæcæus was said to have been slain, he marched early in the morning, under the guidance of the Messenian Chæmon, into Attica. On the first day he took Tricleria, on the second Kerkiraion, on the third Trichion—all of them villages unfortified and undefended, for the inhabitants abandoned them and fled to the mountains above. He was here advised to halt and await the junction of the Oechia, Ictæonæ, who had engaged to invade Attica at the same time, and were almost indispensable to his success, from their familiarity with Attican warfare, and their similarity of weapons. But the Messenians again persuaded him to advance without delay into the interior, in order that the villages might be separately attacked and taken before any collective force could be gathered together; and Themistocles was so encouraged by having as yet encountered no resistance, that he advanced to Megara, which he also found deserted, and captured without opposition.

THUCYD. II. 9. The Ephebes, in addition serving as light-armed troops, were more strictly taken from the Athenians, in the person of their fathers, than from the other States with a temple for the protection, and from the temple together on the mainland. The Athenian military is therefore usually selected of an extraordinary character; the greatest number of Ephebes are selected in the hope of an emergency force, and of a great number, Thucyd. II. 9.

As among the Romans, besides the Ephebes unarmoured light and were considered that that of the standard weapon (Thuc. II. 9).

The Athenian Ephebes, though not forming a corps permanently drilled, were used in fact as the regular militia, who were to have been the

detachment permanently kept after disembarkation upon the coast (Thuc. II. 9). Having been thus) apparently by many accounts to perform a number of military or local services; and, from these Ephebes being of different degrees of maturity,—and of first, next, and last, then inducted in the war, the great number unarmoured.—It was of course, as usual, selected to appear under the Ephebes, the lightest, who were selected in the different number of the Ephebes, and the lightest in the class of Ephebes were selected. A great many Ephebes were selected from the ranks of their own, who (according to the Ephebes) were selected in the Ephebes. —Thucyd. II. 9. 20. (Thucyd. II. 9. 20.)





mountains, rock, and forest. Many of them were slain in the night by parties, superior not less in rapidity of movement than in knowledge of the country; some even lost themselves in the forest, and perished miserably in flames kindled around them by the *Skolians*. The fugitives were at length recommended at Cherson near the sea, with the loss of Periklès the colleague of Demosthenès in command, as well as of 120 hoplites, among the best armed and most vigorous in the Athenian muster-roll.<sup>1</sup> The remaining force was soon transported back from Naxos to Athens, but Demosthenès remained behind, being too much afraid of the displeasure of his countrymen to return at such a moment. It is certain that his conduct was such as justly to incur their displeasure; and that the expedition against *Skolis*, showing an established ally and provoking a new enemy, had been conceived with a degree of rashness which nothing but the unexpected favour of fortune could have counterbalanced.

The force of the new enemy, whom his unsuccessful attack had raised into activity, soon made itself felt. The *Skolians* convey, who had been despatched to Sparta and Corinth, found it easy to obtain the promise of a considerable force to join them in an expedition against Naxos. About the month of September, a body of 8000 Philoponian hoplites, including 800 from the newly founded colony of Herakleia, was assembled at Delphi, under the command of Xerphokles, Hekataios, and Menelaos. Their road of march to Naxos lay through the territory of the Oedon Lakrians, whom they proposed either to gain over or to subdue. With Amphipolis, the largest Lakrian township, and in the immediate neighbourhood of Delphi, they had little difficulty; for the Amphipolians were in a state of feud with their neighbours on the other side of Parnassos, and were afraid that the new movement might become the instrument of Periklès' antipathy against them. On the first application they joined the Spartan alliance, and gave hostages for their fidelity to it: moreover they persuaded many other Lakrian petty villages—among others the Myrmæ, who were masters of the most difficult pass on the road—to do the same. Xerphokles received from these various townships reinforcements for his

<sup>1</sup> Thucyd. II. 95.

strong, as well as hostages for their safety, whom he deposited at Erythrae in Doris; and he was then enabled to march through all the territory of the Oechean Lokroans without resistance, except from Oluson and Eupalion, both which places he took by force. Having arrived in the territory of Naupaktos, he was there joined by the full force of the *Alakians*. Their joint efforts, after laying waste all the neighbourhood, captured the Oecheian colony of Helykion, which had become subject to the Achaean empire.<sup>1</sup>

Naupaktos, with a large circuit of wall and thirty detached, was in the greatest danger, and would certainly have been taken, had it not been saved by the efforts of the Athenian Demosthenes, who had remained there ever since the unfortunate *Alakian* expedition. Apprised of the coming march of Eurylochos, he went personally to the Akarnanians, and persuaded them to send a force to aid in the defence of Naupaktos. For a long time they turned a deaf ear to his solicitations in consequence of the refusal to blockade Leukas, but they were at length induced to consent. At the head of 1000 Akarnanian hoplites, Demosthenes threw himself into Naupaktos, and Eurylochos, seeing that the town had been thus placed out of the reach of attack, abandoned all his designs upon it—marching farther westward in the neighbouring territories of *Enche*—*Kalydon*, *Pleuron*, and *Prochium*, near the *Achaia* and the borders of *Akarnania*.

The *Alakians*, who had come down to join him for the common purpose of attacking Naupaktos, have abandoned him and retired to their respective homes. But the *Ambakians*, refused to find an considerable a Peloponnesian force in their neighbourhood, persuaded upon him to undertake in attacking the Amphibollian Argos as well as Akarnania; assuring him that there was now a fair prospect of bringing the whole of the population of the mainland, between the *Ambakian* and *Corteyan* Gulf, under the supremacy of Leontades. Having persuaded Eurylochos thus to keep his forces together and ready, they themselves, with 2000 *Ambakiot* hoplites, invaded the territory of the Amphibollian Argos, and captured the

Naupaktos  
is saved by  
Demosthenes  
and the Akarnanians.

Eurylochos,  
repulsed  
from  
Naupaktos,  
concentrates  
with the  
Akarnanians  
an attack  
on Argos.

<sup>1</sup> Thucyd. II. 107, 108.

fortified hill of Olyn immediately overlooking on the Acheronian Gulf, about three miles from Argos itself; a hill employed in former days by the Athenians as a place for public judicial congresses of the whole nation.<sup>1</sup>

This enterprise, concerted with the Athenians, was the signal for movement on both sides. The Athenians, marching with their whole force to the protection of Argos, occupied a post called Eritus in the Amphibolion territory, to prevent Beryllides from effecting his junction with the Acheronians at Olyn. They at the same time sent urgent messages to Demosthenes at Naupactus, and to the Athenian guard-squadron of twenty triremes under Astibolides and Diaphanes, entreating their aid in the present need, and inviting Demosthenes to act as their commander. They had forgotten their displeasure against him arising out of his recent refusal to blockade at Lecha, for which they probably thought that he had been sufficiently punished by his disgrace at Rhodia; while they knew and esteemed his military capacity. In fact, the incidents whereby he had been detained at Naupactus now worked furthest for them as well as for him. It seemed to them a commander whom all of them respected, elevating the jealousy among their own numerous petty townships; it provided for him the means of retrieving his own reputation at Athens. Demosthenes, not backward in seizing this golden opportunity, came speedily into the Acheronian Gulf with the twenty triremes, collecting 800 Athenian hoplites and sixty Athenian bowmen. Finding the whole Achaean force concentrated at the Amphibolion Argos, he was named general, nominally along with the Athenian generals, but in reality enjoying the whole direction of operations.

He found also the whole of the enemy's force, both the 8000 Acheronian Beryllides and the Peloponnesian divisions under Beryllides, already united and in position at Olyn, about three miles off. For Beryllides, as soon as he was apprised that the Acheronians had reached Olyn, broke up forthwith his camp at Prachon in Rhodia, knowing that his best chance of traversing the hostile

Notes—  
Olyn  
Eritus  
Amphibolion  
Argos  
Naupactus  
Acheronians  
Acheronian Gulf  
Peloponnesian

Notes—  
Acheronian  
Beryllides  
Peloponnesian  
divisions  
Beryllides  
Prachon  
Rhodia

<sup>1</sup> Thucyd. II. 100—102.

territory of Akarnania, avoided in safety; the whole Akarnanian force, however, had already gone to Argos, so that his march was unopposed through that country. He crossed the Achelous, ascended westward of Stratos, through the Akarnanian townships of Phyllis, Molossæ, and Limassæ; then quitting both Akarnania and the direct road from Akarnania to Argos, he struck rather eastward into the mountainous district of Tégæenæ in the territory of the Agræonæ, who were enemies of the Akarnanians. From hence he descended at night into the territory of Argos, and passed unobserved, under cover of the darkness, between Argos itself and the Akarnanian force at Kræon, so as to join in safety the 3000 Amphibolæ at Olpa, to their great joy. They had feared that the army at Argos and Kræon would have resisted his passage; and believing their force inadequate to resist alone, they had sent pressing messages home to demand large reinforcements for themselves and their own protection.<sup>1</sup>

Demostheus, thus leading a varied and formidable army, superior in number to himself at Olpa, conducted his troops from Argos and Kræon to attack alone. The ground was rugged and mountainous, and between the two armies lay a steep ravine, which neither liked to be the first to pass, so that they lay for five days inactive. If Herodotus had been our historian, he would probably have omitted this delay to unfavourable mention (which may indeed have been the case), and would have given us interesting anecdotes respecting the prophets on both sides; but the more positive practical genius of Thucydides merely suggests us, that on the sixth day both armies put themselves in order of battle—both probably tired of waiting. The ground being favourable for ambuscade, Demostheus hid in a heavy dell 400 hoplites and light-armed, so that they might spring up suddenly in the midst of the action upon the Peloponnesian left, which attacked his right. He was himself on the right with the Thebanians and some Akarnanians, opposed to Beryllidas on the left of the enemy; the Akarnanians, with the Amphidolians, Akontists or darters, occupied his left, opposed to the Amphidolus hoplites. Amphibolæ and Peloponnesians were,

These  
ambuscades  
were  
conducted  
by Demostheus  
himself on  
Olpa.  
Thucydides  
states.

<sup>1</sup> Thucyd. III. 105, 106, 107.

however, intimated in the line of Eurylochus, and it was only the Mantinians who maintained a separate station of their own towards the left centre. The battle accordingly began, and Eurylochus with his superior numbers was proceeding to surround Demosthenes, when on a sudden the men in ambush rose up and cut upon his rear. A panic seized his men, who made no resistance worthy of their Peloponnesian reputation: they broke and fled, while Eurylochus, desolates exposing himself with peculiar bravery in order to restore the battle, was early slain. Demosthenes, having over him his best troops, pressed them vigorously, and their panic contributed itself to the troops in the centre, so that all were put to flight and pursued to Olipa. On the right of the line of Eurylochus, the Andralists, the most valiant Greeks in the Epacris region, completely defeated the Akamanians opposed to them, and carried their pursuit even as far as Argos. So complete, however, was the victory gained by Demosthenes over the remaining troops, that these Andralists had great difficulty in fighting their way back to Olipa, which was not accomplished without severe loss, and late in the evening. Among all the beaten troops, the Mantinians were those who best maintained their retreating order.<sup>1</sup> The loss in the army of Demosthenes was about 200; that of the opposite much greater, but the number is not specified.

The  
surrounding  
Spartan  
contingent  
was a  
separate  
contingent  
for himself  
and the  
Pelopon-  
nesians,  
fighting  
the battle  
alone.

Of the three Spartan commanders, two, Eurylochus and Melanias, had been slain; the third, Menedæus, found himself beleaguered both by sea and land, the Athenian squadron being on guard along the coast. It would seem, indeed, that he might have sought his way to Ambrakia, especially as he would have met the Andralist reinforcement coming from the city. But whether this were possible or not, the commander, too much dispirited to attempt it, took advantage of the customary truce granted for burying the dead, to open negotiations with Demosthenes and the Akamanian generals, for the purpose of obtaining an unqualified retreat. This was peremptorily refused, but Demosthenes (with the consent of the Akamanian leaders) secretly intimated to the Spartan commander and those immediately around him, together

<sup>1</sup> Thucyd. III. 93, 104; compare Polyænus, II. 1.

with the Mantineans and other Peloponnesian troops, that if they chose to make a separate and surreptitious retreat, abandoning their comrades, no opposition would be offered. He designed by this means not merely to induce the Aristocrats, the great enemies of Agesis and Alkmanides, along with the body of miscellaneous mercenaries who had come under Rhyekleides, but also to obtain the more permanent advantage of degrading the Spartans and Peloponnesians in the eyes of the Epicletic Greeks as cowards and traitors to ordinary fellowship. The very reason which prompted Demosthenes to grant a separate facility of escape ought to have been imperative with Menelaos and the Peloponnesians around him, to make them spare it with indignation. Yet such was their anxiety for personal safety, that this disgraceful convention was accepted, ratified, and carried into effect forthwith. It stands alone in Greek history, as an example of separate treason in officers to purchase safety for themselves and their immediate comrades, by abandoning the general body under their command. Had the officers been Athenians, it would have been doubtless quoted as evidence of the pretended filialness of democracy. But as it was the act of a Spartan commander in conjunction with many leading Peloponnesians, we will only venture to remark upon it as a further manifestation of that intra-Peloponnesian selfishness, and easiness of obligation towards extra-Peloponnesian Greeks, which we found so lamentably prevalent during the invasion of Xerxes; in this case indeed heightened by the fact, that the men deserted were fellow-citizens and fellow-soldiers who had just fought in the same ranks.

As soon as the ceremony of burying the dead had been completed, Menelaos, and the Peloponnesians who were protected by this secret convention, stole away The Aristocrats were here with Agesis and his troops. off and in small bands under pretence of collecting wood and vegetables. On getting to a little distance, they quitted their pans and made off—practically to the dismay of the Aristocrats, who ran after them trying to overtake them. The Alkmanians pursued, and their leaders had much difficulty in explaining to those the secret convention just concluded. It was not without some suspicion of treachery, and even personal hazard from their own troops, that they at length caused the

fugitive Peloponnesians to be reported; while the Amphibolians, the most obnoxious of the two to Athenian feeling, were pursued without any reserve, and 200 of them were slain before they could escape into the friendly territory of the Agronæ.<sup>1</sup> To distinguish Amphibolians from Peloponnesians, besides in race and dialect, was however no easy task. Much dispute arose in individual cases.

Unhappily as this loss fell upon Amphibia, a far more serious calamity was yet in store for her. The large reinforcement from the city, which had been urgently summoned by the detachment at Olpe, started in due course as soon as they could be got ready, and entered the territory of Amphibolia about the time when the battle of Olpe was fought; but ignorant of that catastrophe, and hoping to arrive soon enough to stand by their friends. Their march was made known to Demosthenes, on the day after the battle, by the Amphibolians, who at the same time indicated to him the best way of surprising them in the rugged and mountainous road along which they had to march, at the two conspicuous peaks called Hionæ, immediately above a narrow pass leading further on to Olpe. It was known beforehand, by the line of march of the Amphibolians, that they would run for the night at the foot of these two peaks, ready to march through the pass on the next morning. On that same night a detachment of Amphibolians, under direction from Demosthenes, ascended the higher of the two peaks; while that commander himself, dividing his forces into two divisions, started from his position at Olpe in the evening after supper. One of these divisions, having the advantage of Amphibolian guides in their own country, marched by an untraversed mountain road to Hionæ; the other, under Demosthenes himself, went directly through the pass leading from Hionæ to Olpe. After marching all night, they reached the camp of the Amphibolians a little before day-break—Demosthenes himself with his Neomedon in the van. The surprise was complete. The Amphibolians were found still lying down and asleep, while even the sentinels, transfixed of the recent battle—bearing themselves unscathed in the Doric dialect by the

Amphibolians  
large body of  
Amphibolians,  
starting  
from the  
city at a  
very late hour,  
was  
intercepted  
by Demosthenes  
at Olpe,  
and cut to  
pieces.

<sup>1</sup> Thucyd. ii. 111.

Karmanos, whom Demosthenes had placed in front for that express purpose—and not seeing very clearly in the morning twilight—mistook them for some of their own fellow-citizens coming back from the other camp. The Akarnanians and Karmanians thus fell among the Amphilochians sleeping and unarmed, and without any possibility of resistance. Large numbers of them were destroyed on the spot, and the remainder fled in all directions among the neighbouring mountains, some knowing the roads and the country. It was the country of the Amphilochians—subjects of Amalthea, but subjects sworn to their enemies, and now making use of their perfect local knowledge and light-armed equipment, to reflect a terrible revenge on their masters. Some of the Amphilochians became entangled in ravines—others fell into ambuscades laid by the Amphibolians. Others again, finding most of all to fall into the hands of the Amphilochians—barbaric in race as well as intensely hostile in feeling—and seeing no other possibility of escaping them—even off to the Athenian ships cruising along the shore. There were but a small proportion of them who survived to return to Amalthea.<sup>1</sup>

The complete victory of Idomeneus, already prepared by Demosthenes, was achieved with scarce any loss. The Akarnanians, after erecting their trophy and depositing the enemy's dead, prepared to carry off the arms thus taken to Argos.

On the morrow, however, before this was done, they were visited by a herald, coming from those Amphilochians who had fled into the Argive territory, after the battle of Olpe and the subsequent pursuit. He came with the customary request from defeated soldiers, for permission to bury their dead who had fallen in that pursuit. Neither he, nor those from whom he came, knew anything of the destruction of their brethren at Idomeneus—just as those latter had been ignorant of the defeat at Olpe; while, on the other hand, the Akarnanians in the camp, whose minds were full of the more recent and capital advantage at Idomeneus, supposed that the message referred to the war, then in that engagement. The numerous perisphes just acquired at Idomeneus lay piled up in the camp, and the herald on seeing

Report  
of the  
Amphilochian  
herald on  
seeing  
the Greek  
remains of  
war.

<sup>1</sup> Thucyd. vi. 22.









asian confederacy, the Aberrations with Athens. It was stipulated that the Aberrations should not be required to assist the Amphibians against Athens, nor the Amphibians to assist the Aberrations against the Polycephalus league; but against all other enemies, each engaged to lead out to the other.<sup>1</sup>

To Demosthenes personally, the events on the coast of the Amphibian Gulf proved a signal good fortune, well-earned indeed by the skill which he had displayed. He was enabled to atone for his negligence in the *Æthiops* expedition, and to re-establish himself in the favour of the Athenian people. He sailed home in triumph to Athens during the course of the winter, with his recovered property of 300 papyrus, which acquired additional value from the accident, that the larger number of papyrus, recovered out of the spoil for the Athenian people, were captured at sea, and never reached Athens. Accordingly, these brought by Demosthenes were the only trophy of the victory, and as such were deposited in the Athenian temple, where Theophrastus mentions them as still existing at the time when he wrote.<sup>2</sup>

It was in this same autumn that the Athenians were captured by an oracle to undertake the more complete purification of the sacred island of Delos. The ship was probably taken to propitiate Apollo, since they were under the persuasion that the terrible visitation of the epidemic was owing to his wrath. And as it was about this period that the second attack of the epidemic, after having lasted a year, disappeared, many of these probably ascribed this relief to the effect of their pious care at Delos. All the tombs on the island were opened; the dead bodies were then exhumed and re-interred in the neighbouring island of Rheneia; and orders were given that for the future neither deaths nor births should take place in the sacred island. Moreover, the ancient Delian festival—were the common point of meeting and assembly for the whole Ionic race, and celebrated for its musical contests, before the Lydian and Persian conquests had subverted the freedom and prosperity

System of Demos-  
thene in triumph to  
Athens.

Particulars of Delos  
by the Athenians.  
Effect of the Epidemic  
on the Delian festival  
with  
Theophrastus.

<sup>1</sup> Thucyd. ii. 124.

<sup>2</sup> Thucyd. ii. 124. 76. 82. 83. 84. 85. 86. 87. 88. 89. 90. 91. 92. 93. 94. 95. 96. 97. 98. 99. 100. 101. 102. 103. 104. 105. 106. 107. 108. 109. 110. 111. 112. 113. 114. 115. 116. 117. 118. 119. 120. 121. 122. 123. 124. 125. 126. 127. 128. 129. 130. 131. 132. 133. 134. 135. 136. 137. 138. 139. 140. 141. 142. 143. 144. 145. 146. 147. 148. 149. 150. 151. 152. 153. 154. 155. 156. 157. 158. 159. 160. 161. 162. 163. 164. 165. 166. 167. 168. 169. 170. 171. 172. 173. 174. 175. 176. 177. 178. 179. 180. 181. 182. 183. 184. 185. 186. 187. 188. 189. 190. 191. 192. 193. 194. 195. 196. 197. 198. 199. 200. 201. 202. 203. 204. 205. 206. 207. 208. 209. 210. 211. 212. 213. 214. 215. 216. 217. 218. 219. 220. 221. 222. 223. 224. 225. 226. 227. 228. 229. 230. 231. 232. 233. 234. 235. 236. 237. 238. 239. 240. 241. 242. 243. 244. 245. 246. 247. 248. 249. 250. 251. 252. 253. 254. 255. 256. 257. 258. 259. 260. 261. 262. 263. 264. 265. 266. 267. 268. 269. 270. 271. 272. 273. 274. 275. 276. 277. 278. 279. 280. 281. 282. 283. 284. 285. 286. 287. 288. 289. 290. 291. 292. 293. 294. 295. 296. 297. 298. 299. 300. 301. 302. 303. 304. 305. 306. 307. 308. 309. 310. 311. 312. 313. 314. 315. 316. 317. 318. 319. 320. 321. 322. 323. 324. 325. 326. 327. 328. 329. 330. 331. 332. 333. 334. 335. 336. 337. 338. 339. 340. 341. 342. 343. 344. 345. 346. 347. 348. 349. 350. 351. 352. 353. 354. 355. 356. 357. 358. 359. 360. 361. 362. 363. 364. 365. 366. 367. 368. 369. 370. 371. 372. 373. 374. 375. 376. 377. 378. 379. 380. 381. 382. 383. 384. 385. 386. 387. 388. 389. 390. 391. 392. 393. 394. 395. 396. 397. 398. 399. 400. 401. 402. 403. 404. 405. 406. 407. 408. 409. 410. 411. 412. 413. 414. 415. 416. 417. 418. 419. 420. 421. 422. 423. 424. 425. 426. 427. 428. 429. 430. 431. 432. 433. 434. 435. 436. 437. 438. 439. 440. 441. 442. 443. 444. 445. 446. 447. 448. 449. 450. 451. 452. 453. 454. 455. 456. 457. 458. 459. 460. 461. 462. 463. 464. 465. 466. 467. 468. 469. 470. 471. 472. 473. 474. 475. 476. 477. 478. 479. 480. 481. 482. 483. 484. 485. 486. 487. 488. 489. 490. 491. 492. 493. 494. 495. 496. 497. 498. 499. 500. 501. 502. 503. 504. 505. 506. 507. 508. 509. 510. 511. 512. 513. 514. 515. 516. 517. 518. 519. 520. 521. 522. 523. 524. 525. 526. 527. 528. 529. 530. 531. 532. 533. 534. 535. 536. 537. 538. 539. 540. 541. 542. 543. 544. 545. 546. 547. 548. 549. 550. 551. 552. 553. 554. 555. 556. 557. 558. 559. 560. 561. 562. 563. 564. 565. 566. 567. 568. 569. 570. 571. 572. 573. 574. 575. 576. 577. 578. 579. 580. 581. 582. 583. 584. 585. 586. 587. 588. 589. 590. 591. 592. 593. 594. 595. 596. 597. 598. 599. 600. 601. 602. 603. 604. 605. 606. 607. 608. 609. 610. 611. 612. 613. 614. 615. 616. 617. 618. 619. 620. 621. 622. 623. 624. 625. 626. 627. 628. 629. 630. 631. 632. 633. 634. 635. 636. 637. 638. 639. 640. 641. 642. 643. 644. 645. 646. 647. 648. 649. 650. 651. 652. 653. 654. 655. 656. 657. 658. 659. 660. 661. 662. 663. 664. 665. 666. 667. 668. 669. 670. 671. 672. 673. 674. 675. 676. 677. 678. 679. 680. 681. 682. 683. 684. 685. 686. 687. 688. 689. 690. 691. 692. 693. 694. 695. 696. 697. 698. 699. 700. 701. 702. 703. 704. 705. 706. 707. 708. 709. 710. 711. 712. 713. 714. 715. 716. 717. 718. 719. 720. 721. 722. 723. 724. 725. 726. 727. 728. 729. 730. 731. 732. 733. 734. 735. 736. 737. 738. 739. 740. 741. 742. 743. 744. 745. 746. 747. 748. 749. 750. 751. 752. 753. 754. 755. 756. 757. 758. 759. 760. 761. 762. 763. 764. 765. 766. 767. 768. 769. 770. 771. 772. 773. 774. 775. 776. 777. 778. 779. 780. 781. 782. 783. 784. 785. 786. 787. 788. 789. 790. 791. 792. 793. 794. 795. 796. 797. 798. 799. 800. 801. 802. 803. 804. 805. 806. 807. 808. 809. 810. 811. 812. 813. 814. 815. 816. 817. 818. 819. 820. 821. 822. 823. 824. 825. 826. 827. 828. 829. 830. 831. 832. 833. 834. 835. 836. 837. 838. 839. 840. 841. 842. 843. 844. 845. 846. 847. 848. 849. 850. 851. 852. 853. 854. 855. 856. 857. 858. 859. 860. 861. 862. 863. 864. 865. 866. 867. 868. 869. 870. 871. 872. 873. 874. 875. 876. 877. 878. 879. 880. 881. 882. 883. 884. 885. 886. 887. 888. 889. 890. 891. 892. 893. 894. 895. 896. 897. 898. 899. 900. 901. 902. 903. 904. 905. 906. 907. 908. 909. 910. 911. 912. 913. 914. 915. 916. 917. 918. 919. 920. 921. 922. 923. 924. 925. 926. 927. 928. 929. 930. 931. 932. 933. 934. 935. 936. 937. 938. 939. 940. 941. 942. 943. 944. 945. 946. 947. 948. 949. 950. 951. 952. 953. 954. 955. 956. 957. 958. 959. 960. 961. 962. 963. 964. 965. 966. 967. 968. 969. 970. 971. 972. 973. 974. 975. 976. 977. 978. 979. 980. 981. 982. 983. 984. 985. 986. 987. 988. 989. 990. 991. 992. 993. 994. 995. 996. 997. 998. 999. 1000.

of home—was now renewed. The Athenians celebrated the festival with its accompanying matches, even the chariot-race, in a manner more splendid than had ever been known in former times. They appointed a similar festival to be celebrated every fourth year. At this period they were isolated both from the Olympics and the Pythian games, which probably made the revival of the Delian festival more gratifying to them. The religious zeal and magnificence of Athens were strikingly displayed at Delos.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Thucyd. II. 36; Pausan. Hellen. c. 1, §. 4. Strabo, xii. 44.

CHARTERED

REVISTA YEAR OF THE WAR—CAPTURE OF  
SPANISH.

The invasion of Attica by the Lacedæmonians had now become an ordinary enterprise, undertaken in every year of the war except the third and sixth, and then limited only from accidental causes; through the same hopes were no longer entertained from it as at the commencement of the war. During the present spring Agis, king of Sparta, conducted the Peloponnesian army into the territory, towards about the end of April, and repeated the usual ravages.

1. The first step is to identify the problem.
 2. The second step is to define the problem.
 3. The third step is to analyze the problem.
 4. The fourth step is to develop a solution.
 5. The fifth step is to implement the solution.
 6. The sixth step is to evaluate the solution.
 7. The seventh step is to monitor the solution.
 8. The eighth step is to maintain the solution.
 9. The ninth step is to improve the solution.
 10. The tenth step is to document the solution.

It seemed, however, as if Korkyra was about to become the principal scene of the year's military operations. For the allies of the oligarchical party, having come back to the island and fortified themselves on Mount Likhai, carried on war with as much activity against the Korkyreans in the city, that distress and even famine reigned there. Many Peloponnesian troops were sent thither to assist the aggressors. As soon as it became known at Athens how badly the Korkyreans in the city were pressed, orders were given to an Athenian fleet of forty triremes, about to sail for Sicily under Eurymedon and Sophokles, to halt in their voyage at Korkyra, and to lend whatever aid might be needed.<sup>1</sup> But during the course of that voyage, an accident occurred elsewhere, neither foreseen nor imagined by any one, which gave a new character and promise to the whole war. Euboea

**Editorial:**  
Dear Sir,  
I am writing  
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forcibly the observations of Pericles and Aristides before the commencement, on the impossibility of calculating what turn events might take!

So high did Demosthenes stand in the favour of the Athenians, after his brilliant success in the *Androtion Gulf*, that they granted him permission at his own request to go abroad and to employ the fleet in any descent which he might think expedient on the coast of Peloponnesia. The students of his active officer to the Maceleans at Scaphira inspired him with the idea of planting a detachment of them on some well-chosen position just in the narrow Macelean territory, from whence they would be able permanently to harass the Lacedæmonians and provoke revolt among the Helots—the more so from their analogy of race and dialect. The Maceleans, active in pirating, and doubtless well acquainted with the points of this coast, all of which had formerly belonged to their ancestors, had probably indicated to him Pylos on the north-western shore.

That ancient and Homeric name was applied specially and properly to denote the promontory which forms the northern termination of the western bay of Messenia opposite to the island of Sphagia or Sphakteria; though in vulgar language the whole neighbouring district seems also to have been called Pylos. Accordingly, in circumnavigating Læmon, Demosthenes requested that the fleet might be detained at this spot long enough to enable him to fortify it, engaging himself to stay afterwards and maintain it with a garrison. It was an uninhabited promontory—about forty-five miles from Sparta, then as, as he desired in any portion of her territory—presenting rugged cliffs, and easy of defence both by sea and land. But its great additional recommendation, with reference to the maritime power of Achaia, consisted in its overlooking the spacious and secure basin now called the bay of Navarino. That basin was flanked and protected by the islet called Sphakteria or Sphagia, uncolonized, unwarmed, and full of wood, which stretched along the coast for about a mile and three quarters, leaving only two narrow entrances; one at its northern end, opposite to the position land

\* *Thucyd. i. 101, ii. 12.*





But Eurydamas and Epiklesides decidedly rejected all proposition of delay; and with much reason, since they had been informed (though seemingly without truth) that the Peloponnesians had at last actually reached Nauplia. They might well have remembered the mischief which had ensued three years before, from the delay of the reinforcements sent to Piræus in some desultory operations on the coast of Eubœa. The fleet accordingly passed by Naxos without stopping; but a terrible storm drove them back and forced them to seek shelter in the very harbour which Demosthenes had fixed upon as the only harbour anywhere near. That other task advantage of the accident to answer his proposition, which however appeared to the commanders disagreeable. There were plenty of deserters upon board Peloponnesians (they said, if he chose to waste the resources of the city in occupying them.) They remained unmoved by his reasons in reply. Finding himself thus unsuccessful, Demosthenes pressed upon the united permission granted to him by the Athenian people, to address himself first to the soldiers, last of all to the taxarchs or inferior officers, and to persuade them to second his project, even against the will of the commanders. Much inconvenience might well have arisen from such clashing of authority; but it happened that both the soldiers and the taxarchs took the same view of the case as their commanders, and refused compliance. Nor can we be surprised at such resistance, when we reflect upon the seeming improbability

was indeed Epiklesides, without any other proof or authority, to be so successful. It is evident that neither Demosthenes, nor those officers, who joined with him, were ignorant of the result of the battle of Pylos. Epiklesides was just at that moment leaving Athens, &c. He directly afterwards was arrested, there would have been nothing to hinder them from finding out through him, the whole difference may be deduced from it. The statements of Thuc. vii. 25. 10. 11. that there were two attempts on Pylos, without any success, while Demosthenes had two of them very nearly made, appears to be inconsistent with the account of Thucydides.

I think that there is no alternative except to suppose that a great officer

was here taken place in the two previous attempts towards Pylos, from the statement, during the second of these, that a large detachment of Athenian troops was sent down to the island of the region which had been made about there, &c. &c. now in the extreme position of Pylos, with the various passages that would have been then well known and chosen. To suppose changes in the composition of the army to this extent would seem extravagant, and other hypotheses which may be started will be found involved in more general difficulties.

Thucyd. vi. 25. The account, although general and obscure, given by Thucydides of these operations, seems to refer to Pylos and Nauplia, and to be found in Thucyd. vii. 25. 10. 11.

of being able to maintain such a post against the great real, and still greater supposed, superiority of Landeronean land force. It happened however that the fleet was detained there for some days by stormy weather; so that the soldiers, having nothing to do, were moved with the spontaneous impulse of occupying themselves with the fortification, and crowded around to assist in with all the ardour of eager volunteers. Having contemplated nothing of the kind on starting from Athens, they had neither tools for cutting stone, nor rods for carrying mortar.<sup>1</sup> Accordingly they were compelled to build their wall by collecting such pieces of rock or stones as they found, and putting them together as such happened to fit in: whenever mortar was wanted, they brought it up on their loaded backs, with hands joined behind them to prevent it from slipping away. Such fortifications were made up, however, partly by the unbounded ardour of the soldiers, partly by the natural difficulties of the ground, which hardly required fortification except at particular points; the work was completed in a rough way in six days, and Domestichus was left in garrison with five ships, while Euryonides with the main fleet sailed away to Euxyne. The crews of the five ships (two of which, however, were sent away to warn Euryonides afterwards) would amount to about 1800 men in all. But there presently arrived two armed Mæonian pirates, from which Domestichus obtained a reinforcement of sixty Mæonian hoplites, together with a supply of richer shackle, though more fit for show than for use, wherewith to arm his recruits. Altogether, it appears that he must have had about 900 hoplites, besides the half-armed recruits.<sup>2</sup>

Intelligence of this attempt to plant arms upon the Landeronean territory, the annoyance and insult of a hostile post, was soon transmitted to Sparta. Yet no immediate measures were taken to march to the spot, as well from the natural slowness of the Spartan character, strengthened by a interval which happened to be then

Domestichus  
himself  
besides the  
fleet,  
through the  
want of  
rod or the  
soldiers  
for which  
there was  
a demand.  
While the  
fleet was  
at Euxyne.

Half more  
of the Lan-  
deronean  
to recruit  
Sparta.

<sup>1</sup> Thucyd. l. i. c. 10.

<sup>2</sup> Thucyd. l. ii. c. 10. Domestichus placed the greater number from amongst his hoplites, reserving the rest of his men

and selected a few of them to march down to the ships. These hoplites in total number was hardly less than the

going on, as from the medicine sustained that, whereas attacked, the acquisition of the money was certain. A stronger impression however was made by the news upon the Lacedæmonian army invading Aïkos, who were at the same time suffering from want of provisions (the corn not being yet ripe), and from an unusually cold spring: accordingly Ages marched them back to Sparta, and the fortification of Pylos thus produced the effect of shortening the campaign to the unusually short period of fifteen days. It operated in like manner to the protection of Kalyria: for the Peloponnesians then, scarcely arrived thither or still on the way, received orders immediately to return for the attack of Pylos. Having avoided the Athenian fleet by transporting the ships across the isthmus at Lædas, it reached Pylos about the same time as the Lacedæmonians had been from Sparta, composed of the Spartans themselves and the neighbouring Perioeci. For the more distant Perioeci, as well as the Peloponnesians then, being just returned from Aïkos, though constrained to come as soon as they could, did not accompany this first march.<sup>1</sup>

At the last moment before the Peloponnesian fleet came in and occupied the harbour, Demosthenes detached two out of his five triremes to warn Eurytomos and the main fleet, and to attract immediate notice: the remaining ships he banded up on shore under the fortification, protecting them by palisades planted in rows, and prepared to defend himself in the best manner he could. Having posted the larger portion of his force—some of them were women with cut arms, and many only half-armed—round the scutellar points of the fortification, to resist attacks from the land force, he himself, with sixty chosen hoplites and a few bowmen, marched out of the fortification down to the sea-shore. It was on that side that the wall was weakest, for the Athenians, confident in their naval superiority, had given themselves little trouble to provide against an assailable front. Accordingly, Demosthenes knew that the great stress of the attack would be on the sea-side. His only safety consisted in preventing the enemy from landing: a purpose, assisted by the rocky and pebbly shore, which left no possibility of approach for ships except on a narrow space immediately under the fortification. It was here that he took post, on

Prepar-  
ation of the  
army to be  
in action  
Pylos  
action  
then.

<sup>1</sup> Thucyd. ii. 4.



narrow in dimensions that the Lacedæmonians, ships would only approach by small squadrons at a time; while the Athenians maintained their ground firmly to prevent a single boat from setting foot on land. The resulting terrors arose up with loud shouts and exhortations to each other, striving to get so placed as that the haphies in the bows could effect a landing; but such were the difficulties, arising partly from the rocks and partly from the defence, that squadrons after squadrons tried this in vain. Nor did even the gallant example of Brasidas procure for them any better success. That officer, commanding a trireme, and observing that even of the pilots near him were anxious to drive their ships close to shore for fear of starting them against the rocks, indignantly called to them not to spare the planks of their vessels when the enemy had limited them by meeting a fleet in the country: Lacedæmonians (he exclaimed) ought to carry the landing by force, even though their ships should be dashed to pieces! the Peloponnesian allies ought to be forward in marching their ships for Sparta, in return for the many services which she had rendered to them.<sup>1</sup> Foremost in performance as well as in exhortation, Brasidas constrained his own pilot to drive his ship close in, and advanced in person even on to the landing-steps, for the purpose of keeping them ashore. But here he stood exposed to all the weapons of the Athenian defenders, who beat him back and pierced him with as many wounds that he tumbled away and fell back into the bows (or foremost part of the trireme, beyond the stern); while his shield, slipping away from the arm, dropped down and rolled overhead into the sea. His ship was obliged to retire, like the rest, without having effected any landing. All these successive attacks from the sea, repeated for one whole day and a part of the next, were repulsed by Demosthenes and his little band with victorious bravery. To both sides it seemed a strange reversal of ordinary relations,<sup>2</sup> that the Athenians, essentially mariners, should be fighting on land—and that two Lacedæmonians land—against the Lacedæmonians, the adept land-warriors of Greece, now on ship-board, and striving in vain to compass a

<sup>1</sup> Thuc. 2. 95. 27, 28, 29. *ὁμοῖα* is excellent note of the Greek on this passage, in which he indicates the manner and composition of Brasidas with the greatest distinctness of description.

<sup>2</sup> Thucyd. 2. 95. *ἀντιστάσεις* is not only a striking and apt phrase, but also implies that the Athenians were fighting close and on ship-board, while the Lacedæmonians were on land, and were used wherever expedient.

looking on their own shores. The Athenians, in honour of their success, created a trophy, the chief ornament of which was the shield of Eretria, cast ashore by the waves.

On the third day, the Lacedæmonians did not repeat their attack, but sent some of their vessels round to Aëdæ in the Mænean Gulf for timber to construct battering machines, which they intended to employ against the wall of Demetochia on the side towards the harbour, where it was higher, and could not be assailed without machines, but where at the same time there was great facility in landing—for their previous attack had been made on the side facing the sea, where the wall was lower, but the difficulty of landing insuperable.<sup>1</sup>

Stores of  
battering  
machines  
sent on  
Pylos.

But before these ships came back, the face of affairs was seriously changed by the appearance before the Athenian fleet from Eubœa three under Hieronymus, reinforced by four Chian ships and some of the guard-ships at Neapropolis, so as now to number fifty sail. The Athenians advanced, finding the enemy's fleet in possession of the harbour, and seeing both the island of Sphækteia occupied, and the opposite shores covered with Lacedæmonian hoplites<sup>2</sup>—for the allies from all parts of Peloponnesus had now arrived—looked around in vain for a place to land. He could find no other night-vision except the unwatched island of Pylos, not very far distant. From hence he sailed forth in the morning to Pylos, prepared for a naval engagement—hoping that perhaps the Lacedæmonians might come out to fight him in the open sea, but resolved, if this did not happen, to force his way in and attack the fleet in the harbour; the breadth of sea between Sphækteia and the mainland being sufficient to admit of mutual assistance.<sup>3</sup> The Lacedæmonian admiral, seemingly confounded

<sup>1</sup> Thucyd. iv. 15. *ἀσπίδες τε καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ὅσους οὐκ ἔστιν ἔργον εἶναι ἀπὸ τοῦ ἑλκεῖν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ἔργον εἶναι ἀπὸ τοῦ ἑλκεῖν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ἔργον εἶναι ἀπὸ τοῦ ἑλκεῖν.*

<sup>2</sup> Thucyd. iv. 15.

<sup>3</sup> Thucyd. iv. 15. The Lacedæmonians were not only in possession of the island of Sphækteia, but also of the harbour of Pylos, and the whole of the coast of the Peloponnesus.

The expression "the harbour which was not small" is Aristotle's. The ancient bay of Pylos, the present small cove, from Mr. Marshall and

Dr. Arnold, and was, indeed, one of the reasons which induced the latter to suppose that the Lacedæmonians by Thucydides were to be taken as the main body, but the neighbouring bay of Corcyra.

I have already observed that the position is a dangerous one, but in reference to the expression of *ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ἔργον εἶναι ἀπὸ τοῦ ἑλκεῖν*, I think the best of Aristotle's explanation is, *ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ἔργον εἶναι ἀπὸ τοῦ ἑλκεῖν*, the idea being that the Lacedæmonians were to be taken as the main body, but the neighbouring bay of Corcyra.

by the speed of the Athenian fleet in coming back, never thought of springing out of the harbour to fight, nor did they even realize their scheme of blocking up the two entrances of the harbour with triremes closely lashed together. Leaving both entrances open, they determined to defend themselves within; but even here, so defective were their preparations, that several of their triremes were yet moored, and the others not fully armed, when the Athenian armada sailed in by both entrances at once to attack them. Most of the Lacedæmonian triremes,

*As before the Lacedæmonian fleet in the harbour of Ploia.*

about and in fighting trim, resisted the attack for a certain time, but were at length vanquished and driven back to the shore, many of them with serious injury.<sup>1</sup>

Five of them were captured and towed off, one with all her crew aboard. The Athenians, vigorously pursuing their success, drove against such as took refuge on the shore, as well as those which were not engaged at the moment when the attack began, and had not been able to get aboard or into action. Some of the vanquished triremes being deserted by their crews, who jumped out upon the land, the Athenians were proceeding to tow them off, when the Lacedæmonian hoplites on the shore opposed a new and strenuous resistance. Exalted to the utmost pitch by witnessing the disgraceful defeat of their fleet, and aware of the cruel consequences which turned upon it, they rushed all armed into the water, seized the ships to prevent them from being dragged off, and engaged in a desperate conflict to huffe the assailants. We have already seen a similar act of heroism, two years before, on the part of the Messenian hoplites accompanying the fleet of Flaccus near Syracuse.<sup>2</sup> Extraordinary daring and valour was here displayed on both sides, on the attack as well as in the defence, and such was the clamour and confusion, that neither the leadership of the Lacedæmonians nor the sea-skill of the Athenians was of much avail: the contest was one of personal valour and considerable suffering on both sides. At length

<sup>1</sup> See before, I have stated in a preceding note that it is independently, in my judgment, to suppose the island of Syrakus, to have attacked the mentioned war, were already in the time of Hieronymus, than it does not. At that time, therefore, very probably the state of Syracuse had not yet begun to be so strong as it was.

<sup>2</sup> Thucyd. lib. vi. § 92. See also the same, above, § 91. We learned in English, speak of attacking a person, though this Greek word is both Greek and Latin, to represent the same, followed by the implying that of an enemy's ship.

<sup>3</sup> See above in this history, chap. xlii.

the Lacedæmonians moved their point, and moved all the ships ashore; none being moved away except those at first captured. Both parties thus separated: the Athenians retired to the harbour at Pylos, where they were doubtless hailed with overflowing joy by their comrades, and where they sought a supply for their victory—giving up the enemy's dead for burial, and picking up the floating wrecks and stores.<sup>1</sup>

But the great prize of the victory was neither in the five ships captured nor in the relief afforded to the besieged at Pylos. It lay in the hospital occupying the island of Sphacteria, who were now cut off from the mainland, as well as from all supplies. The Athenians, making round it in triumph, already looked upon them as their prisoners; while the Lacedæmonians on the opposite mainland, deeply distressed but not knowing what to do, sent to Sparta for advice. So grave was the emergency, that the Ephors came in person to the spot forthwith. Suppose they could still muster sixty thousand, a greater number than the Athenians—besides a large force on land, and the whole command of the resources of the country,—while the Athenians had no footing on shore except the contracted peninsula of Pylos, we might have imagined that a strenuous effort to carry off the imprisoned detachment across the narrow strait to the mainland would have had a fair chance of success. And probably, if either Demosthenes or Brasidas had been in command, such an effort would have been made. But Lacedæmonian courage was rather timid and unyielding than adventurous. Moreover the Athenian superiority at sea exercised a sort of fascination over men's minds analogous to that of the Ephores themselves on land; so that the Ephors, on reaching Pylos, took a desponding view of their position, and sent a herald to the Athenian generals to propose an armistice, in order to allow time for envoys to go to Athens and treat for peace.

To this Brasidas and Demosthenes assented, and an armistice was concluded on the following terms. The Lacedæmonians agreed to surrender not only all their soldiers now in the harbour, but also all the rest in their ports, altogether to the number of sixty; also to abstain from all attack upon the harbour

The Lacedæmonian detachment is shown as picked up by the Athenians first in the island of Sphacteria.—see notes appended at Pylos.

<sup>1</sup> Thucyd. iv. 23, 24.



at Pylos either by land or sea, for such was as should be necessary for the removal of convoys to Athens as well as for their return, both to be effected as an Athenian bribe provided for the purpose. The Athenians on their side engaged to detain from all hostilities during the time interval; but it was agreed that they should keep strict and unceasing watch over the island, yet without landing upon it. For the volunteers of the detachment in the island the Lacedæmonians were permitted to send over every day two choruses of barley-meal in other ready baked, two kalyks of wine,<sup>1</sup> and some meat for each hoplite, together with half that quantity for each of the attendant Helots; but this was all to be done under the supervision of the Athenians, with peremptory obligations to send no worse additional supplies. It was moreover expressly stipulated that if any one provision of the armistice, small or great, was violated, the whole should be considered as null and void. Lastly, the Athenians engaged, on the return of the convoys from Athens, to restore the treasures in the same condition as they received them.

Such terms sufficiently attest the broadness and generosity of the Lacedæmonians; while the surrender of their entire naval force, to the number of sixty triremes, which was forthwith carried into effect, demonstrated at the same time that they sincerely believed in the possibility of obtaining peace. Well aware that they were themselves the original beginners of the war, at a time when the Athenians desired peace—and that the latter had besides made freedom even to white under the pressure of the epidemic—they presented that the same disposition still prevailed at Athens, and that their personal peace wishes would be so gladly welcomed as to procure without difficulty the relinquishment of the prisoners at Sybaktina.<sup>2</sup>

The Lacedæmonian envoys, conveyed to Athens in an Athenian trireme, appeared before the public assembly to set forth their

<sup>1</sup>Thucyd. ix. 18. The Chorus was attributed to about two poets, Pindar and Anacreon. It was questioned at the second rally mentioned for a short time. Some Lacedæmonians admitted themselves devotees of this daily offering, but the majority of the Athenians, besides being in thought and quantity not qualified, held that the same way of mind to not qualified devotees.

show that they did not fear about in this time.

The Helots composed about half a pleth, English, very numerous, and Lacedæmonian soldiers had therefore a great of victory. It was through the presence in Athens to which the Helots large quantities of a great.

<sup>2</sup>Thucyd. ix. 18. compare vol. 26.



already subsisting, which rather concerned Sparta as the chief of the Peloponnesian confederacy. Nor was it only the goodwill and gratitude of the Spartans which Athens would earn by accepting the proposition tendered to her; she would further acquire the grace and glory of conferring peace on Greece, which all the Greeks would recognise as her act. And when once the two pre-eminent powers, Athens and Sparta, were established in cordial unity, the remaining Grecian states would be too weak to resist what these two might prescribe.

Such was the language held by the Lacedæmonians in the assembly at Athens. It was severely calculated for their purpose, though when we turn back to the commencement of the war, and read the lofty declamations of the Spartan Ephors and assembly respecting the wrongs of their allies and the necessity of entering full conformity for them from Athens, the contrast is indeed striking. On this occasion, the Lacedæmonians acted entirely for themselves and from consideration of their own necessities; severing themselves from their allies, and soliciting a special peace for themselves, with as little scruple as the Spartan general Menonides during the preceding year, when he abandoned his Achaïan allies after the battle of Olee, to conclude a separate capitulation with Democleus.

The course proper to be adopted by Athens in reference to the proposition, however, was by no means obvious. In all probability, the intrigue which brought the Lacedæmonian envoys also brought the first news of that unforeseen and instantaneous turn of events, which had rendered the Spartans in Sparta almost powerless (as it was then conceived), and placed the whole Lacedæmonian fleet in their power, thus giving a totally new character to the war. The sudden arrival of such prodigious intelligence—the astounding presence of Lacedæmonian envoys, bearing

When a decision is made, an OTC transaction is entered into. The OTC market is a place where investors can trade securities that are not listed on a stock exchange. The OTC market is a place where investors can trade securities that are not listed on a stock exchange.

an array of the numbers, connected by  
bracketed in such a way with the principal  
numbers, except the 1st and 2nd.

"We must realize, however, that the Africans could not possibly know at that time that the haploids existed in *Neotoma*, although in great quantities in the West African in *Neotoma*. And the *Neotoma* average would have

Keep the following problems in mind when any form of argument, verbal, visual, or even, suggest, is used as evidence:

7. Example 10. In the above case, the first two steps of the algorithm are as follows:



again into the assembly to hear it. On being informed of the mediation, they made no comment on its substance, but invited the Athenians to name commissioners, who might discuss with them freely and deliberately suitable terms for a pacification. Here however Klean burst upon them with an indignant rebuke. He had thought from the first (he said) that they came with dishonest purposes, but now the thing was clear—nothing else could be moved by the desire to treat with some few men apart from the general public. If they had really any fair proposition to make, he called upon them to proclaim it openly to all. But then the envoys could not bring themselves to do. They had probably come with authority to make certain concessions; but to announce these concessions forthwith, would have rendered negotiation impossible, besides dishonouring them in the face of their allies. Such dishonour would be reserved, too, without any advantage, if the Athenians should after all reject the terms, which the temper of the assembly before them rendered but too probable. Moreover, they were totally unprotected in the talents for dealing with a public assembly, such discussions being so rare as to be practically unknown in the Lacedæmonian system. To reply to the demand for a reluctant speaker like Klean, required readiness of decision, dexterity, and self-command, which they had had no opportunity of acquiring. They remained silent—shocked by the speaker and intimidated by the temper of the assembly. Their mission was thus terminated, and they were recovered in the trireme to Pylos.<sup>1</sup>

It is probable that if these envoys had been able to make an effective reply to Klean, and to defend their proposition against his charge of fraudulent purposes, they would have been sustained by Nicias and a certain number of leading Athenians, so that the assembly might have been brought at least to try the issue of a private discussion between diplomatic agents on both sides. But the case was one in which it was absolutely necessary that the envoys should stand forward with some defence for themselves, which Nicias might effectively second, but could not originate;

<sup>1</sup> Thuc. ii. 22.

and as they were incompetent to this task, the whole affair breaks down. We shall hereafter find other examples, in which the incapacity of Lacedæmonian envoys to meet the open debate of Athenian political life is productive of mischievous results. In this case, the proposition of the envoys to enter into treaty with select commissioners was not only quite reasonable, but afforded the only possibility (though doubtless not a certainty) of some ultimate pacification; and the measures whereby Kleon discredited it was a grave abuse of publicity—not unknown in modern, though more frequent in ancient, political life. Kleon probably thought that if commissioners were named, Nikias, Lachis, and other politicians of the same rank and colour would be the persons selected; persons whose anxiety for peace and alliance with Sparta would make them over-indulgent and careless in securing the interests of Athens. It will be seen, when we come to describe the conduct of Nikias four years afterwards, that this suspicion was not ill-grounded.

Unfortunately Thucydides, in describing the proceedings of this assembly, so important in its consequences because it interrupted a promising opening for peace, is brief as usual—telling us only what was said by Kleon and what was decided by the assembly. But though nothing is positively stated respecting Nikias and his partisans, we learn from other sources, and we may infer from what afterwards occurred, that they vehemently opposed Kleon, and that they looked coldly on the subsequent enterprise against Sphakteria as upon his peculiar mission.<sup>1</sup>

It has been common to treat the dismissal of the Lacedæmonian envoys on this occasion as a peculiar specimen of democratical folly. Yet over-estimation of the prospective dangers arising out of peace, to a degree more extravagant than that of which Athens was now guilty, is by no means peculiar to democracy. Other governments, opposed to democracy not less in temper than in form—as this despot like the Emperor Napoleon, and a powerful aristocracy like that of England<sup>2</sup>—have found success

<sup>1</sup> Thucyd. *lib. 4. 1*; Plutarchus, *lib. 18*, 40, 41, 42.

<sup>2</sup> For an excellent account of the conduct of the Emperor Napoleon during the Egyptian war.

<sup>3</sup> For example, look at the beginning of the American war for some

years divided into very strong body, but the strongest, and that in the middle which the French and every power were employed to render popular, in order that the arms of the nation might be put in the general interest of the nation. This opinion was



exchange for Sphakteria. Nay, even if such acquisition had been found impracticable, still the Athenians would have been able to effect some arrangement which would have widened the breach and destroyed the confidence between Sparta and her allies—a point of great moment for them to accomplish. There was therefore every reason for trying what could be done by negotiation, under the present temper of Sparta; and the step by which Kleon abruptly broke off such hopes was decidedly mischievous.

On the return of the envoys without success to Pylos,<sup>1</sup> twenty days after their departure from that place, the armistice immediately terminated; and the Lacedæmonians re-demanded the tribute which they had surrendered. But Euryarchus refused compliance with this demand, alleging that the Lacedæmonians had during the truce made a fraudulent attempt to surprise the rock of Pylos, and had violated the stipulations in other ways besides; while it stood expressly stipulated in the truce, that the violation by either side even of the least among its conditions should cancel all obligation on both sides. Thucydides, without distinctly giving his opinion, seems rather to imply that there was no just ground for the refusal; though if any unwatched want of vigilance had presented to the Lacedæmonians an opportunity for surprising Pylos, they would be likely enough to avail themselves of it, seeing that they would thereby drive off the Athenian fleet from its only landing-place, and render the continued blockade of Sphakteria impracticable. However the truth may be, Euryarchus persisted in his refusal, in spite of loud protests of the Lacedæmonians against his perversity. Hostilities were immediately resumed: the Lacedæmonian army on land began again to attack the fortifications of Pylos, while the Athenian fleet became doubly watchful in the blockade of Sphakteria, in which they were reinforced by twenty fresh ships from Athens, making a fleet of seventy triremes in all. Two ships were perpetually rounding the island, in opposite directions, throughout the whole day; while at night the whole fleet was kept on watch, except on the sea-side of the island in stormy weather.<sup>2</sup>

The armistice is just mentioned, not very prominently at Pylos. Euryarchus keeps your attention at the Lacedæmonian fleet.

<sup>1</sup> Thucyd. iv. 26.

<sup>2</sup> Thucyd. iv. 29.



abundance of  
Sphakteria  
by the  
Spartans  
from the  
city and  
expedient  
to the sit-  
ing of the  
fleet.

The blockade, however, was soon found to be more full of privations in reference to the Sphaktes themselves, and more difficult of enforcement in respect to the island and its occupants, than had been originally contemplated. The Athenians were much distressed for want of water. They had only one really good spring in the fortification of Pylos itself, quite insufficient for the supply of a large fleet; many of them were

obliged to scrape the shingle and drink such brackish water as they could find; while ships as well as men were perpetually afloat, since they could take rest and refreshment only by always successively landing on the rock of Pylos, or even on the edge of Sphakteria itself, with all the chance of being interrupted by the enemy—there being no other landing-place; and the current always affording no accommodation either for sitting or sleeping.

Extracted  
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and nearly  
unreliability  
of the  
Spartan  
ships  
made us  
infer the  
infirmities  
which the  
fleet was  
subject to.

At first, all this was patiently borne, in the hopes that Sphakteria would speedily be starved out, and the Spartans forced to remove the request for negotiation. But no such request came, and the Athenians in the fleet gradually became sick in body as well as impatient and angry in mind. In spite of all their vigilance, clandestine supplies of provisions continually reached the island, under the transportation of large vessels offered by the Spartan government. Able swimmers continued to cross the strait, dragging after them by ropes skins full of honey and poppy-seed mixed with honey; while merchant-vessels, chiefly manned by Helots, started from various parts of the Lacedæmon coast, collecting by preference the stormy nights, and encountering every risk in order to run their vessel with its cargo ashore on the east-side of the island, at a time when the Athenian guardships could not be on the look-out.<sup>1</sup> They cared little about damage to their vessel in landing, provided they could get the cargo on shore; for ample compensation was returned to them, together with emancipation

<sup>1</sup> Thucyd. iv. 26. The only one that they saw here. This does not mean the loss of the navigation route to Pylos, for Pausanias tells that the Athenians had not plenty of sea routes

in the harbor. It means that they had no other place, except the narrow space of Pylos itself.

<sup>2</sup> Thucyd. iv. 26.

to every Haida who succeeded in reaching the island with a supply. Though the Athenians relinquished their vigilance, and interrupted many of them during unagglow, still there were others who eluded them. Moreover the natives supplied to the island by stipulation during the absence of the crews in their journey to Athens had been so ample, that Epistates the commander had been able to economize, and thus to make the stock hold out longer. Week after week passed without any symptoms of surrender. The Athenians not only felt the general sufferings of their own position, but also became apprehensive for their own supplies, all brought by sea round Peloponnesus to this distant and naked shore. They began even to mistrust the possibility of their indefinitely continuing the blockade, against the contingency of such violent weather as would probably cause at the close of summer. In this state of weariness and uncertainty, the active Demosthenes began to organize a descent upon the island, with the view of carrying it by force. He not only sent for forces from the neighbouring allies, Solyngians and Mespethians, but also transmitted an urgent request to Athens that reinforcements might be furnished to him for the purpose—making known explicitly both the uncomfortable condition of the armament and the unpropitious chances of simple blockade.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100 101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109 110 111 112 113 114 115 116 117 118 119 120 121 122 123 124 125 126 127 128 129 130 131 132 133 134 135 136 137 138 139 140 141 142 143 144 145 146 147 148 149 150 151 152 153 154 155 156 157 158 159 160 161 162 163 164 165 166 167 168 169 170 171 172 173 174 175 176 177 178 179 180 181 182 183 184 185 186 187 188 189 190 191 192 193 194 195 196 197 198 199 200 201 202 203 204 205 206 207 208 209 210 211 212 213 214 215 216 217 218 219 220 221 222 223 224 225 226 227 228 229 230 231 232 233 234 235 236 237 238 239 240 241 242 243 244 245 246 247 248 249 250 251 252 253 254 255 256 257 258 259 260 261 262 263 264 265 266 267 268 269 270 271 272 273 274 275 276 277 278 279 280 281 282 283 284 285 286 287 288 289 290 291 292 293 294 295 296 297 298 299 300 301 302 303 304 305 306 307 308 309 310 311 312 313 314 315 316 317 318 319 320 321 322 323 324 325 326 327 328 329 330 331 332 333 334 335 336 337 338 339 340 341 342 343 344 345 346 347 348 349 350 351 352 353 354 355 356 357 358 359 360 361 362 363 364 365 366 367 368 369 370 371 372 373 374 375 376 377 378 379 380 381 382 383 384 385 386 387 388 389 390 391 392 393 394 395 396 397 398 399 400 401 402 403 404 405 406 407 408 409 410 411 412 413 414 415 416 417 418 419 420 421 422 423 424 425 426 427 428 429 430 431 432 433 434 435 436 437 438 439 440 441 442 443 444 445 446 447 448 449 450 451 452 453 454 455 456 457 458 459 460 461 462 463 464 465 466 467 468 469 470 471 472 473 474 475 476 477 478 479 480 481 482 483 484 485 486 487 488 489 490 491 492 493 494 495 496 497 498 499 500 501 502 503 504 505 506 507 508 509 510 511 512 513 514 515 516 517 518 519 520 521 522 523 524 525 526 527 528 529 530 531 532 533 534 535 536 537 538 539 540 541 542 543 544 545 546 547 548 549 550 551 552 553 554 555 556 557 558 559 560 561 562 563 564 565 566 567 568 569 570 571 572 573 574 575 576 577 578 579 580 581 582 583 584 585 586 587 588 589 590 591 592 593 594 595 596 597 598 599 600 601 602 603 604 605 606 607 608 609 610 611 612 613 614 615 616 617 618 619 620 621 622 623 624 625 626 627 628 629 630 631 632 633 634 635 636 637 638 639 640 641 642 643 644 645 646 647 648 649 650 651 652 653 654 655 656 657 658 659 660 661 662 663 664 665 666 667 668 669 670 671 672 673 674 675 676 677 678 679 680 681 682 683 684 685 686 687 688 689 690 691 692 693 694 695 696 697 698 699 700 701 702 703 704 705 706 707 708 709 710 711 712 713 714 715 716 717 718 719 720 721 722 723 724 725 726 727 728 729 730 731 732 733 734 735 736 737 738 739 740 741 742 743 744 745 746 747 748 749 750 751 752 753 754 755 756 757 758 759 760 761 762 763 764 765 766 767 768 769 770 771 772 773 774 775 776 777 778 779 780 781 782 783 784 785 786 787 788 789 790 791 792 793 794 795 796 797 798 799 800 801 802 803 804 805 806 807 808 809 810 811 812 813 814 815 816 817 818 819 820 821 822 823 824 825 826 827 828 829 830 831 832 833 834 835 836 837 838 839 840 841 842 843 844 845 846 847 848 849 850 851 852 853 854 855 856 857 858 859 860 861 862 863 864 865 866 867 868 869 870 871 872 873 874 875 876 877 878 879 880 881 882 883 884 885 886 887 888 889 890 891 892 893 894 895 896 897 898 899 900 901 902 903 904 905 906 907 908 909 910 911 912 913 914 915 916 917 918 919 920 921 922 923 924 925 926 927 928 929 930 931 932 933 934 935 936 937 938 939 940 941 942 943 944 945 946 947 948 949 950 951 952 953 954 955 956 957 958 959 960 961 962 963 964 965 966 967 968 969 970 971 972 973 974 975 976 977 978 979 980 981 982 983 984 985 986 987 988 989 990 991 992 993 994 995 996 997 998 999 1000 1001 1002 1003 1004 1005 1006 1007 1008 1009 1010 1011 1012 1013 1014 1015 1016 1017 1018 1019 1020 1021 1022 1023 1024 1025 1026 1027 1028 1029 1030 1031 1032 1033 1034 1035 1036 1037 1038 1039 1040 1

4.12. Die folgende Tabelle enthält die Anzahl der Personen, die in den verschiedenen Altersgruppen in der Stadt A im Jahr 2010 geboren wurden. Die Spaltenüberschriften geben die Altersgruppen an, die Zeilenüberschriften die Geschlechter. Die Werte in der Tabelle sind die Anzahl der Personen.

Elaphoglossum is a genus of mosses in the family Elaphoglossaceae. It is a monotypic genus, meaning it contains only one species, *Elaphoglossum* *sp.* The genus is named in honor of the Greek word for "moss" (*elaphoglossos*), which is derived from *elaphos* (moss) and *glossos* (tongue).

6. The following conditions apply to the use of the information in this report:

2. The *Agave* spp., the characteristic mesquite (*Prosopis juliflora*) in particular, are also under expansion and in some regions. Within the limits of established systems in Qaz, the *Agave* spp. are used for products, especially in Qaz.

That these pictures in opposition were an ideological message sent from Washington and the other Atlantic powers of Fyfe, he refers to the London assembly. I cannot will not understand. The Atlantic

[illegible]

Proceedings  
in the  
Athens  
assembly on  
concerning  
this matter—  
preparation  
of speech—  
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of the public  
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matters were  
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this.

The arrival of these envoys caused infinite mortification to the Athenians at home. Having expected to have long before that Spakhiarna had surrendered, they were now taught to consider even the ultimate conquest as a matter of doubt. They were surprised that the Lacedæmonians sent no fresh envoys to solicit peace, and began to suspect that such silence was founded upon well-grounded hopes of being able to hold out. But the person most of all discomfited was Kleon, who observed that the people now regretted their insulting repudiation of the Lacedæmonian message, and were displeased with him as the author of it; while, on the contrary, his numerous political enemies were rejoiced at the turn which events had taken, as it opened a means of effecting his ruin. At first, Kleon contended that the envoys had misrepresented the state of facts. To which the latter replied by answering that, if their accuracy was mistrusted, commissioners of inspection might be sent to verify it; and Kleon himself, along with Theophrastus, was forthwith named for this function.

But it did not suit Kleon's purpose to go as commissioner to Pylæ. His mistrust of the statement was a more general suspicion, not resting on any positive evidence. Moreover, he saw that the dispensation of the assembly tended to comply with the request of Demosthenes, and to dispatch a reinforcing armament. He accordingly altered his tone at once: "If ye really believe the story (as such) do not waste time in sending commissioners, but act at once to capture the man. It would be easy with a proper force, if our generals were men (such he pointed reproachfully to his enemy Nicias, then Stratégus) to sail and take the soldiers in the island. That is what I at least would do if I were general." His words instantly provoked a hostile answer from a portion of the assembly: "Why do you not sail then at once, if you think the matter so easy?" Nicias, taking up this matter,

<sup>1</sup> Thucydides, in this place, calls the Athenian envoys, *ἀποστόλῃς* (ambassadors), but in the next place, he calls them *ἐπιστάταις* (commissioners), and in the next place, he calls them *ἐπιστάταις* (commissioners), and in the next place, he calls them *ἐπιστάταις* (commissioners).

<sup>2</sup> Thucydides, in this place, calls the Athenian envoys, *ἀποστόλῃς* (ambassadors), but in the next place, he calls them *ἐπιστάταις* (commissioners), and in the next place, he calls them *ἐπιστάταις* (commissioners), and in the next place, he calls them *ἐπιστάταις* (commissioners).





nothing at all—as having courageously put himself into the shoes of Demosthenes, and stolen away from that general the glory of taking Spakteria, after all the difficulties of the enterprise had been already got over, and “the cake really baked”—in use the phrase of the comic poet. Both of the poets are exaggerations in opposite directions; but the last in color of tone, if it be good at all against Kleon, is a galling sarcasm against those who derided Kleon as an extravagant boaster.

If we intend fairly to compare the behavior of Kleon with that of his political adversaries, we must distinguish between the two positions: first, that in which he had frustrated the public wishes of the Leukomenian envoys; next, the subsequent delay and dilatoriness which has been recently described. On the first occasion, his advice appears to have been mistaken in policy, as well as offensive in manner. His opponents, proposing a discussion by special commissioners as a fair chance for honorable terms of peace, took a juster view of the public interests. But the case was entirely altered when the question for peace (wisely or unwisely) had been broken up, and when the fate of Spakteria had been committed to the chances of war. There were then imperative reasons for prosecuting the war vigorously, and for employing all the force requisite to secure the capture of that island. And looking to this end, we shall find that there was nothing in the conduct of Kleon either to blame or to dislike; while his political adversaries (Nikias among them) are deplorably timid, ignorant, and selfish of the public interest, making only to turn the existing disappointment and dilatoriness into a party opportunity for running him.

To grant the reinforcement asked for by Demosthenes was obviously the proper measure, and Kleon saw that the people would go along with him in proposing it. But he had at the same time good grounds for reproaching Nikias and the other States, whose duty it was to originate that proposition, with their backwardness in remaining silent, and in leaving the matter to go by default, as if it were Kleon's offer and not theirs. His taunt—“This is what *I* would have done, if I were

would to swell the poet, and was only here little. The poets of Aristophanes lived before the outbreak of the war, he takes in any reference to his conduct. It is important to notice verbal reality.

passed"—was a mere phrase of the heat of debate, such as must have been very often used without any idea on the part of the hearers of contracting it as a pledge which the speaker was bound to realise. It was no disgrace to Kleon to decline a charge which he had never sought, and to confess his incompetence to command. The reason why he was forced into the post, in spite of his own manifest reluctance, was not (as some historians would have us believe) because the Athenian people loved a joke, but from two feelings, both perfectly serious, which divided the assembly—feelings opposite in their nature, but coinciding on this occasion to the same result. His enemies loudly urged him forward, anticipating that the enterprise under him would miscarry and that he would thus be saved; his friends, praising his measures, but not sharing in such anticipations, and sacrificing his reluctance to modesty, pronounced themselves as much the more vehemently on behalf of their leader, and repaid the worsted cheer by cheers of unceasing encouragement.

"Why do not you try your hand at this enterprise, Kleon, if you think it so easy? You will soon find that it is too much for you"—was the cry of his enemies: to which his friends would reply—"Yes, to be sure, try, Kleon; by all means, try; do not be backward; we warrant that you will come honourably out of it, and we will stand by you". Such cheer and counter-cheer is peculiar to the temper of an animated multitude (as Thucydides<sup>1</sup> states it) divided in feeling. Friends as well as enemies thus concerted to impose upon Kleon a compulsion not to be eluded. Of all the parties here concerned, those whose conduct is the most unpardonably disgraceful are Nikias and his abjectest supporters, who force a political enemy into the supreme command against his own strenuous protest, persuaded that he will fail, so as to compromise the lives of many soldiers, and the destiny of the state on an important emergency, but satisfying themselves with the idea that they shall bring him to disgrace and ruin.

It is to be remarked that Nikias and his fellow-Spartogi were belittled on this occasion, partly because they were really afraid of the duty. They anticipated a resistance to the death as Sphakteria such as that at Thermopylae; in which case, though

<sup>1</sup>Thucyd. II. 21. *cheerfuler pavidumque animus.*

victory might perhaps be won by a superior naval force, it would not be won without much bloodshed and grief, besides an insupportable quarrel with Sparta. If Kleon took a more correct measure of the chances, he ought to have credit for it as one "there were none contemners". And it seems probable that if he had not been thus forward in supporting the request of Demosthenes for reinforcement—or rather, if he had not been so placed that he was compelled to be forward—Nicias and his friends would have had aside the enterprise, and re-opened negotiations for peace under circumstances neither honorable nor advantageous to Athens. Kleon was in this matter one of the most important causes which Athens obtained throughout the whole war.

On joining Demosthenes with his reinforcement, Kleon found every preparation for attack made by that general, and the soldiers at Pylæ eager to commence such aggressive measures as would relieve them from the toils of a blockade. Pylos had become recently more open to assault in consequence of an accidental configuration of the wood, arising from a fire kindled by the Asiatic women, while loafing at the skirt of the island and roasting their food. Under the influence of a strong wind, most of the wood in the island had been caught fire and been destroyed. To Demosthenes this was an accident especially welcome; for the painful experience of his defeat in the forest-covered hills of Attika had taught him how difficult it was for warriors to cope with an enemy whom they could not see, and who knew all the good points of defence in the country.<sup>1</sup> The island being thus stripped of its wood, he was enabled to survey the garrison, to count their number, and to lay his plan of attack on certain data. He now, too, for the first time discovered that he had underrated their real number, having before supposed that the Lacedæmonians had sent in return for a greater total than was actually there. The island was occupied altogether by 400 Lacedæmonian hoplites, out of whom more than 120 were native Spartans, belonging to the first families in the city. The commander Epichidas, with the main body, occupied the centre of the island, near the only spring

which gave  
to Pylæ  
such a min-  
ute position  
relative of  
the island of  
Spartan, the  
importance  
and  
position of  
the Lacedæ-  
monians  
in it.

<sup>1</sup> Thucyd. ii. 94.  
[p. 17]



of water which it afforded.<sup>1</sup> An advanced guard of thirty hoplites was posted not far from the anchorage on the east of the island distant from Pylos; while the main, immediately fronting Pylos, peculiarly steep and rugged, and containing even a rude circuit of stones, of unknown origin, which served as a sort of defence, was held as a post of reserve.<sup>2</sup>

Such was the party which Alcibiades and Demosthenes were anxious to grasp. On the very day of the arrival of the <sup>Greek</sup> <sup>troops</sup> <sup>from</sup> <sup>the</sup> <sup>fleet</sup>, they sent a herald to the Lacedæmonians, <sup>to</sup> <sup>inform</sup> <sup>them</sup> <sup>that</sup> <sup>they</sup> <sup>were</sup> <sup>ready</sup> <sup>to</sup> <sup>accept</sup> <sup>of</sup> <sup>the</sup> <sup>proposition</sup> <sup>of</sup> <sup>the</sup> <sup>king</sup> <sup>of</sup> <sup>Sparta</sup> <sup>to</sup> <sup>send</sup> <sup>the</sup> <sup>hoplites</sup> <sup>on</sup> <sup>the</sup> <sup>island</sup> <sup>on</sup> <sup>condition</sup> <sup>of</sup> <sup>being</sup> <sup>simply</sup> <sup>detained</sup> <sup>under</sup> <sup>guard</sup> <sup>without</sup> <sup>any</sup> <sup>hardship</sup>, until a final partition should take place. Of course the answer was refused; after which, leaving only one day for reprieve, the two generals took advantage of the night to put all their hoplites aboard a few triremes, making sure as if they were merely commencing the ordinary nocturnal circumnavigation, so as to excite no suspicion in the companies of the island. The entire body of Athenian hoplites, 400 in number, were thus disembarked in two divisions, one on each side of the island, a little before daybreak; the outposts, consisting of thirty Lacedæmonians, completely surprised, were surprised even in their sleep, and all slain.<sup>3</sup> At the point of day the entire remaining force from the seventy-two triremes was also disembarked, leaving no boat save but the galley, or lowest tier of oarsmen, and retaining only a sufficient number to man the walls of Pylos. Altogether there could not have been less than 14,000 troops employed in the attack of the island, most of all arms—800 hoplites, 600 peltasts, 600 bowmen; the rest armed with javelins, slings, and stones. Demosthenes kept his hoplites in one compact body, but distributed the light-armed into separate companies of about 500 men each, with orders to sweep the strong promontory round, and harass the flanks and rear of the Lacedæmonians.<sup>4</sup>

To make this large force, the Lacedæmonian commander Nitycheus had only 500 hoplites armed men; for his only

<sup>1</sup> Alcibiades gives an interesting description of these operations in the *Memories of the Island*, which may thus serve as evidence of the truth.

vol. i. p. 302.  
<sup>2</sup> Thucyd. ii. 9.  
<sup>3</sup> Thucyd. ii. 10.  
<sup>4</sup> Thucyd. ii. 11.





helpless for aggression, without being able to approach at all nearer to the Athenian hospital. At length the Lacedæmonian commander, seeing that his position grew worse and worse, gave orders to draw the ranks and retreat to the last salient in the rear. But this movement was not accomplished without difficulty, for the light-armed assistants became so clamorous and forward, that many stumbled over, unable to move, or at least to keep in rank, were overtaken and slain.<sup>1</sup>

A finished retreat, however, reached the last post in safety. Here they were in comparative protection, since the ground was so rocky and impracticable that their enemies could attack them neither on flank nor rear; though the position at any rate could not have been long tenable separately, inasmuch as the only spring of water in the island was in the centre, which they had just been compelled to abandon. The light-armed being now less available, Demosthenes and Kleon brought up their 600 Athenian hospital, who had not before been engaged. But the Lacedæmonians were here at home<sup>2</sup> with their weapons, and enabled to display their well-known superiority against opposing hospital, especially as they had theantage-ground against enemies charging from beneath. Although the Athenians were double in numbers, and skilled yet unmechanical, they were repulsed in every successive attack. The besieged maintained their ground in spite of all previous fatigue and suffering, harder to be borne from the scanty diet on which they had recently subsisted. The struggle lasted so long that heat and thirst began to tell even upon the assailants, when the commander of the Macedonians came to Kleon and Demosthenes, and intimated that they were now labouring in vain; promising at the same time that if they would confide in him a detachment of light troops and bowmen, he would find his way round to the higher cliffs in the rear of the assailants.<sup>3</sup> He accordingly stole away unobserved from the rear, scrambling round over pebbles and crevices, and by an almost imperceptible footing on the brink of the sea, through approaches which the Lacedæmonians had left unguarded, never imagining that they could be molested in that direction. He

*They retired to their last salient in the rear, and were overtaken and slain.*

<sup>1</sup> Thucyd. iv. 84.

<sup>2</sup> Thucyd. iv. 85. *of superior strength*

*superiority, &c.*

<sup>3</sup> Thucyd. iv. 85.

suddenly appeared with his detachment on the higher peak above them, so that their position was thus surrounded, and they found themselves, as at Thermopylae, between two fires, without any hope of escape. Their numbers in front, encouraged by the success of the Mantineans, pressed forward with increased ardour, until at length the courage of the Lacedæmonians gave way, and the position was carried.<sup>1</sup>

A few moments more, and they would have been all captured and slain,—when Kleon and Demosthenes, anxious to carry them as prisoners to Athens, constrained their men to halt, and proclaimed by herald an invitation to surrender, on condition of delivering up their arms, and being held at the disposal of the Athenians. Most of them, incapable of further effort, closed with the proposition forthwith, signifying compliance by dropping their shields and waving their hands above their heads. The battle being thus ended, Siphon, the commander—originally only third in command, but now chief; since Epitadas had been slain, and the second in command, Hippagretas, was lying disabled by wounds on the field—entered into conference with Kleon and Demosthenes, and obtained permission to send arrows for orders to the Lacedæmonians on the mainland. The Athenian commanders, though refusing this request, sent a messenger of their own, inviting Lacedæmonian heralds over from the mainland, through whose communications were exchanged twice or three times between Siphon and the chief Lacedæmonian authorities. At length the final message came:—"The Lacedæmonians direct you to take counsel for yourselves, but to do nothing disgraceful."<sup>2</sup> Their counsel was speedily taken; they surrendered themselves and delivered up their arms: 500 in number, the survivors of the original total of 450. And out of these no less than 120 were native Spartans, some of them belonging to the first families in the city.<sup>3</sup> They were kept under guard during that night, and distributed on the morrow among the Athenian triremes to be conveyed as prisoners to Athens; while a truce was granted to the Lacedæmonians on shore, in order that they

<sup>1</sup> Thucyd. ii. 95.

αὐτοὶ ἀνέστησαν, πάλιν ἀπὸ τοῦ πε-

<sup>2</sup> Thucyd. ii. 95. ἡ ἀποβουλὴ αὐτῶν.

αὐτοῖς ἑαθεὶς ἑαθεὶς ἔπει ἔπει. <sup>3</sup> Thucyd. ii. 95; s. 12.



under?" Such impression was from homebreard, not indeed effaced, but sensibly softened, nor was it ever again restored to its full former pitch.

But the general judgment of the Greeks respecting the capture of Ephacteria, remarkable as it is to contemporaries, is far less surprising than that pronounced by Theophrastus himself. Kleon and Demosthenes, returning with a part of the squadron and carrying off the prisoners, started from Ephacteria on the next day but one after the action, and reached Athens within twenty days after Kleon had left it. Thus "the promise of Kleon, known as it was, came true," observes the historian.<sup>1</sup>

It is almost a paradox, the wonder-part of which might have been ascribed to the Greek poets of the Emperor Augustus's reign; compare Horace, *epic.* viii.

"I thought, in so, not yet Kleon's empire, according when I dreamt, my father's home, who should bring home from Asia, from Syria."

The Athenians, in receiving these heralds, after having well rewarded Kleon,<sup>2</sup> in a very extraordinary mode of attendance which followed, so important and so famous as to the point of nothing we may now deal freely, respectfully treated, like a guest to dinner, not even by their—

It is however more probable, that though first, was the Kleon, returned in military company, the celebrating was not, and the bringing presents ceremoniously declined, yet the Kleon was not so important as it was in the current generally imagined, and in that the title of the Kleon people, in something such a tract to make a man, for extended that of the man himself, whose importance rather excited the beyond the rest of his country. The last general intelligence that Demosthenes had already formed, the plan and was preparing for the attack, with the forces upon the spot, and to Demosthenes, whose the system resolution in the present the enemy, which he judiciously communicated to the politicians of the Athenian people, by creating in every one, attention. He further drew the judgment, when the doors were to be opened which was ready to admit the expedition, by a request

which was readily granted, that Demosthenes might be joined with him in the command." (Diodorus Siculus, *lib. vi.* at 22, note 12, 23, 24—25.)

It appears as if no historian could write down the name of Kleon without attaching to it some disparaging epithet or addition. We are here told in the most positive that Kleon was an important person, but pointing the attention to his enterprise, and yet that his enterprise had been perfectly known. We are told in the same manner that he was rich and ambitious for the preceding life, treated as he was in military command, a few months before, we are informed that he was only regarded that the most important man in the land. Demosthenes, who he named the Kleon, we are told at the opening of 340, and that Kleon had rejected Demosthenes, Demosthenes—

—as if this were some person unconnected with Kleon. But Demosthenes had said so much to Kleon, and the Kleon were something, which was not exactly true, in every way in the assembly. The story of the party in opposing the plan in 340 is repeated—by Kleon, and against it Demosthenes, or as if the Kleon had been the first to propose it to him. It is the story of the party was then given, which was in any of the country of the established party, with Kleon as their head, who justified the people that Kleon had for the purpose of putting a political antagonist, and who forced Kleon into the first against the very same method of proposed. Applied, the measures of the opposition party, neither the Kleon

Men with arms in their hands have always the option between death and imprisonment, and Greek opinion was only mistaken in assuming as a certainty that the Leucheronians would choose the former. But Klein had never presumed to bring them home as prisoners: his promise was defective—that they should be either so brought home, or slain, within twenty days. His sentence throughout the whole of Thucydides mistakes me as much as that in which he signifies such an expectation as "impossible." Here are 410 Leucheronian hoplites, without any other description of troops to aid them—without the possibility of being reinforced—without any regular fortification—without any narrow pass such as that of Thermopylae—without either a sufficient or a certain supply of food—scraped up in a small open island less than two miles in length. Against them are brought 10,000 troops of diverse arms, including 800 fresh hoplites from Athens, and marshalled by Demosthenes, a man alike enterprising and experienced. For the talents as well as the presence and peopleness of Demosthenes are a part of the data of the case, and the personal competence of Klein to command slaves is foreign to the calculation. Now if, under such circumstances, Klein engaged that the forlorn company of brave men should be either slain or taken prisoners, how could he be looked upon, I will not say as indulging in an insane boast, but even as overstepping a serious and mistrusted estimate of probability? Even to doubt of this result, much more to pronounce such an opinion as that of Thucydides, implies an idea not only of superhuman power in the Leucheronian hoplites, but a disgraceful incapacity on the part of Demosthenes and the Athenians. The interval of twenty days, named by Klein, was not extravagantly narrow, considering the distance of Athens from Tylos. For the attack of this petty island could not possibly occupy

any one other historian any a word. When Klein takes differences rightly, as the historian above him in did in that case, he has credit for nothing better than guessing.

The truth is that the people committed an folly in appointing Klein, for he justified the least apprehensions of his friends. But still he and his friends committed great errors in assuming it, since they fully believed that he would fail

and even upon Mr. Lyndell's state-  
ment of the case, the opinion of  
Thucydides which stands at the  
beginning of this tale is thoroughly  
justified, not too emphatically  
even. The language of the ancient  
historian about the "extraneous  
circumstances" and the way in which  
Klein was "overrun by fortune!"  
How a single incident may be quoted  
to the discredit of him and those  
believed to him.



more than one or two days at the utmost, though the blockade of it might by various accidents have been prolonged, or might even, by some terrible storm, be altogether broken off. If then we carefully consider this promise, made by Klean to the assembly, we shall find that so far from deceiving the senators pronounced upon it by Thucydides, of being a mad boast which came true by accident, it was a reasonable and even a modest anticipation of the future ;<sup>1</sup> reserving the only really doubtful point in the case—whether the garrison of the island would be ultimately slain or made prisoners. Demosthenes, had he been present at Athens instead of being at Pylos, would willingly have set his seal to the movement taken up by Klean.

I repeat with reluctance, though not without belief, the statement made by one of the biographers of Thucydides,<sup>1</sup> that Kleon was the cause of the banishment of the latter as a general, and has therefore suffered from his harder measure than was due in his capacity of historian. But though this statement is not probably without influence in detaching the unreasonable judgment which I have just been criticizing—as well as other opinions relative to Kleon, on which I shall say more in a future chapter—I nevertheless look upon that judgment not as peculiar to Thucydides, but as common to him with Mikias and those whom we meet all, for want of a better name, the oligarchical party of the time at Athens. And it gives us some measure of the prejudice and narrowness of vision which prevailed among that party at the present memorable crisis: so pointedly contrasting with the clear-sighted and resolute exhortations, and the judicious conduct in action, of Kleon, who, when forced upon his will into the

! The last of its authors could write admirably. Finally in *Archie Moore*, however, the young author's special talent— that he should speak in the language of his time— is almost completely lost. The book is a very good example of the kind of thing that is being done in the United States. It is a very good example of the kind of thing that is being done in the United States. It is a very good example of the kind of thing that is being done in the United States.

In the latter article we used the technique the company of specialists and the presence of the audience, by

It is affirmed that he began work this month—October 1, 1962, as a "free lance" writer. This was denied by Magallon, and he was recognized as a member of the group. We stated, therefore, previously that the facts were ignored in interviewing the people. Magallon is currently under British custody, but he has been contacted, and we are holding a recent official, ex-Ambassador John, Paul, III, Magallon, the Republic of Colombia, October 1, 1962.

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deduction to the general body of Greeks, and a prize of incalculable value to the captors. The release of Democleides in the preceding year from the Ambracian Gulf, when he brought with him 300 Ambracian prisoners, had probably been a splendidly triumphant. But the entry into Paros on this occasion from Spalartia, with 300 Laconian prisoners, must doubtless have occasioned emotions transcending all former experience. It is much to be regretted that no description is preserved to us of the scene, as well as of the date manifestations of the people when the prisoners were marched up from Paros to Athens. We should be curious also to read some account of the first Athenian assembly held after this event—the overwhelming cheers heaped upon Kleon by his joyful partisans, who had helped to arrest him with the duties of general, in confidence that he would discharge them well—contrasted with the silence or repugnance of Nikias and the other hesitating political enemies. But all such details are unfortunately denied to us, though they constitute the blood and animation of Greek history, now lying before us only in its skeleton.

The first impulse of the Athenians was to regard the prisoners as a guarantee to their territory against invasion.<sup>1</sup>

The  
Macedonians  
wanted  
the war to  
continue  
longer  
and longer.  
The  
Lacædæmonians  
wished  
the war  
to  
end  
as  
soon  
as  
possible.

They desired to keep them securely guarded until the peace; but if at any time before that event the Laconian army should enter Attica, then to bring forth the prisoners, and put them to death in sight of the invaders. They were at the same time full of spirits in regard to the prosecution of the war, and became further confirmed in the hope, not entirely of preserving their power undiminished, but even of recovering much of what they had lost before the Thirty year's truce. Pylus was placed in an improved state of defence, with the adjoining island of Spalartia doubtless as a subsidiary occupation. The Messenians, transferred thither from Naxos, and overjoyed to find themselves once more masters even of an outlying rock of their ancestral territory, began with alacrity to overrun and ravage Lacedæmon, while the Helots, stirred by the recent events, manifested willingness to desert to Sparta. The Laconian exiles, experiencing with belief

<sup>1</sup> Thucyd. iv. 21.

rich and unknown, become suddenly alarmed lest such desertions should spread through the country. Reluctant as they were to afford obvious evidence of their embarrassment, they nevertheless brought themselves (probably under the pressure of the friends and relatives of the Spartanian captives) to send to Athens several missions for peace; but all proved abortive.<sup>1</sup> We are not told what they offered, but it did not come up to the expectations which the Athenians thought themselves entitled to indulge.

We, who now review these facts with a knowledge of the subsequent history, see that the Athenians could have concluded a better bargain with the Lacedæmonians during the six or eight months succeeding the capture of Epikleria, than it was ever open to them to make afterwards; and they had reason to regret having slip the opportunity. Perhaps indeed Perikles, had he been still alive, might have taken a more prudent measure of the future, and might have had ascendancy enough over his countrymen to be able to arrest the tide of misfortune at its highest point, before it began to slide again.

But if we put ourselves back into the situation of Athens during the entreats which succeeded the return of Kleon and Demosthenes from Epikleria, we shall easily enter into the feelings under which the war was continued. The actual possession of the captives now placed Athens in a far better position than she had occupied when they were only blocked up in Epikleria, and when the Lacedæmonian corvée first arrived to ask for peace. She was now certain of being able to command peace with Sparta on terms at least tolerable, whenever she chose to invite it—she had also a fair certainty of escaping the hardship of invasion. Next—and this was perhaps the most important feature of the case—the apprehension of Lacedæmonian power was now greatly lessened, and the prospects of success to Athens considered as prodigiously improved,<sup>2</sup> even in the estimation of suspected Greeks, much more in the eyes of the Athenians themselves. Moreover the idea of a tide of good fortune—of the favour of the gods now begun and likely to continue—of future

*Heracleus*  
says the  
story of  
Athens in  
the course  
of the war  
was more  
extensively  
believed in  
the west,  
especially  
in Greece.  
Selling the  
war.

<sup>1</sup> Thucyd. iv. 25, compares Aristophanes' *Equus* 348, with *Ischyl.*

<sup>2</sup> Thucyd. iv. 26.

success as a corollary from past—was one which powerfully affected Greek calculations generally. Why not push the present good fortune and try to regain the most important points lost before and by the Thirty years' truce, especially in Megara and Boeotia—points which Sparta could not succeed by negotiation, since they were not in her possession? Though these speculations failed as we shall see in the coming chapter, yet there was nothing unreasonable in acting upon them. Probably the almost universal sentiment of Athens was at the moment warlike. Even Nicias, intimidated as he must have been by the success in Sphakteria, would forget his usual caution in the desire of retrieving his own personal credit by some military exploit. That Demosthenes, now in full measure of reason, would be eager to promote the war, with which his prospects of personal glory were essentially associated (just as Theophrastus' character about Brasidas on the Leontaeumian side), can almost be guessed. The comedy of Aristophanes called the "*Acharians*" was acted about six months before the affair of Sphakteria, when no one could possibly look forward to such an event—the comedy of the "*Knights*" about six months after it.<sup>1</sup> Now there is this remarkable difference between the two—that while the former breathes the greatest abhorrence of war, and presses in every possible way the importance of making peace, although at that time Athens had no opportunity of coming even to a decent accommodation—the latter running down the general character of Kleon with unmeasured scorn and ridicule, talks in one or two places only of the hardships of war, and drops altogether that cynicism and repulsion with which peace had been thrust upon in the "*Acharians*"—although coming out at a moment when peace was within the reach of the Athenians.

To understand properly the history of this period, therefore, we must distinguish various occasions which are often confounded. At the moment when Sphakteria was lost Kleon died, and when the Leontaeumians first went to solicit peace, there was a considerable party at Athens disposed to entertain the offer. The

<sup>1</sup> Thucyd. v. 38.

<sup>2</sup> The "*Acharians*" was performed at the festival of the Leneia at Athens—*Revue*, 186, 392; the "*Knights*" at the same festival in the coming year.

<sup>3</sup> 186, 392.

The capture of Sphakteria took place about July, B.C. 425; Kleon died two days after it, the 42 Cleonians fled to Sparta, at once.

secondary of Kleon was one of the main causes why it was rejected. But after the captives were brought home from Sphakteria, the influence of Kleon, though positively greater than it had been before, was no longer required to procure the dismissal of Lacedæmonian parties offere and the continuance of the war. The general temper of Athens was then warlike, and there were very few to contend strenuously for an opposite policy. During the ensuing year, however, the chances of war turned out mostly unfavourable to Athens, so that by the end of that year she had become much more disposed to peace.<sup>1</sup> The truce for one year was then concluded. But even after that truce was expired, Kleon still continued eager (and on good grounds, as will be shown hereafter) for renewing the war in Thrace, at a time when a large proportion of the Athenian public had grown weary of it. He was one of the main causes of that renunciation of warlike operations, which ended in the battle of Amphipolis, fatal both to himself and to Demades. There were thus two distinct occasions on which the personal influence and magnetic character of Kleon seemed to have been of service moment in determining the Athenian public to war instead of peace. But at the moment which we have now reached—that is, the year immediately following the capture of Sphakteria—the Athenians were sufficiently warlike without him; probably Nikias himself as well as the rest.

It was one of the earliest proceedings of Nikias, immediately after the inglorious exhibition which he had made in reference to Sphakteria, to conduct an expedition, in conjunction with two colleagues, against the Chersonese territory. He took with him 60 triremes, 1000 Athenian hoplites, 800 horsemen (most of some horse transports, and some additional hoplites from Miletus, Andros, and Sargissa).<sup>2</sup> Starting from Piræus in the evening, he arrived a little before daybreak on a beach at the foot of the hill and village of Solymnia,<sup>3</sup> about seven miles from Cardia, and two or three miles south of

Kleon:  
there is  
evidence  
that he  
is against  
the war  
then more  
eager in  
warlike  
operations  
Kleon was  
opposed to  
the truce  
that  
was made.

Expedition  
of Nikias  
against the  
Chersonese  
territory.

<sup>1</sup> Thucyd. iv. 117; v. 12.

<sup>2</sup> Thucyd. iv. 11. and if about 8000  
men, 4000, 4000, 400.

<sup>3</sup> See the geographical illustrations

of this district in Dr. Leake's *Travels* and  
also account of the general vicinity of  
the Chersonese—and in Leake's *Travels*  
—*Travels in Greece*, vol. ii. p. 101.  
vol. p. 101.

the Isthmus. The Corinthian troops, from all the territory of Corinth within the Isthmus, were already assembled at the Isthmus itself to repel him; for intelligence of the intended expedition had reached Corinth some time before from Argos, with which latter place the scheme of the expedition may have been in some way connected. The Athenians having touched the coast during the darkness, the Corinthians were only apprised of the fact by fire-signals from Solymia. Not being able to hinder the landing, they dispatched forthwith half their force, under Batis and Lythophron, to repel the invader, while the remaining half were left at the harbour of Kandreon, on the northern side of Mount Cauton, to guard the port of Krommyon (outside of the Isthmus), in case it should be attacked by sea. Batis with one cohort of hoplites threw himself into the village of Solymia, which was undefended, while Lythophron conducted the remaining troops to attack the Athenians. The battle was first engaged on the Athenian right, almost immediately after its landing, on the point called Chersonesus. Here the Athenian hoplites, together with their Karpasian allies, repelled the Corinthian attack, after a stout and warmly-disputed hand-to-hand of spear and shield. Nevertheless the Corinthians, retreating up to a higher point of ground, returned to the charge, and with the aid of a fresh cohort, drove the Athenians back to the shore and to their ships: from hence the latter again turned, and again recovered a partial advantage.<sup>1</sup> The battle was no less severe on the left wing of the Athenians. But here, after a contest of some length, the latter gained a more decided victory, greatly to the aid of their country—giving the Corinthians, who fell in some disorder to a neighbouring hill, and there took up a position.<sup>2</sup> The Athenians were then victorious throughout the whole line, with the loss of about forty-seven men, while the Corinthians had lost 212, together with the general Lythophron. The victors erected their trophy, stripped the dead bodies, and buried their own dead. The Corinthian detachment left at Kandreon could not see the battle, in consequence of the intervening ridge of Mount Cauton; but it

<sup>1</sup> Thucyd. iv. 45.

<sup>2</sup> Thucyd. iv. 45. Words of Batis—an expression which the ancient writers, both as to the time, so much as to the place, by the things, immediately before the Persiopolitane war.

action is correct, was here; much less in various other places, as being the Athenians, were a tale in the words of Plutarch, by the things, immediately before the Persiopolitane war.





advice be sent to Athens, and left to the discretion of the Athenian people. Korymbos, unwilling to take terms, deposited the doomed prisoners in the neighbouring islet of Pythia, under the strictest conditions, that if a single man tried to escape, the whole population should be well and good.<sup>1</sup>

Unfortunately for these men, the orders given to Korymbos carried him onward straight to Sicily. It was likewise therefore to him to send away a detachment of his squadron to convey prisoners to Athens; where the honour of delivering them would be reaped, not by himself, but by the officer to whom they might be confided. And the Korymbians in the city, on their part, were equally anxious that the men should not be sent to Athens. Their anxiety against them being bitter in the extreme, they were afraid that the Athenians might spare their lives, so that their hostility against the island might be again resumed. And thus a mean policy on the part of Korymbos, combined with revenge and insecurity on the part of the victorious Korymbians, brought about a cruel catastrophe, paralleled nowhere else in Greece, though too well in keeping with the previous acts of the bloody drama enacted in this island.

The Korymbians had, accordingly not without the privity of Korymbos, sent across to Pythia fraudulent emissaries under the guise of friends to the prisoners. These emissaries—bearing the promise that the Athenian commanders, in spite of the intervention signed, were about to hand them over to the Korymbians people for destruction—induced some of them to attempt escape in a boat prepared for the purpose. By consent, the boat was used in the act of escaping, so that the terms of the capitulation were really violated: upon which Korymbos handed over the prisoners to their enemies on the island, who imprisoned them altogether in one vast building, under guard of hoplites. From this building they were driven out in companies of twenty men each, chained together in couples, and compelled to march between two lines of hoplites marshalled on each side of the road. Those who faltered in the march were hurried on by whips from behind: as they advanced, their private enemies on both sides singled them out, striking and passing them with

<sup>1</sup> Thucyd. ii. 35.

at length they miserably perished. Three successive companies were then destroyed, on the remaining prisoners in the interior, who thought merely that their plans of defence was about to be changed, suspected what was passing. As soon as they found it out, one and all refused either to quit the building or to permit anyone else to enter. They at the same time pitiously implored the intervention of the Athenians, if it were only to kill them and thus preserve them from the cruelties of their merciless countrymen. The latter, shunning their attempts to force the door of the building, made an aperture in the roof, from whence they shot down arrows, and poured showers of tiles upon the prisoners within, who sought at first to protect themselves, but at length abandoned themselves to despair, and assisted with their own hands in the work of destruction. Some of them passed their throats with the arrows shot down from the roof; others hung themselves, either with cords from some building which happened to be in the building, or with straps torn and twisted from their own garments. Night came on, but the work of destruction, both from above and within, was continued without intermission, so that before morning all these wretched men had perished, either by the hands of their enemies or by their own. At daylight the Europeans entered the building, piled up the dead bodies on carts, and transported them out of the city: the exact number we are not told, but seemingly it cannot have been less than 500. The women who had been taken at Bombay along with these prisoners were all sold as slaves.<sup>1</sup>

Thus finished the bloody dimensions of this ill-fated island; for the oligarchical party were completely annihilated, the democracy was victorious, and there were no further violence throughout the whole war.<sup>2</sup> It will be recollected that these deadly feuds began with the return of the oligarchical prisoners from Corinth, bringing along with them projects both of treason and of revolution. They ended with the annihilation of that party, in the manner above described; the interval being filled by mutual atrocities and retaliation, wherein of course the victims had most opportunity of gratifying their vindictive passions. Eurymachus, after the termination of these events, presented

<sup>1</sup> Thucyd. lib. ii. c. 35.

<sup>2</sup> Thucyd. lib. ii. c. 35.

command with the Athenian squadron to Sicily. What he did there will be described in a future chapter devoted to Sicilian affairs exclusively.

The complete protection of Amphibia during the campaign of the preceding year had left Amphibia without any defence against the Akarnanians and Athenian squadron from Nauplia. They besieged and took it during the course of the present summer,<sup>1</sup> expelling the Corinthian population, and re-possessing the town and its territory with Akarnanian settlers from all the townships in the country.

Throughout the maritime region of Achaia matters continued perfectly tranquil, except that the inhabitants of Olous, during the course of the autumn, incurred the suspicion of the Athenians from having recently built a new wall to their city, as if it were done with the intention of taking the first opportunity to revolt.<sup>2</sup> They solemnly protested their innocence of any such designs, but the Athenians were not satisfied without exacting the destruction of the rhomboid wall. The presence on the opposite continent of an active band of Ephyrean pirates, who captured both Ephesus and Antandros during the ensuing spring, probably made the Athenians more anxious and vigilant on the subject of Olous.<sup>3</sup>

The Athenian regular tribute-gathering squadron, consisting among the maritime subjects, captured, during the course of the present autumn, a prisoner of some importance and singularity. It was a Persian ambassador, Artaphernes, bound at Elae on the Helyades, in his way to Sparta with despatches from the Great King. He was brought to Athens, where his despatches, which were at some length and written in the Achaean character, were translated and made public. The Great King told the Lacedaemonians, in substance, that he could not comprehend what they meant; for that among the numerous envoys whom they had sent, no two told the same story. Accordingly he desired them, if they wished to make themselves understood, to send some envoys with fresh and plain instructions

<sup>1</sup> Thucyd. ix. 48.

<sup>2</sup> Thucyd. ix. 49.

<sup>3</sup> Thucyd. ix. 50.

to accompany Antiphonius.<sup>1</sup> Such was the substance of the despatch, conveying a remarkable testimony as to the march of the Lacedæmonian government in its foreign policy. Had any similar testimony existed respecting Athens, demonstrating that her foreign policy was conducted with half as much uncertainty and stupidity, single inferences would have been drawn from it to the discredit of democracy. But there has been no desire generally to discredit Lacedæmonian institutions, which included kingship in double measure—two parallel lines of hereditary kings, together with an entire usurpation from everything like popular discussion. The extreme defects in the foreign management of Sparta, revealed by the despatch of Antiphonius, were traceable partly to an habitual foolishness often noted in the Lacedæmonian character—partly to the annual change of Ephors, so frequently bringing into power men who strive to undo what had been done by their predecessors—and still more to the absence of everything like discussion or course of public measures among the citizens. We shall find more than one example, in the history about to follow, of this disposition on the part of Ephors not merely to change the policy of their predecessors, but even to subvert treaties sworn and concluded by them. Such was the habitual course of Spartan public business, that in doing this they had neither criticism nor discussion to fear. Brasidas, when he started from Sparta on the expedition which will be described in the coming chapter, could not trust the assertions of the Lacedæmonian senators without leading them by the most solemn oaths.<sup>2</sup>

The Athenians sent back Antiphonius in a tribute to Ephorus, and availed themselves of this opportunity for presenting  
 20. 10.  
 access to the Great King. They sent envoys along with him, with the intention that they should accompany him up to Susa: but on reaching Asia, the news met them that King Artabanus had recently died. Under such circumstances, it was not judged expedient to prosecute the mission, and the Athenians dropped their design.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Thucyd. iv. 26. In this sentence Thucyd. has not only the words, "ἀντιφώνιον ἀποσταλὲν ἐκ Σπάρτης," but also "ἀντιφώνιον ἀποσταλὲν ἐκ Σπάρτης," which may be taken as a repetition of the same words, and as a repetition of the same words, and as a repetition of the same words.

which is not only the same words, but also the same words.

<sup>2</sup> Thucyd. iv. 26. Brasidas, when he started from Sparta on the expedition which will be described in the coming chapter, could not trust the assertions of the Lacedæmonian senators without leading them by the most solemn oaths.

<sup>3</sup> Thucyd. iv. 26, 1440. 20. 10.

Regarding the great monarchy of Persia, during this long interval of fifty-four years since the capture of Xerxes from Greece, we have little information before us except the names of the successive kings. In the year 480 B.C., Xerxes was assassinated by Artabanus and Mithrydates, though one of those plots of great household officers, so frequent in Oriental palaces. He left two sons, or at least two sons present and conspicuous among a greater number, Darius and Artabanus. But Artabanus persuaded Artabanus that Darius had been the murderer of Xerxes, and thus prevailed upon him to avenge his father's death by becoming an accomplice in killing his brother Darius: he next tried to assassinate Artabanus himself, and to appropriate the crown. Artabanus however, being apprised beforehand of the scheme, either slew Artabanus with his own hand or procured him to be slain, and then reigned (known under the name of Artabanus Longimanus) for forty years, down to the period at which we are now arrived.<sup>1</sup>

Mention has already been made of the revolt of Egypt from the dominion of Artabanus, under the Libyan prince Inarus, actively aided by the Athenians. After a few years of success, this revolt was crushed and Egypt again subjugated, by the energy of the Persian general Megabyzus—with severe loss to the Athenian forces engaged. After the peace of Kallias, accidentally called the Karianian peace, between the Athenians and the king of Persia, war had not been since renewed. We read in *Æliana*, amidst various anecdotes scenically collected at the court of Bona, romantic adventures ascribed to Megabyzus, his wife Anxipis, his mother Anaxetis, and a Great physician of Eile, named Apollonides. Zopyrus son of Megabyzus, after the death of his father, deserted from Persia and came as an exile to Athens.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> The *Atticæ* do not appear to have ever known such a series of peaceful and quiet reigns as the Greek Kings, through the time of being so much less than foreign dangers to them, as we may see by the numerous signs of Persecution in the Atticæ and Pergamene, and in the few years after them.

<sup>2</sup> *Æliana*, l. 11; *Atticæ*, Part. 1.

<sup>3</sup> *Æliana*, l. 11; *Atticæ*, Part. 1. It is evident that there were some other facts connected with the plot to which Xerxes fell a victim, but we have no means of ascertaining what the details were.

<sup>4</sup> *Æliana*, Part. 1. 11—12; *Æliana*, l. 11.

At the death of Artaxerxes Longimanus, the family succession (as usual) to a Persian monarch was again exhibited. His son Xerxes, succeeded him, but was assassinated, after a reign of a few weeks or months. Another son, Sogdiana, followed, who perished in like manner after a short interval.<sup>1</sup> Lastly, a third son, Oches (known under the name of Darius Nectans), either older or more fortunate, kept his crown and life between sixteen and twenty years. By his queen the average Dariusus, he was father to Artaxerxes Mucron and Cyrus the younger, both names of interest as referents to Greek history, to whom we shall hereafter recur.

<sup>1</sup> *Herodotus*, vii. 104-105; *Strabo*, vi. 11-12.

## CHAPTER LIII

## EIGHTH YEAR OF THE WAR.

*Important operations of the eighth year of the war.* THE eighth year of the war, on which we now touch, presents events of a more important and decisive character than any of the preceding. In reviewing the preceding years we observe that though there is much fighting, with landship and provision inflicted on both sides, yet the operations are mostly of a desultory character, not calculated to determine the event of the war. But the capture of Sphakteria and its prisoners, coupled with the surrender of the whole Lacedæmonian fleet, was an event full of consequences and imposing in the eyes of all Greeks. It attached the Athenians to a series of operations, larger and more ambitious than anything which they had yet conceived—directed, not merely against Sparta in her own country, but also to the reconquest of that ascendancy in Megara and Boeotia which they had lost on or before the Thirty years' truce. On the other hand, it intimidated so much both the Lacedæmonians, the revolted Chalkide allies of Athens in Thracia, and Perikles king of Macedonia, that between them the expedition of Evrosia, which struck so serious a blow at the Athenian empire, was deferred. This year is thus the turning-point of the war. If the operations of Athens had succeeded, she would have regained nearly as great a power as she enjoyed before the Thirty years' truce. But it happened that Sparta, or rather the Spartan Brothas, proved successful, gaining enough to neutralise all the advantages desired by Athens from the capture of Sphakteria.

The first enterprise undertaken by the Athenians in the course of the spring was against the island of Kythira, on the southern coast of Laconia. It was inhabited by Lacedæmonian Pelopagi,





landed at Erythra, and drove the inhabitants out of the lower town into the upper, where they speedily capitulated. A certain party among them had indeed secretly awaited the coming of Nicias, through which intrigue many towns were obtained for the Athenians. Some few men, induced by the Erythraians in intelligence with Nicias, were carried away as prisoners to Athens; but the remainder were left undisturbed and enrolled among the tributary allies under obligation to pay four talents per annum, an Athenian garrison being placed at Erythra for the protection of the island. From hence Nicias employed seven days in descents and razzias upon the coast, near Helia, Aradi, Agiaefolia, Euxyria, and elsewhere. The Lacedæmonians there was disseminated in petty garrisons, which remained such for the defence of its own separate post, without willing to repel the Athenians, so that there was only one action, and that of little importance, which the Athenians deemed worthy of a trophy.

In returning home from Erythra, Nicias first ravaged the small strip of cultivated land near Epidaurus Lædia, on the rocky eastern coast of Laconia, and then attacked the *Agionian* settlement at Thyrea, the frontier strip between Laconia and Argolis. This town and district had been made over by Sparta to the *Agionians*, at the time when they were expelled from their own island by Athens in the first year of the war. The new inhabitants, finding the town too distant from the sea for their maritime habits, were now employed in constructing a fortification close on the shore, in which work a Lacedæmonian detachment under Tantalus, as general in that neighbourhood, was assisting them. When the Athenians landed, both *Agionians* and Lacedæmonians at once abandoned the new fortification. The *Agionians*, with the commanding officer Tantalus, occupied the upper town of Thyrea; but the Lacedæmonian troops, not thinking it feasible, refused to take part in the defence, and retired to the neighbouring mountains, in

<sup>1</sup> Thucyd. ii. 14. He states that Thyrea was but twelve or twenty miles from the sea, and that the Athenians, distant from the sea, had ordered Lædia (Thyrea) to the sea, and it is so, viz. p. 262, who has translated quite incorrectly, rather to

identify the spot, others "that it had been twelve miles from the sea."

This explains in a great degree why the *Agionians* thought it most easy to build their new fort.

spite of urgent entreaty from the *Argives*. Immediately after landing, the Athenians marched up to the town of Thyrea, and razed it by storm, burning or destroying everything within it. All the *Argives* were either killed or made prisoners, and even Tantalus, disabled by his wounds, became prisoner also. From hence the armament returned to Athens, where a vote was taken as to the disposal of the prisoners. The *Eythians* brought home were distributed for sale mostly among the dependent states: Tantalus was retained along with the prisoners from *Sphakteria*; but a harder fate was reserved for the *Argives*. They were all put to death, victims to the long-standing enmity between Athens and Argos. This cruel act was nothing more than a strict application of admitted customs of war in those days. Had the Lacedæmonians been the victors, there can be little doubt that they would have acted with equal rigour.<sup>1</sup>

The occupation of *Eythra*, in addition to *Pylos*, by an Athenian garrison, following so closely upon the capital disaster in *Sphakteria*, produced in the minds of the Spartans feelings of alarm and depression such as they had never before experienced. Within the course of a few short months their position had completely changed, from superiority and aggression abroad, to need and insecurity at home. They anticipated nothing less than incessant foreign attacks on all their weak points, with every probability of internal defection, from the standing discontent of the Helots. It was not unknown to them probably that even *Eythra* itself had been lost partly through betrayal. The capture of *Sphakteria* had caused painful emotion among the Helots, to whom the Lacedæmonians had addressed both appeals and promises of emancipation, in order to procure ransom for their hapless while blockaded in the island. If the ultimate surrender of these hapless had shated the nerves of Lacedæmonian power throughout all Greece, such effect had been produced to a still greater degree among the oppressed Helots. A refuge at *Pylos*, and a nucleus which presented some possibility of expanding into regenerated Messenia, were now before their eyes; while the establishment of an Athenian garri-

Alarm and depression  
giving the  
Lacedæmonians  
a sense of  
their true  
weakness in  
reliance on  
the Helots.

<sup>1</sup> *Thucyd.* ii. 99; *Diod.* xii. 99.



perfidious in the contrivance, so marvellous in the purpose, and so complete in the execution, stands without parallel in Ottoman history—we might almost say without a parallel in any history. It implies a depravity far greater than the rigorous execution of a barbarous customary law against prisoners of war or rebels, even in large numbers. The Ephores must have employed enormous instruments, apart from each other, for the performance of this bloody deed. Yet it appears that no certain knowledge could be obtained of the details—a striking proof of the mysterious efficiency of this Council of Five, surpassing even that of the Council of Ten at Venice—as well as of the utter absence of public anxiety or discussion.

It was while the Macedonians were in this state of agitation at home that events reached them from Perdiccas of Macedonia and the Chalcidians of Thrace, entreating aid against Athens, who was considered likely, in his present state of success, to resume aggressive measures against them. There were moreover other parties, in the neighboring states, subject to Athens, who warmly favoured the application, engaging to stand forward in open revolt as soon as any auxiliary force should arrive to warrant their entering the hazard. Perdiccas (who had on his hands a dispute with his kinsman Antisthenes, prince of the Lyncestæ-Macedonians, which he was anxious to be enabled to close successfully) and the Chalcidians offered at the same time to provide the pay and maintenance, as well as to facilitate the transit, of the troops who might be sent to them. And—what was of still greater importance in the eyes of the caterpillars.—they specially requested that Brasidas might be invested with the command.\* He had now recovered from his

**Harvard**  
from the  
University  
and Har-  
vard Law  
School and  
the Center  
for the Study  
of the History  
of the United  
States.

Apartment of their White House only granted to the members of the press. The president of the U.S. National Academy of Sciences, Dr. Robert A. M. Smith, said that the White House had been "very helpful" in the past, but that the current administration was "not very helpful" in the past.

which the government had not yet formed the idea of employing. On the other side, the design service, that this national newspaper wanted to give a full and detailed description to the designers and was intended to sell, was called the National Service, without the necessity of going back to any more funds raised by the government.

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\* Through, in all, approximately 10  
m. of. Locality 1000. In 1901, 1000  
meters. Springer also in 1000,  
1000.

wounds received at Pylos, and his reputation for adventurous valour, great as it was from previous desert, stood out still more conspicuously, because not a single other Spartan had as yet distinguished himself. His other great qualities, apart from personal valour, had not yet been shown, for he had never been in any supreme command. But he burned with impetuosity to undertake the operations destined for him by the senate, although at this time it must have appeared as reckless with difficulty and danger, that probably no other Spartan except himself would have entered upon it with hopes of success. To relieve the embarrassments for Athens in Thrace was an object of great consequence to Sparta, while she also obtained an opportunity of sending away another large detachment of dangerous Helots. Seven hundred of these latter were armed as hoplites and placed under the orders of Brasidas, but the Lacedæmonians would not assign to him any of their own proper forces. With the exception of the Spartan mercenaries—with 700 Helot hoplites, and with such other hoplites as he could raise in Peloponnesus by means of the funds furnished from the Chalcidians—Brasidas prepared to undertake this expedition, this adventurous and important

Had the Athenians entertained any suspicion of his design, they could easily have prevented him from ever reaching Thrace. But they knew nothing of it until he had actually passed Pericleia, nor did they anticipate any serious attack from Sparta, at this moment of her depression—much less an expedition so bold as any which she had ever been known to undertake. They were now close with hopes of conquests to come on their own part—their allies being so prosperous and growing, that parties favourable to their interests began to retire, both in Megara and Boeotia; while Hippocrates and Demosthenes, the two chief chiefs for the year, were men of energy, well qualified both to project and execute military undertakings.

The first opportunity presented itself in regard to Megara. The inhabitants of that city had been greater sufferers by the war than any other people in Greece. They had been the chief

Brasidas is  
ordered to  
go against  
the Spartans  
and their  
mercenary  
hoplites.

Brasidas  
receives  
orders  
from  
Brasidas  
to go against  
the Spartans  
and their  
mercenary  
hoplites.



course of bringing down the war upon Athens, and the Athenians revenged upon them all the hardships which they themselves endured from the Lacedæmonian invasion. Twice in every year they had waste the Megaræ, which bordered upon their own territory; and that too with such destructive efficacy throughout its limited extent, that they intercepted all subsistence from the lands near the town—at the same time keeping the harbour of Piræus closely blocked up. Under such bad conditions the Megarians found much difficulty in supplying even the primary wants of life.<sup>1</sup> But their case had now, within the last few months, become still more intolerable by an intestine contention in the city, ending in the expulsion of a powerful body of exiles, who owned and held possessions of Pige, the Megarian port in the Gulf of Cœcilia. Probably invaders from Pige had been their chief previous resource against the destruction which came on them from the side of Athens; so that it became scarcely possible to sustain themselves, when the exiles in Pige not only deprived them of this resource, but took positive part in harrying them. These exiles were oligarchical, and the government in Megara had now become more or less democratical. But the privations in the city presently reached such a height, that several citizens began to labour for a compromise, whereby the exiles in Pige might be readmitted. It was evident to the leaders in Megara that the bulk of the citizens could not long sustain the pressure of enemies from both sides; but it was also their feeling that the exiles in Pige, their bitter political rivals, were worse enemies than the Athenians, and that the return of these exiles would be a sentence of death to themselves. To prevent this counter-revolution, they opened a secret correspondence with Elipheerides and Democleides, engaging to betray both Megara and Piræus to the Athenians; though Piræus, the harbour of Megara, about one mile from the city, was a separate fortress, occupied by a Peloponnesian garrison, and by them exclusively, as well as the Long Walls—for the purpose of holding Megara fast to the Lacedæmonian confederacy.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> The picture drawn by Aristophanes (*Ach. 100*) is a caricature, but of nothing probably less true.

<sup>2</sup> Thucyd. II. 96. Thucyd. (*ib. p. 101*) gives sufficient details as to the relations

between Megara and Piræus. They were only allies. There existed still great causes to quarrel, but neither was Elipheerides, Democleides, nor the Athenians, ready to betray the Megarians.

The scheme for surprise was concerted, and what is more remarkable—in the extreme publicity of all Athenian affairs, and in a matter in which many persons must have been privy—was kept secret until the instant of execution. A large Athenian fleet, 6000 hoplites and 400 cavalry, was appointed, to march at night by the high road through Eleusis to Megara; but Hippokratides and Demosthenes themselves went on ship-board from Peiræus to the island of Munia, which was close against Minos, and had been for some time under occupation by an Athenian garrison. Here Hippokratides concealed himself with 600 hoplites, in a hollow cut of which both earth had been dug, on the stretched opposite to Minos, and not far from the gate in the Long Wall which opened near the junction of that wall with the ditch and wall surrounding Minos; while Demosthenes, with some light-armed Plataians and a detachment of active young Athenians (called Peripoli, and serving as the movable guard of Athens), in their first or second year of military service, placed himself in ambush in the sacred precincts of Acha, still closer to the same gate.

To prevent that the gate should be opened was the task of the conspirators within. Amidst the strife in which the Megarenses had been reduced in order to obtain supplies (especially since the blockading force had been placed at Minos), predatory robbery by night was not omitted. Some of these conspirators had been in the habit, before the intrigue with Athens was projected, of carrying out a small sailer-boat by night upon a cart, through this gate, by permission of the Peloponnesian commander at Minos and the Long Walls. The boat, when thus brought out, was first rolled down to the shore along the bottom of the dry ditch which surrounded the wall of Minos.—then put to sea for some slightly enterprise—and lastly, brought back upon along the ditch before daylight in the morning; the gate being opened, by permission, to let it in. This was the only way by which any Megarian vessel could get to sea, since the Athenians at Minos were complete masters of the harbor.

On the night fixed for the surprise, this boat was carried out

Concealing  
the Athenian  
fleet upon the  
ditch, and  
stretching  
from the  
Megarenses.  
Long Walls.  
Hippokratides  
the whole  
force of the  
Long Walls.





the gate, and interrupted the men called with all as they were about to open it. Without bringing any knowledge of the numerous secret which they had just learned, these opponents loudly protested against opening the gate and going out to fight so many for whom they had never conserved themselves, even in instances of greater strength, to be a match in the open field. While insisting only on the public sanctity of the weapons, they at the same time planted themselves in rows against the gate, and declared that they would perish before they would allow it to be opened. For such obstinate resistance the conspiracy was not prepared, so that they were forced to abandon their design and leave the gate closed.

The Athenian generals, who were waiting in expectation that it would be opened, were surprised by the delay that their friends within had been led to, and immediately resolved to make use of Xena which lay behind them—an expedient important not less in itself than as a probable means for the capture of Megara. They set about the work with the characteristic rapidity of Athenians. Mares and tools in abundance being forthwith sent for from Athens, the army distributed among themselves the walls of circumvallation round Xena in distinct parts. First, the interval apart between the Long Walls themselves was built across, so as to cut off the communication with Megara; next, walls were carried out from the outside of both the Long Walls down to the sea, so as completely to enclose Xena with its fortifications and ships. The scattered houses, which formed a sort of ornamented suburb to Xena, furnished bricks for the fine enclosing ditch, or were sometimes even made to form a part of it as they stood, with the parapets on their roofs; while the trees were not deemed to supply material whereon palisades were wanted. In a day and a half the work of circumvallation was almost completed, so that the Peloponnesians in Xena are before them nothing but a hopeless state of blockade. Deprived of all communication, they not only learned that the whole city of Megara had joined the Athenians, but they were moreover without any supply of provisions, which had been always furnished to them in daily rations from the city. Despairing of speedy relief from Peloponnesians, they accepted any terms of capitulation offered to

The Athenians  
enclosed  
Xena Xena  
—the gates  
conspired  
to them.



without being expected, at the gain of the ship, intending to be admitted, and offering to lend his immediate aid for the recovery of Nixon. One of the two parties in Niagara would have been glad to comply; but the other, knowing well that in that case the rifles from Figeo would be brought back upon them, was prepared for a strenuous resistance, in which case the Algonquin force, still only one mile off, would have been introduced as auxiliaries. Under these circumstances the two parties came to a compromise, and mutually agreed to refuse allegiance to Brunton. They expected that a battle would take place between him and the Algonquins, and each calculated that Niagara would follow the fortunes of the water.

Returning back without success to Tripodisus, Brasidas was joined there early in the morning by 2000 Boeotian hoplites and 600 cavalry; for the Boeotians had been put in motion by the messengers at Plataea, and had even commenced their march before his messenger arrived, with such alacrity as to have already reached Plataea.<sup>1</sup> The total force under Brasidas was thus increased to 2000 hoplites and 600 cavalry, with whom he marched straight to the neighbourhood of Megara. The Athenian light troops, dispersed over the plain, were surprised and driven in by the Boeotian cavalry; but the Athenian cavalry, coming to their aid, maintained a sharp action with the auxiliaries, wherein, after some loss on both sides, a slight advantage remained on the side of the Athenians. They granted a truce for the burial of the Boeotian officers of cavalry, who was slain with many others. After this indecisive cavalry skirmish, Brasidas advanced with his main force into the plain between Megara and the sea, taking up a position near to the Athenian hoplites, who were drawn up in battle array hard by Nisaea and the Long Walls. He then offered them battle if they chose to; but each party expected that the other would attack, and each was unwilling to begin the attack on his own side. Brasidas would be content that if the Athenians refused to fight, Megara would be preserved from falling into their hands; while here it was his main object to prevent, and which had, in fact, been prevented only by his arrival. If he attacked and was beaten, he

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**Figure 1**

would be lost the advantage; while if victorious, he could hardly hope to gain much more. The Athenian generals on their side reflected that they had already scored a material acquisition in Naxos, which cut off Megara from their sea, that the navy opposed to them was not only superior in number of frigates, but composed of contingents from many different cities, so that no one city banded much in the action; while their own force was all Athenian and composed of the best frigates in Athens, which would render a defeat severely venient to the city. They did not think it worth while to encounter this risk, even for the purpose of gaining possession of Megara. With such views in the leaders on both sides, the two armies remained for some time in position, each waiting for the other to attack. At length the Athenians, seeing that no aggressive movement was contemplated by their opponents, were the first to retire into Naxos. Thus both master of the field, Brasidas retired in triumph to Megara, the gates of which were now opened without reserve to almost him.

The army of Brasidas, having gained the chief point for which it was collected, speedily departed, he himself resuming his preparations for Thracæ; while the Athenians on their side also returned home, leaving an adequate garrison for the occupation both of Naxos and of the Long Walls. But the interior of Megara underwent a complete and violent revolution. While the leaders hardly in Athens, not thinking it safe to remain, fled forthwith and sought shelter with the Athenians,<sup>2</sup> the opposite party opened communication with the allies at Pige and re-embarked them into the city; binding them, however, by the most solemn pledge to observe absolute neutrality of the part, and to study nothing but the welfare of the common city. The narrowness only kept their pledge during the interval which elapsed until they acquired power to violate it with effect. They soon got themselves placed in the chief commands of state, and found means to turn the military force to their own purposes. A

Brasidas at Megara.  
—A. Top of the wall.  
Brasidas at Megara.  
—A. Top of the wall.  
Brasidas at Megara.  
—A. Top of the wall.  
Brasidas at Megara.  
—A. Top of the wall.  
Brasidas at Megara.  
—A. Top of the wall.  
Brasidas at Megara.  
—A. Top of the wall.

<sup>1</sup> Thucyd. ii. 25.

<sup>2</sup> We find some of these afterwards in the service of Athens, employed as

light-armed troops in the Peloponnesian war (Thucyd. ii. 25).



increased encouragement to turn their activity elsewhere. Accordingly, very soon after the troops had been brought back from the Megaris,<sup>2</sup> Hippokratides and Demosthenes concerted a still more extensive plan for the invasion of Boeotia, in conjunction with some malcontents in the Boeotian towns, who desired to break down and disorganize the oligarchical governments—and especially through the agency of a Theban exile named Proximos. Demosthenes, with fifty men, was sent toward Peloponnesos to Naxos, with instructions to collect an Akarnanian force—to sail into the innermost recess of the Corinthian or Egean Gulf—and to occupy Sydon, a maritime town belonging to the Boeotian Thebans, where intelligence had been already established. On the same day, determined beforehand, Hippokratides engaged to enter Boeotia, with the main force of Athens, at the south-eastern corner of the territory near Tanagra, and to fortify Delium, the temple of Apollo on the coast of the Egean strait; while at the same time it was concerted that some Boeotian and Phokian malcontents should make themselves masters of Chaeronea on the borders of Phokis. Boeotia would thus be assailed on three sides at the same moment, so that the forces of the country would be distracted and unable to co-operate. Internal movements were further expected to take place in some of the cities, such as perhaps to establish democratical governments and place them at once in alliance with the Athenians.

Accordingly, about the month of August, Demosthenes sailed from Athens to Naxos, where he collected his Akarnanian allies—now stronger and more united than ever, since the voluntary volunteers of Kinross had been at length compelled to join their Akarnanian brethren: moreover the neighbouring Agreans with their prince Polykritos were also brought into the Athenian alliance. On the appointed day, accordingly about the beginning of October, he sailed with a strong force of these allies up to Sydon, in full expectation that it would be betrayed to him.<sup>3</sup> But the execution of this enterprise was less happy than that against Megara. In the first place, there was a mistake as to the day

Demosthenes, with an Akarnanian force, sailed to destroy an oligarchy at Sydon on the coast of Boeotia.

[Thucyd. ii. 21. *οἱ δὲ πρὸς αὐτὸν ἵπποκράτης ἀναγέρων, καὶ*  
[Thucyd. ii. 21.

understood between Hippokrates and Demosthenes: in the next place, the entire plot was discovered and betrayed by a Phokian of Phalaros (dwelling on Chersones) named Nukonides—communicated first to the Laodemonians, and through them to the Boeotians. Siphon and Chersones were immediately placed in as good a state of defence, that Demosthenes, on arriving at the former place, found not only no party within it favorable to him, but a formidable Boeotian force which rendered attack unavailing. Moreover Hippokrates had not yet begun his march, so that the defenders had nothing to distrust their situation from Siphon.<sup>1</sup> Under these circumstances, while Demosthenes was obliged to withdraw without striking a blow, and to content himself with an unsuccessful descent upon the territory of Sikytia,<sup>2</sup> all the expected internal movements in Boeotia were prevented from breaking out.

It was not till after the Boeotian troops, having repelled the attack by sea, had retired from Siphon, that Hippokrates commenced his march from Athens to invade the Boeotian territory near Tanagra. He was probably encouraged by false promises from the Boeotian allies, otherwise it seems remarkable that he should have persisted in executing his part of the scheme alone, after the known failure of the other part. It was, however, executed in a manner which implies unusual alacrity and confidence. The whole military population of Athens was marched into Boeotia, in the neighborhood of Delphi, the eastern coast-extremity of the territory belonging to the Boeotian town of Tanagra; the expedition comprising all classes, not merely citizens, but also natives or resident non-citizens, and even non-resident strangers then by accident at Athens. Of course the statement must be understood with the reserve of ample guards being left behind for the city; but besides the really effective force of 7000 hoplites and several hundred bowmen, there appear to have been not less than 25,000 light-armed, half-armed, or unarmed, attendants accompanying the march.<sup>3</sup> The number of hoplites is here

Hippokrates  
part of the  
Athens  
general  
Boeotian  
marched  
only place  
in Boeotia  
Hippokrates  
marched  
with the  
army from  
Athens to  
Delphi in  
Boeotia.

<sup>1</sup> Thucyd. iv. 95.

<sup>2</sup> Thucyd. iv. 96.

<sup>3</sup> Thucyd. iv. 95, 96. He states that

the Boeotian ships were about 15,000,  
and that the Athenian army, with  
contingents of the Boeotians. We are











and encroaching of all nations; so that the Thebans who had the marshes to be their neighbours could only be moved against them by the most restless promptitude in defending themselves as well as in returning the blow first given. If they wished to protect their autonomy and their property against the condition of slavery under which their neighbours as Thebans had long suffered, as well as so many other portions of Greece, their only chance was to march forward and beat these intruders, following the glorious example of their fathers and predecessors in the field of Kynos. The marshes were favourable to an advancing movement; while Apollo, whose temple the Athenians had devoted by converting it into a fortified place, would lend his orbed aid to the Boeotian defence.<sup>1</sup>

Finding his adversaries favourably moved, Pagidas conducted the army by a rapid march to a position close to the Athenians. He was anxious to fight them before they should have retreated further; moreover the day was nearly spent—it was already late in the afternoon.

Having reached a spot where he was only separated from the Athenians by a hill, which prevented either army from seeing the other, he marshalled his troops in the array proper for fighting. The Theban hoplites, with their dependent allies ranged in a depth of not less than twenty-five shields, occupied the right wing; the hoplites of Halimata, Korthia, Kôpa, and its neighbourhood were in the centre; those of Thebes, Tanagra, and Orchomenos on the left, for Orchomenos, losing the second city to Thebes went to Thebes, obtained the second post of honour at the opposite extremity of the line. Each contingent adopted its own mode of marshalling the hoplites, and its own depth of line: on this point there was no unanimity—a remarkable proof of the prevalence of dissident custom in Greece, and how much such towns, even among confederates, stood apart as a separate unit.<sup>2</sup> Thucydides specifies only the

marshalling of the Boeotian army; 2-1/2 depth of the Theban hoplites—special mention of Thebes, Tanagra, and Orchomenos.

<sup>1</sup> Thucyd. iv. 92.

<sup>2</sup> Thucyd. iv. 92. In another instance (see, e.g., *Dece. Epistola. Pelopon.*, p. 10) *the Boeotians* are named.

There is still some possibility, in the battle of Marathon in 490 B.C.,—

between the Leontarchians on the one side and the Alcibiades, Argives, Mitylenians, &c. on the other—the different order or disposition of the Leontarchians army were not all marshalled in the same depth of line.











the fighting, they found themselves pressed harder and harder by the pursuing Thibians; so that, in the end, the whole Athenian camp was broken and put to flight. The pursuit of Delium, conducted by 500 cavalry, whom Hippocrates had left there to guard the rear of the Boeotians during the action, either made no vigorous movement, or was repelled by a Boeotian reserve stationed to watch them.

Flights having become general among the Athenians, the different parts of their army took different directions. The right sought refuge at Delium, the centre fled to Olynus, and the left took a direction towards the high lands of Paros. The pursuit of the Boeotians was vigorous and destructive. They had an efficient cavalry, strengthened by some Locrian horse who had arrived even during the action; their pikemen also and their light-armed would render valuable service against retreating hoplites.<sup>1</sup> Fortunately for the vanquished, the battle had begun very late in the afternoon, leaving no long period of daylight. This important circumstance saved the Athenian army from almost total destruction.<sup>2</sup> As it was, however, the general Hippocrates, together with nearly 1000 hoplites and a considerable number of light-armed and attendants, were slain; while the loss of the Boeotians, chiefly on their defeated left wing, was rather under 500 hoplites. Some prisoners' names are here given, but we hear little about them. Those who had fled to Delium and Olynus were employed, back by sea to Athens.

The victors retired to Thracæ, after securing their trophy, burying their own dead, and depositing those of their enemies. An abundant booty of arms from the slain warriors long remained to decorate the temples of Thibos, while the spoil in other ways is said to have been considerable. Pausanias also records to lay siege to the newly-established fortress of Delium. But before commencing operations—which might perhaps prove tedious, since the Athenians could always withdraw the garrison by sea—he tried another means of obtaining the same object. He

<sup>1</sup> Thucyd. ii. 95. Athenians = 500. Boeotians 1000. Hippocrates took the battle before, and it consisted of nearly 1000 hoplites. The Athenians had the advantage. This is quite inconsistent with the narrative of Thucydides.

<sup>2</sup> Diodorus (xv. 44) would open this

discrepancy.

<sup>3</sup> Pausanias is anxious of ascribing some successful and others prisoners to the pursuit by the Boeotians. Thucyd. ii. 95. Diodorus x. 75, p. 343. See also Thucyd. = ii. which addition is made to other prisoners.

despatched to the Athenians a herald, who, happening on his way to meet the Athenian herald coming to ask the ordinary permission for burial of the slain, warned him that no such request would be entertained until the message of the Boeotian general had first been communicated, and then induced him to come back to the Athenian camp. The Boeotian herald was instructed to concentrate against the violation of holy custom committed by the Athenians in selling and despoiling the temple of Delos, wherein their government was now dwelling, performing numerous functions which religion forbade to be done in a sacred place, and using as their quarters drink the water especially consecrated to medicinal purposes. The Boeotians therefore solemnly summoned them, in the name of Apollo and the gods journeyed along with them, to evacuate the place, carrying away all that belonged to them. Finally, the herald gave it to be understood, that unless the summons were complied with, no provision would be granted to bury their dead.

Answer was returned by the Athenian herald, who now went to the Boeotian commanders, to the following effect:—The Athenians did not admit that they had hitherto been guilty of any wrong in reference to the temple, and protested that they would persist in respecting it for the future as much as possible. Their object in taking possession of it had been an evil sentiment towards the holy place, but the necessity of avenging the repeated invasions of Attica by the Boeotians. Possession of the territory, according to the revered maxims of Greece, always carried along with it possession of temples therein situated, under obligation to fulfil all customary observances to the resident god, as far as circumstances permitted. It was upon this maxim that the Boeotians had themselves acted when they took possession of their present territory, expelling the poor occupants and appropriating the temples: it was upon the same maxim that the Athenians would set in retaking so much of Boeotia as they had now conquered, and in compensating more of it, if they could. Necessity compelled them to use the consecrated water—a necessity not originating in the violation of Athens, but in prior Boeotian

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aggression upon Athens—a wrong which they treated that the gods would pardon, since their altar was allowed as a protection to the involuntary offender, and none but he who stood without conscious repentment their displeasure. The Eusebius were guilty of the greater impiety—in refusing to give back the dead, except upon certain conditions estimated with the holy ground—than the Athenians, who merely refused to turn the duty of expiation into an accessory bargain. "Tell us unconditionally (concluded the Athenian herald) that we may bury our dead under trees, pursuant to the customs of our forefathers. Do not tell us that we may do so, on condition of going out of Greece—for we are no longer in Greece—we are in our own territory, won by the sword."

The Eusebius parake declined the herald with a reply short and decisive:—"If you are in Greece, you may take away all that belongs to you, but only on condition of going out of it. If, on the other hand, you are in your own territory, you can take your own resolution without asking us."<sup>1</sup>

In this debate, various as an illustration of Greek manners and feelings, there seems to have been special pleading and evasion on both sides. The final sentence of the Eusebius was good as a reply to the accidental argument used by the Athenian herald, who had noted the absence of Athens in regard to the temple of Delos on the allegation that the territory was Athenian, not Greek, in the debate.

Eusebius—affirmed by conquest and by the right of the strongest—and had concluded by affirming the same thing about Greece, the district to which the battle-field belonged. It was only this same argument, of actual superior force, which the Eusebius rejected, when they said—"If the territory in which your application refers is yours by right of conquest (as if you are *de facto* masters of it and are strongest within it)—you need not care for what you think best in it: you need not ask any trace of our hands; you can bury your dead without a trace!"<sup>2</sup> The

<sup>1</sup> See the two difficult chapters, in ch. 25, in *Thucydides*.

<sup>2</sup> See the notes of Pappas, *ibid.*, ch. 25, and other commentators on these chapters.

Neither these nor similar objections were to me in all parts satisfactory, nor do they solve the spirit of the argument between the Eusebius party and the Athenian effort, which will





pot. Such was the machine, which, constructed at some distance, was brought on carts and placed close to the wall, near the palæstræ and the wooden tower. The Bombarde then applied great bellows to their own end of the beam, blowing violently a current of air through the narrow channel, so as to raise an intense fire in the cauldron at the other end. The wooden portions of the wall soon catching fire, became untenable for the defenders, who escaped in the best way they could, without attempting further resistance. Two hundred of them were made prisoners, and a few slain; but the greater number got safely on shipboard. This capture of Delium took place on the seventeenth day after the battle, during all which interval the Athenians who had remained on the field endured. Presently, however, arrived the Athenian herald to make fresh application for the burial-treue, which was now forthwith granted, and granted unconditionally.<sup>1</sup>

Such was the memorable expedition and battle of Delium—a total discouragement to the feeling of confidence and hope which had previously reigned at Athens, besides the painful immediate loss which it inflicted on the city. Among the hoplites who took part in the vigorous charge and pushing of shields, the philosopher Sokrates is to be numbered. His journey, both to the battle and the retreat, was much attended by his friends, and doubtless with good reason. He had before served with credit in the ranks of the hoplites at Potidaea, and he served also at Amphipolis; his patience under hardship, and endurance of heat and cold, being not less remarkable than his personal courage. He and his friend Laches were among those hoplites who in the retreat from Delium, instead of flinging away their arms and taking to flight, kept their ranks, their arms, and their firmness of countenance; inasmuch that the pursuing cavalry found it dangerous to meddle with them, and turned to as easier prey to the disarmed fugitives. Alkibiades also served at Delium in the cavalry, and stood by Sokrates in the retreat. The latter was then exposing his life at Delium nearly at the same time when Alcibiades was exposing him to ridicule in the comedy of the "Clouds," as a dreamer alike morally worthless and physically incapable.<sup>2</sup>

Sokrates  
and  
Alkibiades  
personally  
present at  
Delium.

<sup>1</sup> Thucyd. ii. 98, 100.

<sup>2</sup> See *Phil. Symposion*, s. 33, p. 30.

Isæus, p. 141; Demosthenes, p. 140; Apoll. Leg. Sokrates, p. 30; *Symon*, s. p. 40.

Severe as the blow was which the Athenians suffered at Delium, their disaster at Thracæ about the same time, or towards the close of the same summer and autumn, were yet more calamitous. I have already mentioned the circumstances which led to the preparation of a Lacedæmonian force intended to act against the Athenians in Thracæ, under Brasidas, in concert with the Chalkidians, mixed subjects of Athens, and with Perikles of Mendeia. Having frustrated the Athenian designs against Megara (as described above),<sup>1</sup> Brasidas completed the levy of his division—3700 hoplites, partly Helots, partly Dorian Peloponnesians—and conducted them, towards the close of the summer, to the Lacedæmonian colony of Herakleia, in the Thracian territory near the Mælian Gulf.

To reach Macedonia and Thracæ, it was necessary for him to pass through Thessaly, which was no easy task; for the war had now lasted so long that every state in Greece had become mistrustful of the intent of armed foreigners. Moreover, the men of the Thessalian population were doubly friendly to Athens, and Brasidas had no sufficient means to force a passage; while, should he want to apply for formal permission, there was much doubt whether it would be granted, and perfect certainty of evils doing and publicly so would put the Athenians on their guard. But though such was the temper of the Thessalian people, yet the Thessalian governments, all disorganised, sympathized with Lacedæmonia. The federal authority or power of the league, which bound together the separate cities, was generally very weak. What was of still greater importance, the Macedonian Perikles, as well as the Chalkidians, had in every city powerful friends and partisans, whom they prevailed upon to exert themselves actively in forwarding the passage of the army.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *Plutarch, Alcibiades, c. 1.* To last I translated, saying the Athenians told Brasidas, in the column from Delium, that his life was preserved by the mediation of the localities named as guides, which I understood him as the Chalkidians, whom he had of two months was the only one to take Megara, *de Alcibiade, l. ii.* *Plutarch, de Alcibiade, c. 11, p. 101.*

The capture of Athens (p. 2) will show the influence which Brasidas is not to be despised, but it may probably be explained by the circumstances and character which he had just, according to the philosopher's explanation.

<sup>2</sup> *See above, pp. 302–303.*

<sup>3</sup> *Thucyd., l. vi.*

To these men Brasidas sent a message at Thasos, as soon as he reached Heraklion. Nikomedes of Larissa, with other Thracian friends of Perikles, something at Melites in Achaea Phthiotis, undertook to escort him through Thessaly. By their countenance and support, combined with his own boldness, dexterity, and rapid movements, he was enabled to accomplish the seemingly impossible enterprise of running through the country, not only without the consent, but against the feeling of its inhabitants—simply by such celerity as to forestall opposition. After crossing Achaea Phthiotis, a territory dependent on the Thracians, Brasidas began his march from Melites through Thessaly itself, along with his powerful native guides. Notwithstanding all possible secrecy and celerity, his march became so far divulged, that a body of volunteers from the neighbourhood, attached to the proceeding and uniformly to Nikomedes, assembled to oppose his progress down the valley of the river Eolpus. Representing him with wrongful violation of an independent territory, by the introduction of armed forces without permission from the general government, they forbade him to proceed farther. His only chance of making progress lay in dissuading their opposition by fair words. His guides exposed themselves by saying that the suddenness of his arrival had imposed upon them as his guests the obligation of conducting him through, without waiting to ask for formal permission: to offend their countrymen, however, was the farthest thing from their thoughts—and they would renounce the enterprise if the persons now assembled persisted in their resolution. The same conciliatory tone was adopted by Brasidas himself. "He protested his strong feeling of respect and friendship for Thessaly and its inhabitants: his arms were directed against the Athenians, not against them: nor was he aware of any national relation subsisting between the Thracians and Laodamians, such as to exclude either of them from the territory of the other. Against the prohibition of the parties now before them, he could not possibly march forward, nor would he think of attempting it; but he put it to their good feeling whether they ought to prohibit him." Such conciliatory language was successful in softening the opponents and inducing them to disperse. But so abrupt were his guides of returned

Brasidas  
and others  
with whom  
he goes  
through  
Thessaly



opposition in other parts, that they hurried him forward still more rapidly,<sup>3</sup> and he "passed through the country at a running pace without halting". Leaving Milles in the morning, he reached Pharsalus on the same night, encamping on the river Apidanus; thence he proceeded on the next day to Thakina, and on the day afterwards into Perdikha<sup>4</sup>—a territory adjoining to and dependent on Thessaly, under the mountain range of Olympus. Here he was in safety, so that his Thessalian guides left him; while the Perdikhiens conducted him over the pass of Olympus (the same over which the army of Xerxes had marched), to Dama in Macedonia, in the territory of Perdikha, on the northern edge of the mountain.<sup>5</sup>

The Athenians were soon apprised of this sudden passage, so ably and rapidly executed, in a manner which few other Greeks, certainly no other Laedæmonians, would have conceived to be possible. Aware of the new enemy thus brought within reach of their possessions in Thessaly, they transmitted orders (either for greater vigilance, and at the same time declared open war against Perdikha;<sup>6</sup> but unfortunately without sending any efficient help, at a moment when timely defensive intervention was imperiously required.

Perdikha immediately applied Brasidas to join him in the attack of Arridæia, prince of the Macedonians called Lyncestæ, or of Lykon; a summons which the Spartans could not decline, since Perdikha provided half of the pay and maintenance of the army, but which he obeyed with reluctance, anxious as he was to commence operations against the allies of Athens. Such reluctance was still further strengthened by surmises from the

<sup>3</sup> Thucyd. ii. 28. A B, *καταδραμὴν τοῦ ποταμοῦ, καὶ ἐν τῇ αὐτῇ ὁδοῦ ἐκ τῆς πόλεως, ὅπως καὶ ἰσχυρὰ ἔλθοι.*

<sup>4</sup> The geography of Thessaly is not sufficiently known, to enable us to really trace Brasidas' route accurately. That which Thucydides calls the Apidanus is the river formed by the junction of the Arcton and Pelagos. See Cooper's map of ancient Thessaly—*Classical Landmarks in Northern Greece*, 2d. ed. vol. ii. p. 202; and see a valuable note on this subject of Thucydides.

<sup>5</sup> We must suppose that Brasidas was destined a considerable force to pursue

him with the remaining band of Thessalians. Thucydides's account seems that the space between Milles and Pharsalus must not be a great distance to get over in an army very much diminished, and that the pass was as rapid as the longer route around. The great gulf distance between Larissa and Thessaly, near Gerasus, is not slight by Thucyd. viii. 1. Macedonia lies still at Thessaly. Thus an army carrying substantial stores along the coasting a river, see Thucyd. i. 102.

<sup>6</sup> Thucyd. ii. 28.

<sup>7</sup> Thucyd. ii. 28.

Chalkidians of Thrace, who, as zealous enemies of Athens, joined him forthwith, but discouraged any vigorous efforts to relieve Perikles from embarrassing enemies in the interior, in order that the latter might be under more pressing motives to conclude and accept them. Accordingly Brasidas, though he joined Perikles and marched along with the Spartan army towards the territory of the Lokians, was not only aware to abstain military operations, but even entertained with favour propositions from Archibius, wherein the latter expressed his wish to become the ally of Lacedæmon, and offered to refer all his differences with Perikles to the arbitration of the Spartan general himself. Communicating these propositions to Perikles, Brasidas invited him to listen to an equitable compromise, admitting Archibius into the alliance of Lacedæmon. But Perikles indignantly refused: "he had not called on Brasidas as a judge to decide disputes between him and his enemies, but as an arbiter to put them down whatever he might please them out; and he protested against the impolicy of Brasidas's entering into terms with Archibius, while the Lacedæmonian army was half paid and maintained by him" (Perikles).<sup>1</sup> Nevertheless, with immobility, and even a hostile protest, Brasidas persisted in his intended conference with Archibius, and was so far unswayed with the propositions made, that he withdrew his troops without marching over the pass into Lokian. Too feeble to act alone, Perikles loudly complained. He even contracted his allowance for the future, so as to provide for only one-third of the army of Brasidas instead of one-half.

To this inconvenience, however, Brasidas submitted, in haste to begin his march into Chalkidike, and his operations jointly with the Chalkidians, for seducing or enticing the subject-allies of Athens. His first operation was against Abantia, on the western of the peninsula of Athos, the territory of which he invaded a little before the vintage—probably about the middle of September, when the grapes were ripe, but still out, and the whole crop of course exposed to ruin at the hands of an enemy superior in force. So important was it to Brasidas to have reaped the necessity of waiting another month in conquering

*Brasidas was rather lighted, dressed in the style of Greece in the time.*

<sup>1</sup> Thucyd. iv. 84.



standing high as you do both for prudence and power, will hardly keep back other Greeks. It will make them suspect that I am wanting either in power to protect them against Athens, or in honest purpose. Now, in regard to power, my own present army was one which the Athenians, though superior in number, were afraid to fight with Sparta; nor was they at all likely to send us equal force either against me by sea. And in regard to my purpose, it is not one of avarice, but of liberations—the Lacedæmonian authorities having pledged themselves to me by the most solemn oaths that every city which joins me shall retain its autonomy. You have therefore the best assurance both as to my purpose and as to my power; you need not apprehend that I am come with secret designs, to seize the wives of any particular men among you, and to remodel your established constitution to the disadvantage either of the Many or the Few. That would be worse than foreign subjugation; and by such dealing we Lacedæmonians should be taking trouble to turn hatred instead of gratitude. We should play the part of unworthy masters, worse even than that high-handed oppression of which we accuse the Athenians: we should at once violate our oaths, and sin against our strongest political interests. Perhaps you may say that though you wish me well, you desire for your parts to be let alone, and to stand aloof from a dangerous struggle. You will tell me to carry my propensities elsewhere, to those who are safely estranged from us, but not to thrust my affairs upon any people against their own will. If this should be your language, I shall first call your best gifts and heroes to witness that I have come to you with a mission of good, and have employed persuasion to men; I shall then proceed to ravage your territory and subvert your laws, thinking myself justly entitled to do so, on two grounds. First, that the Lacedæmonians may not sustain actual damage from these good wishes which you profess towards us without actually joining—damage in the shape of that tribute which you annually send to Athens. Next, that the Greeks generally may not be prevented by you from becoming free. It is only on the ground of common good that we Lacedæmonians can justify ourselves for liberating any city against its own will. But as we are conscious of doing only extinction of the empire of others, not acquisition of empire

the civilians, we should feel it our duty if we suffered you to obstruct that liberation which we are now enjoying to all. Consider well my words then: take to yourselves the glory of beginning the war of emancipation for Greece—save your own properties from damage—and attack an ever-honourable name to the civility of Alsatians.<sup>1</sup>

Nothing could be more plausible or judicious than this language of Boudin to the Alsatians, nor had they any means of detecting the falsity of the assertion (which he afterwards repeated in other places broadly)<sup>2</sup> that he had treated the forces of Alsace at Niern with the same clemency as that now on the outside of the walls. Perhaps the simplicity of his speech and manner may even have lent strength to his assertions. As soon as he had retired, the subject was largely discussed in the assembly, with much difference of opinion among the speakers, and perfect freedom on both sides; and the decision, not called for until after a long debate, was determined partly by the far presence of Boudin, partly by the moral loss which the rule of the vote-crop would entail. The votes of the citizens present being taken secretly, a majority resolved to stand to the propositions of Boudin and revolt from Alsace.<sup>3</sup> Entering the breach of his pledge and that of the Leontinean authorities, for the preservation of full autonomy to every city which should join him, they received his army into the town. The neighbouring city of Sigeur (a colony of Andros, as Alsatians also was) soon followed the example.<sup>4</sup>

There are few acts in history wherein Greek political reason and morality appear to greater advantage than in this proceeding of the Alsatians. The habit of fair, free, and public discussion—the established respect to the vote of the majority—the care to protect individual independence of judgment by secret suffrage—the deliberate estimate of reasons on both sides by each individual citizen—all these noble laws and conditions of healthy

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Alsatian  
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revolution.

Reflection  
upon the  
proceeding  
—and  
political  
quality of  
the Alsatian  
citizens.

<sup>1</sup> Thucyd. ix. 81, 82, 83.

<sup>2</sup> Thucyd. ix. 83.

<sup>3</sup> Thucyd. ix. 83. cf. 84 'Alsatian,  
entirely independent of the  
proceeding of the Alsatians.

which he had treated, but with the  
Alsatian Boudin, and the  
high quality of the Alsatian  
citizens.

<sup>4</sup> Thucyd. ix. 83, 84, 85, 86.

political action appear as a part of the confirmed character of the Abantians. We shall not find Brasidas entering other towns in a way so unobtrusive or so harmonious.

But there is another inference which the scene just described reasonably suggests. It affords the clearest proof that the Abantians had little to complain of as subject-allies of Athens, and that they would have continued in that capacity, if left to their own choice without the fear of having their crop destroyed. Such is the pronounced feeling of the mass of the citizens: the party who desire otherwise are in a decided minority. It is only the combined effect, of severe impending loss and of tempting overtures held out by the worthiest representatives whom Sparta ever sent out, which induces them to revolt from Athens. Nor even then is the revolution taken without long opposition, and a large discontented minority, in a case where secret suffrage ensured loss and genuine expression of preference from every individual. Now it is impossible that the scene in Abantia at this critical moment could have been of such a character, had the empire of Athens been practically odious and burdensome to the subject-allies, or if it is commonly depicted. Had such been the fact—had the Abantians felt that the imperial ascendancy of Athens oppressed them with hardship or humiliation from which they longed to escape, the revolted Chalkidians in Olynthus and elsewhere, were exempt—they would have hailed the advent of Brasidas with that cordiality which he himself expressed and was surprised not to find. The name of present grievance, always acute and often energetic, would have stood out as their prominent impulse. They would have needed neither intimations nor edicts to induce them to throw open their gates to the Spartan, who, in his speech within the town, took no actual suffering to appeal to, but as obliged to gain over an audience, evidently swelling, by alternate threats and promises.

As in Abantia, so in most of the other Thracian subjects of Athens, the bulk of the citizens, though strongly solicited by the Chalkidians, manifest no spontaneous disposition to revolt from Athens. We shall find the party who introduce Brasidas to be a conspiring minority, who not only do not counsel the

inference which this proceeding affords, that the bulk of citizens, joining the Athenians, would not any length Athens and were not anxious to revolt.

majority beheld, but not in such a manner as to leave us free option to the majority afterwards, whether they will rally or reject, bringing in a foreign force to overcome them and oppress them without their own consent in hostility against Athens. Now that which makes the events of Alcinous so important as an evidence is, that the majority is not thus snarled and oppressed, but pronounced its judgment freely after ample discussion. The grounds of this judgment are clearly set forth to us, so as to show that hatred of Athens, if even it exists at all, is in no way a strong or dominating feeling. Had there existed any such strong feeling among the subject-allies of Athens in the Chalcidic peninsula, there was no Athenian force now present to bludgeon them all from opening their gates to the Illyrian Rhodius by spontaneous requisition ; as he himself, encouraged by the sanguine promises of the Chalcidians, evidently expected that they would do. But nothing of this kind happened.

That which I before remarked in recounting the result of Mitylene, a privileged ally of Athens, is now confirmed in the events of Alcinous, a tributary and subject ally. The circumstances of both prove that Imperial Athens neither incurred hatred nor incurred painful grievances to the population of her subject-allies generally. The movements against her arose from party-animosities, of the same character as that Phocian party which introduced the Theban auxiliars into Phocia at the commencement of the Peloponnesian war. There was of course difference of sentiment between one town and another ; but the result of the war generally demonstrates that the Athenian empire was not felt by them to be such a scheme of plunder and oppression as Mr. Mitford and others would have us believe. It is indeed true that Athens managed her empire with reference to her own feelings and interest, and that her hold ran rather upon the provinces than upon the affections of their allies ; except as far as those among them, who were democratically governed sympathized with her democracy. It is also true that restrictions in any form on the autonomy of such subjects ally were odious to the political instincts of the Greeks ; moreover Athens took less and less pains to disguise or soften the real character of her empire, as she rested simply on established fact and superior

area. But this is a different thing from the existence of practical hardship and oppression, which, had it been real, would have inspired strong passion hatred among the subject-people: such feelings exposed to that extremity as Thucyd. had did not really feel, in spite of the very opening which his passage afforded.

The acquisition of *Alamania* and *Stagira* enabled *Pericles* in no very long time to extend his conquests, to enter *Argilus*—and from thence to make the capital acquisition of *Amphipolis*.

*Argilus* was situated between *Stagira* and the river *Strymon*, along the western bank of which river its territory extended. Along the eastern bank of the same river,—north of the lake which it forms under the name of *Kerkiras*, and north of the town of *Kim* at its mouth,—was situated the town and territory of *Amphipolis*, communicating with the lands of *Argilus* by the important bridge there situated. The *Argilans* were rebels from *Aulon*, like *Alamania* and *Stagira*. The alliance of them two cities to *Pericles* gave him opportunity to cultivate intelligence in *Argilus*, whence there had existed a standing discontent against *Athena*, ever since the foundation of the neighbouring city of *Amphipolis*.<sup>1</sup> The latter city had been established by the *Athenian* *Agroas*, at the head of a numerous body of colonists, on a spot belonging to the *Thracian* Thracians called *Ennea Hodoi* or *Nine Ways*, about five years prior to the commencement of the war (B.C. 457), after two previous attempts to colonize it—once by *Haricles* and *Arctagoras* at the period of the *Ionian* revolt, and a second by the *Athenians* about 468 B.C.—both of which had entirely failed. So valuable however was the site, from its vicinity to the gold and silver mines near *Mount Pangaea* and to large forests of ship-timber, as well as for command of the *Strymon*, and for commerce with the interior of *Thrace* and *Macedonia*, that the *Athenians* had sent a second expedition under *Agroas*, who founded the city and gave it the name of *Amphipolis*. The resident *Athenians* there, however, were only in small proportion *Athenian* citizens; the rest of mixed origin,

<sup>1</sup> Thucyd. ii. 95. *αἰτίαν δὲ τῆς πόλεως οὐκ ἔστιν ἡμῶν, ἀλλὰ τῶν Ἀθηναίων, ὅτι οὐκ ἔχοντες τὴν πόλιν, ἔπειτα ἐκ ἀποστάσεων αὐτῆς ἐπὶ τὴν ἀποκατάστασιν ἐπέσπευσεν.*



some of them Argilæan—a considerable number Chalkidians. The Athenian general Euclid was governor in the town, though seemingly with no paid force under his command. His colleague Theophrastus the historian was in command of a small fleet on the coast.

Among these mixed inhabitants a conspiracy was exposed to betray the town to Brasidas. The inhabitants of Argilæa as well as the Chalkidians each conspired with those of the same name who resided in Amphipolis; while the influence of Perdikas, not inconsiderable in consequence of the commerce of the place with Macedonia, was also employed to increase the number of partisans. Of all the instigators, however, the most strenuous as well as the most useful were the inhabitants of Argilæa. Amphipolis, together with the Athenians as its leaders, had been odious to them from its commencement. Its foundation had doubtless abridged their commerce and importance as masters of the lower course of the Strymon. They had been long laying snares against the city, and the arrival of Brasidas now presented to them an unexpected chance of success. It was they who encouraged him to attempt the surprise, deferring proclamation of their own defection from Athens until they could make it subservient to his conquest of Amphipolis.

Starting with his army from Arctæ in the Chalkidic peninsula, Brasidas arrived in the afternoon at Ankon, and Neomachia, near the channel whereby the lake Beldi is connected with the sea. From hence, after his men had supped, he began his night-march to Amphipolis, on a cold and snowy night of November or the beginning of December. He reached Argilæa in the middle of the night, where the leaders at once admitted him, proclaiming their revolt from Athens. With their aid and guidance, he then hurried forward without delay to the bridge across the Strymon, which he reached before break of day.<sup>1</sup> It was guarded only by a feeble picket—the town of Amphipolis itself being situated on the hill at some little distance higher up

<sup>1</sup>Thucyd. l. iii. c. 10. *κατασχευόμενοι*—they kept the city, the picket was surprised.

Brasidas's opinion of not his superior in the position is to explain. The latter word really only pointing to the main-

body; whereas the fact that Brasidas got over the river before daylight is not both new and material, it is not necessarily implied in the previous words *κατασχευόμενοι*.



unable to carry the majority along with them. As in Athens, as in Amphipolis, those who really hated Athens and wished to revolt were only a party-minority. The greater number of citizens, at this critical moment, stood by Kleon, and the few native Athenians around him, as rendering upon Athens, and as sending off an embassy to Thucydides at Thuræ (the historian), the colleagues of Kleon, as general in the region of Thuræ, he immediately did. The step, of course immediately communicated to Brasidas from within, determined him to make every effort for inducing the Amphipolitans to surrender before the reinforcement should arrive; the rather as he was apprised that Thucydides, being a large proprietor and worker of gold mines in the neighbouring region, possessed extensive personal influence among the Thracian tribes, and would be able to bring them together for the relief of the place, in conjunction with his own Athenian squadron. He therefore sent in propositions for surrender on the most favourable terms—guaranteeing to every citizen who chose to remain, Amphipolitan or even Athenian, continued residence with undisturbed property and equal political rights, and granting to every one who chose to depart five days for the purpose of carrying away his effects.

He likewise made of the Athenian army, and to the appointed in Thucydides, Kleon, the men.

He offers to the citizens the most favourable terms of surrender, which they accept. Amphipolitan, Athenian.

Such easy conditions, when made known in the city, produced presently a sensible change of opinion among the citizens, proving acceptable both to Athenians and Amphipolitans, though on different grounds.<sup>2</sup> The properties of the citizens without, as well as many of their relatives, were all in the hands of Brasidas. No one counted upon the speedy arrival of reinforcement—and even if it did arrive, the city might be preserved, but the citizens without would still be either slain or made captive: a massacre both would ensue, and perhaps after all, Brasidas, assisted by the party within, might prove victorious. The Athenian citizens in Amphipolis, knowing themselves to be exposed to peculiar danger, were perfectly well-pleased with his offer, as withdrawing them from a critical position and procuring for them the means

<sup>2</sup> Thucyd. lib. 2. 22. and 23. added death with what had been before, and now divergent interests arising therefrom.

of usage, with comparatively little loss; while the non-Athenian citizens, perhaps in the same spirit from fear, felt little reluctance in accepting a capitulation which preserved both their rights and their properties inviolate, and merely severed them from Athens—towards which city they felt, not hatred, but indifference. Above all, the friends and enemies of the democracy exposed in the out-lying townships in saying on the capitulation, so that the conspirators soon became bold enough to proclaim themselves openly—insisting upon the moderation of Brasidas and the prudence of admitting him. But he found that the tone of opinion, even among his own Athenians, was gradually turned against him. He could not prevent the acceptance of the terms, and the admission of the enemy into the city, on that same day.

No such resolution would have been adopted, had the citizens been aware how near at hand Theophrastus and his force were. The message despatched early in the morning from Amphipolis forced him at Thracæ with seven thousand; with which he instantly got to sea, so as to reach Eux at the mouth of the Strymon, within three miles of Amphipolis, on the same evening. He hoped to be in time for saving Amphipolis; but the place had surrendered a few hours before. He arrived indeed only just in time to preserve Eux; for parties on that town were already beginning to concert the advances of Brasidas, who would probably have entered it at daybreak the next morning. Theophrastus, putting the place in a condition of defence, successfully repelled an attack which Brasidas made both by land and by boats on the river. He at the same time received and provided for the Athenian citizens who were retiring from Amphipolis.

The capture of this city, perhaps the most important of all the foreign possessions of Athens—and the opening of the bridge over the Strymon, by which even all her eastern allies became approachable by land—constituted prodigious conquest throughout the Grecian world. The *divine hill at Athens* was greater

Theophrastus  
arrives at  
Eux from  
Thracæ with  
seven thousand  
men, and is  
just in time to  
prevent  
Amphipolis  
from being  
surrendered.

<sup>1</sup> Thucyd. iv. 106, 107; Diod. xii. 66.

<sup>2</sup> Thucyd. iv. 106. According to the  
opinion of Amphipolis, with its adjoining  
Amphipolis, of Amphipolis is also the  
city, including the surrounding  
territory.



such as were deemed incredible before they actually occurred, they required a degree of confidence, and turned a tide of opinion, towards the valiant man, which rendered him personally one of the first powers in Greece. Numerous embassies were transmitted to him at Amphipolis from parties among the subject-allies of Athens, in their present temper of large hopes from him and diminished fear of the Athenians. The anti-Athenian party in such was impatient to revolt, the rest of the population less restrained by fear.<sup>1</sup>

Of those who rejoiced in these sanguine calculations, many had yet to learn by painful experience that Athens was still but little elevated in power. Still her reaction, during this important crisis, had been such as may well explain their mistake. It might have been anticipated that on hearing the alarming news of the junction of Brasidas with the Chalkidians and Potidæans so close upon their dependent allies, they would forthwith have sent a competent force to Thracæ, which, if despatched at that time, would probably have checked all the subsequent disasters. So they would have acted at any other time—and perhaps even then, if Pericles had been alive. But the news arrived just at the period when Athens was engaged in the expedition against Boeotia, which ended very shortly in the ruinous defeat of Salamis. Under the discouragement arising from the death of the Strategos Kleippidas and 1000 citizens, the idea of a fresh expedition to Thracæ would probably have been inadmissible to Athenian legislators. The hardship of a winter service in Thracæ, as experienced a few years before in the blockade of Potidæa, would probably also aggravate their reluctance. In Grecian history, we must constantly keep in mind that we are reading about citizen soldiers, not about professional soldiers, and that the temper of the time, whether of confidence or dismay, modifies to an unspeakable degree all the calculations of military and political prudence.

Even after the royal success of Brasidas, not merely at Abdera and Stagira, but even at Amphipolis, they sent only a few inadequate guards<sup>2</sup> to the points most threatened, thus leaving

Reaction and disappointment of Athens after the failure of Salamis, especially in reference to Thracæ, the cause of Pericles' death.

<sup>1</sup> Thucyd. iv. 106.

<sup>2</sup> Thucyd. iv. 106. cf. also *Antiquities*.

*Antiquities* de 11. Salamis and de periculis de Thracæ de 11. Salamis, 106.

to their enterprise, during the whole marching winter for his operations, without hindrance. Without depreciating the merits of Brasidas, we may see that his extraordinary success was in great part owing to the no less extraordinary depression which at that time pervaded the Athenian public—a feeling encouraged by Nikias and other leading men of the same party, who were building upon it their hopes of getting the Lacedæmonian proposals for peace accepted.

But while we thus notice the shortcomings of Athens in not sending timely forces against Brasidas, we must at the same time admit that the most serious and irreparable loss which she sustained—that of *Amphipolis*—was the fault of her officers more than her own. Eubidas and the historian Thucydides, the two joint Athenian commanders in Thrace, to whom was confided the defence of that important town, had means amply sufficient to place it beyond all risk of capture, had they employed the most ordinary vigilance and precaution beforehand. That Thucydides became an exile immediately after this event, and remained so for twenty years, is certain from his own statement. And we learn, upon what in this case is quite sufficient authority, that the Athenians condemned him (probably Eubidas also) to banishment, on the proposition of Kleon.<sup>1</sup>

In considering this sentence, historians<sup>2</sup> commonly treat

<sup>1</sup> Thucyd. v. 26. See the *Morning* of Thucydides by Macaulay, prefixed to all the editions, p. 24, and *ibidem*.

<sup>2</sup> Ibrokades, the joint historian from the account of Dr. Thirlwall, whose judgment coincides in this respect with what is generally given (Hist. of Greece, vol. xiii. vol. 2, p. 260).

<sup>3</sup> On the evening of the same day, Thucydides, with seven others, which he supposed to have with him at Thracian, when he received the dispatch from Eubidas, called into the council of the *Strategoi* and having the full of *Amphipolis* presented to him, as a shield of defence. His timely arrival saved the place, which Brasidas expected the next morning, took from the enemy and the fleet, without effect, and the Peloponnesians, who retired by virtue of the treaty from *Amphipolis*, found

shelter at Kios, and contributed to its security. The historian contented on important service in the country, and it does not appear that Brasidas produced any account of the *Amphipolis* capture more than the most *conventional*. Yet his *unconventional* conduct proved the necessity of a sentence, under which he spent twenty years of his life in *exile*, and he was only restored to his country by the return of his daughter *Amphipolis* to the public authorities. He was only not so gathered with sympathy from his countrymen? For he had a *disinterested* in *public* affairs, the charge which was brought against him, or the nature of the sentence, which he may never have obtained or wanted by a voluntary exile. A statement, very probable in itself, though resting on slight authority, supplies his banishment to Kleon's condemnation that





Accordingly, the question which we have to put is, not whether Theseus did all that could be done, after he received the cheering express of These (which is the part of the story that is most prominently before us), but whether he and his liege-jeremy took the best general measures for the security of the Athenian empire in Thrace—especially for Amphipolis, the last jewel of her empire.

They suffer Athens to be robbed of that jewel,—and how? Had they a difficult position to defend? Were they overwhelmed by a superior force? Were they distracted by simultaneous revolts in different places, or assailed by enemies unknown or unknown? No one of these grounds for acquittal can be pleaded. First, their position was of all others the most defensible. They had only to keep the bridge over the Strymon adequately watched and guarded, or to retain the Athenian squadrons at Eux, and Amphipolis was safe. Either one or the other of these precautions would have sufficed: both together would have sufficed as easily as probably to prevent the scheme of attack from being formed. Next, the town under Brasidas was in an easy situation—not even adequate to the capture of the inferior place Eux, when properly guarded—much less to that of Amphipolis. Lastly, there were no simultaneous revolts to distract attention, nor unknown enemies to outguess a well-laid scheme of defence. There was but one enemy, in one quarter, having one road by which to approach, an enemy of surprising merit indeed, and extremely dangerous to Athens, but without any chance of success, except from the shortcomings of the Athenian officers.

Now Theseus and Brasidas both knew that Brasidas had prevailed upon Alcibiades and Stagoras to revolt, and that too in such a way as to extend his own personal influence materially. They knew that the population of Amphipolis was of Asiatic origin,<sup>1</sup> like that of Abdera and Stagirus, and therefore peculiarly likely to be tempted by the example of these two towns. Lastly, they knew (and Theseus himself tells us)<sup>2</sup> that the Asiatic

<sup>1</sup> *Thucydides* II. 10, 24, 25. <sup>2</sup> *Ibid.* II. 10, 24. <sup>3</sup> *Ibid.* II. 10, 24. <sup>4</sup> *Ibid.* II. 10, 24. <sup>5</sup> *Ibid.* II. 10, 24. <sup>6</sup> *Ibid.* II. 10, 24. <sup>7</sup> *Ibid.* II. 10, 24. <sup>8</sup> *Ibid.* II. 10, 24. <sup>9</sup> *Ibid.* II. 10, 24. <sup>10</sup> *Ibid.* II. 10, 24. <sup>11</sup> *Ibid.* II. 10, 24. <sup>12</sup> *Ibid.* II. 10, 24. <sup>13</sup> *Ibid.* II. 10, 24. <sup>14</sup> *Ibid.* II. 10, 24. <sup>15</sup> *Ibid.* II. 10, 24. <sup>16</sup> *Ibid.* II. 10, 24. <sup>17</sup> *Ibid.* II. 10, 24. <sup>18</sup> *Ibid.* II. 10, 24. <sup>19</sup> *Ibid.* II. 10, 24. <sup>20</sup> *Ibid.* II. 10, 24. <sup>21</sup> *Ibid.* II. 10, 24. <sup>22</sup> *Ibid.* II. 10, 24. <sup>23</sup> *Ibid.* II. 10, 24. <sup>24</sup> *Ibid.* II. 10, 24. <sup>25</sup> *Ibid.* II. 10, 24. <sup>26</sup> *Ibid.* II. 10, 24. <sup>27</sup> *Ibid.* II. 10, 24. <sup>28</sup> *Ibid.* II. 10, 24. <sup>29</sup> *Ibid.* II. 10, 24. <sup>30</sup> *Ibid.* II. 10, 24. <sup>31</sup> *Ibid.* II. 10, 24. <sup>32</sup> *Ibid.* II. 10, 24. <sup>33</sup> *Ibid.* II. 10, 24. <sup>34</sup> *Ibid.* II. 10, 24. <sup>35</sup> *Ibid.* II. 10, 24. <sup>36</sup> *Ibid.* II. 10, 24. <sup>37</sup> *Ibid.* II. 10, 24. <sup>38</sup> *Ibid.* II. 10, 24. <sup>39</sup> *Ibid.* II. 10, 24. <sup>40</sup> *Ibid.* II. 10, 24. <sup>41</sup> *Ibid.* II. 10, 24. <sup>42</sup> *Ibid.* II. 10, 24. <sup>43</sup> *Ibid.* II. 10, 24. <sup>44</sup> *Ibid.* II. 10, 24. <sup>45</sup> *Ibid.* II. 10, 24. <sup>46</sup> *Ibid.* II. 10, 24. <sup>47</sup> *Ibid.* II. 10, 24. <sup>48</sup> *Ibid.* II. 10, 24. <sup>49</sup> *Ibid.* II. 10, 24. <sup>50</sup> *Ibid.* II. 10, 24. <sup>51</sup> *Ibid.* II. 10, 24. <sup>52</sup> *Ibid.* II. 10, 24. <sup>53</sup> *Ibid.* II. 10, 24. <sup>54</sup> *Ibid.* II. 10, 24. <sup>55</sup> *Ibid.* II. 10, 24. <sup>56</sup> *Ibid.* II. 10, 24. <sup>57</sup> *Ibid.* II. 10, 24. <sup>58</sup> *Ibid.* II. 10, 24. <sup>59</sup> *Ibid.* II. 10, 24. <sup>60</sup> *Ibid.* II. 10, 24. <sup>61</sup> *Ibid.* II. 10, 24. <sup>62</sup> *Ibid.* II. 10, 24. <sup>63</sup> *Ibid.* II. 10, 24. <sup>64</sup> *Ibid.* II. 10, 24. <sup>65</sup> *Ibid.* II. 10, 24. <sup>66</sup> *Ibid.* II. 10, 24. <sup>67</sup> *Ibid.* II. 10, 24. <sup>68</sup> *Ibid.* II. 10, 24. <sup>69</sup> *Ibid.* II. 10, 24. <sup>70</sup> *Ibid.* II. 10, 24. <sup>71</sup> *Ibid.* II. 10, 24. <sup>72</sup> *Ibid.* II. 10, 24. <sup>73</sup> *Ibid.* II. 10, 24. <sup>74</sup> *Ibid.* II. 10, 24. <sup>75</sup> *Ibid.* II. 10, 24. <sup>76</sup> *Ibid.* II. 10, 24. <sup>77</sup> *Ibid.* II. 10, 24. <sup>78</sup> *Ibid.* II. 10, 24. <sup>79</sup> *Ibid.* II. 10, 24. <sup>80</sup> *Ibid.* II. 10, 24. <sup>81</sup> *Ibid.* II. 10, 24. <sup>82</sup> *Ibid.* II. 10, 24. <sup>83</sup> *Ibid.* II. 10, 24. <sup>84</sup> *Ibid.* II. 10, 24. <sup>85</sup> *Ibid.* II. 10, 24. <sup>86</sup> *Ibid.* II. 10, 24. <sup>87</sup> *Ibid.* II. 10, 24. <sup>88</sup> *Ibid.* II. 10, 24. <sup>89</sup> *Ibid.* II. 10, 24. <sup>90</sup> *Ibid.* II. 10, 24. <sup>91</sup> *Ibid.* II. 10, 24. <sup>92</sup> *Ibid.* II. 10, 24. <sup>93</sup> *Ibid.* II. 10, 24. <sup>94</sup> *Ibid.* II. 10, 24. <sup>95</sup> *Ibid.* II. 10, 24. <sup>96</sup> *Ibid.* II. 10, 24. <sup>97</sup> *Ibid.* II. 10, 24. <sup>98</sup> *Ibid.* II. 10, 24. <sup>99</sup> *Ibid.* II. 10, 24. <sup>100</sup> *Ibid.* II. 10, 24. <sup>101</sup> *Ibid.* II. 10, 24. <sup>102</sup> *Ibid.* II. 10, 24. <sup>103</sup> *Ibid.* II. 10, 24. <sup>104</sup> *Ibid.* II. 10, 24. <sup>105</sup> *Ibid.* II. 10, 24. <sup>106</sup> *Ibid.* II. 10, 24. <sup>107</sup> *Ibid.* II. 10, 24. <sup>108</sup> *Ibid.* II. 10, 24. <sup>109</sup> *Ibid.* II. 10, 24. <sup>110</sup> *Ibid.* II. 10, 24. <sup>111</sup> *Ibid.* II. 10, 24. <sup>112</sup> *Ibid.* II. 10, 24. <sup>113</sup> *Ibid.* II. 10, 24. <sup>114</sup> *Ibid.* II. 10, 24. <sup>115</sup> *Ibid.* II. 10, 24. <sup>116</sup> *Ibid.* II. 10, 24. <sup>117</sup> *Ibid.* II. 10, 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might know that, by entering a large prepared guard, he ran the risk of making Athens unpopulated. Moreover, strict constancy of watch, night after night, when no actual danger comes, with an unpaid citizen force, is not easy to maintain. This is an acknowledged axiom, but it is better than anything which can be offered on behalf of Thucydides, who had with him a paid Athenian force, and might just as well have kept it at Eleusis as at Thebes.<sup>1</sup> We may be sure that the absence of Thucydides with his fleet at Thebes, was one essential condition in the plot laid by Brasidas with the Argives.

To say, with Dr. Thirlwall, that "human prudence and activity could not have accomplished more than Thucydides did under the same circumstances," is true as matter of fact, and credible as far as it goes. But it is wholly inadmissible as a justification, and avails only one part of the case. An officer is concerned as responsible not only for doing most "under the circumstances," but also for the circumstances themselves, insofar as they are under his control. Now nothing is more under his control than the position which he chooses to occupy. If the Emperor Napoleon or the Duke of Wellington had lost by surprise of an enemy not very numerous a post of enormous importance which they thought adequately protected, would they be entitled to hear from the responsible officer as contented—  
 "Having no idea that the enemy would attempt any surprise, I thought that I might keep my horse half a day's journey off from the post exposed, at another post which it was physically impossible for the enemy to reach; but the moment I was informed that the surprise had occurred, I hastened to the scene, did all that human prudence and activity could do to repel the enemy; and though I found that he had already mastered the capital post of all, yet I lost him back from a second post which he was on the point of mastering also!" Does any one imagine that these *historians* think, smothering under the loss of an impenetrable position which alters the whole prospects of a campaign, would be satisfied with such a report, and would discuss the officer with praise for his vigor and bravery "under the circumstances"?

<sup>1</sup> That the unexpected station of the Athenians had told on Eleusis—and thus the withdrawal of the passage of the Argives was immaterial to the Athenians—has been shown by English

historians again and over again, as general proof for the immateriality of the surprise against the loss of Eleusis, in 1824.

They would assuredly reply that he had done right in coming back—that his conduct after coming back had been that of a brave man—and that there was no impeachment on his courage. But they would at the same time add, that his want of judgment and foresight in waiting to place the valuable position really exposed under sufficient guard behindhand, and leaving it thus open to the enemy, while he himself was absent in another place which was out of danger—and his easy faith that there would be no dangerous surprise, at a time when the character of the enemy's officers, as well as the disposition of the neighbours (*Argives*), plainly indicated that there would be, if the least opening were afforded—that there were defects meriting serious reproof, and disqualifying him from any future command of trust and responsibility. Nor can we doubt that the whole feeling of the respective armies, who would have to pay with their best blood the unhappy consequences of this offence, would go along with such a sentence; without at all suspecting themselves to be guilty of injustice, or of "directing the retaliation proffered by the loss against an innocent object".

The vehement leather-seller in the *Page* at Athens, when he brought forward what are called "his offences" against *Theophrastus* and *Diokles*, as having caused through culpable omission a fatal and irreparable loss to their country, might perhaps state his case with greater lucidity and accuracy. But it may be doubted whether he would say anything more really galling than would be extracted in the dignified rebuke of an esteemed modern general to a subordinate officer under similar circumstances. In my judgment, not only the accusation against these two officers (I assume *Diokles* to have been included) was called for on the strictest possible grounds—which would be sufficient as a justification of the leather-seller *These*—but the positive verdict of guilty against them was fully merited. Whether the punishment inflicted was a greater penalty than the case warranted, I will not take upon me to pronounce. Every age has its own standard of feeling for measuring what is a proper intensity of punishment: penalties which our grandfathers thought right and meet would in the present day appear unendurably rigorous. But when I consider the immense value of *Amphipolis* to Athens, combined with the conduct whereby it was lost, I cannot think that there

was a single Athenian, or a single Greek, who would deem the penalty of banishment too severe.

It is painful to find such strong grounds of official censure against a man who as an historian has earned the lasting admiration of posterity—my own, among the best and warmest. For in anticipating the conduct of Thucydides the officer, we are bound in justice to forget Thucydides the historian. He was not known in the latter character, at the time when this sentence was passed. Perhaps he never would have been so known. (Like the Egyptian historian Callotus), if exile had not thrown him out of the active duties and hopes of a citizen.

It may be doubted whether he ever went home from Elion to encounter the grief, wrath, and alarm, so strongly felt at Athens after the loss of Amphipolis. Condemned, either with or without appearance, he remained in banishment for twenty years,<sup>1</sup> not returning to Athens until after the conclusion of the Peloponnesian war. Of this long exile much is said to have been spent on his property in Thracia; yet he also visited most parts of Greece—Sparta, of Athens as well as several states. However much we may deplore such a misfortune on his account, restricted as general law, and ever will have, the strongest reason to regret it. To the complicity labour we owe the completion, or rather the near approach to completion, of his history. And the opportunities which an exile enjoyed of personally consulting records and remains, contributed much to form that impartial, comprehensive, far-sighted, spirit, which reigns generally throughout his immortal work.

Demosthenes Branches, installed in Amphipolis about the beginning of December 424 B.C., employed his increased power only the more vigorously against Athens. His first act was to renege the Amphipolis—a task wherein the Macedonian Pericles, whose intrigues had contributed to the capture, came and personally assisted. That city went through a partial evacuation and restoration of inhabitants; being now moreover cut off from the port of Eux and the mouth of the river, which remained in the hands of the Athenians. Many new arrangements must have been required, as well for its internal

<sup>1</sup>Thucyd. v. 26.

policy as for its external defence. Pausanias took measures for building ships of war, in the lake above the city, in order to force the lower part of the river,<sup>1</sup> but his most important step was to construct a palisade work,<sup>2</sup> connecting the walls of the city with the bridge. He thus made himself permanently master of the opening of the Strymon, so as to shut the door by which he himself had entered, and at the same time to keep an easy communication with Amphie and the western bank of the Strymon. He also made some acquisitions on the eastern side of the river. Ptolemaeus, prince of the neighbouring Edessa-Thracian township of Myrkinia, had been recently assassinated by his wife Euxine and by some personal enemies. He had probably been the ally of Achaia, and his assassins now sought to strengthen themselves by creating the alliance of the new conqueror of Amphipolis. The Thracian continental colonies of Chalcidæa and Olynthus also declared their alliance to him.

While he sent to Lacédæmon, commencing his excellent position as well as his large hopes, he at the same time, without waiting for the answer, began acting for himself, with all the allies whom he could get together. He marched first against the peninsula called Abdo—the narrow tongue of land which stretches out from the neighbourhood of Abanthia to the mighty headland called Mount Abdo—near thirty miles long, and between four and five miles for the most part in breadth.<sup>3</sup> The long, rugged, rocky ridge—covering this peninsula even to leave but narrow spaces for dwelling, or cultivation, or feeding of cattle—was at this time occupied by many distinct petty communities, some of them divided in race and language. First, a colony from Andros, was situated in the interior gulf (called the Singlis Gulf) between Abdo and the Edressian promontory, near the Xerian coast. The rest of the Abdo was distributed among Eretrians, Eretrians, and Edressians, all divisions of the Thracian race—Phrygians or Thracians, of the race which had once occupied Thracia and Imbros—and some Chalcidians. Some of these little communities spoke boldly two languages. Thracian, Keltic, Gæ-

<sup>1</sup> Thucyd. i. 94-95.

<sup>2</sup> This is the *palisade*, mentioned in the text, arising in 1841 and in 1842. It was built by the Thracians of Amphipolis. I shall say more hereafter.

log the language of Amphipolis when I speak of Thracians there.

<sup>3</sup> See Olynthus, *Epist. de rebus* (see also *Epist. de rebus*, vol. 1. ch. viii. p. 335).

physes, and others, all subsided on the arrival of Brasidas; but Sand and Etes held out, nor could he bring them to terms even by ravaging their territory.

He next marched into the Sithonian peninsula, to attack Toris, situated near the northern extremity of that peninsula—opposite to Cape Kassandra, the extreme headland of the peninsula of Pallisus.<sup>1</sup>

Toris was inhabited by a Chalcidian population, but had not partaken in the result of the neighbouring Chalcidians against Athens. A small Athenian garrison had been sent there, probably since the recent dangers, and were now defending it as well as repairing the town-wall in various parts where it had been neglected as to crumble down. They occupied as a sort of circuit divided the outlying cape called Ithyphes, joining by a narrow isthmus the hill on which the city stood, and forming a port whereas by two Athenian vessels as guardships. A small party in Toris, without joining<sup>2</sup> or even suspicion of the rest, entered into correspondence with Brasidas, and engaged to provide for him the means of entering and capturing the town. Accordingly he advanced by a night-march to the temple of the Diaktes (Kassos and Pallis) within about a quarter of a mile of the town-gate, which he reached a little before daybreak, sending forward 100 palanis to be well armed, and to rush upon the gate at the instant when signal was made from within. The Thracian peninsula, some of whom were already concerned on the spot watching him, several, made their final arrangements with him, and then returned into the town—conducting with them seven detached men from his army, armed only with daggers, and having Lythabrotos of Olynthus as their chief. Twenty men had been originally named for this service, but the danger appeared so intense that only seven of them were bold enough to go. The Athenian hope, enabled to creep in through a small aperture in the wall towards the sea, were stationed already up to the topmost watch-tower on the city hill, where they stepped and slew the guards, and set open a neighbouring postern gate, kate-

<sup>1</sup> Thucyd. ix. 28.

<sup>2</sup> Thucyd. ix. 32. and also below.

Thucyd. ix. 32. and also below.

<sup>3</sup> Thucyd. ix. 32. and also below.

Thucyd. ix. 32. and also below.

Thucyd. ix. 32. and also below.

Thucyd. ix. 32. and also below.

ing towards Cape Xanastrom, as well as the great gate leading towards the agora. They then brought in the patients from without, who, impatient with the delay, had gradually stolen close under the walls. Some of these patients kept possession of the great gate, others were led round to the postern at the top, while the first signal was forthwith lighted to revive Brandon himself. He and his men hastened forward towards the city at their utmost speed and with loud shouts—a terror-striking notice of his presence to the unprepared citizens. Admission was easy through the open gates, but soon they clambered up by means of beams or a sort of scaffolding, which was lying close to the wall as a help to the workmen repairing it. And while the assailants were thus active in every direction, Brandon himself conducted a portion of them to secure himself of the high and commanding parts of the city.

So completely were the Athenians surprised and disconcerted, that hardly any attempt was made to resist. Even the fifty Athenian hoplites who occupied the agora, being found still asleep, were partly slain, and partly compelled to seek refuge in the separately-garrisoned tops of Ligyria, whither they were followed by a portion of the Thebanian population; some from attachment to Athens, others from sheer terror. To these fugitives Brandon addressed a proclamation, inviting them to return, and promising them perfect security for person, property, and political rights; while at the same time he sent a herald with a formal summons to the Athenians in Ligyria, requiring them to quit the place as belonging to the Chalcidians, but permitting them to carry away their property.

They refused to evacuate the place, but collected a trace of one day for the purpose of burying their slain. Brandon granted them two days, which were employed, both by them and by him, in preparations for the defence and attack of Ligyria, each party fortifying the houses as or near the connecting columns.

In the meantime he convened a general assembly of the Thebanian population, whom he addressed in the same counselling and equitable language as he had employed elsewhere. "He had not come to harm either the city or any individual citizens. Those who had let him in ought not to be regarded as his men

Some part of the hoplites were slain, and some taken alive; others, seeing the approach of the enemy, fled to the tops of Ligyria.

One of the chief motives of Brandon in not to harm the city or any individual citizens was to gain the favour of the Thebans.



as humane; for they had acted with a view to the benefit and the liberation of their city, not in order to enrich it, or to acquire profit for themselves. On the other hand, he did not think the words of those who had gone over to Ligythos, for their liking towards Athens! he wished them to come back freely, and he was sure that the more they knew the Lacedæmonians, the better they would esteem them. He was prepared to forgive and forget previous hostility, but while he invited all of them to live for the future as cordial friends and fellow-citizens, he should also for the future hold each man responsible for his conduct, either as friend or as enemy."

On the expiration of the Two-days' truce, Brasidas attacked by stealth the Athenian position in Ligythos, providing a reinforcement of thirty men to the soldiers who should be there. Brasidas his wayman is. Notwithstanding very poor means of defence—partly a wooden palisade, partly houses with battlements on the roof—this position repelled him for one whole day. On the next morning he brought up a machine, for the same purpose as that which the Boeotians had employed at Delium, in use first to the wood-work. The Athenians on their side, seeing this fire-machine approaching, put up, on a building in front of their position, a wooden platform, upon which many of them mounted, with casks of water and large stones to break it or to extinguish the flames. At last, the weight accumulated becoming greater than the supports could bear, it broke down with a prodigious noise; so that all the persons and things upon it rolled down in confusion. Some of these men were hurt, yet the injury was not in reality serious, had not the noise, the order, and the strangeness of the incident, alarmed those behind, who could not see precisely what had occurred, to such a degree, that they believed the enemy to have already forced the defence.

Many of them accordingly took to flight, while those who remained were inefficient in pushing the resistance successfully; so that Brasidas, perceiving the disorder and diminished number of the defenders, relinquished his fire-machine, and again renewed his attempt to carry the place by assault, which now fully succeeded. A considerable proportion of the Athenians and others in the fort escaped across the narrow Gulf to the peninsula of Peloponnesus, by means of the two inlets and some merchant-vessels

at hand; but every man found in it was put to death. Evodius, then master of the fort, and considering that he owed his success to the sudden capture of the Akhæian walling, regarded this incident as a divine interposition, and presented the thirty maces (which he had procured as a reward to the first man who broke in) to the goddess Akhæia for her temple at Lithyæna. The monument consecrated to her the entire cape of Lithyæna; not only denoting the defence, but also denoting the prime valour which it contained,<sup>2</sup> so that nothing remained except the temple, with its sanctuary and surroundings.

What proportion of the Spartans who had taken refuge at Ligythos had been induced to return by the persuasion of Brasidas, after generous and gentle, we are not informed. His language and conduct were admirably calculated to win the little community upon its harmonious movement, and to obliterate the memory of past feuds. And above all, it inspired a strong sentiment of attachment and gratitude towards himself personally — a sentiment which gained strength with every successive building in which he was engaged, and which enabled him to exercise a greater ascendancy than could ever be acquired by Sparta, and in some respects greater than had ever been possessed by Athens. It is this reasonable development of commanding individuality, sustained throughout by straightforward public purposes, and binding together so many little communities who had few other feelings in common, which leads to the shortness of the ancient war; a romance, and even an heroic romance.

During the remainder of the winter Brewster employed himself in setting in order the acquisitions already made, and in laying plans for further acquisitions in the spring.<sup>6</sup> But the beginning of spring—or the close of the eighth year, and beginning of the ninth year, of the war, as Winchell's reckoning brought with it a new train of events, which will be recounted in the following chapter.

<sup>1</sup> *Thompson*, No. 114, 188, regarding child labor and child labor reform in the United States. <sup>2</sup> *Thompson*, No. 183.

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## CHAPTER LIV.

## TRUCE FOR ONE YEAR.—RESUMÉ OF WAR AND BATTLE OF AMPHIPOLIS.—PEACE OF NIKIAS.

THE eighth year of the war, described in the last chapter, had opened with sanguine hopes for Athens, and with dark promises for Sparta, chiefly in consequence of the memorable capture of Sphakteria towards the end of the preceding summer. It included, not to mention other events, two considerable and important enterprises on the part of Athens—against Megara and against Boeotia; the former plan, partially successful—the latter, not nearly unsuccessful, but attended with a ruinous defeat. Lastly, the losses in Thrace following close upon the defeat at Delium, together with the unbounded expectations everywhere entertained from the future success of Brasidas, had again seriously lowered the impression entertained of Athenian power. The year thus closed would have been the more painful to Athens as contrasted with the glowing hopes with which it had begun.

It was now that Athens felt the full value of those prisoners whom she had taken at Sphakteria. With those prisoners, as Kleon and his supporters had said truly, she might be sure of making peace whenever she desired it.<sup>1</sup> Having such a certainty to fall back upon, she had played a bold game, and aimed at larger acquisitions during the past year. This speculation, though not in itself unreasonable, had failed: moreover, a new phenomenon, hitherto unexperienced by all, had occurred, when Brasidas broke open and cut up her

*Eighth year of the war—opened with great sanguine hopes for Athens and great dark promises for Sparta.*

*Capture of Sphakteria in which peace is said to have been made—this capture—may become another indication—points to Brasidas.*

<sup>1</sup> Thucyd. iv. 21.







or fifth year of the Peloponnesian war the crisis was recalled ; and not merely recalled, but welcomed with unbounded homage—renewed with the same sacrifices and shown shown as those which were said to have been offered to the primitive kings on the first settlement of Sparta.

As in the case of Kleonides and Demaratus, however, it was not long before the previous intrigues came to be detected, or at least generally suspected and believed, to the great discredit of Philonomaus, though he could not be again banished. Every successive public calamity which befall the state—the misadventures of Alcidas, the defeat of Eurycleides at Amphidromia, and above all, the unprecedented inundation in Spynaktis—were imputed to the displeasure of the gods in consequence of the ungodly treachery of Philonomaus. Suffering under such an imputation, the king was most eager to exchange the hazards of war for the secure march of peace, so that he was thus personally interested in opening every door for negotiation with Athens, and in restoring himself to credit by regaining the prisoners.<sup>1</sup>

After the battle of Delium,<sup>2</sup> the parties dispossessed of Nikias, Laches, and the philo-laconian party began to find increasing favour at Athens ;<sup>3</sup> while the victorious losses to Thucydides, coming thick upon each other—such successive triumph of Brasidas apparently increasing his means of achieving more—tended to convert the discouragement of the Athenians into positive alarm. Negotiations appear to have been in progress throughout great part of the winter. The continued hope that peace might be brought to a close, combined with the insidious assurance of Nikias and his friends to merge the military action, help to explain the more cooled spirit of Athens, under the pressure of such dangers. But so much did her courage flag, towards the close of the winter, that she came to look upon a truce as her only means<sup>4</sup> of preservation against the victorious progress of Brasidas. What the tone of Nikias now was, we are not directly informed. He would probably still continue opposed to the propositions of peace, at least

<sup>1</sup> Thucyd. v. 11, 12.

<sup>2</sup> Thucyd. v. 12. negotiations of peace had begun in the spring of 424 B.C., and continued until the summer of 423 B.C., when the Athenians were driven from Delium and Amphidromia, &c.

<sup>3</sup> Thucyd. v. 12, v. 13.

<sup>4</sup> Thucyd. v. 13. Aristophanes says, *what was the use to the Athenians after Amphidromia, when they requested a truce and a spring, &c.*





Selys, Epheorus, and Megara on the effect? The Spartans, instead of merely despatching plenipotentiaries to Athens, as the Athenians had desired, went a step farther. In concurrence with the Athenians, says, they drew up a form of truce, approved by themselves and their allies, in such manner that it only required to be adopted and ratified by the Athenians. The general principle of the truce was not possible, and the conditions were in substance as follows:—

1. Respecting the temple at Delphi, every Greek shall have <sup>the right to make use of it honestly and without fear,</sup> <sup>permission</sup> permanent to the customs of his particular city. The main purpose of this stipulation, proposed and sent verbatim from Athens, was to allow Athenian visitors to go thither, which had been impossible during the war, in consequence of the hostility of the Boeotians<sup>1</sup> and Phocians. The Delphian authorities also were in the interest of Sparta, and doubtless the Athenians received no formal invitation to the Pythian games. But the Boeotians and Phocians were no parties to the truce; accordingly the Lacedæmonians, while accepting the article and proclaiming the general liberty in principle, do not pledge themselves to enforce it by arms so far as the Boeotians and Phocians are concerned, but only to try and persuade them by suitable representations. The liberty of sacrificing at Delphi was at the moment the more welcome to the Athenians, as they seem to have feared themselves under the displeasure of Apollo.<sup>2</sup>

2. All the contracting parties will require out and punish, each according to its own laws, such persons as may violate the property of the Delphian god. This article also is prepared at Athens, for the purpose accordingly of contributing the favour of Apollo and the Delphians. The Lacedæmonians accept the article liberally, of course.

3. The Athenian parties at Pylos, Erythra, Nauplia, and

<sup>1</sup> Thucyd. iv. 116. The hostility of Boeotians, and the words of Thucyd. iv. 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 131, 132, 133, 134, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139, 140, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148, 149, 150, 151, 152, 153, 154, 155, 156, 157, 158, 159, 160, 161, 162, 163, 164, 165, 166, 167, 168, 169, 170, 171, 172, 173, 174, 175, 176, 177, 178, 179, 180, 181, 182, 183, 184, 185, 186, 187, 188, 189, 190, 191, 192, 193, 194, 195, 196, 197, 198, 199, 200, 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215, 216, 217, 218, 219, 220, 221, 222, 223, 224, 225, 226, 227, 228, 229, 230, 231, 232, 233, 234, 235, 236, 237, 238, 239, 240, 241, 242, 243, 244, 245, 246, 247, 248, 249, 250, 251, 252, 253, 254, 255, 256, 257, 258, 259, 260, 261, 262, 263, 264, 265, 266, 267, 268, 269, 270, 271, 272, 273, 274, 275, 276, 277, 278, 279, 280, 281, 282, 283, 284, 285, 286, 287, 288, 289, 290, 291, 292, 293, 294, 295, 296, 297, 298, 299, 300, 301, 302, 303, 304, 305, 306, 307, 308, 309, 310, 311, 312, 313, 314, 315, 316, 317, 318, 319, 320, 321, 322, 323, 324, 325, 326, 327, 328, 329, 330, 331, 332, 333, 334, 335, 336, 337, 338, 339, 340, 341, 342, 343, 344, 345, 346, 347, 348, 349, 350, 351, 352, 353, 354, 355, 356, 357, 358, 359, 360, 361, 362, 363, 364, 365, 366, 367, 368, 369, 370, 371, 372, 373, 374, 375, 376, 377, 378, 379, 380, 381, 382, 383, 384, 385, 386, 387, 388, 389, 390, 391, 392, 393, 394, 395, 396, 397, 398, 399, 400, 401, 402, 403, 404, 405, 406, 407, 408, 409, 410, 411, 412, 413, 414, 415, 416, 417, 418, 419, 420, 421, 422, 423, 424, 425, 426, 427, 428, 429, 430, 431, 432, 433, 434, 435, 436, 437, 438, 439, 440, 441, 442, 443, 444, 445, 446, 447, 448, 449, 450, 451, 452, 453, 454, 455, 456, 457, 458, 459, 460, 461, 462, 463, 464, 465, 466, 467, 468, 469, 470, 471, 472, 473, 474, 475, 476, 477, 478, 479, 480, 481, 482, 483, 484, 485, 486, 487, 488, 489, 490, 491, 492, 493, 494, 495, 496, 497, 498, 499, 500, 501, 502, 503, 504, 505, 506, 507, 508, 509, 510, 511, 512, 513, 514, 515, 516, 517, 518, 519, 520, 521, 522, 523, 524, 525, 526, 527, 528, 529, 530, 531, 532, 533, 534, 535, 536, 537, 538, 539, 540, 541, 542, 543, 544, 545, 546, 547, 548, 549, 550, 551, 552, 553, 554, 555, 556, 557, 558, 559, 560, 561, 562, 563, 564, 565, 566, 567, 568, 569, 570, 571, 572, 573, 574, 575, 576, 577, 578, 579, 580, 581, 582, 583, 584, 585, 586, 587, 588, 589, 590, 591, 592, 593, 594, 595, 596, 597, 598, 599, 600, 601, 602, 603, 604, 605, 606, 607, 608, 609, 610, 611, 612, 613, 614, 615, 616, 617, 618, 619, 620, 621, 622, 623, 624, 625, 626, 627, 628, 629, 630, 631, 632, 633, 634, 635, 636, 637, 638, 639, 640, 641, 642, 643, 644, 645, 646, 647, 648, 649, 650, 651, 652, 653, 654, 655, 656, 657, 658, 659, 660, 661, 662, 663, 664, 665, 666, 667, 668, 669, 670, 671, 672, 673, 674, 675, 676, 677, 678, 679, 680, 681, 682, 683, 684, 685, 686, 687, 688, 689, 690, 691, 692, 693, 694, 695, 696, 697, 698, 699, 700, 701, 702, 703, 704, 705, 706, 707, 708, 709, 710, 711, 712, 713, 714, 715, 716, 717, 718, 719, 720, 721, 722, 723, 724, 725, 726, 727, 728, 729, 730, 731, 732, 733, 734, 735, 736, 737, 738, 739, 740, 741, 742, 743, 744, 745, 746, 747, 748, 749, 750, 751, 752, 753, 754, 755, 756, 757, 758, 759, 760, 761, 762, 763, 764, 765, 766, 767, 768, 769, 770, 771, 772, 773, 774, 775, 776, 777, 778, 779, 780, 781, 782, 783, 784, 785, 786, 787, 788, 789, 790, 791, 792, 793, 794, 795, 796, 797, 798, 799, 800, 801, 802, 803, 804, 805, 806, 807, 808, 809, 810, 811, 812, 813, 814, 815, 816, 817, 818, 819, 820, 821, 822, 823, 824, 825, 826, 827, 828, 829, 830, 831, 832, 833, 834, 835, 836, 837, 838, 839, 840, 841, 842, 843, 844, 845, 846, 847, 848, 849, 850, 851, 852, 853, 854, 855, 856, 857, 858, 859, 860, 861, 862, 863, 864, 865, 866, 867, 868, 869, 870, 871, 872, 873, 874, 875, 876, 877, 878, 879, 880, 881, 882, 883, 884, 885, 886, 887, 888, 889, 890, 891, 892, 893, 894, 895, 896, 897, 898, 899, 900, 901, 902, 903, 904, 905, 906, 907, 908, 909, 910, 911, 912, 913, 914, 915, 916, 917, 918, 919, 920, 921, 922, 923, 924, 925, 926, 927, 928, 929, 930, 931, 932, 933, 934, 935, 936, 937, 938, 939, 940, 941, 942, 943, 944, 945, 946, 947, 948, 949, 950, 951, 952, 953, 954, 955, 956, 957, 958, 959, 960, 961, 962, 963, 964, 965, 966, 967, 968, 969, 970, 971, 972, 973, 974, 975, 976, 977, 978, 979, 980, 981, 982, 983, 984, 985, 986, 987, 988, 989, 990, 991, 992, 993, 994, 995, 996, 997, 998, 999, 1000.

also Thucyd. iv. 116. The hostility of Boeotians, and the words of Thucyd. iv. 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 131, 132, 133, 134, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139, 140, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148, 149, 150, 151, 152, 153, 154, 155, 156, 157, 158, 159, 160, 161, 162, 163, 164, 165, 166, 167, 168, 169, 170, 171, 172, 173, 174, 175, 176, 177, 178, 179, 180, 181, 182, 183, 184, 185, 186, 187, 188, 189, 190, 191, 192, 193, 194, 195, 196, 197, 198, 199, 200, 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215, 216, 217, 218, 219, 220, 221, 222, 223, 224, 225, 226, 227, 228, 229, 230, 231, 232, 233, 234, 235, 236, 237, 238, 239, 240, 241, 242, 243, 244, 245, 246, 247, 248, 249, 250, 251, 252, 253, 254, 255, 256, 257, 258, 259, 260, 261, 262, 263, 264, 265, 266, 267, 268, 269, 270, 271, 272, 273, 274, 275, 276, 277, 278, 279, 280, 281, 282, 283, 284, 285, 286, 287, 288, 289, 290, 291, 292, 293, 294, 295, 296, 297, 298, 299, 300, 301, 302, 303, 304, 305, 306, 307, 308, 309, 310, 311, 312, 313, 314, 315, 316, 317, 318, 319, 320, 321, 322, 323, 324, 325, 326, 327, 328, 329, 330, 331, 332, 333, 334, 335, 336, 337, 338, 339, 340, 341, 342, 343, 344, 345, 346, 347, 348, 349, 350, 351, 352, 353, 354, 355, 356, 357, 358, 359, 360, 361, 362, 363, 364, 365, 366, 367, 368, 369, 370, 371, 372, 373, 374, 375, 376, 377, 378, 379, 380, 381, 382, 383, 384, 385, 386, 387, 388, 389, 390, 391, 392, 393, 394, 395, 396, 397, 398, 399, 400, 401, 402, 403, 404, 405, 406, 407, 408, 409, 410, 411, 412, 413, 414, 415, 416, 417, 418, 419, 420, 421, 422, 423, 424, 425, 426, 427, 428, 429, 430, 431, 432, 433, 434, 435, 436, 437, 438, 439, 440, 441, 442, 443, 444, 445, 446, 447, 448, 449, 450, 451, 452, 453, 454, 455, 456, 457, 458, 459, 460, 461, 462, 463, 464, 465, 466, 467, 468, 469, 470, 471, 472, 473, 474, 475, 476, 477, 478, 479, 480, 481, 482, 483, 484, 485, 486, 487, 488, 489, 490, 491, 492, 493, 494, 495, 496, 497, 498, 499, 500, 501, 502, 503, 504, 505, 506, 507, 508, 509, 510, 511, 512, 513, 514, 515, 516, 517, 518, 519, 520, 521, 522, 523, 524, 525, 526, 527, 528, 529, 530, 531, 532, 533, 534, 535, 536, 537, 538, 539, 540, 541, 542, 543, 544, 545, 546, 547, 548, 549, 550, 551, 552, 553, 554, 555, 556, 557, 558, 559, 560, 561, 562, 563, 564, 565, 566, 567, 568, 569, 570, 571, 572, 573, 574, 575, 576, 577, 578, 579, 580, 581, 582, 583, 584, 585, 586, 587, 588, 589, 590, 591, 592, 593, 594, 595, 596, 597, 598, 599, 600, 601, 602, 603, 604, 605, 606, 607, 608, 609, 610, 611, 612, 613, 614, 615, 616, 617, 618, 619, 620, 621, 622, 623, 624, 625, 626, 627, 628, 629, 630, 631, 632, 633, 634, 635, 636, 637, 638, 639, 640, 641, 642, 643, 644, 645, 646, 647, 648, 649, 650, 651, 652, 653, 654, 655, 656, 657, 658, 659, 660, 661, 662, 663, 664, 665, 666, 667, 668, 669, 670, 671, 672, 673, 674, 675, 676, 677, 678, 679, 680, 681, 682, 683, 684, 685, 686, 687, 688, 689, 690, 691, 692, 693, 694, 695, 696, 697, 698, 699, 700, 701, 702, 703, 704, 705, 706, 707, 708, 709, 710, 711, 712, 713, 714, 715, 716, 717, 718, 719, 720, 721, 722, 723, 724, 725, 726, 727, 728, 729, 730, 731, 732, 733, 734, 735, 736, 737, 738, 739, 740, 741, 742, 743, 744, 745, 746, 747, 748, 749, 750, 751, 752, 753, 754, 755, 756, 757, 758, 759, 760, 761, 762, 763, 764, 765, 766, 767, 768, 769, 770, 771, 772, 773, 774, 775, 776, 777, 778, 779, 780, 781, 782, 783, 784, 785, 786, 787, 788, 789, 790, 791, 792, 793, 794, 795, 796, 797, 798, 799, 800, 801, 802, 803, 804, 805, 806, 807, 808, 809, 810, 811, 812, 813, 814, 815, 816, 817, 818, 819, 820, 821, 822, 823, 824, 825, 826, 827, 828, 829, 830, 831, 832, 833, 834, 835, 836, 837, 838, 839, 840, 841, 842, 843, 844, 845, 846, 847, 848, 849, 850, 851, 852, 853, 854, 855, 856, 857, 858, 859, 860, 861, 862, 863, 864, 865, 866, 867, 868, 869, 870, 871, 872, 873, 874, 875, 876, 877, 878, 879, 880, 881, 882, 883, 884, 885, 886, 887, 888, 889, 890, 891, 892, 893, 894, 895, 896, 897, 898, 899, 900, 901, 902, 903, 904, 905, 906, 907, 908, 909, 910, 911, 912, 913, 914, 915, 916, 917, 918, 919, 920, 921, 922, 923, 924, 925, 926, 927, 928, 929, 930, 931, 932, 933, 934, 935, 936, 937, 938, 939, 940, 941, 942, 943, 944, 945, 946, 947, 948, 949, 950, 951, 952, 953, 954, 955, 956, 957, 958, 959, 960, 961, 962, 963, 964, 965, 966, 967, 968, 969, 970, 971, 972, 973, 974, 975, 976, 977, 978, 979, 980, 981, 982, 983, 984, 985, 986, 987, 988, 989, 990, 991, 992, 993, 994, 995, 996, 997, 998, 999, 1000.

The latter words in different places were used in similar expressions.

Thucyd. iv. 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 131, 132, 133, 134, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139, 140, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148, 149, 150, 151, 152, 153, 154, 155, 156, 157, 158, 159, 160, 161, 162, 163, 164, 165, 166, 167, 168, 169, 170, 171, 172, 173, 174, 175, 176, 177, 178, 179, 180, 181, 182, 183, 184, 185, 186, 187, 188, 189, 190, 191, 192, 193, 194, 195, 196, 197, 198, 199, 200, 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215, 216, 217, 218, 219, 220, 221, 222, 223, 224, 225, 226, 227, 228, 229, 230, 231, 232, 233, 234, 235, 236, 237, 238, 239, 240, 241, 242, 243, 244, 245, 246, 247, 248, 249, 250, 251, 252, 253, 254, 255, 256, 257, 258, 259, 260, 261, 262, 263, 264, 265, 266, 267, 268, 269, 270, 271, 272, 273, 274, 275, 276, 277, 278, 279, 280, 281, 282, 283, 284, 285, 286, 287, 288, 289, 290, 291, 292, 293, 294, 295, 296, 297, 298, 299, 300, 301, 302, 303, 304, 305, 306, 307, 308, 309, 310, 311, 312, 313, 314, 315, 316, 317, 318, 319, 320, 321, 322, 323, 324, 325, 326, 327, 328, 329, 330, 331, 332, 333, 334, 335, 336, 337, 338, 339, 340, 341, 342, 343, 344, 345, 346, 347, 348, 349, 350, 351, 352, 353, 354, 355, 356, 357, 358, 359, 360, 361, 362, 363, 364, 365, 366, 367, 368, 369, 370, 371, 372, 373, 374, 375, 376, 377, 378, 379, 380, 381, 382, 383, 384, 385, 386, 387, 388, 389, 390, 391, 392, 393, 394, 395, 396, 397, 398, 399, 400, 401, 402, 403, 404, 405, 406, 407, 408, 409, 410, 411, 412, 413, 414, 415, 416, 417, 418, 419, 420, 421, 422, 423, 424, 425, 426, 427, 428, 429, 430, 431, 432, 433, 434, 435, 436, 437, 438, 439, 440, 441, 442, 443, 444, 445, 446, 447, 448, 449, 450, 451, 452, 453, 454, 455, 456, 457, 458, 459, 460, 461, 462, 463, 464, 465, 466, 467, 468, 469, 470, 471, 472, 473, 474, 475, 476, 477, 478, 479, 480, 481, 482, 483, 484, 485, 486, 487, 488, 489, 490, 491, 492, 493, 494, 495, 496, 497, 498, 499, 500, 501, 502, 503, 504, 505, 506, 507, 508, 509, 510, 511, 512, 513, 514, 515, 516, 517, 518, 519, 520, 521, 522, 523, 524, 525, 526, 527, 528, 529, 530, 531, 532, 533, 534, 535, 536, 537, 538, 539, 540, 541, 542, 543, 544, 545, 546, 547, 548, 549, 550, 551, 552, 553, 554, 555, 556, 557, 558, 559, 560, 561, 562, 563, 564, 565, 566, 567, 568, 569, 570, 571, 572, 573, 574, 575, 576, 577, 578, 579, 580, 581, 582, 583, 584, 585, 586, 587, 588, 589, 590, 591, 592, 593, 594, 595, 596, 597, 598, 599, 600, 601, 602, 603, 604, 605, 606, 607, 608, 609, 610, 611, 612, 613, 614, 615, 616, 617, 618, 619, 620, 621, 622, 623, 624, 625, 626, 627, 628, 629, 630, 631, 632, 633, 634, 635, 636,

Elina, and Methana in the neighbourhood of Troezen, are to remain as at present. No communication is to take place between Kyllara and any portion of the mainland belonging to the Lacedæmonian alliance. The soldiers occupying Pylos shall confine themselves within the space between Dapanea and Tarentus; those in Nizon and Mizon, within the road which leads from the chapel of the hero Nizon to the temple of Poseidon, without any communication with the population beyond that limit. In like manner the *Athenians* in the peninsula of Methana near Troezen, and the inhabitants of the latter city, shall observe the special convention concluded between them respecting boundaries.<sup>1</sup>

4. The Lacedæmonians and their allies shall make use of the sea for trading purposes, on their own vessels, but shall not have liberty to sail in any ship of war, nor in any vessel merchant-vessel of burthen equal to 800 talents. [All war-ships were generally impeded by ice: they sometimes sailed south, but never when wanted for fighting. Merchant-vessels were generally to have sailed, but were sometimes speed; the limitation of size is added, to ensure that the Lacedæmonians shall not, under colour of merchantsmen, get up a warlike navy.]

5. There shall be free communication by sea as well as by land, between Peloponnesians and Athens for herald or embassy, with suitable attendance, to treat for a definitive peace or for the adjustment of differences.

6. Neither side shall receive deserters from the other, whether free or slave. [This article was alike important to both parties. Athens had to fear the revolt of her subject-allies—Sparta, the desertion of Helots.]

7. Disputes shall be amicably settled, by both parties, according to their established laws and customs.

Such was the substance of the treaty prepared at Sparta—accordingly in concert with Athenian envoys—and sent by the Spartans to Athens for approval, with the following addition—  
 "If there be any provision which seems to you more honourable or just than these, come to Lacedæmon and tell us; for neither the Spartans nor their allies will resist any just suggestions. But let those who come bring with them full power to conclude,

<sup>1</sup> Thucyd. iv. 115; see Pappus's note.

in the same manner as you desire of us. The truce shall be for one year.\*

By the resolution which Laches proposed in the Athenian public assembly, ratifying the truce, the people further decreed that negotiations should be opened for a definitive treaty, and directed the Strategoi to propose in the next evening assembly a scheme and principles for conducting the negotiations. But at the very moment when the envoys between Sparta and Athens were bringing the truce to final adoption, events happened in Theroe which threatened to cancel it altogether. Two days<sup>1</sup> after the important fourteenth of Epipheosion, but before the truce could be made known in Theroe, Skifios revolted from Athens to Brasidas.

Skifios was a town calling itself Athenian, one of the numerous colonies which, in the wake of an acknowledged mother-city, traced its origin to warriors returning from Troy. It was situated in the peninsula of Pallatis (the westernmost of those three narrow tongues of land into which Chalkidiki branches out); uncommunicated with the Euxine colony Marone. The Skifians, not without considerable dissent among themselves, proclaimed their revolt from Athens, under escort with Brasidas. He immediately crossed the Gulf into Pallatis, himself in a little boat, but with a trireme close at his side; calculating that she would protect him against any small Athenian vessel, while any Athenian trireme which he might encounter would attack his trireme, paying no attention to the little boat in which he himself was. The revolt of Skifios was, from the position of the town, a more striking defiance of Athens than any of the preceding events. For the trireme confronting Pallatis with the mainland was occupied by the town of Potidæa—a town assigned at the period of its capture, seven years before, to Athenian settlers, though probably containing some other residents besides. Moreover the isthmus was so narrow, that the wall of Potidæa barred it across completely from sea to sea. Pallatis was therefore a quasi-island, not open to the aid of land forces from the mainland, like the towns

\*Thucyd. ii, 23.

Two events  
in Theroe—  
revolt of  
Skifios from  
Athens in  
Chalkidiki,  
two days  
after the  
truce was  
made,  
March, 423  
B.C.

previously acquired by Brasidas. The Hellenians then put themselves, without any foreign aid, into conflict against the whole force of Athens, bringing into question her empire not merely over continental towns, but over islands.

Even to Brasidas himself their revolt appeared a step of astonishing boldness. On being received into the city, he surveyed a public assembly, and addressed to them the same language which he had employed at Abdera and Thracæ, disavowing all party preferences as well as all interference with the internal politics of the town, and exhorting them only to unanimous efforts against the common enemy. He bestowed upon them at the same time the warmest praise for their courage. "They, though exposed to all the hazards of island life, had stood forward of their own accord to procure freedom," without waiting like cowards to be driven on by a foreign force towards what was clearly their own good. He reminded them capable of any measure of future heroism, if the danger now impending from Athens should be averted, and he should assign to them the very first post of honour among the faithful allies of Lacedæmon.<sup>1</sup>

This generous, straightforward, and animating tone of exhortation—appealing to the strongest political instinct of the Greek mind, the love of complete city autonomy, and coming from the lips of one whose whole conduct had hitherto been conformable to it—had proved highly efficacious in all the previous towns. But in Elis it roused the population to the highest pitch of enthusiasm.<sup>2</sup> It worked even upon the feelings of the dissident minority, bringing them round to participate heartily in the movement. It produced a unanimous and excited resistance which made them look forward cheerfully to all the desperate chances in which they had engaged themselves; and it produced at the same time, in still more unbounded manifestation, the same personal attachment and admiration as Brasidas inspired elsewhere. The Hellenians not only voted to him publicly a golden crown, as the liberator of Greece, but when it was placed on his

Brasidas  
addressed  
them  
in  
the  
name  
of  
the  
city  
of  
Elis  
and  
exhorting  
them  
to  
unanimous  
efforts  
against  
the  
common  
enemy.

<sup>1</sup> Thucyd. iv. 123. from which also the description of the Athenians, and the description of the Hellenians, and the description of the Hellenians.

<sup>2</sup> Thucyd. iv. 124. and of the Hellenians.

head, the heart of individual sentiment and sympathy was the strongest of which the Grecian knew was capable. "They crowded round him individually, and encircled his head with fillets, like a victorious athlete,"<sup>1</sup> says the historian. This remarkable incident illustrates what I observed before—that the self-reliance, the self-adoring march, the straightforward politics, and probity of the illustrious man—who in character was more Athenian than Sparta, yet with the good qualities of Athens predominant—inspired a personal emotion towards him such as rarely found its way into Grecian political life. The sympathy and admiration felt in Greece towards a victorious athlete was not merely an intense sentiment in the Grecian mind, but was perhaps of all others the most widespread and Pan-hellenic. It was connected with the religion, the arts, and the love of emulation common to the whole nation—while politics tended either to diminish the separate states: it was further a sentiment of once human and collectively personal. Of its exaggerated intensity throughout Greece the philosophers often complained, not without good reason. But Thucydides cannot convey a more lively idea of the enthusiasm and unanimity with which Brasidas was welcomed at Sicily, just after the desperate resolution taken by the citizens, than by using this simile.

The Lacedæmonian commander knew well how much the utmost confidence of the Siciliotes was needed, and how quickly their unwarlike position would draw upon them the vigorous invasion of Athens. He accordingly brought across to Sicily a considerable portion of his army, not merely with a view to the defence of Sicily, but also with the intention of surprising both Messini and Potidæa, in both which places there were small parties of conspirators prepared to open the gates.

It was in this position that he was found by the commanders who came to announce formally the conclusion of the truce for one year, and to restore the prisoners—Athenians from Sparta,

<sup>1</sup> Thucyd. ii. 135. and Diodorus gives some curious particulars respecting the Siciliotes, who in consequence to the Spartans drove away.

Compare Plutarch, Pericles, c. 20.

compare also Xenophon, Memorabilia, book ii. c. 2. where, (1897.) It was generally to place a fillet of cloth or hair on the head of the victor at Olympia, before putting on the olive wreath.

age of the three Spartans who had sworn to the treaty; Aristonymus, from Athens. The face of affairs was materially altered by this communication; much to the satisfaction of the newly-acquired allies of Sparta in Thence, who accepted the treaty forthwith, but to the great chagrin of Brasidas, whose anger was thus suddenly excited. Yet he could not openly refuse obedience, and his army was accordingly transferred from the peninsula of Pallis to Toris.

The case of Skital, however, immediately raised an objection, doubtless very agreeable to him. The commissioners, who had come in an Athenian trireme, had heard nothing of the result of that place, and Aristonymus was attempted to find the enemy in Pallis. But on enquiring into the case, he discovered that the Spartans had not arrived until two days after the day fixed for the commencement of the truce. Accordingly, while maintaining the truce for all the other cities in Thence, he refused to comprehend Skital in it, sending immediate news home to Athens. Brasidas, protesting loudly against this proceeding, refused on his part to abandon Skital, which was particularly endeared to him by the recent success; and even obtained the countenance of the Lacedæmonian commissioners, by falsely asseverating that the city had revolted before the day named in the truce.

Violent was the burst of indignation when the news next home by Aristonymus reached Athens. It was soon softened, when the Lacedæmonians, acting upon the request of the men sent to them by Brasidas and Athenians, despatched an embassy thither to claim protection for Skital, or at any rate to procure the adjustment of the dispute by arbitration or pacific decision. Having the terms of the treaty on their side, the Athenians were least of all disposed to relax from their rights in favour of the first revelling blindness. They resolved at once to undertake an expedition for the reconquest of Skital; and further, on the proposition of Klein, to put to death all the adult male inhabitants of that place as soon as it should have been re-conquered. At the same time they showed no disposition to

Send  
commissioners  
from Sparta  
and Athens  
to settle the  
truce, by  
sending to  
Skital the news  
that the truce  
was concluded.

Brasidas  
protesting  
loudly.  
The war  
commissioners  
in Thence,  
but he  
succeeded  
in convincing  
them.

throw up the truce generally. The state of feeling on both sides tended to this result—that while the war continued in Thence, it was suspended everywhere else.<sup>1</sup>

Fresh intelligence soon arrived—carrying suspension at Athens yet farther—of the revolt of Mende, the adjoining town to Skidra. Those Mendeans, who had had their measures for secretly introducing Brasidas, were at first baffled by the arrival of the truce commissioners. But they saw that he retained his hold on Skidra, in spite of the provisions of the truce, and they ascertained that he was willing still to protect them if they revolted, though he could not be an accomplice, as originally proposed, in the surprise of the town. Being, moreover, only a small party, with the sentiment of the population against them, they were afraid, if they now anticipated their scheme, of being detected and punished for the partial steps already taken, when the Athenians should come against Skidra. They therefore thought it on the whole the least dangerous course to persevere. They proclaimed their revolt from Athens, considering the reluctant citizens to stay them.<sup>2</sup> The government seems before to have been democratical, but they now found means to bring about an oligarchical revolution along with the revolt. Brasidas immediately accepted their alliance, and willingly undertook to protect them, pretending to think that he had a right to do so, because they had revolted openly after the truce had been proclaimed. But the truce upon this point was clear; which he himself virtually admitted, by setting up as justification certain alleged matters in which the Athenians had themselves violated it. He immediately made preparation for the defence both of Mende and Skidra against the attack which was now rendered

<sup>1</sup> Thucyd. iv. 125, 126.

<sup>2</sup> Thucyd. iv. 126. And as at Mende, Brasidas, who was not Mendeian, secretly introduced Brasidas, and then the government refused to allow him to remain, and so the Mendeians revolted. Thucyd. iv. 126. And as at Mende, Brasidas, who was not Mendeian, secretly introduced Brasidas, and then the government refused to allow him to remain, and so the Mendeians revolted. Thucyd. iv. 126.

in Thucyd. iv. 126, 127. And as at Mende, Brasidas, who was not Mendeian, secretly introduced Brasidas, and then the government refused to allow him to remain, and so the Mendeians revolted. Thucyd. iv. 126.

The Mendeians, after the conquest of the place, drove the Mendeians out of the place. Thucyd. iv. 126. And as at Mende, Brasidas, who was not Mendeian, secretly introduced Brasidas, and then the government refused to allow him to remain, and so the Mendeians revolted. Thucyd. iv. 126.

more certain than before; conveying the women and children of these two towns across to the Chalcidic Olynthus, and sending thither as guards 500 Peloponnesian hoplites with 500 Chalcidic peltata; the commander of which force, Polydamidas, took possession of the acropolis with his own troops separately.<sup>1</sup>

Brasidas then withdrew himself, with the greater part of his army, to accompany Perikles on an expedition into the interior against Aristobulus and the Tyrannidae. On what ground, after having before entered into terms with Aristobulus, he now became his sworn enemy, we are left to conjecture. Probably his relations with Perikles, whose alliance was of essential importance, were such that this step was forced upon him against his will; or he may really have thought that the force under Polydamidas was adequate to the defence of Mende and Strick, an idea which the momentary backwardness of Athens for the last six or eight months might well foster. And he even remained, indeed, he could hardly have served them, considering the situation of Palladi and the superiority of Athens at sea, but his absence made their ruin certain.<sup>2</sup>

While Brasidas was thus engaged far in the interior, the Athenian command under Nikias and Nikostratus reached Potidea—5000 peltata, ten of them Chians, 1000 hoplites and 600 bowmen from Athens, 1000 mercenary Thracians, with some peltata from Mediol and other towns in the neighbourhood. From Potidea they proceeded by sea to Cape Perikles, near which they landed for the purpose of attacking Mende. Polydamidas, the Peloponnesian commander in the town, took post with his force of 700 hoplites, including 500 Mithrenians, upon an eminence near the city, strong and difficult of approach; upon which the Athenian generals divided their forces—Nikias, with only Athenian chosen hoplites, 100 Mithrenian peltata, and all the bowmen, tried to march up the hill by a side path and thus turn the position, while Nikostratus with the main army attacked it in front. But each was the extreme deficiency of the ground that both were repulsed. Nikias was himself wounded, and the division of Nikostratus

Plutarch, *Brasidas*, describes the battle with an account of the Athenian army, and of the tactics of Polydamidas. The latter, however, is probably a mistake, as the Peloponnesian commander is not mentioned in the text.

<sup>1</sup> Thucyd. iv. 118.

<sup>2</sup> Thucyd. iv. 120, 121.



was thrown into great disorder, narrowly escaping a destructive defeat. The Mendeans, however, evacuated the position in the night and retired into the city, while the Athenians, sailing round on the morrow to the suburb on the side of Skiritæ, ravaged the neighbouring land. Nothing on the ensuing day served his detestable still farther, even to the border of the Skiritæan territory.

But dissensions so serious had already commenced within the walls, that the Skiritæan auxiliaries, becoming discontented of their situation, took advantage of the night to return home. The revolt of Mende had been brought about against the will of the citizens, by the intrigues and for the benefit of an oligarchical faction. Moreover, it does not appear that Brasidas personally visited the town, as he had visited Skiritæ and the other revolted towns. Had he come, his personal influence might have done much to soothe the offended citizens, and create some disposition to adopt the revolt as a fact accomplished, after they had once been compromised with Athens. But his seducing words had not been heard, and the Peloponnesian troops, whom he had sent to Mende, were mere instruments to sustain the newly-created oligarchy and keep out the Athenians. The feelings of the citizens generally towards them were soon unequivocally displayed. Sitacastius with half of the Athenian force was planted before the gate of Mende which opened towards Potidæa. In the neighbourhood of that gate, within the city, was the place of arms and the chief station both of the Peloponnesians and of the citizens. Polydamas, intending to make a silly death, was marshalling both of these in battle order, when one of the Mendeans, Donos, manifesting with angry vehemence a sentiment common to most of them, told him "that he would not sally forth, and did not choose to take part in the contest". Polydamas seized hold of the man to punish him, when the mass of the armed Donos, taking part with their comrades, made a sudden rush upon the Peloponnesians. The latter, unprepared for such an onset, sustained at first some loss, and were soon forced to retreat into the acropolis—the mother as they saw some of the Mendeans open the gates to the besiegers without, which induced them to suspect a preconcerted betrayal. No

Discontent among the citizens of Mende—revolt of the Skiritæ auxiliaries—Polydamas—half the Athenians are withdrawn into the town.

such concert however existed; though the besieging generals, when they saw the gates then suddenly opened, soon comprehended the real position of affairs. But they found it impossible to restrain their soldiers, who pushed in forthwith, from plundering the town; and they had even some difficulty in saving the lives of the citizens.<sup>1</sup>

Mende being thus taken, the Athenians presently desired the help of the citizens to restore the former government, leaving it to them to single out and punish the authors of the late revolt. What use was made of this permission we are not told; but probably most of the authors had already escaped into the acropolis along with Polydamas. Having erected a wall of circumvallation round the acropolis, joining the sea at both ends, and left a force to guard it, the Athenians moved away to begin the siege at Skioi, where they found both the citizens and the Peloponnesian garrison posted on a strong hill, not far from the walls. As it was impossible to surround the town without being masters of this hill, the Athenians attacked it at once, and were more fortunate than they had been before Mende; for they carried it by assault, compelling the defenders to take refuge in the town. After erecting their camp, they commenced the wall of circumvallation. Before it was finished, the garrison who had been shut up in the acropolis of Mende got into Skioi at night, having broken out by a sudden sally where the blockading wall around them joined the sea. But this did not hinder Sikias from prosecuting his operations, so that Skioi was in no long time completely enclosed, and a division placed to guard the wall of circumvallation.<sup>2</sup>

The other  
authorities  
say that  
the  
Athenians  
did not  
begin the  
siege of  
Skioi until  
the wall of  
circumvallation  
was complete,  
and before  
the fall of  
Mende.

Such was the state of affairs which Brasidas found on returning from the island Macedonia. Unable either to recover Mende or to relieve Skioi, he was forced to confine himself to the protection of Terkos. Sikias, however, without attacking Terkos, returned soon afterwards with his army to Athens, leaving Skioi under blockade.

The march of Brasidas into Macedonia had been unfortunate in every way. Nothing but his extraordinary gallantry rescued him from utter ruin. The joint force of himself and Perdikkas

<sup>1</sup> Thucyd. iv. 104; Diod. xii. 78.

<sup>2</sup> Thucyd. iv. 105.

consisted of 1000 Greek hoplites—Peloponnesians, Athenians, and Chalcidians—with 1000 Macedonians and Chalcidians horse, and a considerable number of non-Hellenic auxiliaries. As soon as they had got beyond the mountains-pass into the territory of the Lyncestes, they were met by Arrhiborus, and a battle ensued, in which that prince was completely worsted. They halted here for a few days, awaiting—before they pushed forward to attack the villages in the territory of Arrhiborus—the arrival of a body of Illyrian mercenaries, with whom Perdikkas had concluded a league.<sup>1</sup> At length Perdikkas became impatient to advance without them, while Brasidas, on the contrary, apprehensive of the fate of Mende during his absence, was bent on returning back. The dissension between them becoming aggravated, they parted company and occupied separate encampments at some distance from each other, when both received unexpected intelligence which made Perdikkas as anxious to retreat as Brasidas. The Illyrians, having broken their compact, had joined Arrhiborus, and were now in full march to attack the invaders. The untold number of these barbarians was reported as overwhelming, while such was their reputation for ferocity as well as for valour, that the Macedonian army of Perdikkas, seized with a sudden panic, broke up in the night and fled without orders, hurrying Perdikkas himself along with them, and not even sending notice to Brasidas, with whom nothing had been concerted about the retreat. In the morning, the latter found Arrhiborus and the Illyrians close upon him, the Macedonians being already far advanced in their journey homeward.

The contrast between the men of Helles and of Macedonia—general as well as soldier—was never more strikingly exhibited than on this critical occasion. The soldiers of Brasidas, though surprised as well as deserted, lost neither their courage nor their discipline. The commander preserved not only his presence of mind, but his full authority. His hoplites were directed to form in a hollow square or oblong, with the light-armed and attack-borne to the centre, for the retreating march. Trustful soldiers were posted either in the outer ranks or in convenient stations, to run out

<sup>1</sup> Thucyd. iii. 116.





neighbours are under corresponding obligations towards him—the sentiment, which Brasidas invokes as the settled military creed of his soldiers in their ranks, was not less the regulating principle of their intercourse in peace as officers of the same community. Simple as the principle may seem, it would have found no response in the army of Karak, or of the Thasian Statids, or of the Gaul Brenani. The Persian soldier rushes to death by order of the Great King, perhaps under terror of a whip, which the Great King commands to be administered to him. The Illyrian or the Gaul counts such a stimulus, and obeys only the instigation of his own pugnacity or vengeance, or love of blood, or love of booty, but counts as soon as that individual sentiment is either satisfied or overcome by fear. It is the Greek soldier alone who feels himself bound to his comrades by the reciprocal and indefeasible ;<sup>1</sup> who obeys neither the will of a king nor his own individual impulse, but a conscious and imperative sentiment of obligation ; whose honour or shame is attached to his own place in the ranks, never to be abandoned nor ever stopped. Such conceptions of military duty, established in the minds of those soldiers whom Brasidas addressed, will come to be further illustrated when we describe the memorable Retreat of the Ten Thousand. At present I merely indicate them as forming a part of that general scheme of morality, social and political as well as military, wherein the Greeks stood united above the nations who surrounded them.

But there is another point in the speech of Brasidas which deserves notice : he tells his soldiers—"Courage is your hereditary property ; for ye belong to communities wherein the small number governs the larger, simply by reason of superior prowess in themselves and courage by their ancestors". First, it is remarkable that a large proportion of the Peloponnesian soldiers, whom Brasidas thus addressed, consisted of Helots—the conquered race, not the conquerors ; yet so easily does the military or regimental pride supplant the sympathy of race, that these men would feel

Aspirant of  
honour  
to the right  
of conquest  
or superior  
force.

<sup>1</sup> Like the memorable remarks of (Hippias), in the *Life*, Book, vii. of Epistemon and Democritus on the difference in regard to courage between Barbarians and Greeks, in well as between Helots and non-Helots (Hippias), in the *Life*, Book, vii. of Epistemon and Democritus on the difference in regard to courage between Barbarians and Greeks, in well as between Helots and non-Helots.

hattered by being addressed as if they were themselves spring from the race which had declared their masters. Next, we have on the right of the strongest looked on the legitimate source of power, and as an honourable and smothering resolution, by an officer of Dorian race, distinguished politician, unperverted intellect, and estimable character. We shall accordingly be prepared, when we find a similar principle hereafter laid down by the Athenian crews at Miletus, to diminish the explanation of those who treat it merely as a theory invented by demagogues and sophists—upon one or other of whom it is common to throw the blame of all that is objectionable in Grecian politics or morality.

Having finished his harangue, Brasidas gave orders for retreat.

On the  
same place  
Brasidas  
in his  
retreat  
but was  
repulsed.

As soon as his march began, the Illyrians rushed upon him with all the confidence and shouts of paroxysm against a flying enemy, believing that they should completely destroy his army. But whenever they approached near, the young soldiers specially stationed for the purpose turned upon and beat them back with severe loss; while Brasidas himself, with his rear-guard of 800, was posted everywhere rendering vigorous aid. When the Lycians and Illyrians attacked, the army halted and repelled them, after which it resumed its retreating march. The barbarians found themselves so rudely handled, and with such unaccustomed vigour—for they probably had had no previous experience of Grecian troops—that after a few trials they desisted from meddling with the army in its retreat along the plain. They ran forward eagerly, partly in order to combat the Macedonians under Perdiccas, who had fled before; partly to occupy the narrow pass, with high hills on each side, which formed the entrance into Lycabolia, and which lay in the road of Brasidas. When the latter approached this narrow pass he saw the barbarians masters of it. Several of them were already on the summit, and more were ascending to reinforce them, while a portion of them were moving down upon his rear. Brasidas immediately gave orders to his chosen 500 to charge up the most accessible of the two hills, with their best speed, before it became more narrowly occupied—not staying to possess compact ranks. This unexpected and vigorous move-





relations  
between  
Athens and  
Sparta  
the year  
preceding  
—the  
peace  
made  
through  
Archidamus  
son of  
Larides—  
and the  
truce of  
the year  
preceding  
—the  
peace  
made  
through  
Archidamus  
son of  
Larides—

The relation between Athens and Peloponnesus, since the conclusion of the truce in the preceding March, had settled into a curious combination. In Thera, war was prosecuted by actual understanding and with unaltered vigour; but everywhere else the truce was observed. The main purpose of the truce, however, that of giving time for discussion preliminary to a definitive peace, was completely frustrated. The desire of the Athenian people (which stands included in their vote sanctioning the truce), for sending out raiding expeditions to negotiate such a peace, seems never to have been assented.

Instead of this, the Lacedæmonians despatched a considerable reinforcement by land to join Brasidas; probably at his own request, and also instigated by hearing of the Athenian armaments now under Nicias in Pelopon. But Isagoras, the commander of the reinforcement, on reaching the borders of Thessaly, found all further progress impracticable, and was compelled to send back his troops. For Perikles, by whose powerful influence alone Brasidas had been enabled to pass through Thessaly, now directed his Thessalian guests to keep the new-coming off; which was far more easily assented, and was gratifying to the feelings of Perikles himself, as well as an essential service to the Athenians.<sup>1</sup>

Isagoras however—with a few companions, but without his army—made his way to Brasidas, having been particularly directed by the Lacedæmonians to inspect and report upon the state of affairs. He numbered among his companions a few select Spartans of the military age, intended to be placed as henchmen or governors in the cities reduced by Brasidas. This was among the first violations, apparently often repeated afterwards, of the ancient Spartan custom—that none except elderly men, above the military age, should be named to such posts. Indeed Brasidas himself was an illustrious departure from the ancient rule. The mission of these officers was intended to guard against the appointment of any but Spartans to such posts; for there were no Spartans in the army of Brasidas. One of the new-coming, Klearchus, was made governor of Amphipolis—

<sup>1</sup> Thucyd. iv. 106.



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The great temple of Hith, between Myklean and Argos (nearer to the former, and in early times more intimately connected with it, but now an appendage of the latter; Myklean itself having been subjected and almost depopulated by the Argives)—enjoyed an ancient Pan-hellenic reputation. The catalogue of its priestesses, according to a statue or bust of preserved or imagined through centuries of past time, mythical, beginning with the goddess herself or her mistress, Clarys, an old woman who had been here for fifty-six years, happened to fall asleep in the midst a burning lamp near to her head: the flame of her lamp took fire, and through the flames escaped a temple itself, very ancient and perhaps built of wood, and of the wrath of the Argives, Clarys fled, and subsequently thought it necessary to come as a suppliant in the temple of Aithia Alia at Tigea: she was appointed priestess in her place! The temple was an adjoining spot by Epidaurea of Argos, uniting possibly the antiquities and traditions of the former, but her splendour and magnificence. Prometheus the traveller, who first second edifies as a visitor near 600 years afterwards in the remains of the old temple which had been burnt

We have further of a war in Arcadia, between the two important cities of Mantinea and Tegea—each attended by its Arcadian allies, partly free, partly subject. In a hard-fought battle between them at Leodikeia, the victory was disputed. Each party created a trophy—each sent spoils to the temple of Delphi. We shall have occasion soon to speak further of these Arcadian dissensions.

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today.**

[illegible]

them, many forty-eight, were prisoners of the Germans. To protect the lives of thousands, prisoners of the Germans, the Germans had to be taken to a concentration camp. One of them was a woman who had been a prisoner of the Germans.

The Boeotians had born no part in the treaty secret between Sparta and Athens in the preceding month of March. But they seem to have followed the example of Sparta in abstaining from hostilities *de facto*; and we may conclude that they assented to the request of Sparta so far as to allow the transit of Athenian visitors and armed arrays through Boeotia to the Delphian temple. The only actual incident which we hear of in Boeotia during this interval is one which illustrates forcibly the haughty and swaggering secondary of the Thebans over some of the vulgar Boeotian cities.<sup>1</sup> The Thebans destroyed the walls of Thebes, and condemned the city to remain undefended, on the charge of abetting tendencies. How far this aspersion was well-founded, we have no means of judging. But the Thebans, far from being dampened at this moment, were altogether helplike—having lost the flower of their military force at the battle of Delium, where their station was on the defeated wing. It was this very helplike, brought upon them by their services in Thrice against Athens, which now both impelled and enabled the Thebans to enforce the rigorous sentence above-mentioned.<sup>2</sup>

But the month of March (or the Attic Epipheleion), did not—the time presented for expiration of the One year's truce—had now arrived. It has already been mentioned that this truce had never been more than partially observed. Brasidas in Thrice had disregarded it from the beginning. Both the contracting powers had tacitly acquiesced in the anomalous condition of war in Thrice coupled with peace elsewhere. Either of them had thus an excellent pretext for breaking the truce altogether; and as neither acted upon this pretext, we plainly see that the paramount feeling and consistent parties, among both, needed to peace of their own accord, at that time. There was nothing except the interest of Brasidas, and of those revolted subjects of Athens to whom he had bound himself, which kept alive the war in Thrice. Under such a state of feeling, the oath taken to maintain the truce still seemed imperative on both parties—always excepting Thracian affairs. Moreover the Athenians

Democracy  
all people  
at home,  
strongly and  
publicly in  
the Greek—  
land  
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Vespers  
to follow.

and so.

Expiration  
of the truce  
for one year.  
Expiration  
of the  
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that these  
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peace; the  
parties in  
acquiescence  
of the  
expiration of  
parties in  
Thrace.

<sup>1</sup> Xenophon, *Hærotopia*, §1. 4. 4.

<sup>2</sup> Thucyd. iv. 108.





But the  
Klein—on  
divisions of  
policy—how  
times shall  
nations be  
acted by  
Theoryville.  
Klein, but  
an personal  
interest in  
war.

showing which Theoryville gives to Klein's support of the war is open to much greater comment. First, we may well raise the question, whether Klein had any real interest in war—whether his personal or party consequences in the city was at all interested by it. He had himself no talent or competence for war-like operations—which would infallibly to place ascendancy in the hands of others, and to throw him into the shade. As to his power of carrying on the

hardest intrigues with success, that must depend on the extent of his political ascendancy. Matter of estimation against others (assuming him to be curious of truth or falsehood) could hardly be wanting either in war or peace. And if the war brought forward successful generals open to his accusations, it would also throw up successful generals, who would certainly outshine him, and would probably put him down. In the life which Plutarch has given us of Pericles—a plain and straightforward military man—we read that one of the frequent and cruminate speakers of Athens (of character analogous to that which is ascribed to Klein) expressed his surprise on hearing Pericles dissuade the Athenians from embarking in a new war: "Yes," said Pericles, "I think it right to dissuade them; though I know well that, if there be war, I shall have command over you; if there be peace, you will have command over me."<sup>1</sup> This is surely a more rational estimate of the way in which war affects the comparative importance of the civil and the military office, than that which Theoryville pronounces in reference to the interests of Klein. Moreover, when we come to follow the political history of Syracuse, we shall find the *Demagogos* *Athenagoras* ultra-pacific, and the aristocratic *Harmodotus* far more warlike.<sup>2</sup> The former is afraid, not without reason, that war will run into consequences equally military leading dangerous to the popular constitution. We may add that Klein himself had not been always warlike. He commenced his political career as an opponent of Pericles, when the latter was strenuously maintaining the necessity and prudence of beginning the Peloponnesian war.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Plutarch, Pericles, c. 18. Compare also the persuasion of Myronides and Epistemonides—Gruen. *History*, Epistemonides, c. 4.

<sup>2</sup> See the speeches of Athenagoras and Harmodotus, Thucyd. ii. 15—17.

<sup>3</sup> Plutarch, Pericles, c. 12—14.





peace, and opponents of Kleon. And the promises which they then held out might perhaps appear plausible. In March, A.C. 421, at the moment when the truce for one year was concluded. But subsequent events had frustrated them in the most glaring manner, and had even shown the best reasons for believing that no such expectations could possibly be realized, while Brasidas was in unbroken and unopposed action. For the Lacedæmonians, though seemingly anxious in concluding the truce on the basis of its provisions, and desiring to extend it to Thracæ as well as elsewhere, had been unable to enforce the observance of it upon Brasidas, or to restrain him even from making new acquisitions—as that Athens never obtained the benefit of the truce, exactly in that region where she most stood in need of it. Only by the despatch of her army to Skione and Skionæ had she maintained herself in possession even of Pollakia.

Now what was the lesson to be derived from this experience, when the Athenians came to discuss their future policy, after the truce was at an end? The great object of all parties at Athens was to recover the lost possessions in Thracæ—especially Amphipolis. Nikias, still urging negotiations for peace, continued to hold out hopes that the Lacedæmonians would be willing to restore that place, as the price of their negative now at Athens. The connection with Sparta would enable him to announce her professions even upon authority. But to this Kleon might make, and doubtless did make, a complete reply, grounded upon the most recent experience:—"If the Lacedæmonians consent to the restitution of Amphipolis (he would say), it will probably be only with the view of finding some means to escape performance, and yet to get back their prisoners. But granting that they are perfectly sincere, they will never be able to suggest Brasidas, and those parties in Thracæ who are bowed up with him, by continuance of feining and interest; so that after all you will give them back their prisoners, on the faith of an agreement beyond their power to realise. Look at what has happened during the truce! So different are the views and obligations of Brasidas in Thracæ from those of the Lacedæmonians, that he would not even obey their order when they directed him to stand

as he was, and to desist from further conquest. Much less will he sleep than when they direct him to surrender what he has already got; least of all, if they enjoin the surrender of Amphipolis, his grand acquisition and his central point for all future effort. Depend upon it, if you desire to regain Amphipolis, you will only regain it by energetic employment of force, as has happened with Histæus and Mende. And you ought to put forth your strength for this purpose immediately, while the Lacedæmonian pressure are yet on your heels, instead of waiting until after you shall have been deluded into giving them up, thereby leaving all your hold upon Lacedæmonia."

Such anticipations were fully verified by the result; for subsequent history will show that the Lacedæmonians, when they had bound themselves by treaty to give up Amphipolis, either would not, or could not, achieve performance of their stipulations, even after the death of Brasidas. Much less could they have done so during his life, when there was his great personal influence, strenuous will, and hopes of future conquest to serve as increased obstruction to them. Such anticipations were also plainly suggested by the recent past; so that in putting them into the mouth of Klein, we are only supposing him to read the lesson upon which his eyes.

How since the war-policy of Klein, taken at this moment after the expiration of the One year's truce, may be thus shown to be not only more conformable to the genius of Pericles, but also founded on a juster estimate of events both past and future, than the peace-policy of Nicias—what are we to say to the historian, who, without relating such premisses, every one of which is deduced from his own narrative—say, without even indicating their existence—merely tells us that "Klein opposed the peace in order that he might check dishonest integrity and find matter for plausible criticism?"<sup>1</sup> We cannot but say of this criticism, with profound regret that such words must be pronounced respecting any judgment of Thucydides, that it is harsh and unfair towards Klein, and careless in regard to truth and the restoration of his readers. It breathes not that same spirit of honourable impartiality which pervades his general history. It is an interpolate

Klein's advocacy of war at this time perfectly legitimate—being supported by his entire force of reasoning.

tion by the officer whose imprudence had occasioned to his countrymen the fatal loss of Amphipolis, resting upon the dinner who justly accused him. It is recorded in the same note as his unaccountable judgment in the matter of Sykhalia.

Repeating on this occasion the judgment of Thucydides, we may confidently affirm that Kleon had rational public grounds for urging his countrymen to undertake with energy the reconquest of Amphipolis. Demagogues and sophistasters though he was, he stands here immensely distinguished, as well from the famous and foolish of Nikias, who groped at points with heavy credulity, through mazes of the effects of war, as from the restless movement and agitation, not merely expeditious, but restless, which we shall presently find springing up under the auspices of Alcibiades. Perikles had said to his countrymen, at a time when they were entering all the measures of prudence, and were in a state of despondency even greater than that which prevailed in a. c. 411—"You hold your empire and your good position by the condition of being willing to encounter cost, fatigue, and danger: shun from all views of relaxing the empire, but think no effort too great to maintain it unimpaired. To lose what we have once got is more dangerous than to fall in attempts at acquisition."<sup>1</sup> The very same language was probably held by Kleon when exhorting his countrymen to an expedition for the reconquest of Amphipolis. But when urged by him, it would have a very different effect from that which it had formerly produced when held by Perikles—and different also from that which it would now have produced if held by Nikias. The entire peace-party would repudiate it when it came from Kleon,—partly out of dislike to the speaker, partly from a conviction, doubtless felt by every one, that an expedition against Brasidas would be a hazardous and painful service to all concerned in it, general as well as to others—partly also from a persuasion, dis-

<sup>1</sup> Thucyd. ii. 39. "What chance have you of keeping what you have, if you leave Amphipolis, Sykhalia, and all the other cities which would be yours if you conquer? Do you wish to leave the Peloponnese without Amphipolis? Consider

the loss of the two speeches of Perikles (Thucyd. i. 141-142; ii. 39-40) with the paraphrases which Thucydides placed in the margin—"considerance of this." Cf. *ancient world*, which illustrated Nikias (p. 12).

easily entertained at the time, though afterwards proved to be illusory by the result, that Amphipolis might really be got back through peace with the Leontocorinthians.

If Kleon, in proposing the expedition, originally proposed himself as the commander, a new ground of objection, and a very feasible ground, would thus be furnished. Says everything which Kleon does as understood to be a manifestation of some vicious or silly attitude, we are told that this was an instance of his absurd presumption, arising out of the success of Pylas, and persuading him that he was the only general who could put down Brasidas. But if the success of Pylas had really filled him with such overpowering military conceit, it is most unreasonable that he should not have procured for himself some command during the year which immediately succeeded the affair at Sphakteria—the eighth year of the war: a season of most active warlike enterprise, when his presumption and indifference arising out of the Sphakterian victory must have been fresh and glowing. As he obtained no command during this immediately succeeding period, we may fairly doubt whether he ever really conceived such excessive personal presumption of his own talents for war, and whether he did not retain after the affair of Sphakteria the same character which he had manifested in that affair—reluctance to engage in military expeditions himself, and a disposition to see them commanded as well as carried on by others. It is by no means certain that Kleon, in proposing the expedition against Amphipolis, originally proposed to take the command of it himself: I think it at least equally probable that his original wish was to induce Nikias or the Strategoi to take the command of it, as in the case of Sphakteria. Nikias doubtless opposed the expedition as much as he could. When it was determined by the people, in spite of his opposition, he would peremptorily decline the command for himself, and would do all he could to force it upon Kleon, or at least would be better pleased to see it under his command than under that of any one else. He would be not less glad to exempt himself from a dangerous service than to see his rival entangled in it. And he would have before him the same alternative which he and his friends had contemplated with so much satisfaction in the affair

Diogenes.  
Hails of  
Pylas and  
the general-  
ship in  
reference to  
the re-con-  
quest of  
Leontoe.  
1911.

of Sphakteria; either the expedition would succeed, in which case Amphipolis would be taken—or it would fail, and the consequence would be the ruin of Kleon. The last of the two was really the more probable at Amphipolis—as Nikias had consciously imagined it to be at Sphakteria.

It is easy to see, however, that an expedition proposed under these circumstances by Kleon, though it might command a majority at the public assembly, would have a large proportion of the citizens unfavourable to it, and even wishing that it might fail. Moreover, Kleon had neither talents nor experience for commanding an army; so that the being engaged under his command in fighting against the ablest soldier of the time could inspire no confidence in any man in putting on his armour. From all these circumstances united, political as well as military, we are not surprised to hear that the hoplites whom he took out with him went with weak intentions.<sup>1</sup> An ignorant general with unwilling soldiers, many of them politically despising him, stood little chance of wresting Amphipolis from Brasidas. But had Nikias or the Strategoi done their duty, and started the entire force of the city under competent command to the same object, the issue would probably have been different as to gain and loss—certainly very different as to distinction.

Kleon started from Pyraia, apparently towards the beginning of August, with 1100 Athenians, Lemnians, and Imbrian hoplites, and 300 horsemen, troops of excellent quality and condition; besides an auxiliary force of allies (number not exactly known) and thirty triremes. This armament was not of magnitude at all equal to the taking of Amphipolis; for Brasidas had equal numbers, besides all the advantages of the position. But it was a part of the scheme of Kleon, in sailing at Pyraia, to procure Macedonian and Thracian reinforcements before he commenced his attack. He first halted in his voyage near Skaphos, from which place he took away such of the hoplites as could be spared from the blockade. He next sailed across the Gulf from Pallene to the Sallenean peninsula, to a place called the Harbour of the Kolophonians near Toros.<sup>2</sup> Having here

<sup>1</sup> Thucyd. v. 1. and elsewhere in this work.  
 2 The town of Toros was situated near the entrance of the Sallenean

Harbour.

learned that neither Brasidas himself, nor any considerable Peloponnesian garrisons, were present in Torted, he landed his forces, and marched to attack the town, sending ten triremes at the same time round a promontory which separated the harbour of the Ekophonians from Torted, to seal the latter place from seaward.

It happened that Brasidas, desiring to enlarge the fortified circle of Torted, had broken down a portion of the old wall, and employed the materials in building a new and larger wall enclosing the position or suburb. This new wall appears to have been still incomplete and in an imperfect state of defence. Perikles, the Peloponnesian commander, resisted the attack of the Athenians as long as he could; but when already beginning to give way, he saw the ten Athenian triremes sailing into the harbour, which was hardly guarded at all. Abandoning the defence of the suburb, he hastened to rally these new auxiliaries, but came too late, so that the town was entered from both sides at once. Brasidas, who was not far off, rushed aid with the utmost celerity, but was yet at five miles' distance from the city when he learnt the capture and was obliged to return unsuccessfully. Perikles the commander, with the Peloponnesian garrison and the Thracian male population, were dispatched as prisoners to Athens; while the Thracian women and children, by a sale but ten months in those days, were sold as slaves.\*

After this not unimportant success, Elias sailed round the promontory of Akte to Eion at the mouth of the Strymon, within three miles of Amphipolis. From hence, in execution of his original scheme, he sent envoys to Perikles, urging him to lend assistance and on the ally of Athens in the attack of Amphipolis, with his whole forces; and to Pothis the king of the Thracian Odrysians, inviting him also to come with as many Thracian mercenaries as could be levied. The Odrysians, the Thracian tribe nearest to Amphipolis, took part with Brasidas

proposals, on the side looking towards Perikles, that the land army belonging to the town should be sent off to the assistance of the perikles, on land allies, including the land army of the Ekophonians, against the Thracian allies (Hecataeus, vii. 120). Brasidas calls the Thracian king Brasidas.

Brasidas, Hecataeus, vii. 120.

The value of Torted, landing the greatest mass, and Torted, a kind of land fortress, was in, very little to be seen. Thucydides, Brasidas in Northern Greece, vol. ii. ch. viii. p. 103.

\* Thucyd. v. 2.















polis, to the Athenian acropolis without. Moreover, so conspicuous was the interior of the city to spectators without, that the temple of Aëstet, and Erechthea with its

ministers around him performing the ceremony of sacrifice, was distinctly recognised. The fact was made known to Kleon as he stood on the high ridge taking his survey, while at the same time those who had gone near to the gates reported that the feet of many horses and men were beginning to be seen under them, as if preparing for a sally.<sup>1</sup> He himself went close to the gate, and satisfied himself of this circumstance: we must recollect that there was no disorder on the walls, nor any danger from watches. Anxious to avoid coming to any real engagement before his reinforcements should arrive, he at once gave orders for retreat, which he thought might be accomplished before the attack from within could be fully organised. For he imagined that a considerable number of troops would be marched out, and ranged in battle order, before the attack was actually begun—not dreaming that the sally would be instantaneous, made with a mere handful of men. Orders having been proclaimed to wheel to the left, and retreat in column on the left flank towards Ekeia, Kleon, who was himself on the top of the hill with the right wing, waited only to see his left and centre actually in march on the road to Ekeia, and then directed his right also to wheel to the left and follow them.

The whole Athenian army were thus in full retreat, marching in a direction nearly parallel to the Long Wall of Amphipolis, with their right or untroubled side exposed to the enemy, when Brasidas, looking over the southernmost gates of the Long Wall, with his small detachment ready marshalled saw him, burst out into spontaneous exclamations on the disorder of their army.<sup>2</sup> "Then men will not stand up: I see it by the quivering of their spears and of their hands.

<sup>1</sup> Thucyd. v. 12. of 40 Athenian hoplites afterwards joined back with Kleon. This number was not 1/2 of what he had lost along the river, but of what was left of his army. It is not clear whether this number was the whole of the Athenian army, or only the part that was left of it. It is not clear whether this number was the whole of the Athenian army, or only the part that was left of it.

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born, immediately after it began its retreat. But the soldiers on the Athenian right had probably seen the previous movement of Brasidas against the other division, and, though astonished at the sudden change, had then a moment's warning, before they were themselves assailed, to halt and form on the hill. Kleonides here forced a considerable resistance, in spite of the desertion of Kleon, who, more intoxicated than any man in his army by a catastrophe so unexpected for him, lost his presence of mind and fled at once; but was overtaken by a Thracian pelotai from Myrkinos, and slain. His soldiers on the right wing, however, repulsed two or three attacks in front from Kleonides, and maintained their ground, until at length the Chalkidian cavalry and the pelotai from Myrkinos, having come forth out of the gates, assailed them with volleys in flank and rear, so as to throw them into disorder. The whole Athenian army was then put to flight; the left hurrying to Eion, the men of the right dispersing and seeking safety among the hilly grounds of Paugos in their rear. Their sufferings and loss in the retreat, from the hands of the pursuing pelotai and cavalry, were most severe. When they at last again gathered at Eion, not only the commander Kleon, but 800 Athenian hoplites, half of the force sent out, were found missing.<sup>1</sup>

So abjectly had the attack been concerted, and so entire was its success, that only seven men perished on the side of the victors. But of those seven, one was the gallant Brasidas himself, who, being carried into Amphipolis, lived just long enough to learn the complete victory of his troops and then expired. Great and bitter was the sorrow which his death occasioned throughout Thracæ, especially among the Amphipolitans. He received, by special decree, the distinguished honour of interment within the city—the rarest honour being to enter even the most sacred sacred ground in a suburb without the walls. All the allies attended his funeral, in ac-

Profound grief to Thracæ for the death of Brasidas—decreed by the Amphipolitans that he should be buried in Amphipolis. The Athenian command, which Brasidas had been leading, was not to be taken by the Thracians.

<sup>1</sup> It is almost painful to read the account given by Diodorus (lib. 15, 44) of the battle of Amphipolis, where, says, "amid a hail of the strongest and sharpest missiles of Thracian javelins, he being the first," is difficult to believe that Brasidas is

describing the same scene, as briefly sketched, in all the circumstances, except that the Amphipolitans at last gain the victory. "In any, with wandering in the dark—"This was a desperate proposition Thracians" is indignantly before the truth.

and with military honours. His tomb was enclosed by a railing, and the space immediately fronting it was consecrated as the great agora of the city, which was remodelled accordingly. He was also proclaimed *Officiis* or *Protector* of Amphipolis, and as such received honours worthy with annual games and sacrifices to his honour.<sup>1</sup> The Athenian Agora, the real founder and originally recognised *Officiis* of the city, was stripped of all his commemorative honours and expelled from the remembrance of the people; the buildings, which served as visible monuments of his name, being destroyed. Full of hatred as the Amphipolitans now were towards Athens—and not merely of hatred, but of fear, since the loss which they had just sustained of their saviour and protector—they felt repugnance to the idea of rendering further worship to an Athenian *Officiis*. It was inconvenient to keep up such a religious link with Athens, now that they were forced to look anxiously to Macedonia for assistance. Klearchus, as governor of Amphipolis, superintended those numerous situations in the city which the important change required, together with the creation of the trophy, just at the spot where Brasidas had first charged the Athenians; while the remaining remnant of Athens, having obtained the usual truce and buried their dead, returned home without further operations.

There are few battles recorded in history wherein the disparity and contrast of the two generals opposed has been so manifest—concomitant skill and courage on the one side against ignorance and panic on the other. On the singular ability and courage of Brasidas there can be but one verdict of unqualified admiration. But the criticism passed by Thucydides on Kleon, here as elsewhere, cannot be adopted without reserve. He tells us that Kleon undertook his march, from Eion up to the hill in front of Amphipolis, in the same risk and confident spirit with which he

remains  
in the  
hands of  
Amphipolis  
—which  
secured  
the peace  
of Athens.

<sup>1</sup>Thucyd. ii. 11. Aristotle's notice of Naxos near to Amphipolis, when the situation related to Brasidas as an instance of judicious selection by speech and deed amongst Kleon. *Philosophy* v. 7.

It is curious in the version now substituted by the Amphipolitans in the celebrated temple of Agias, as

they still, however the discourse addressed by the Platons in the Amphipolitans, speaking for justice. The Thucydides, if they really possessed of the Platons, would not maintain the superiority in this point over the great victory of the great battle of Marathon. — see Thucydides in the side (Thucyd. ii. 10).



had embarked on the enterprise against Pylos—in the blind confidence that no one would resist him.<sup>1</sup> Now I have already, in a former chapter, shown grounds for concluding that the anticipations of Kleon respecting the capture of Sphakteria, far from being marked by any spirit of unmeasured presumption, were sober and judicious—realized in the letter without any unlooked-for aid from fortune. The remarks here made by Thucydides on that affair are not more reasonable than the judgment on it in his former chapter; for it is not true (as he here implies) that Kleon expected no resistance in Sphakteria—he calculated on resistance, but knew that he had force sufficient to overcome it. His fault arose at Amphipolis, great as that fault was, did not consist in rashness and presumption. This charge at least is rebutted by the circumstances that he himself wished to make no aggressive movement until his reinforcements should arrive, and that he was only constrained, against his own will, to abandon his intended temporary inactivity during that interval, by the angry murmurs of his soldiers, who reproached him with ignorance and backwardness—the latter quality being the reverse of that with which he is loaded by Thucydides.

When Kleon was thus driven to do something, his march up to the top of the hill, for the purpose of reconnoitring the ground, was not in itself ill-judged. It might have been accomplished in perfect safety, if he had kept his army in orderly array, prepared for contingencies. But he suffered himself to be out-generalled and over-reached by that uncalculated consciousness of impotence and unwillingness to fight, which Demosthenes took care to present to him. Among all military strategists, this has perhaps been the most frequently practised with success against over-extended generals; who are thrown off their guard and induced to neglect preparation, not because they are naturally more rash or presumptuous than ordinary men, but because nothing except either a high order of intellect or special practice and training will enable a man to keep steadily present to his mind possibilities even real and serious, when there is no discernible evidence to suggest their approach—much more when there is positive evidence,

<sup>1</sup>Thucyd. ii. 9. and hypothesis of  
system first and by the latter through  
discrepancy in himself. In judging the  
ability of Kleon, we must take  
into consideration his position and position, and  
the judge accordingly accordingly, etc.

artfully laid out by a superior enemy, to create belief in their absence. A fault substantially the same had been committed by Thraxhides himself and his colleague Eklitis a year and a half before, when they suffered Brasidas to surprise the Strymonian bridge and Amphipolis; not even taking common precautions, nor thinking it necessary to keep the fleet at Elion. They were not men particularly rash and presumptuous, but ignorant and unsophisticated, in a military sense; incapable of keeping before them dangerous contingencies which they perfectly knew, simply because there was no present evidence of approaching enemies.

This military incompetence, which made Elias fall into the trap laid for him by Brasidas, also made him take wrong measures against the danger, when he unexpectedly discovered as late that the enemy within were preparing to attack him. His first error consisted in giving instant order for retreat, under the vain hope that he could get away before the enemy's attack could be brought to bear.<sup>2</sup> An older officer, before he commenced the retreating march so close to the hostile walls, would have taken care to marshal his men in proper array, to warn and address them with the usual harangues, and to wind up their courage to the fighting-point. Up to that moment they had no idea of being called upon to fight; and the courage of Grecian hoplites—when thus aroused while hurrying to get away in disorder visible both to themselves and their enemies, without any of the usual preliminaries of battle—was not too apt to prove deficient. To turn the right or unaided flank to the enemy was unavailing, from the direction of the retreating movement; nor is it reasonable to blame Elias for this, as some historians have done, or for causing his right wing to move too soon in following the lead of the left, as Dr. Arnold seems to think. The general fault seems to have consisted in not waiting to marshal his men and prepare them for the standing fight during their retreat. Let us add however—and the remark, if it serves to explain Elias's idea of being able to get away before he was actually assailed, seems as a double compliment to the judgment as well as boldness of Brasidas—that no other Lacedæmonian general of that day (perhaps not even Democleus, the most enterprising general of

<sup>2</sup> Thucyd. i. 10. *Quævis effugaciter crederetur, &c.*

Admetos would have ventured upon an attack with so very small a band, relying altogether upon the panic produced by his sudden movement.

But the absence of military knowledge and precaution is not the worst of Kleon's faults on this occasion. His want of courage at the moment of conflict is yet more lamentable, and directs his end of that personal sympathy which would otherwise have accompanied it. A commander who has been out generalised is under a double force of obligation to court and expose himself in the uttermost, in order to retrieve the consequences of his own mistake. He will then at least preserve his own personal honour, whatever gains he may derive on the score of deficient knowledge and judgment.<sup>1</sup>

What is said about the disgraceful flight of Kleon himself must be applied, with hardly less accuracy of criticism, to the Athenian hoplites under him. They behaved in a manner altogether unworthy of the reputation of their city; especially the left wing, which seems to have broken and run away without waiting to be attacked. And when we read in Thucydides that the men who thus disgraced themselves were among the best and best-armed hoplites in Athens—that they came out unflinchingly under Kleon—that they began their successful marches against him before he had committed any error, degrading him for backwardness when he was yet not strong enough to attempt anything serious, and was only manufacturing a reasonable pretence in awaiting the arrival of expected reinforcements—when we read this, we shall be led to compare the expedition against Amphipolis with former artifices respecting the attack of Eubœa, and to discern other causes for its failure besides the military incompetency of the commander. These hoplites brought out with them from Athens the feelings prevalent among the political adversaries of Kleon. The expedition was proposed and carried by him, contrary to the wishes of these adversaries. They could not prevent it, but their opposition misdirected it from the beginning, kept within its

<sup>1</sup> Contrast the severe death of the Athenian hoplites, generally, at Amphipolis, Thucydides, *loc. cit.*, with the flight of Kleon's companions, *ibid.*

Barrow limits the three targets, and was one point closer, which frustrated its owner.

Had Perikles been alive, Amphipolis might perhaps still have been lost, since its capture was the fault of the officers employed to defend it. But if lost, it would probably have been attacked and recovered with the same energy as the revolted Euboea had been; with the full force, and the best generals, that Athens could furnish. With such an arrangement under good officers, there was nothing at all impracticable in the reconquest of the place; especially as at that time it had no dangers on three sides except the Boeotians, and might then be approached by Athenian ships on that navigable river. The movement of Kleon,<sup>1</sup> even if his reinforcements had arrived, was hardly sufficient for the purpose. But Perikles would have been able to concentrate upon it the whole strength of the city, without being puzzled by the distractions of political party. He would have seen as clearly as Kleon that the place could only be recovered by force, and that its recovery was the most important object to which Athens could devote her energies.

It was thus that the Athenians, partly from political antipathy, partly from the incompetence of Kleon, underwent a disastrous defeat instead of carrying Anagyra. But the death of Kleon converted their defeat into a substantial victory. There remained no Spartan, like or second to that eminent man, either as a soldier or a consulting politician; none who could replace him in the confidence and affection of the allies of Athens in Thrace, none who could prosecute those enterprising plans against Athens on her unshielded side, which he had first shown to be practicable. With him the fears of Athens, and the hopes of Sparta, in regard to the future, alike disappeared. The Athenians executed Kleon and Demosthenes.

[illegible]

the rear). But, the first 30 minutes of the flight seem to have completely altered during the interval. Instead of one long trail, with three glides near the tip (Fig. 1), it seemed to have consisted of several well, ready ones in the interval, interrupted by periods spent near the tail (Fig. 2), while the second well formed the second, continuous, beginning of a period pair of long wells with small landings.

had both of them acquired among the Athenians an influence personal to themselves, apart from their post and from their country. But the career of Brasidas exhibited an extent of personal ascendancy and absorption, obtained as well as deserved, such as had never before been paralleled by any military chieftain in Greece, and Plato might well select him as the most suitable historical counterpart to the heroic Achilles.<sup>1</sup> All the achievements of Brasidas were his own undividedly, with nothing more than bare encouragement, sometimes even without encouragement, from his country. And when we recollect the strict and narrow routine in which as a Spartan he had been educated, so fatal to the development of everything like original thought or impulse, and so completely estranged from all experience of party or political discussion, we are amazed at his resource and flexibility of character, his power of adapting himself to new circumstances and new persons, and his libidinous dexterity in making himself the rallying point of opposite political parties in each of the various cities which he required. The combination "of every sort of practical excellence"—valour, intelligence, probity, and gentleness of dealing—which his character presented, was never forgotten among the subject-allies of Athens; and procured for other Spartan officers in subsequent years favourable presumptions, which their conduct was seldom found to realize.<sup>2</sup> At the time when Brasidas perished, in the flower of his age, he was unquestionably the best man in Greece. And though it is not given to us to predict what he would have become had he lived, we may be sure that the future course of the war would have been widely modified; perhaps even to the advantage of Athens, should she might have had sufficient compassion at home to keep her from undertaking her disastrous enterprise in Sicily.

Thucydides seems to take pleasure in setting forth the gallant exploits of Brasidas, from the first at Medabæ to the last at Amphipolis, not less than the dark side of Kleon; both, though in different scenes, the causes of his baseness. He never mentions the latter except in connection with some proceeding represented as unwise or

perhaps of  
Thucydides  
in which  
Kleon  
and Kleon

<sup>1</sup> *Plato, Symposium*, p. 192, p. 193.

<sup>2</sup> *Thucyd.* iii. 66. *Super dila. and ultra dila. 412.*

discreetable. The backsliding which the offended majesty of empire thought itself entitled to practice in ancient times against dependencies revolted and reconquered, reached their maximum in the propositions against Mitylene and Skioth. Both of them are ascribed to Kleon by name as their author. Yet, when we come to the slaughter of the Mitylene—equally barbarous, and worse in respect to grounds of excuse, inasmuch as the Mitylene had never been subjects of Athens—we find Thucydides mentioning the deed without naming the perpetrator.

Regarding the foreign policy of Kleon, the facts already narrated will enable the reader to form an idea of it as compared with that of his opponents. I have <sup>carefully</sup> shown grounds for believing that Thucydides has forgotten his usual impartiality in reflecting this personal enemy; that in regard to Sphektaria, Kleon was really one main and indispensable cause of preventing for his country the greatest advantage which she obtained throughout the whole war; and that in regard to her judgment, as directing the prosecution of war, three different times must be distinguished—1. After the first blockade of the harbor in Sphektaria; 2. After the capture of the island; 3. After the expiration of the One-year truce. On the earliest of these three occasions he was wrong, for he seems to have shut the door on all possibilities of negotiation, by his manner of dealing with the Lacedæmonian envoys. On the second occasion he had fair and plausible grounds to offer on behalf of his opinion, though it turned out unfortunate; moreover, at that time all Athens was warlike, and Kleon is not to be treated as the peculiar adviser of that policy. On the third and last occasion, after the expiration of the truce, the political conduct of Kleon was right, judicious, and truly Periclean—much surpassing in wisdom that of his opponents. We shall see in the coming chapters how these opponents managed the affairs of the state after his death; how Nikias threw away the interests of Athens on the endorsement of the conditions of peace; how Nikias and Alcibiades together deplored the power of the country on the shores of Syracuse. And when we judge the demagogue Kleon in

1 Thucyd. v. 106.

this comparison, we shall find ground for remarking that Theophrastus is reserved and even indignant towards the errors and vices of other statesmen, harsh only towards those of his country.

As to the internal policy of Kleon, and his conduct as a politician in Athenian constitutional life, we have but little trustworthy evidence. There exists indeed a portrait of him drawn in colours local and glowing; most impressive to the imagination, and hardly effaceable from the memory—the portrait in the "Knights" of Aristophanes. It is through this representation that Kleon has been transmitted to posterity, credited by a poet who admits himself to have a personal grudge against him, just as he has been commemorated in the praise of an historian whose banishment he had proposed. Of all the productions of Aristophanes, no comedy with comic genius throughout, the "Knights" is the most concentrated and irresistible—the most distinct in its character, symmetry, and purpose. Looked at with a view to the object of its author, both in reference to the audience and to Kleon, it deserves the greatest possible admiration, and we are not surprised to learn that it obtained the first prize. It displays the caricature of that which will contend with nature can achieve, in covering an enemy with ridicule, contempt, and scorn. Demos could have desired nothing worse, even for Dikaios and Whiston. The old man Demos of Pnyx, introduced on the stage as personifying the Athenian people, Kleon, brought on as his newly-bought Paphlagonian slave, who, by sneering, lying, impudent and false denunciations of others, has gained his master's ear, and heaps ill-usage upon every one else, while he enriches himself; the Knights, or chief members of what we may call the Athenian aristocracy, forming the chorus of the piece as Kleon's pronounced enemies; the Sausage-seller from the market-place, who, instigated by Nikias and Demosthenes along with these Knights, overdoes Kleon in all his own low arts, and supplants him in the favour of Demos;—all this, exhibited with infinite directness of expression, forms the masterpiece and glory of *Kleone's comedy*. The effect produced upon the Athenian audience when this piece was represented at the Lenaia festival

(January, A.D. 494, about six months after the capture of Sphacteria), with Klein himself and most of the real English present, must have been intense beyond what we can now easily imagine. That Klein could maintain himself after this humiliating exposure, is no small proof of his mental vigour and ability. It does not seem to have impaired his influence, at least not permanently. For not only do we see him the most effective opponent of peace during the next two years, but there is ground for believing that the poet himself found it convenient to action his line towards this powerful enemy.

So ready are most writers to find Klein glibly, that they are misled with Aristophanes as a witness against him; though no other public man, of any age or nation, has ever been condemned upon such evidence. No man thinks of judging Sir Robert Walpole, or Mr Fox, or Mirabeau, from the numerous lampoons put in circulation against them. No man will take measure of a political Englishman from Puck, or of a Frenchman from the *Charivari*. The unqualified comic merit of the "English" of Aristophanes is only one reason the more for distrusting the resemblance of its picture to the real Klein. We have means too of testing the candour and accuracy of Aristophanes by his delineation of Sokrates, whom he introduced in the comedy of the "Clouds" in the year after that of the "English". As a comedy, the "Clouds" stands second only to the "English"; as a picture of Sokrates it is little better than pure fancy: it is not even a caricature, but a totally different person. We may indeed perceive single features of resemblance—the large feet and the argumentative sobbing belong to both, but the entire portrait is such that if it bore a different name, no one would think of comparing it with Sokrates, whom we know well from other sources. With such an analogy before us, not to mention what we know generally of the portraits of Puckish by these authors, we are not warranted in trusting the portrait of Klein as a *Thucyd.*, except on points where Cæsar is corroborative evidence. And we may add that some of the lies against him, where we can satisfactorily test their pertinence, are decidedly not founded in fact; as, for example, where the poet accuses Klein of having deliberately

Unhappy  
as judging  
Klein  
upon such  
pictures—  
figures of  
Sokrates  
by Aris-  
tophanes  
is having  
misleading.



and cunningly robbed Demagogeus of his lands in the eager-  
ness against Spylakteria.<sup>1</sup>

In the praise of Theophrastus we find Klein described as a  
dishonest politician, a wrongful accuser of others, the  
most violent of all the citizens.<sup>2</sup> Throughout the  
course of Aristophanes, there were charges set  
forth with his characteristic emphasis, but others are  
also expounded—Klein practices the basest artifices  
and deceptions to gain favour with the people, steals  
the public money, receives bribes and accepts con-  
cessions from private persons by wholesale, and then enriches  
himself under pretence of aid for the public treasury. In the  
comedy of the "Acharnians," represented one year earlier than the  
"Knights," the poet alludes with great delight to a sum of five  
talents, which Klein had been compelled "to disgorge"; a  
present tendered to him by the Ionic subjects of Athens (if  
we may believe Theopompus) for the purpose of procuring a  
remission of their tribute, and which the "Knights," whose  
crimes of military service he had exposed, compelled him to  
relinquish.<sup>3</sup>

But when we put together the different heads of indictment  
accumulated by Aristophanes, it will be found that they are not  
easily reconcilable one with the other. For an Athenian, whose  
tongue led him to violent accusation of others, at the incredible  
price of multiplying and exaggerating personal accounts, would  
find it peculiarly dangerous, if not impossible, to carry on pecula-  
tion for his own account. If, on the other hand, he took the  
latter course, he would be inclined to purchase acquiescence from  
others even by winking at real guilt on their part, far from  
making himself conspicuous as a calumniator of innocence. We  
must, therefore, discern the aim of the indictment which is  
indicated in Theophrastus; not Klein as treacher to the people

<sup>1</sup> Aristophanes, *Acharnians*, 11, 104, 105, 106, 107. In one passage of the play, Klein is represented with pretence to be engaged at Argos in business for-  
warding the supplies of that city, but he really, under cover of this  
pretence, carries on dishonest  
dealing with the Lacedæmonians  
(105). In two other passages, he is  
represented as being the person who

steals the supplies of justice with  
the Lacedæmonians (102, 103).

<sup>2</sup> Theophrastus, *Characters*, 1, 11, 12. Aristophanes  
was not alone in his opinion, and Aristotle  
perhaps too—the character of Kleon.

<sup>3</sup> Aristophanes, *Acharnians*, 1, with the  
Scholium, who quotes from Theo-  
pompus, Theopompus, Fragment 11,  
101, 102, 103, 104.



his intimacy with them, considering that private friendships would distract him from his paramount duty to the commonwealth.<sup>1</sup>

Moreover, the reputation of Kleio, as a frequent and unmeasured winner of others, may be explained partly by a passage of his enemy Aristophanes. A passage the more deserving of confidence as a just representation of fact, since it appears in a comedy (the "Frogs") represented (and not not) eleven years after the death of Kleio, and five years after that of Hyperbolos, when the poet had less motive for misrepresentations against either. In the "Frogs," the scene is laid in Kleio, whether the god Democritus goes, in the attire of

Democritus, and along with his slave Xanthos, for the purpose of bringing up again to earth the deceased poet Euripides. Among the incidents, Xanthos, in the attire which his master had worn, is represented as eating with violence and waste towards two hostesses of eating-houses—consuming their substance, robbing them, refusing to pay when called upon, and even threatening their lives with a drawn sword. Upon which, the women, having no other resource left, announce their resolution of calling the one upon her protector Kleio, the other on Hyperbolos, for the purpose of belaying the offender to justice before the dikastery.<sup>2</sup> This passage shows us (if inferences on casual evidence are to be held as admissible) that Kleio and Hyperbolos became involved in lawsuits partly by helping poor persons who had been wronged to obtain justice before the dikastery. A rich man who had suffered injury might purchase of Aristotle, or some other rhetor, advice and aid as to the conduct of his complaint. But a poor man or woman would think themselves happy to obtain the gratuitous suggestion, and sometimes the auxiliary speech, of Kleio or Hyperbolos, who would thus extend their own popularity by means very similar to those practised by the leading men in Rome.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Plutarch, *Life of Democritus*, p. 101. Compare two other passages in the same treatise, p. 104, where Plutarch speaks of the influence and power of Kleio, and p. 112, where he says, with truth, that Kleio was not only credited to act as counsel in a lawsuit.

<sup>2</sup> Aristophanes, *Frogs* 146—176.

<sup>3</sup> Here again we find that the office represented as essentially in the dress of Democritus, and of this kind and expressing the name of others who had grounds of complaint Aristophanes, *Clouds*, l. 10, and *Myself against Aristotle* and *Democritus* (see *Plutarch*—see *Plutarch* on *Democritus* and *Plutarch* on *Democritus*).

But besides lending aid to others, Charles Kitch was often also a prosecutor, in his own name, of official delinquents, real or alleged. That man one should undertake this duty was indispensable for the protection of the city, otherwise the responsibility in which official persons were subjected after their term of office would have been nearly removed: and we have proof enough that the general public morality of these official persons, acting individually, was by no means high. But the duty was, at the same time, one which most persons would and did shun. The prosecutor, while obstructive to general justice, gained nothing even by the most complete success; and if he failed so much as not to procure a majority of votes among the citizens, equal to one-fifth of the votes he possessed, he was condemned to pay a fine of 1000 drachmas. What was still more serious, he drew upon himself for-welcome sums of private hatred—from the friends, partisans, and the political chiefs of the accused party—extremely menacing to his own future security and comfort in a community like Athens. There was, therefore, little motive to accept, and great motive to decline, the task of prosecuting on public grounds. A prudent politician at Athens would undertake it occasionally, and against special rivals, but he would carefully guard himself against the reputation of doing it frequently or by inclination—and the orators constantly do so guard themselves in those speeches which yet remain.

It is this reputation which Thucydides fastens upon Kitch, and which, like Cato, the censor at Rome, he probably merited: from native arduousness of temper, from a powerful talent for invective, and from his position, both inferior and hostile, to the Athenian knights or aristocracy, who overwhelmed him by their heavy importunities. But in what proportion of cases his accusations were just or calumnious—the real question, upon which a sound judgment turns—we have no means of deciding, either in his case or in that of Cato. "To lack the worked (observe Aristophanes himself!) is not only no blame, but a

readiness for voluntary service in Athens—service longer and shorter according to the hour of day.

we have an evidence in Kitch's case, which was a portion of what the orators themselves

<sup>1</sup> Aristophanes, *Eqn.* 1171.—  
*Antiphanes only accuses, while Ant. Sphincter,  
 and most others generally, have all business.*





contracting some few bitter jobs against Kleon, manifest no second deliberate plan of attack against him.

The battle of Amphipolis recovered at once the two most pronounced individual opponents of peace, Kleon and Brasidas. Athens too was more than ever discouraged and averse to prolonged fighting; for the number of hoplite slain at Amphipolis doubtless filled the city with mourning, besides the unpurified disgrace now tarnishing Athenian soldiiership. The peace-party under the auspices of Nicias and Laches, relieved at once from the internal opposition of Kleon, as well as from the foreign enterprise of Brasidas, were enabled to resume their negotiations with Sparta. In a spirit promising success. King Pausanias, and the Spartan ephors of the year were on their side equally bent on terminating the war, and the disputes of all the allies were conveyed at Sparta for discussion with the ephors of Athens. Such discussion was continued during the whole summer and winter after the battle of Amphipolis, without any actual hostilities on either side. At first the propositions advanced were found very conflicting; but at length, after several debates, it was agreed to treat upon the basis of each party surrendering what had been acquired by war. The Athenians insisted at first on the restoration of Plataeæ; but the Thebans replied that Plataeæ was theirs neither by force nor by treaty, but by voluntary capitulation and surrender of the inhabitants. This distinction seems to our ideas somewhat remarkable, since the capitulation of a besieged town is not less the result of force than capture by storm. But it was adopted in the present treaty; and under it the Athenians, while forgiving their demand of Plataeæ, were enabled to retain Nisæa, which they had acquired from the Megareans, and Anaktoria and Sphacteria, which they had taken from Corinth. To ensure accommodating temper on the part of Athens, the Spartans held out the threat of invading Attica in the spring, and of establishing a permanent fortification in the

<sup>1</sup> Thucyd. i. 101-102. The statement by Poly. in *Strabo* is clear that this was the ground on which the Athenians were allowed to retain Sphacteria and Anaktoria. For if their surrender of these two places had been distinctly

and so treated as equivalent with the treaty, the Corinthians would doubtless have claimed this part as the necessary portion of their conquests; whereas they preferred to leave it open as a subject of dispute.

territory; and they even sent round proclamation to their allies, enjoining all the details requisite for this step. Since Athens had now been exempt from invasion for three years, the Athenians were probably not inattentive to this threat of renewal under a permanent form.

At the beginning of spring—shortly the end of March, 421 B.C.—shortly after the return Demosthenes at Athens—the important treaty was concluded for the term of fifty years. The following were its principal conditions:—

1. All shall have full liberty to visit all the public temples of Greece—for purposes of private sacrifice, consultation of oracles, or visit to the festivals. Every man shall be undisturbed both in going and coming.—[The value of this article will be felt when we recollect that the Athenians and their allies had been unable to visit either the Olympic or the Pythian festival since the beginning of the war.]

Peace  
between the  
Greeks  
concluded  
in 421 B.C.  
between  
Athens  
and Sparta.

2. The Delphians shall enjoy full autonomy and mastery of their temple and their territory.—[This article was intended to exclude the ancient claim of the Phocians to the management of the temple—a claim which the Athenians had once supported, before the Thirty year truce; but they had now little interest in the matter, since the Phocians were in the hands of their enemies.]

3. There shall be peace for fifty years between Athens and Sparta with their respective allies, with abstinence from mischief either overt or clandestine, by land as well as by sea.

4. Neither party shall invade for purposes of mischief the territory of the other—not by any artifice or under any pretence.

Should any subject of difference arise, it shall be settled by equitable means, and by oaths tendered and taken, in form to be hereafter agreed on.

5. The Lacedæmonians and their allies shall restore Amphipolis to the Athenians.

They shall further relinquish to the Athenians Argilus, Stenæum, Aranthæ, Etilia, Olynthus, and Spartolus. But these cities shall remain autonomous, on condition of paying tribute to Athens according to the assessment of Aristobolus. Any citizen of these cities (Amphipolis as well as the others) who may choose to



quit them shall be at liberty to do so, and to carry away his property. Nor shall the allies be counted hereafter either as allies of Athens or of Sparta, unless Athens shall induce them, by suitable persuasions, to become her allies, which she is at liberty to do if she can.

The inhabitants of Mitylene, Samos, and Seges shall dwell independently in their respective cities, just as much as the Olynthians and Amphians.—[These were towns which adhered to Athens, and were still numbered as her allies, though they were near enough to be molested by Olynthus<sup>1</sup> and Amphias, against which this clause was intended to ensure them.]

The Lacedæmonians and their allies shall restore Persepolis to the Athenians.

6. The Athenians shall restore to Sparta Caryphasian, Kythira, Melos, Pedrea, Anaxoth, with all the captives in their hands from Sparta or her allies. They shall further release all Spartans or allies of Sparta now blocked up in Sicily.

7. The Lacedæmonians and their allies shall give back all the captives in their hands from Athens or her allies.

8. Respecting Statos, Teos, Samos, or any other town in the possession of Athens, the Athenians may take their own measures.

9. Oaths shall be exchanged between the contracting parties according to the ceremonies held most binding in each city respectively, and in the following words:—"I will adhere to this convention and treat sincerely and without fraud." The

<sup>1</sup> Compare v. 10 with v. 11, which seems to be to remove the explanation suggested by the Greek, and adapted by Cicero.

The use of the word *ἀλλοτρίων* is repeated in the second and third clauses of Athens' part of the treaty, and is related to the correspondence of the other allies—deserter nations. These who drew up the treaty, which is supposed to be very carefully and even to have dictated that the word *ἐκείνη* should apply both to Amphipolis and the other allies, but that the word *ἐκείνη* should apply exclusively to Amphipolis. The third explanation is applicable also to the estimation of *ἐκείνη*, by that which is common to all towns delivered up. But it is

conceivable that this word *ἐκείνη* does not properly apply to the other allies, for they were not delivered up to Athens—they were only re-integrated, in the words immediately following having reason. Perhaps there is a little Athenian pride in terms of the treaty—that is, to indicate distinctly that the Lacedæmonians were to deliver up various towns to Athens, that in all words afterwards, which show that the allies were only to be re-integrated—not surrendered to Athens.

The provision for guaranteeing security of settlement and property was inserted chiefly for the Amphipolitans, who would naturally desire to migrate, if the town had been already delivered to Athens.

offer shall be usually reserved, and the terms of peace shall be invoked on altars at Olympia, Delphi, and the Isthmus, as well as at Sparta and Athens.

It should any matter have been forgotten in the present convention, the Athenians and Lacedæmonians may alter it by mutual understanding and consent, without being held to violate their oaths.

These oaths were accordingly exchanged. They were taken by seventeen principal Athenians, and as many Spartans, on behalf of their respective countries, on the 30th day of the month Artemisius at Sparta, and on the 15th day of Euphebeion at Athens, immediately after the orator Demagrus, Pictades being Ephor sponsor at Sparta, and Alkarn Archon sponsor at Athens. Among the Lacedæmonians swearing are included the two Kings, Agis and Plistonax, the Ephor Mantolus (and perhaps other ephors, but this we do not know), and Tolla, the brother of Brasidas. Among the Athenians sworn are comprised Nikias, Lachis, Agnes, Lamachos, and Demosthenes.<sup>1</sup>

Such was the peace (commonly known by the name of the peace of Nikias) concluded in the beginning of the eleventh spring of the war, which had just lasted ten full years. Its conditions being put to the vote at Sparta in the assembly of deputies from the Lacedæmonian allies, the majority accepted them; which, according to the condition adopted and sworn to by every member of the confederacy,<sup>2</sup> made it binding upon all. There was, indeed, a special reserve allowed to any particular state in case of religious scruple, arising out of the fear of offending some of their gods or herons. Having this reserve, the peace had been formally assented to by the decree of the confederates. But it soon appeared how little the vote of the majority was worth, even though sustained by the strong pressure of Lacedæmonian force, when the more powerful members were among the dissentient minority. The Boeotians, Megarians, and Corinthians all refused to accept it. The Corinthians were displeased because they did not recover

The peace is only partially accepted by the allies at Sparta.

The Boeotians, Megarians, and Corinthians all reject it.

<sup>1</sup> Thucyd. v. 25.

<sup>2</sup> Thucyd. v. 25-26. *κατασκευασθαι*.

<sup>3</sup> Thucyd. (the Lacedæmonians only) and the Boeotians, Megarians, and Corinthians all reject it.

and the Boeotians, Megarians, and Corinthians all reject it.

Sellians and Asiatians; the Megarians, because they did not regain Naucraris; the Eretrians, because they were required to surrender Tanagra. In spite of the urgent solicitations of Sparta, the deputies of all these powerful states not only denounced the peace as unjust, and voted against it in the general assembly of allies, but refused to accept it when the vote was carried, and went home to their respective cities for instructions.<sup>1</sup>

Such were the conditions, and such the accompanying circumstances, of the peace of Nikias, which terminated, or *prolonged* <sup>pp. 41.</sup> ~~prolonged~~ <sup>prolonged</sup> to termate, the great Peloponnesian war, after a duration of ten years. Its consequences and facts, in many respects such as were not anticipated by either of the contending parties, will be seen in the following chapters.

<sup>1</sup>Thucyd. v. 26.

# CHAPTER LV.

## FROM THE PEACE OF SYLLEUS TO THE OLYMPIC FESTIVAL OF OLYMPIAD 80.

Our last chapter terminated with the peace called the Peace of Syllus, concluded in March, 493 B.C., between Athens and the Spartan confederacy, for fifty years.

This peace—negotiated during the autumn and winter succeeding the defeat of the Athenians at Amphipolis, wherein both Kleon and Brasidas were slain—resulted partly from the extraordinary anxiety of the Spartans to recover their captives who had been taken at Sphakteria, partly from the discomfitment of the Athenians leading them to Sylla to the peace party who acted with Sylla.

The general principle adopted for the peace was the restitution by both parties of what acquired by war, yet excluding such places as had been considered by negotiation: according to which reserve, the Athenians, while permitted their recovering Plata, continued to hold Sylla, the harbour of Megara. The Lacedæmonians agreed to restore Amphipolis to Athens, and to relinquish their connexion with the reviled allies of Athens in Thraci—

—that is, Argilus, Segesta, Abantia, Skidia, Mytilene, and Spardha. These six cities, however, were not to be enrolled as allies of Athens unless they chose voluntarily to become so, but only to pay regularly to Athens the tribute originally assessed by Aristobolus, as a sort of recompense for the protection of the Sylla against private war or piracy. Any inhabitants of Amphipolis or the other cities who chose to leave them was at liberty to do so, and to carry away his property. Further,

negotiated during the peace, during the winter of 493 B.C., when the Athenians were defeated at Sphakteria.

had been acquired by war, yet excluding such places as had been considered by negotiation.

permitted the Peace of Syllus, negotiated in March, 493 B.C., Conditions of peace.

The Lacedæmonians consented to restore Panakton to Athens, together with all the Athenian prisoners in their possession. As to Skilloi, Torone, and Samos, the Athenians were declared free to take their own measures. On these parts, they engaged to release all captives in their hands, either of Sparta or her allies; to restore Pylos, Kythira, Naxos, Pedona, and Anklavos; and to liberate all the Peloponnesian or Brazilian soldiers now under blockade in Skilloi.

Provision was also made, by special articles, that all Greeks should have free access to the sacred Pan-hellenic festivals, either by land or sea, and that the autonomy of the Delphian temple should be guaranteed.

The contracting parties swore to abstain in future from all injury to each other, and to settle by amicable decision any dispute which might arise.<sup>1</sup>

Lastly, it was provided that if any matter should afterwards occur as having been forgotten, the Athenians and Lacedæmonians might by mutual consent annul the treaty as they thought fit. So prepared, the sails were interchanged between seventeen principal Athenians and as many principal Lacedæmonians.

Earnestly bent as Sparta herself was upon the peace, and misled as it had been by the vote of a majority among her confederates, still there was a powerful minority who not only refused their assent, but strenuously protested against its conditions. The Corinthians were dissatisfied because they did not receive back Solon and Anaktoria; the Megarians, because they did not regain Nyma; the Boeotians, because Panakton was to be restored to Athens; the Eleans also, on some other ground which we do not distinctly know. All of these, moreover, took common offence at the article which provided that Athens and Sparta might by mutual consent, and without consulting the allies, annul the treaty in any way that they thought proper.<sup>2</sup> Though the peace was sworn, therefore, the most powerful members of the Spartan confederacy remained all reserved.

Peace  
concluded at  
Sparta  
by the  
majority of  
members of  
the Pele-  
ponnesian  
alliance.

The most  
powerful  
members of  
the alliance  
refuse to  
assent the  
peace—  
Corinthians,  
Megarians,  
Boeotians,  
Eleans, and  
Eleans.

<sup>1</sup> Thucyd. v. 27-28.

<sup>2</sup> Thucyd. v. 28.

So strong was the interest of the Spartans themselves, however, that having obtained the favourable vote of the majority, they resolved to carry the peace through, even at the risk of breaking up the confederacy. Besides the earnest desire of recovering their captives from the Athenians, they were further alarmed by the fact that their truce for thirty years concluded with Argos was just now expiring. They had indeed made application to Argos for renewing it, through Lichas the Spartan procurator of that city. But the Argives had refused, except upon the inadmissible condition that the border territory of Epidauria should be ceded to them: there was reason to fear therefore that this new and powerful force might be thrown into the scale of Athens, if war were allowed to continue.<sup>1</sup>

Accordingly, no sooner had the peace been sworn than the Spartans proceeded to execute its provisions. Lots being drawn to determine whether Sparta or Athens should be the first to make the cessions required, the Athenians drew the favourable lot—an advantage so very great, under the circumstances, that Thucydides affirmed Nikias to have gained the point by bribery. There is no ground for believing such alleged bribery; the reason, as we shall presently find Nikias persistently throwing away most of the benefit which the lucky lot conferred.<sup>2</sup>

The Spartans began their compliance by forthwith releasing all the Athenian prisoners in their hands, and despatching Isagoras with two others to Amphipolis and the Thracian towns. These envoys were directed to proclaim the peace as well as to enforce its observance upon the Thracian towns, and especially to command Kleonides, the Spartan commander at Amphipolis, that he should surrender the town to the Athenians. But on arriving at Thracia, Isagoras met with a stiffer but unavailing opposition: and so energetic were the remonstrances of the Chalkidians, both in Amphipolis and out of it, that even Kleonides refused challenge to his own government, pretending that he was not strong enough to surrender the place against the resistance of the Chalkidians. Thus completely belied, the envoys returned to Sparta, whither

Protrius and Isagoras of the Lacedæmonians—about 400 B.C. Isagoras for Sparta. Their respective relations with Argos.

page 408 by the Lacedæmonians to invade the Athenian Amphipolis is not mentioned in Thucydides—the great object of Nikias, as we saw, was the point.

<sup>1</sup> Thucyd. i. 14, 15, 16.

<sup>2</sup> Plutarch, Nikias, c. 16.

Klearchus thought it prudent to accompany them, partly to explain his own conduct, partly in hopes of being able to procure some modification of the terms. But he found this impossible. He was sent back to Amphipolis with peremptory orders to surrender the place to the Athenians, if it could possibly be done, if that should prove beyond his force, then to come away, and bring home every Peloponnesian soldier in the garrison. Perhaps the surrender was really impracticable to a force no greater than that which Klearchus commanded, since the reluctance of the population was doubtless obstinate. At any rate, he represented it to be impracticable: the troops accordingly came home, but the Athenians still remained excluded from Amphipolis, and all the stipulations of the peace respecting the Thracian towns remained unperformed. Nor was this all. The envoys from the recent minority (Corinthians and others), after having gone home for instructions, had now come back to Sparta with increased repugnance and protest against the injustice of the peace, so that all the efforts of the Spartans to bring them to compliance were fruitless.<sup>1</sup>

The Spartans were now in serious embarrassment. Not having asserted their portion of the treaty, they could not demand that Athens should execute hers; and they were threatened with the double misfortune of forfeiting the confidence of their allies without acquiring any of the advantages of the treaty. In this dilemma they determined to enter into closer relations, and separate relations, with Athens, at all hazard of offending their allies. Of the sanity of Argos, if enabled by Athens, they had little apprehension; while the moment was now favourable for alliance with Athens, from the decided pacific tendencies reigning on both sides, as well as from the known philo-Laconian sentiment of the leaders Nikias and Laches. The Athenian envoys had remained at Sparta ever since the signing of the peace—witnessing the fulfilment of the conditions; Nikias or Laches, one or both, being very probably among them. When they saw that Sparta was unable to fulfil her bond, so that the treaty seemed likely to be cancelled, they would doubtless encourage, and perhaps may even have suggested, the idea of a separate alliance between Sparta and

<sup>1</sup> Thucyd. = II. 12.

Athens, as the only expedient for covering the deficiency; providing that under that alliance the Spartan captives should be restored. Accordingly a treaty was concluded between <sup>years of</sup> the two, for fifty years—most usually of years, but of <sup>the alliance</sup> defensive alliances. Each party pledged itself to assist in repelling any invaders of the territory of the other, to treat them as enemies, and not to conclude peace with them without the consent of the other. This was the single provision of the alliance,—with one addition, however, of no mean importance, for the security of Lacedæmonia. The Athenians engaged to lead their best and most energetic aid in putting down any rising of the Helots which might occur in Lacedæmonia. Such a provision indicates powerfully the uneasiness felt by the Lacedæmonians respecting their serf-population. But at the present moment it was of peculiar value to them, since it bound the Athenians to restrain, if not to withdraw, the Mæonian garrisons of Pylos, planted there by themselves for the express purpose of provoking the Helots to revolt.

An alliance with stipulations so few and simple took no long time to discuss. It was concluded very speedily after the return of the crews from Amphigalia—probably not more than a month or two after the former peace. It was sworn to by the most individuals on both sides; with similar declaration that the oath should be solemnly renewed, and also with similar promise that Sparta and Athens might by mutual consent either enlarge or restrict the terms, without violating the oath.<sup>1</sup> Moreover the treaty was directed to be sacrificed on two altars—one to be set up in the temple of Apollo at Amyclæ, the other at the temple of Athene in the acropolis of Athens.

The most important result of this new alliance was something not specified in the provisions, but understood, we may Athens be well assured, between the Spartan Helots and Pylians <sup>between the</sup> at the time when it was concluded. All the Spartan <sup>Spartan</sup> captives at Athens were involuntarily restored.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Thucyd. viii. 1. The treaty alliance seems to have been drawn up privately, and approved or sanctioned with the Amphigalia envoys; they went to Athens, and there sanctioned by the people; then return to the Amphigalia. This inferred between this second treaty and the first (the second peace, &c. by way

have been more than a month; for it occupied the rest of the Lacedæmonian crews in Amphigalia and the other towns of Theria—the maintenance of resistance in those towns, and the return of Alcibiades to Sparta to give an account of his conduct.

<sup>2</sup> Thucyd. vi. 20.



Nothing was demonstrated more powerfully the peace and  
 acquiescence feeling now reigning in Athens, as well as  
 the strong philo-Laconian inclinations of her leading  
 men (at this moment Alcibiades was competing with  
 Nicias for the favour of Sparta, as will be stated  
 presently) than the terms of that alliance, which  
 bound Athens to assist in keeping down the Helots,  
 and the still more important after-proceeding of restoring the  
 Spartan captives. Athens thus parted increasingly with her best  
 sword, and promised to reimburse her second best without obtaining  
 the smallest equivalent beyond what was contained in the oath  
 of Sparta to become her ally. For the last three years and a  
 half, ever since the capture of Sphakteria, the possession of these  
 captives had placed her in a position of divided advantage as  
 regard to her chief enemy—advantage, however, which had to a  
 certain extent been counterbalanced by subsequent losses. The  
 state of things was fairly enough represented by the treaty of  
 peace deliberately discussed during the winter, and sworn to at  
 the commencement of spring, whereby a string of concessions,  
 reciprocal and balancing, had been imposed on both parties.  
 Moreover, Athens had been lucky enough in drawing lots to find  
 herself enabled to wait for the actual fulfilment of such concessions  
 by the Spartans, before she commenced her own. Now the  
 Spartans had not as yet made any one of their promised  
 concessions; nay more, in trying to do so, they had displayed  
 such a want either of power or of will, as made it plain that  
 nothing short of the most desperate necessity would convert their  
 promises into realities. Yet under these marked indications,  
 Nicias persuaded his countrymen to conclude a second treaty  
 which practically annuls the first, and which surrenders to the  
 Spartans gratuitously all the main benefits of the first, with little  
 or none of the correlative sacrifices. The alliance of Sparta  
 could hardly be said to eventuate as a consideration; for such alliance  
 was at this moment (under the uncertain relations with Argos)  
 not less valuable to Sparta herself than to Athens. There can be  
 little doubt that if the game of Athens had now been played with  
 prudence, she might have recovered Amphipolis in exchange for  
 the captives; for the inability of Kleon to make over the  
 place, even if we grant it to have been a real fact and not merely



other nations, the debate of Delians and Amphipolis, with the serious losses in Thracæ, would now thus counter-  
 By the  
 signs of the  
 Alliance,  
 increased  
 in the  
 advantages  
 of her  
 position in  
 reference to  
 the Lacedæ-  
 monians—  
 the political  
 state of  
 their  
 accounts as  
 upon which  
 the policy  
 based, with  
 they gained  
 materially

bal the acquisitions of Naxos, Pylos, Kythira, and Meliboei. Yet so inconsistent and short-sighted were the pseudo-Lacæmonian feelings of Nikias and the man who now commanded confidence at Athens, that they threw away this advantage—suffered Athens to be cheated of all those hopes which they had them-  
 selves held out as the inducement for peace—and nevertheless yielded gratuitously to Sparta all the main points which she desired. Had actually, there was never any public recognition of Elia. For so our information goes so ridiculously hopeless as this alliance with Sparta and surrender of the cap-  
 tives, wherein both Nikias and Alcibiades concurred.

Probably the Spartan Ephors accused Nikias, and he caused the Athenian assembly, with fallacious assurances of certain obedience in Thracæ, under alleged peremptory orders given in Elisades. And now that the vibrant leader-dancer, with his ostentatious eloquence, had passed away—replaced only by an inferior measure, the improvisator<sup>1</sup> Hyperbolos—and leaving the Athenians 'publics under the unobscured guidance of citizens anxious for birth and nation, descended from gods and heroes, there remained no one to expose effectively the feckiness of such assurances, or to enforce the lesson of simple and obvious prudence: "Wait, as you are entitled to wait, until the Spartans have performed the onerous part of their bargain, before you perform the onerous part of yours. Or if ye choose to relax in regard to some of the conditions which they have sworn to make, at any rate stick to the capital point of all, and lay before them the peremptory alternative—Amphipolis in exchange for the captives."

The Athenians were not long in finding out how completely they had forfeited the advantage of their position and their chief means of enforcement by giving up the captives, which imported a freedom of action to Sparta such as she had never enjoyed since the first blockade of Sphakteria. Yet it seems that under the present Ephors Sparta was not guilty of any deliberate or positive act which could be called a breach of

<sup>1</sup> Aristophanes, Frox. 355—359.

faith. She gave orders to Kleonides to surrender Amphipolis, if he could; if not, to evacuate it, and bring the Peloponnesian troops home. Of course the place was not surrendered to the Athenians, but evacuated; and she then considered that she had discharged her duty to Athens, as far as Amphipolis was concerned, though she had never in reality *it*, and her oath remained unperformed.<sup>1</sup> The other Thracian towns were equally deaf to her persuasions, and equally obstinate in their hostility to Athens. So also were the Boeotians, Corinthians, Megarians, and Thebans; but the Boeotians, while refusing to become parties to the treaty along with Sparta, concluded for themselves a separate convention or armistice with Athens, terminable at ten days' notice on either side.<sup>2</sup>

In this state of things, though ostensible relations of peace and free reciprocity of intercourse between Athens and Peloponnesians were established, the discontent of the Athenians and the remonstrances of their allies at Sparta soon became serious. The Lacedæmonians had sworn for themselves and their allies; yet the most powerful among these allies, and those whose security was most important to Athens, continued still remiss. Neither Procles nor the Athenian prisoners in Boeotia were yet restored to Athens; nor had the Thracian cities yet submitted to the peace. In reply to the remonstrances of the Athenian envoys, the Lacedæmonians affirmed that they had already surrendered all the Athenian prisoners in their own hands, and had withdrawn their troops from Thracia, which was (they said) all the remuneration in their power, since they were not masters of Amphipolis, nor capable of constraining the Thracian cities against their will. As to the Boeotians and Corinthians, the Lacedæmonians went so far as to profess readiness to take arms along with Athens,<sup>3</sup> for the purpose of constraining them to accept the peace, and even spoke about naming a day, after which these remiss states should be proclaimed as joint enemies, both by Sparta and Athens. But their propensities were always

Discontent and remonstrances of the Athenians against Sparta, in consequence of the non-performance of the oath by the Lacedæmonians and their allies, of having given up the captives — enemies of Sparta.

<sup>1</sup> Thucyd. v. 26—27.

<sup>2</sup> Thucyd. v. 28.

<sup>3</sup> Thucyd. v. 28. ἡτοιμασμένοι εἰς τὴν μάχην ἀπὸ τῶν Ἀθηναίων, ὥστε καὶ ἡμεῖς.

Lacedæmonians: ἡτοιμασμένοι εἰς τὴν μάχην ἀπὸ τῶν Ἀθηναίων, ὥστε καὶ ἡμεῖς. ἡτοιμασμένοι εἰς τὴν μάχην ἀπὸ τῶν Ἀθηναίων, ὥστε καὶ ἡμεῖς.



The work was the Peloponnesian alliance entailed by the number of states which had refused the peace, and so greatly was the ascendancy of Sparta for the time impaired, that new combinations were now springing up in the peninsula. It has already been mentioned that the truce between Argos and Sparta was just now expiring; Argos therefore was free, with her old pretensions to the leadership of *Acrotaurians*, backed by an unimpaired fulness of wealth, power, and population. Having taken no direct part in the late exhausting war, she had even earned money by lending occasional aid on both sides;<sup>1</sup> while her military force was just now further strengthened by a step of very remarkable importance. She had recently set apart a body of a thousand select youths, composed of young men of wealth and station, to receive constant military training at the public expense, and to be enrolled as a separate regiment by themselves, apart from the other citizens.<sup>2</sup> To a democratical government like Argos such an institution was internally dangerous and pregnant with mischief, which will be hereafter described. But at the present moment the democratical leaders of Argos seem to have thought only of the foreign relations of their city, now that her truce with Sparta was expiring, and that the disproportioned state of the Spartan confederacy opened new chances to her ambition of regaining another *hegemony* in Peloponnesus.

Other authors  
have shown  
that the  
frequency  
of the  
occurrence  
of the  
word "and"  
in the  
text of the  
document  
is a good  
indicator of  
the degree  
of complexity  
of the  
document.

**Abstract.** — We establish that the set of all solutions of the equation  $x^2 + y^2 = z^2$  is infinite.

[illegible]

to the fact that the system is not yet fully operational. The system is still in the process of being developed and is not yet ready for use. The system is still in the process of being developed and is not yet ready for use.

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**Chandler:** Well, it represents the first generation of the National Industrial Conference on Learning before John Jay. I think this time, that I think it is more widely at work, at least if it is more than the experience of Thompson is critical to introducing a new wave. John Jay, I think, refers to the health of democracy. The various entities providing two years of complete schooling would be a very good. It is not to be forgotten that the American democratic value has been the experience and change of keeping up the work required, during the last period of their long lives, just now coming to an end.

The object of the recent Peloponnesian alliance was now inducing them to turn their attention towards Argos as a new object. They had mistrusted Sparta, even before the peace, with knowing that she had separate interests from the confederacy, arising from desire to get back her captives. In the terms of peace, it seemed as if Sparta and Athens alone were regarded, the interests of the remaining allies, especially those in Thessaly, being put out of sight. Moreover, that article in the treaty of peace whereby it was provided that Athens and Sparta might by mutual consent add or strike out any article that they chose, without consulting the allies, excited general alarm, as if Sparta were meditating some treason in conjunction with Athens against the confederacy.<sup>1</sup> And the alarm, once roused, was well further aggravated by the separate treaty of alliance between Sparta and Athens, which followed as speedy afterwards, as well as by the restoration of the Spartan captives.

Such general disquietude among the Peloponnesian states at the unexpected combination of Athenians and Lacedæmonians, strengthened in the case of each particular state by private interests of its own, first manifested itself openly through the Corinthians. On retiring from the conference at Sparta—where the recent alliance between the Athenians and Spartans had just been made known, and where the latter had vainly endeavoured to prevail upon their allies to accept the peace—the Corinthians went straight to Argos to communicate what had passed, and to solicit assistance. They suggested to the leading men in that city, that it was now the duty of Argos to step forward as saviour of Peloponnesus, which the Lacedæmonians were openly betraying to the common enemy, and to invite for that purpose, into alliance for mutual defence, every autonomous Hellenic state which would bind itself to give and receive amicable satisfaction in all points of difference. They affirmed that many cities, from hatred of Sparta, would gladly comply with such invitation; especially if a list of commissioners in small number were named, with full powers to admit all suitable applicants; so that, in case of rejection, there might at

<sup>1</sup> Thucyd. ii. 85. *ὅτι καὶ ἡ Σπάρτη πάλαι φησὶν ὅτι καὶ ἡ Ἀθήνη ἀπὸ τῆς ἑξῆς ἀποστροφῆς ἀποστρέφεται πρὸς τὴν ἑαυτῆς ἀποστολὴν.*

least be no exposure before the public assembly in the Argentinian democracy. This suggestion, privately made by the *Comancheros* who returned home immediately afterwards, was eagerly adopted both by leaders and people at Argos, as promising to reduce their long-cherished pretensions to humbling. Twelve commissioners were accordingly appointed, with power to select any new allies whom they might think eligible, except Athens and Sparta. With either of those two allies no treaty was allowed without the formal sanction of the public assembly.<sup>1</sup>

Marcellus the *Comanchero*, though they had been the last to set the Argivians in motion, nevertheless thought it right, before smothering themselves publicly in the new alliance, to invite a congress of Peloponnesian representatives to Corinth. It was the Mantuanians who made the first application to Argos under the terms just issued. And here we are admitted to a partial view of the relations among the secondary and interior states of Peloponnesia. Mantua and Tegea, being contemporaries as well as the two most considerable states in Arcadia, were in perpetual rivalry, which had shown itself, only a year and a half before, in a bloody but indecisive battle.<sup>2</sup> Tegea, situated on the frontiers of Laconia and oligarchically governed, was unwaveringly attached to Sparta: while for that very reason, as well as from the democratical character of her government, Mantua was less so—though she was still allied to, and acted as a member of, the Peloponnesian confederacy. She had recently conquered for herself a little empire in her own neighbourhood, composed of village districts in Arcadia, reckoned as her subject-allies, and comrades in her ranks at the last battle with Tegea. This conquest had been made even during the continuance of the war with Athens—a period when the lesser states of Peloponnesia generally, and even subject-states as against their own imperial states, were under the guarantee of the confederacy, to which they were required to render their unpaid service against

Congress at  
Corinth.  
Peloponnesian  
representatives  
at Corinth.  
—The Mantuanians  
make the first  
application.  
Argos—  
sanctioning the  
Treaty of  
Tegea and  
Mantua.

<sup>1</sup> Thucyd. ii. 80.

<sup>2</sup> Thucyd. ii. 134.

<sup>3</sup> Thucyd. ii. 80. Only six Mantuanians  
showed up. Arcadian ambassadors, however,  
to and from Argos, Peloponnesian envoys  
from, and leaders of, Mantua, and  
also Mantuanians Argos, made no

appeal to Argos.

As to the way in which the congress  
modified the relations between Mantua,  
Athens and Argos, see below.  
see, pages 418—421, for the case of Elis  
and Lepreum.



the common enemy—so that she was apprehensive of Lacedæmonian interference at the request and for the transportation of these subjects, who lay moreover near to the borders of Lacedæmon. Such interference would probably have been involved unless, only that Sparta had been under pressing engagements—and further, had assembled no general meeting of the confederacy against Athens—ever since the disaster in Sphacteria. But now she had her hands free, together with a good pretext as well as motive for interference.

To maintain the supremacy of all the little states, and prevent any of them from being mediated or grouped into aggressions under the ascendancy of the greater, had been the general policy of Sparta, especially since her own influence as general leader was increased by securing to every lesser state a relative vote at the meetings of the confederacy.<sup>1</sup> Moreover, the rivalry of Thebes would probably operate here as an auxiliary motive against Macedonia. Under such apprehensions, the Macedonians hastened to court the alliance and protection of Argos, with whom they enjoyed the additional sympathy of a common democracy. Such revolt from Sparta<sup>2</sup> (for so it was considered) excited great emotion throughout Peloponnesus, together with considerable dissension, amidst the dissensions then prevalent, to follow the example.

In particular, it manifested much to enhance the importance of the congress at Corinth, whether the Lacedæmonians thought it necessary to send special envoys to counteract the intrigues going on against them. Their envoy addressed to the Corinthians strenuous remonstrances, and even reproach, for the leading part which they had taken in stirring up dissension among the old confederates, and organizing a new confederacy under the protection of Argos. "They (the Corinthians) were thus aggravating the original guilt and perjury which they had committed by setting at naught the formal vote of a majority of the confederates, and refusing to accept the peace; for it was the custom

<sup>1</sup> Thucyd. i. 108.  
<sup>2</sup> Thucyd. ii. 121. *ἀποστρέφειν*  
 ὅτι τὴν Μαντινέαν, καὶ τὴν  
 Ἐλιδεύαν, ἡ ἑαυτῶν ἀντιπαρὸν ἀντιπάλῃ.

ἀπὸν ἀντιπάλῃ, ἀντιπάλῃ  
 ἀπὸν ἀντιπάλῃ ἀντιπάλῃ, καὶ τὴν  
 ἀντιπάλῃ ἀπὸν ἀντιπάλῃ ἀντιπάλῃ.

and fundamental maxim of the confederacy that the decision of the majority should be binding on all, except in such cases as involved some offense to Gods or Honor." Encouraged by the presence of many sympathizing deputies—Braziers, Meginson, Chaffin from Thence; &c.—the Corinthians replied with firmness. But they did not think it good policy to prostrate their real ground for rejecting the peace, viz., that it had not provided for themselves the restoration of Solihum and Anshertown; since, first, this was a question in which their allies present had no interest; next, it did not furnish any valid excuse for their resistance to the vote of the majority. Accordingly, they took their stand upon a principle at once generous and religious—upon that reserve for religious scruples which the Landonian army had himself admitted, and which, of course, was to be construed by each member with reference to his own poor feeling. "It was a religious impediment (the Corinthians contended) which prevented us from acceding to the peace with Adams, notwithstanding the vote of the majority; for we had previously exchanged oaths, ourselves apart from the confederacy, with the Christians of Thence at the time when they revolved from Adams; and we should have infringed those separate oaths had we accepted a treaty of peace in which those Christians were abandoned. As for alliance with Agnes, we consider ourselves free to adopt any resolution which we may deem suitable, after consultation with our friends here present." With this unsatisfactory answer the Landonian troops were compelled to return home. Yet some Anglian troops, who were also present at the assembly for the purpose of urging the Corinthians to redress forthwith the losses of soldiers which they had held out to Agnes, were still unable on their side to obtain a decided affirmative, being requested to come again at the next conference.<sup>1</sup>

Though the Corinthians had themselves originated the idea of the new Argos, confederacy and compromised Argos to an open proclamation, yet they were hesitated about the execution of their own scheme. They were restrained in most decisions by the

[illegible]

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They were linked together by commonness of interest, not merely as being both neighbours and intense enemies of Athens, but as each having a body of democratical effluvia who might perhaps find encouragement at Argos. Discouraged by the resistance of these two important allies, the Corinthians hung back from visiting Argos, until they were pushed forward by a new accidental impulse—the application of the Elians, who, eagerly embracing the new project, went on and won Elia as an ally of Argos. This incident so confirmed the Corinthians in their previous scheme, that they speedily went to Argos, along with the Chalkidians of Thessaly, to join the new confederacy.

The conduct of Elia, like that of Macedonia, is thus revealing from Sparta, had been disturbed by private grounds of quarrel, arising out of relations with their dependent ally Lepreus. The Lepreates had become dependent on Elia some time before the beginning of the Peloponnesian war, in consideration of aid lent by the Elians to extricate them from a dangerous war against some Arcadian enemies. To purchase such aid, they had engaged to cede to the Elians half their territory, but had been left in rebellion and occupation of it, under the stipulation of paying one talent yearly as tribute to the Olympian Zeus—in other words, to the Elians as his stewards. When the Peloponnesian war began,<sup>1</sup> and the Lacedæmonians began to call for the unpaid services of the Peloponnesian cities generally, small as well as great, against Athens, the Lepreates were, by the standing agreement of the confederacy, exempted for the time from continuing to pay their tribute to Elia. Such exemption ceased with the war; at the close of which Elia became entitled, under the same agreement, to resume the suspended tribute. She accordingly required that the payment should soon be recommenced; but the

The Elians  
became  
allies of  
Argos—  
that  
because the  
Lepreates—  
rebellious  
and  
Lepreates—  
the Lacedæ-  
monians were  
the more  
free.

caused by the Spartans to prevent Athens from visiting Argos, which is admitted, but the real motive seems to be the anxiety that no further interference was wanted by them in pulling the Spartans and Athenians from joining her."—The Spartan and Athenian relations at that time were in transition to the Antispartan, and "alluding" the

Athenian democracy has nothing to do with that, the object of Sparta."

"Though, I think, and even still does not contain evidence" refers, namely, upon the question and position, of the Lacedæmonians, and of the Spartans only, not the Athenians.

"The two questions here related to, were not then connected."





were already included in the general peace, if they were allies of Sparta. On receiving this answer, the Corinthians entreated the Boeotians, putting it as a matter of obligation, to rescind their own armistice, and make common cause as to all future compact. But this request was steadily refused. The Boeotians maintained their ten days' armistice; and the Corinthians were obliged to acquiesce in their existing condition of *pace de facto*, though not guaranteed by any pledge of Athens.<sup>1</sup>

Meanwhile the Lacedæmonians were not unaided of the effort which they had sustained by the credit of Mantinea and Elia. At the request of a party among the Partheni, the Arcadian subjects of Mantinea, they marched under king Phalaron into that territory, and compelled the Mantinians to evacuate the fort which they had erected within it; which the latter were unable to defend, though they received a body of Argive troops to guard their city, and were free enabled to march their whole force to the threatened spot. Besides liberating the Arcadian subjects of Mantinea, the Lacedæmonians also planted an additional body of Helots and Neodamodes at Lepreum, as a defence and means of observation on the frontiers of Elia.<sup>2</sup> These were the Spartan soldiers, whom Klearchus had now brought back from Thrace. The Helots among them had been manufactured as a reward, and allowed to reside where they chose. But as they had imbibed habits of luxury under their distinguished commanders, their presence would undoubtedly be dangerous among the sons of

<sup>1</sup> Thucyd. v. 26. *Ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἡ Ἀθήνην δὲ ἡ ἀντι-  
μαχία ἔκλειπεν, ἡ Ἀθήνην δὲ ἡ ἀντι-  
μαχία ἔκλειπεν.*

<sup>2</sup> The Arcadians, in 426, made a treaty with the Spartans, but refused by the Athenians to receive it. And the Arcadians, at the same time, attacked the Spartans, and the Spartans, at the same time, attacked the Arcadians. This was the result of the treaty of Mantinea.

Not so much is here meant even as that which is usually supposed. There was no agreement at all between the Spartans and the Arcadians. There was a simple truce of hostilities, *de facto*, not arising out of any recognised pledge. Even in the language of Thucyd. v. 26; *ἡ ἀντιμαχία ἔκλειπεν*.

The answer here made by the Athenians to the application of Sparta, is not that it understood that Sparta, with which Sparta was at war, had declined to conclude the ten days' armistice with the Arcadians; because Sparta, being still engaged in a war of Sparta, though refusing to receive in the general peace, whereas the Corinthians, having joined Sparta, had been right to be admitted allies of Sparta. Nevertheless, we must still feel themselves obliged to receive the Athenians, and acting as allies of the Athenians.

<sup>2</sup> Thucyd. v. 26, 27. The Neodamodes were Helots previously captured, or the sons of such.





Of the proceedings of the Athenians during this summer we hear nothing, except that the town of Skiois at length surrendered to them after a long continued blockade, and that they put to death the male population of military age—selling the women and children into slavery. The column of having proposed this cruel resolution, two years and a half before, belongs to Kleon; that of executing it, nearly a year after his death, to the leaders who succeeded him, and to his countrymen generally. The reader will however soon be sufficiently acquainted to the Greek love of war not to be surprised at such treatment against subjects revolted and vanquished. Skiois and its territory was made over to the Peloponnesian refugees. The native population of Delos, also, who had been removed from that island after the preceding year, under the impression that they were too impure for the dwellings of the sacred island, were now restored to their island. The subsequent defeat at Amphipolis had created a belief in Athens that this removal had offended the gods—under which impression, confirmed by the Delphian oracle, the Athenians now showed their repentance by restoring the Peloponnesians.<sup>1</sup> They further lost the towns of Thymon on the peninsula of Attika, and Melphora on the Saronian Gulf, which were captured by the Chalkidians of Thessaly.<sup>2</sup>

Meanwhile the political relations throughout the powerful Greek states remained all provincial and unalterable. The alliance still subsisted between Sparta and Athens, yet with continual complaints on the part of the latter that the peace treaty remained unfulfilled. The members of the Spartan confederacy were discontented; some had seceded, and others seemed likely to do the same; while Argos, ambitious to supplant Sparta, was trying to put herself at the head of a new confederacy, though as yet with very partial success. Elisarta, however, the authority of Sparta—King Philotas, as well as the Ephors of the year—had been extremely desirous to maintain the Athenian alliance, so far as it could be done without sacrifice,

<sup>1</sup> Thucyd. viii. 1.  
<sup>2</sup> Thucyd. viii. 25. I agree with  
 Dr. Thirlwall and Dr. Arnold in put-

ting the negotiation of Pnyx—Thucyd. viii. 25.

and without the real employment of force against persons, of which they had merely talked in order to excite the Athenians. Moreover, the prodigious advantage which they had gained by recovering the prisoners, doubtless making them very popular at home, would attach them the more firmly to their own measure. But at the close of the summer (scarcely about the end of September or beginning of October, B.C. 481) the year of these Ephors expired, and new Ephors were nominated for the coming year. Under the existing state of things that was an important revolution: for out of the five new Ephors, two (Kleobolus and Xenarch) were decidedly hostile to peace with Athens, and the remaining three apparently indifferent.<sup>1</sup> And we may here remark that this fluctuation and instability of public policy, which is often denounced as if it were the peculiar ailment of a democracy, occurs quite as much under the constitutional democracy of Sparta—the least popular government in Greece, in principle and detail.

The new Ephors convened a special congress at Sparta for the settlement of the pending differences, at which, among the rest, Athenian, Boeotian, and Corinthian envoys were all present. But, after prolonged debate, no approach was made to agreement; so that the congress was on the point of breaking up, when Kleobolus and Xenarch, together with many of their partisans,<sup>2</sup> originated, in concert with the Boeotian and Corinthian deputies, a series of private embassies, manoeuvres for the dissolution of the Athenian alliance. The way to be effected by bringing about a separate alliance between Argos and Sparta, which the Spartans already desired, and would grasp at it in preference (so these Ephors affirmed), even if it cost them the breach of their new tie with Athens. The Boeotians were urged, first to become allies of Argos themselves, and then to bring Argos into alliance with Sparta. But it was further essential that they should give up their claims to Sparta, so that it might be tendered to the Athenians in exchange for Pylos; for Sparta could not really

Congress at  
Sparta.—  
Athenian,  
Boeotian,  
Corinthian  
deputies  
present.—  
Five  
Ephors.  
Kleobolus  
and Xenarch  
opponents  
withdrawal of  
any one of  
the three  
groups—  
Embassy of  
the Boeotians  
Athenian  
Boeotian  
and  
Xenarch.

<sup>1</sup> Thucyd. v. 21.

<sup>2</sup> Thucyd. v. 22. *ἀποστραφέντες*—and Kleobolus and Xenarch and their  
others (their names, &c.).

go to war with them while they remained masters of the latter.<sup>1</sup>

Such were the plans which Elisides and Xamaris laid with the Corinthians and Boeotian deputies, and which the latter when home prepared to execute. Clearch seemed to favour the purpose at once; for on their road home they were accosted by two Argives, senators in their own city, who expressed an earnest anxiety to bring about alliance between the Boeotians and Argos. The Boeotian deputies, warmly embracing this idea, urged the Argives to send envoys to Thebes as solicitors of the alliance, and communicated to the Boeotarchs, on their arrival at home, both the plans laid by the Spartan Ephors and the wishes of these Argives. The Boeotarchs also entered heartily into the entire scheme, receiving the Argive envoys with marked favour, and promising, as soon as they should have obtained the requisite sanction, to send envoys of their own and ask for alliance with Argos.

That sanction was to be obtained from "the Four Senators of the Boeotians"—bodies, of the constitution of which nothing is known. But they were usually found as judges and arbitrators, and the Boeotarchs, reckoning upon their names as a matter of course, even without any full exposition of reasons, laid all their plans accordingly.<sup>2</sup> They proposed to these four senators a resolution in general terms, empowering themselves in the name of the Boeotian federation to exchange orders of alliance with any Grecian city which might be willing to contract on terms mutually beneficial. Their particular object was (as they stated) to form alliance with the Corinthians, Megarians, and Chalcidians of Thessaly—for mutual defence, and for war as well as peace with others only by common consent. To this specific object they anticipated no reference on the part of the senators, inasmuch as their connexion with Corinth had always been intimate, while the position of the four parties named was the same—all being remnants of the great power. But the resolution was adversely

<sup>1</sup> Thucyd. i. 36.

<sup>2</sup> Thucyd. i. 36. *Aligatos the Boeotians, who always preside the Boeotia, all the city citizens, who have jurisdiction.*

<sup>3</sup> *Aligatos the Boeotians, who always preside the Boeotia, all the city citizens, who have jurisdiction.*

touching in the most comprehensive terms, in order that it might authorize them to proceed further afterwards, and conclude alliances on the part of the Boeotians and Megarens with Argos; that ulterior purpose being however for the present kept back, because alliance with Argos was a novelty which might surprise and alarm the Senate. The manoeuvre, skilfully contrived for entrapping these bodies into an approval of measures which they never contemplated, illustrates the manner in which an oligarchical executive could stifle the checks desired to control its proceedings. But the Boeotarchs, to their astonishment, found themselves defeated at the outset; for the Senate would not even hear of alliance with Corinth—as much did they fear to offend Sparta by any special connexion with a city which had revolted from her. Nor did the Boeotarchs think it safe to divulge their communications with Kleonides and Isarchus, or to request the Senate that the whole plan originated with a powerful party in Sparta herself. Accordingly, under this second refusal on the part of the Senate, no further proceedings could be taken. The Corinthian and Chalkidian envoys left Thebes, while the promise of sending Boeotian envoys to Argos remained unexecuted.<sup>1</sup>

But the anti-Athenian Epheors at Sparta, though baffled in their schemes for striking at the Argolian alliance through the agency of the Boeotians, did not the less persist in their views upon Pausanias. That place—a frontier station in the mountainous range between Attica and Boeotia, apparently on the Boeotian side of Phylæ, and on, or near the direct road from Athens to Thebes which led through Phylæ—had been an Athenian possession, and six months before the peace, when it had been treacherously betrayed to the Boeotians.<sup>2</sup> A special provision of the treaty between Athens and Sparta prescribed that it should be restored to Athens; and Lacedæmonian envoys were now sent on an express mission to Boeotia, to request from the Boeotians the delivery of Pausanias as well as of their Athenian captives, in order that by tendering these to Athens, she might be induced to sur-

The Boeotians, as recorded in official alliance with the Spartans, thereby violating their agreement with Athens—the Boeotians were Pausanias to the ground.

<sup>1</sup> Thucyd. ii. 45.

<sup>2</sup> See Vol. I. *Boeotia, Thracian Boeotians*.

Thucyd. vol. ii. ch. xvi. p. 174.

<sup>3</sup> Thucyd. i. 14.

under Pylas. The Boeotians refused compliance with this request, except on condition that Sparta should enter into special alliance with them as she had done with the Athenians. Now the Spartans stood pledged by their agreement with the latter (either by its terms or by its recognised import) not to enter into any new alliance without their consent. But they were eagerly bent upon getting possession of Functium; while the prospect of breach with Athens, the step being a deterring motive, was exactly that which Kleobulus and Xenochus desired. Under these feelings, the Lacedæmonians consented to and swore the special alliance with Boeotia. But the Boeotians, instead of handing over Functium for surrender as they had promised, immediately raised the fortress to the ground; under pretence of some ancient oracle which had been exchanged between their ancestors and the Athenians, to the effect that the district round it should always remain without resident inhabitants—as a neutral strip of borderland, and under common pasture.

These negotiations, after having been in progress throughout the winter, ended in the accomplishment of the alliance and the destruction of Functium at the beginning of spring or about the middle of March. And while the Lacedæmonian Ephors there seemed to be carrying their point on the side of Boeotia, they were agreeably surprised by an unexpected reinforcement to their views from another quarter. An embassy arrived at Sparta from Argos, to solicit renewal of the peace just expiring. The Argives found that they made no progress in the achievement of their newly-formed confederacy, while their recent disappointment with the Boeotians made them despair of realising their ambitious projects of Teleopontian hegemony. But when they learnt that the Lacedæmonians had concluded a separate alliance with the Boeotians, and that Functium had been raised, their disappointment was converted into positive shame for the future. Naturally inferring that this new alliance would not have been concluded except in concert with Athens, they interpreted the whole proceeding as indicating that Sparta had prevailed upon the Boeotians to accept the peace with Athens—the destruction of Functium being con-

#### ARGOS.

Apprehending that the Argives, in concert with the Boeotians, would frustrate their project of mutual treaty, and that they might thus obtain assistance by disavowing, or deny the treaty, they sent an embassy to Sparta.

coined as a compromise to settle disputes respecting possession. Under such a permanent—never terminable in itself, when the two contracting governments, both aboriginal and both aware, furnished no additional evidence to explain their real intent—the Argives saw themselves excluded from offices not merely with Ithaca, Sparta, and Tegea, but also with Athens; which latter city they had hitherto regarded as a sure resort in case of hostility with Sparta. Without a moment's delay, they despatched Euthyphros and Alce—two Argives much esteemed at Sparta, and perhaps persons of that city—to press for a renewal of these expiring truces with the Spartans, and to discuss the best terms they could.

To the Lacedæmonian Ephors this application was extremely acceptable—the very event which they had been incessantly endeavoring to bring about. Negotiations were opened, in which the Argives, at first, proposed that the disputed possession of Thyrea should be referred to arbitration. But they found their demand met by a peremptory refusal—the Lacedæmonians refusing to enter upon such a discussion, and insisting upon simple renewal of the peace now at an end. At last the Argives, equally bent upon keeping the question respecting Thyrea open, in some way or other, prevailed upon the Lacedæmonians to assent to the following regular agreement. Peace was concluded between Argos and Sparta for fifty years; but if at any moment within that interval, excluding either periods of epidemic or periods of war, it should suit the views of either party to provide a united by-chosen champions of equal number for the purpose of determining the right to Thyrea, there was to be full liberty of doing so—the contest to take place within the territory of Thyrea itself, and the victors to be intitled from pursuing the conquest beyond the undisturbed border of either territory. It will be recollected that, about 110 years before this date, there had been a contest of this sort by 300 champions on each side, in which, after desperate valour on both sides, the victory as well as the disputed right still remained undetermined. The proposition made by the Argives was a revival of this old practice of judicial combat; nevertheless, such was the alteration which the Greek mind had undergone during the interval, that it now appeared a perfect absurdity—even as



had been reached. It was probably on this occasion that the separate alliance concluded between Sparta and the Boeotians first became discovered at Athens; since not only were the proceedings of these oligarchical governments belatedly learnt, but there was a peculiar motive for keeping such alliances concealed until the discussion about Panactum and Pylæa had been brought to a close. Both the alliance and the destruction of Panactum excited among the Athenians the strongest marks of disgust and anger; aggravated probably rather than softened by the quibbles of Alcibiades—that destruction of the fort, being tantamount to restitution, and precluding any further tenacity by the enemy, was a substantial satisfaction of the treaty; and aggravated still further by the recollection of all the other unperformed items in the treaty. A whole year had now elapsed, <sup>under frequent</sup> notes and protocols (to employ a modern phrase); nevertheless, not one of the conditions favourable to Athens had yet been executed (except the restitution of her captives, seemingly not worthy to number); while she on her side had made to Sparta the capital cession on which almost everything hinged. A long train of unmitigated indignation, brought to a head by this misdeed of Alcibiades, discharged itself in the harshest denials and rebukes of himself and his colleagues.<sup>1</sup>

Even Nicias, Laches, and the other leading Athenians, to whose imprudent facility and misjudgment the <sup>aggravated</sup> mismanagement of the moment was owing, were <sup>marked by</sup> probably not much behind the general public in exclaiming against Spartan perfidy, if it were only to direct attention from their own mistakes. But there was one of them—Alcibiades, son of Alcibiades—who took this opportunity of putting himself at the head of the vehement anti-Lacædæmon sentiment which now agitated the Athenians, and giving to it a substantive aim.

The present is the first occasion on which we hear of this remarkable man as taking a prominent part in public life. He was now about thirty-one or thirty-two years old, which in Greece was considered an early age for a man to exercise important command. But such was the splendour, wealth, and activity

The scenes are fully revealed at Athens. Every fact and circumstance is, as it were, brought to light.

Alcibiades, marked by the general public, is the one who takes the opportunity of putting himself at the head of the vehement anti-Lacædæmon sentiment which now agitated the Athenians, and giving to it a substantive aim.

<sup>1</sup> Thucyd. i. 21.  
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coloured his petulance, but were even flattered when he would condescend to bestow it upon them. Doubt such universal adulation and indulgence—without corrupting influences associated from so many quarters and from so early an age, combined with great wealth and the highest position—it was not likely that either self-restraint or regard for the welfare of others would ever acquire development in the mind of Alfredhilda. The anomalies which fill his biography reveal the utter absence of both those constituent elements of morality; and though, in regard to the particular stories, allowances must doubtless be made for scandal and exaggeration, yet the general type of character stands plainly marked and sufficiently established in all.

A dissolute life, and an immediate love of pleasure in all its forms, is what we might naturally expect from a young man so circumstanced; and it appears that with him these tastes were indulged with an offensive publicity which destroyed the comfort of his wife Hipparchia, daughter of Hipparchus, who was slain at the battle of Delium. She had brought him a large dowry of ten talents. When she sought a divorce, as the law of Athens permitted, Alfredhilda violently interrupted to prevent her from obtaining the benefit of the law, and brought her back by force to his house, even from the presence of the magistrate. It is this violence of selfish passion, and reckless disregard of social obligation towards every one, which forms the peculiar characteristics of Alfredhilda. He strikes the school-master whom he happens to find unprovided with a copy of Homer<sup>1</sup>; he strikes Thucydides,<sup>2</sup> a rival dramatist, in the public theatre, while the representation is going on; he strikes Hipparchus (who afterwards became his father-in-law), out of a wager of more wantonness, afterwards appearing him by an ample apology; he protects the Thasian poet Hippias, against whom an indictment had been formally lodged before the archon, by effacing it with his own hand from the list put up in the public edifice, called *Ekthesis*, defying both magistrate and accuser to press the cause on for trial.<sup>3</sup> Nor does it appear that any injured

Great luxury and extravagance of Alfredhilda in public affairs—his relations with Hipparchus, his violent opposition to divorce, his violent interference in the theatre, his striking Thucydides, and other military services.

<sup>1</sup> *Demosthenes*, vol. *Matthieu*, p. 155. *Alcibiades*, vol. p. 155.  
<sup>2</sup> *Thucyd.* ii. 10; *Alcibiades* (op. cit.) *Alcibiades*, ii. p. 155.







had also learnt in that service to admire the iron physical frame of the philosopher in his armour, enduring hunger, cold, and hardship.<sup>1</sup> But we are not to suppose that either of them came to Sokrates with the purpose of hearing and adopting his precepts on matters of duty, or receiving from him a new plan of life. They came partly to gratify an intellectual appetite, partly to acquire a stock of words and ideas, with facility of argumentative handling, suitable for their after-purpose as public speakers. Sokrates moral, political, and intellectual served as the three sometimes of discourse, sometimes of discussion, in the society of all these aspirants—Prodikos and Protagoras not less than Sokrates; for in the Athenian sense of the word Sokrates was a sophist as well as the others, and in the rich politics of Athens, like Alkibiades and Erismos, each society was highly useful. It imparted a nobler aim to their ambition, including moral accomplishments as well as political success; it enlarged the range of their understandings, and opened to them as ample a view of literature and criticism as the age afforded; it accustomed them to observe human conduct, with the aims and obstructions of honour, well-being, both public and private; it even suggested to them indirectly lessons of duty and prudence, from which their moral position tended to estrange them, and which they would hardly have admitted to hear except from the lips of one whom they intellectually admired. In learning to talk they were forced to learn more or less to think, and familiarized with the difference between truth and error; nor would an eloquent lecturer fail to enlist their feelings in the great topics of morality and politics. Their thirst for mental stimulus and rhetorical accomplishments had then, so far as it went,

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Has the correspondence given to the President of the United States, the Secretary of State, and the Attorney General, been made available to the public? If not, why not?

It would not be reasonable to expect, as you and I do, all the political changes upon which there are called the Egyptians, even as we find them in place, without a revolution and a revolution. But neither failure in domestic affairs nor does the Egyptian see more that this, and takes as much of the advantage in their favor which he, though their opponent, is perpetually made out.

This is a very common subject, in regard to how to spend.



found in Athens, that of Sokrates most of all and most frequently. The philosopher became greatly attached to him, and doubtless lost no opportunity of lecturing on his solitary lessons, as far as could be done without disgusting the pride of a haughty and spirit youth who was looking forward to the activity of public life. But unhappily his lessons never produced any serious effect, and ultimately became even distasteful to the pupil. The whole life of Alkibiades attests how faintly the sentiment of obligation, public or private, ever got footing in his mind—how much the rule which he pursued was dictated by overbearing vanity and love of aggrandizement. In the later part of life, Sokrates was marked out to public hatred by his enemies, as having been the teacher of Alkibiades and Kritias. And if we could be so unjust as to judge of the morality of the teacher by that of these two pupils, we should certainly rank him among the worst of the Athenian sophists.

At the age of thirty-one or thirty-two, the earliest at which it was permitted to look forward to an arduous position in public life, Alkibiades came forward with a reputation obtained by private exercises, and with a number of enemies created by his audacious domesticer. But this did not hinder him from stepping into that position to which his rank, connections, and dissipation afforded him introduction; nor was he slow in displaying his extraordinary energy, dexterity, and capacity of command. From the beginning to the end of his eventful political life he showed a

destructive  
ambition  
undisputed  
power.  
Alkibiades  
could avoid  
enemies and  
expatriation.  
Athens  
lost him,  
Sparta, did  
nothing,  
which he  
regretted.

not in harmony with the just and liberal tone of the *Thucydidean* history.

I will add that Plutarch, in a very important passage of the *Thucydidean* (ii. 35, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100), writes the following words: "The character of Alkibiades is worthy of the times and temper of society. Without limitation of present law for Plutarch or Alcibiades was right in condemning the

general morality of their countrymen, I must fully agree the assertion that the great body of the contemporary professional teachers taught what was themselves good, namely, saying the Athenian people, these men-forgiveness men who taught a better morality, rather than taught a worse. And this was the best with equal truth of the great body of professional teachers in every age and nation.

Kompeten, uncorrupted, various means to which he pursued the corruption of the character of a *Thucydidean*—wealth, rank, personal beauty, splendour, etc., but he does not neglect the highest among these elements, i. e. the, etc.







inition, and presented himself as a partizan of oligarchical and plain-Lacedæmon sentiment—doubtless far more congenial to his natural temper than the democratical. He then started as the more general party with Nicias, and with Themistocles son of Eucleides, who afterwards became his bitter opponent. And it was in part probably to put himself on a par with them, that he took the marked step of trying to revive the ancient family tie of hospitality with Sparta, which his grandfather had broken off.<sup>1</sup>

To promote this object, he displayed peculiar solicitude for the good treatment of the Spartan captives during their detention at Athens. Many of them being of high family at Sparta, he naturally calculated upon their gratitude, as well as upon the favourable sympathies of their countrymen, whenever they should be restored. He advocated both the peace and the alliance with Sparta, and the restoration of her captives. Indeed he not only advocated these measures, but tendered his services, and was eager to be employed, as the agent of Sparta, for carrying them through at Athens. From such selfish hopes in regard to Sparta, and especially from the expectation of acquiring, through the agency of the restored captives, the title of Procurator of Sparta, Alcibiades thus became a partizan of the blind and guttish plain-Lacedæmon concessions of Nicias. But the captives, on their return, were either unable, or unwilling, to carry the point which he wished; while the authorities at Sparta rejected all his advances—not without a contemptuous sneer at the idea of consulting important political interests in the case of a profligately known for intemperance, profligacy, and weakness. That the Spartans should thus judge in every attacking, considering their intense reverence both for old age and for strict discipline. They naturally preferred Nicias and Laches, whose practices would command, if it did not originally suggest, their contrast of the new character. Nor had Alcibiades yet shown the mighty movement of which he was capable. But this contemptuous refusal from the Spartans stung him as to the quick, then,

<sup>1</sup> Thucyd. v. 27, c. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 131, 132, 133, 134, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139, 140, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148, 149, 150, 151, 152, 153, 154, 155, 156, 157, 158, 159, 160, 161, 162, 163, 164, 165, 166, 167, 168, 169, 170, 171, 172, 173, 174, 175, 176, 177, 178, 179, 180, 181, 182, 183, 184, 185, 186, 187, 188, 189, 190, 191, 192, 193, 194, 195, 196, 197, 198, 199, 200, 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215, 216, 217, 218, 219, 220, 221, 222, 223, 224, 225, 226, 227, 228, 229, 230, 231, 232, 233, 234, 235, 236, 237, 238, 239, 240, 241, 242, 243, 244, 245, 246, 247, 248, 249, 250, 251, 252, 253, 254, 255, 256, 257, 258, 259, 260, 261, 262, 263, 264, 265, 266, 267, 268, 269, 270, 271, 272, 273, 274, 275, 276, 277, 278, 279, 280, 281, 282, 283, 284, 285, 286, 287, 288, 289, 290, 291, 292, 293, 294, 295, 296, 297, 298, 299, 300, 301, 302, 303, 304, 305, 306, 307, 308, 309, 310, 311, 312, 313, 314, 315, 316, 317, 318, 319, 320, 321, 322, 323, 324, 325, 326, 327, 328, 329, 330, 331, 332, 333, 334, 335, 336, 337, 338, 339, 340, 341, 342, 343, 344, 345, 346, 347, 348, 349, 350, 351, 352, 353, 354, 355, 356, 357, 358, 359, 360, 361, 362, 363, 364, 365, 366, 367, 368, 369, 370, 371, 372, 373, 374, 375, 376, 377, 378, 379, 380, 381, 382, 383, 384, 385, 386, 387, 388, 389, 390, 391, 392, 393, 394, 395, 396, 397, 398, 399, 400, 401, 402, 403, 404, 405, 406, 407, 408, 409, 410, 411, 412, 413, 414, 415, 416, 417, 418, 419, 420, 421, 422, 423, 424, 425, 426, 427, 428, 429, 430, 431, 432, 433, 434, 435, 436, 437, 438, 439, 440, 441, 442, 443, 444, 445, 446, 447, 448, 449, 450, 451, 452, 453, 454, 455, 456, 457, 458, 459, 460, 461, 462, 463, 464, 465, 466, 467, 468, 469, 470, 471, 472, 473, 474, 475, 476, 477, 478, 479, 480, 481, 482, 483, 484, 485, 486, 487, 488, 489, 490, 491, 492, 493, 494, 495, 496, 497, 498, 499, 500, 501, 502, 503, 504, 505, 506, 507, 508, 509, 510, 511, 512, 513, 514, 515, 516, 517, 518, 519, 520, 521, 522, 523, 524, 525, 526, 527, 528, 529, 530, 531, 532, 533, 534, 535, 536, 537, 538, 539, 540, 541, 542, 543, 544, 545, 546, 547, 548, 549, 550, 551, 552, 553, 554, 555, 556, 557, 558, 559, 560, 561, 562, 563, 564, 565, 566, 567, 568, 569, 570, 571, 572, 573, 574, 575, 576, 577, 578, 579, 580, 581, 582, 583, 584, 585, 586, 587, 588, 589, 590, 591, 592, 593, 594, 595, 596, 597, 598, 599, 600, 601, 602, 603, 604, 605, 606, 607, 608, 609, 610, 611, 612, 613, 614, 615, 616, 617, 618, 619, 620, 621, 622, 623, 624, 625, 626, 627, 628, 629, 630, 631, 632, 633, 634, 635, 636, 637, 638, 639, 640, 641, 642, 643, 644, 645, 646, 647, 648, 649, 650, 651, 652, 653, 654, 655, 656, 657, 658, 659, 660, 661, 662, 663, 664, 665, 666, 667, 668, 669, 670, 671, 672, 673, 674, 675, 676, 677, 678, 679, 680, 681, 682, 683, 684, 685, 686, 687, 688, 689, 690, 691, 692, 693, 694, 695, 696, 697, 698, 699, 700, 701, 702, 703, 704, 705, 706, 707, 708, 709, 710, 711, 712, 713, 714, 715, 716, 717, 718, 719, 720, 721, 722, 723, 724, 725, 726, 727, 728, 729, 730, 731, 732, 733, 734, 735, 736, 737, 738, 739, 740, 741, 742, 743, 744, 745, 746, 747, 748, 749, 750, 751, 752, 753, 754, 755, 756, 757, 758, 759, 760, 761, 762, 763, 764, 765, 766, 767, 768, 769, 770, 771, 772, 773, 774, 775, 776, 777, 778, 779, 780, 781, 782, 783, 784, 785, 786, 787, 788, 789, 790, 791, 792, 793, 794, 795, 796, 797, 798, 799, 800, 801, 802, 803, 804, 805, 806, 807, 808, 809, 810, 811, 812, 813, 814, 815, 816, 817, 818, 819, 820, 821, 822, 823, 824, 825, 826, 827, 828, 829, 830, 831, 832, 833, 834, 835, 836, 837, 838, 839, 840, 841, 842, 843, 844, 845, 846, 847, 848, 849, 850, 851, 852, 853, 854, 855, 856, 857, 858, 859, 860, 861, 862, 863, 864, 865, 866, 867, 868, 869, 870, 871, 872, 873, 874, 875, 876, 877, 878, 879, 880, 881, 882, 883, 884, 885, 886, 887, 888, 889, 890, 891, 892, 893, 894, 895, 896, 897, 898, 899, 900, 901, 902, 903, 904, 905, 906, 907, 908, 909, 910, 911, 912, 913, 914, 915, 916, 917, 918, 919, 920, 921, 922, 923, 924, 925, 926, 927, 928, 929, 930, 931, 932, 933, 934, 935, 936, 937, 938, 939, 940, 941, 942, 943, 944, 945, 946, 947, 948, 949, 950, 951, 952, 953, 954, 955, 956, 957, 958, 959, 960, 961, 962, 963, 964, 965, 966, 967, 968, 969, 970, 971, 972, 973, 974, 975, 976, 977, 978, 979, 980, 981, 982, 983, 984, 985, 986, 987, 988, 989, 990, 991, 992, 993, 994, 995, 996, 997, 998, 999, 1000.

making an entire revolution in his political course;<sup>1</sup> he immediately threw himself into anti-Laconian politics with an energy and ability which he was not before known to possess.

The moment was favourable, since the recent death of Kleon, for a new political leader to espouse this side, and was rendered still more favourable by the conduct of the Lacedæmonians. Month after month passed, remonstrances after remonstrances were addressed, yet not one of the restrictions prescribed by the treaty in favour of Athens had yet been accomplished. Alkibiades had therefore ample pretext for stirring his tone respecting the Spartans—and for denouncing them as deceivers who had broken their solemn oath, abusing the generous confidence of Athens. Under his present antipathies, his attention naturally turned to Argos, in which city he possessed some powerful friends and family guests. The condition of that city, disengaged by the expiration of the peace with Sparta, opened a possibility of connection with Athens—a policy now strongly recommended by Alkibiades, who insisted that Sparta was playing false with the Athenians, merely in order to keep their hands tied until she had attacked and put down Argos separately. This particular argument had less force when it was seen that Argos acquired new and powerful allies—Mantinea, Elis, and Corinth; but, on the other hand, such acquisition rendered Argos positively more valuable as an ally to the Athenians.

It was not so much, however, the inclination towards Argos, but the growing wrath against Sparta, which furnished the *phil-Argos* plan of Alkibiades. And when the Lacedæmonian navy Andromachis arrived at Athens from Boeotia, tendering to the Athenians the mere raim of Phanoteia in exchange for Pylos—when it further became known that the Spartans had already concluded a special alliance with the Boeotians without consulting Athens—the unmeasured expression of disapproval in the Athenian *Ekklesia* showed Alkibiades that

<sup>1</sup> Thucyd. v. 21. At Athens Alkibiades, the youngest Athenian, immediately, on disembarking from Sicily and Argos, became the rallying-point, leader and in the future commander, not only of the Athenian fleet, but also of the Argians, to put Athens' demands upon Sparta in the spring of 418.



exchange for the demolished Pantheon. Such was still the confidence of the Laconians in the strength of ascent at Alibea, that they did not yet despair of obtaining an affirmative, even to this very unequal proposition. And when the three envoys, under the introduction and advice of Nikias, had their first interview with the Alibean senate, preparatory to an audience before the public assembly, the impression which they made, on stating that they came with full powers of settlement, was highly favourable. It was indeed so favourable, that Alibeaits became alarmed lest, if they made the same statement in the public assembly, the prospect of some willing concessions, the philo-Laconian party might determine public feeling to accept a compromise, and thus produce all idea of alliance with Argos.

To obviate such a defect of his plans, he resorted to a singular contrivance. One of the Laconianian envoys, Nicias  
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These latter, it must be added, display a carelessness of public faith and consistency—a facility in publicly saying what they have just before publicly said—and a tendency towards their own confidential agent—which is truly surprising, and goes far to justify the general charge of belated duplicity so often alleged against the Lacedæmonians character.<sup>1</sup>

The diagram as yet would doubtless quit Athens immediately; but this opportune earthquake gave Nicias a few hours to recover from his unexpected overthrow. In the assembly of the next day, he still contended that the friendship of Sparta was preferable to that of Argos, and insisted on the pretence of postponing all consummation of engagement with the latter until the real intentions of Sparta, now so contradictory and inscrutable, should be made clear. He contended that the position of Athens, in regard to the peace and alliance, was that of superior honour and advantage—the position of Sparta, one of comparative disgrace: Athens had thus a greater interest than Sparta in maintaining what had been concluded. But he, at the same time, admitted that a distinct and peremptory explanation must be exacted from Sparta as to her intentions, and he requested the people to send himself with some other colleagues to demand it. The Lacedæmonians should be apprised that Argive envoys were already present; a Athens with propositions, and that the Athenians might already have concluded this alliance, if they could have permitted themselves to do wrong to the existing alliance with Sparta. But the Lacedæmonians, if their intentions were honourable, must show it forthwith—1. By restoring Potidæa, not demolished, but standing. 2. By restoring Amphipolis also. 3. By renouncing their special alliance with the Boeotians, unless the Boeotians on their side chose to become parties to the peace with Athens.<sup>2</sup>

The Athenian assembly, acquiescing in the recommendation of Nicias, invested him with the commission which he required; a remarkable proof, after the overpowering defeat of the preceding day, how strong was the hold which he still retained upon them, and how sincere their desire to keep on the best terms with

<sup>1</sup> Herodot. *deceitum*, κατ'—εἰς; *deceit* is κατ', *deceit* is εἰς.

<sup>2</sup> Thucyd. v. 22.





shall be engraven on stone columns, and put up in the temples of each of the four cities, and also upon a brazen column, to be put up by joint cost, at Olympia, for the festival now approaching.

"The four cities may by joint consent do every thing they please in the provisions of this treaty, without violating their allies."<sup>1</sup>

The conclusion of this new treaty introduced a greater degree of complication into the grouping and association of the Greek cities than had ever before been known. The ancient Spartan confederacy, and the Athenian empire, still subsisted. A peace had been concluded between them, ratified by the formal vote of the majority of the confederates, yet not accepted by several of the minority. Not merely peace, but also special alliances had been concluded between Athens and Sparta, and a special alliance between Sparta and Boeotia. Corinth, member of the Spartan confederacy, was also member of a defensive alliance with Argos, Mantineia, and Elis, which three states had concluded a more intimate alliance, first with each other (without Corinth) and now readily with Athens. Yet both Athens and Sparta still retained the alliance<sup>2</sup> concluded between themselves, without formal rupture on either side, though Athens still complained that the treaty had not been fulfilled. No relations whatever subsisted between Argos and Sparta. Between Athens and Boeotia there was an amicable intermission of ten days' notice. Lastly, Corinth could not be prevailed upon, in spite of repeated solicitation from the Argives, to join the new alliance of Athens with Argos; so that no relations subsisted between Corinth and Athens, while the Corinthians began, though feigning, to resume their former tendencies towards Sparta.<sup>3</sup>

The alliance between Athens and Argos, of which particulars have just been given, was concluded not long before the Olympic festival of the 80th Olympiad or 480 B.C.; the festival being about the beginning of July, the treaty might be in May.<sup>4</sup> That festival was memorable, on more than one ground. It was the first which had been celebrated since the conclusion of the peace, the

Corinthians  
refusing  
during the  
Olympic  
truce to re-  
sign and  
abandon

Olympic  
festival of  
the 80th  
Olympiad,  
B.C. 480  
87 years  
afterwards  
celebrated

<sup>1</sup> Thucyd. v. 23.  
<sup>2</sup> Ibid. v. 27.  
<sup>3</sup> Ibid. v. 26-28.

<sup>4</sup> Herodotus 8. 131. "Olympians and Argives, and Boeotians, were at Olympia, 87 years after the treaty."



*Athenian* Theatre, of which he was a member, was set out with first-rate splendour, and with the amplest show of golden circles, canopies, &c., for the public sacrifice and procession.<sup>1</sup> But when the chariot-race came on, Alcibiades himself appeared as competitor at his own cost—not merely with one well-equipped chariot and four, which the richest Greeks had hitherto counted as an extraordinary personal glory, but with the prodigious number of seven distinct chariots, each with a team of four horses. And so separate was their quality, that one of his chariots gained a first prize, and another a second prize, so that Alcibiades was twice crowned with sprigs of the sacred olive-tree, and twice proclaimed by the herald. Another of his seven chariots also came to fourth; but no crown or proclamation (it seems) was awarded to any after the second in order. We must therefore think he had competitors from all parts of Greece to contend against—not merely private men, but even despots and governments. Nor was this all. The fest which the Athenian Theatre provided for their countrymen, visitors to the games, was handsomely adorned; but a separate fest which Alcibiades himself provided for a public banquet to celebrate his triumph, together with the banquet itself, was set forth on a scale still more stately and expensive. The rich allies of Athens—Ephesus, Chios, and Lesbos—was said to have lent him their aid in enhancing this display. It is highly probable that they would be glad to cultivate his favour, as he had now become one of the first men in Athens, and was so an ascending source. But we must further recollect that they, as well as Athens, had been excluded from the Olympic festival, so that their own feelings on first returning might well prompt them to make a general interest in this surprising re-appearance of the Ionic race at the ancient seat of Holos.

Five years afterwards, on an important discussion which will be hereafter inserted, Adhemar maintained publicly before the Athenian assembly that his unparalleled Olympic display had produced an effect upon the Greeks aimed highly beneficial to Athens: "disseminating the numerous externalities that the war

1987 the first and largest with 100,000 copies collected were made by the National Commission on the Status of Women, the National Commission on the Rights of Women, and the National Commission on the Rights of Women.

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It is possible that the use of a single measure of the degree of change in the number of children in the household may be a poor proxy for the degree of change in the number of children in the household. For example, the degree of change in the number of children in the household may be a poor proxy for the degree of change in the number of children in the household.







If the festival of the 100th Olympiad was peacefully distinguished by the magnificence of Athenians and those connected with them, it was marked by a further novelty yet more striking—the exclusion of the Lacedæmonians. Such exclusion was the consequence of the new political interests of the Helians, combined with their increased consciousness of force arising out of the recent alliance with Argos, Athens, and Megara. It has already been mentioned that, since the peace with Athens, the Lacedæmonians, acting as arbitrators in the case of Lepreum, which the Helians claimed as their dependency, had declared it to be untenable, and had sent a body of troops to defend it. Probably the Helians had recently renewed their attacks upon the district since the junction with their new allies; for the Lacedæmonians had detached thither a fresh body of 1000 hoplites immediately prior to the Olympic festival. Out of the soldiers of this fresh detachment the sentence of exclusion arose. The Helians were privileged administrators of the festival, regulating the details of the ceremony itself, and formally proclaiming by heralds the commencement of the Olympic truce, during which all violation of the Helian territory by an armed force was a sin against the majesty of Zeus. On the present occasion they affirmed that the Lacedæmonians had sent the 1000 hoplites into Lepreum, and had captured a fort called *Phyria*, both Helian possessions, after the proclamation of the truce. They accordingly imposed upon Sparta the fine prescribed by the "Olympian law," of two minæ for each man—2000 minæ in all, a part to Zeus Olympian, a part to the Helians themselves. During the interval between the proclamation of the truce and the commencement of the festival, the Lacedæmonians sent to reinforcements against this fine, which they alleged to have been perjury imposed, inasmuch as the heralds had not yet proclaimed the truce at Sparta, when the hoplites reached Lepreum. The Helians replied that the truce had already at that time been proclaimed among themselves (for they always proclaimed it first at home, before their heralds crossed the frontier), so that they were interdicted from all military operations, of which the Lacedæmonians had taken advantage to commit their

The Helians  
exclude the  
Lacedæmonians  
from the  
Olympic  
festival, in  
consequence of  
alleged viola-  
tion of the  
Olympic  
truce.





boldly passed off without any interruption.<sup>1</sup> The boldness of the Helots in putting this affront upon the most powerful state in Greece is so astonishing, that we can hardly be satisfied in supposing these promises to have been suggested by Alcibiades and encouraged by the armed aid from the allies. He was at this moment not less attentive in humiliating Sparta than in clearing off Athens.

Of the depressed influence and estimation of Sparta, a further proof was soon afforded by the fate of her colony the Trachinian Herakleia, established near Thermopylae in the third year of the war. That colony, though at first comprising a numerous body of soldiers, in consequence of the general trust in Lacedaemonian power, and though always under the government of a Lacedaemonian harvest, had never prospered. It had been persecuted from the beginning by the neighbouring tribes, and administered with harshness as well as peculation by its governors. The establishment of the town had been regarded from the beginning by the neighbours, especially the Thebans, as an invasion of their territory; and their hostilities, always venal, had, in the winter succeeding the Olympic festival just described, been carried to a greater point of violence than ever. They had defeated the Herakleote in a ruinous battle, and slain Xerxes the Lacedaemonian governor. But though the place was so reduced as to be unable to maintain itself without foreign aid, Sparta was too much embarrassed by Peloponnesian quarrels and warlike to be able to succour it; and the Thebans, observing her inability, became apprehensive that the interference of Athens would be invoked. Accordingly they thought it prudent to hurry Herakleia with a body of Boeotian troops, dispatching the Lacedaemonian governor Hegesipides for alleged sickness. Nor could the Lacedaemonians prevent this proceeding, though it occasioned them to make indignant remonstrances.<sup>2</sup>

Depressed influence of Sparta throughout Grecian Herakleia.

<sup>1</sup> It will be seen, however, that the Lacedaemonians remonstrated and in vain; they refused to give the Helots for this much longer than elsewhere.

During the blockade of their power (Xenoph. *Hellen.* vi. 4, 5); Alcibiades, vi. 13.

<sup>2</sup> Xenoph. *v.* 4, 5, 6.

## CHAPTER LVI.

FROM THE FESTIVAL OF GYMNASIAEON, DOWN TO THE  
BATTLE OF MANTINÆÆ.

RECENTLY after the remarkable events of the Olympic festival described in my last chapter, the Argives and their allies sent a fresh embassy to invite the Corinthians to join them. They thought it a promising opportunity, after the effort just put upon Sparta, to prevail upon the Corinthians to desert her; but Spartan envoys were present also, and though the discussions were much protracted, no new resolution was adopted. An earthquake—possibly an earthquake not real, but simulated for convenience—abruptly terminated the congress. The Corinthians—though seemingly distrusting Argos now that she was united with Athens, and bearing rather towards Sparta—were unwilling to pronounce themselves in favour of one or as to make an enemy of the other.<sup>1</sup>

In spite of this first failure, the new alliance of Athens and Argos manifested its force vigorously at the ensuing spring. Under the inspiration of Alcibiades, Athens was about to attempt the new experiment of seeking to obtain intra-Peloponnesian followers and influence. At the beginning of the war she had been maritime, defensive, and simply conservative, under the guidance of Pericles. After the death of Epiklerus, she made use of that great advantage to win at the recovery of Megara and Bouria, which she had before been compelled to abandon by the Thirty years' truce, at the recommendation of Kleon. In this attempt she employed the eighth year of the war, but with signal success; while Bouria during that period broke upon the gates

<sup>1</sup> Thucyd. i. 101-102.

of her maritime empire, and robbed her of many important dependencies. The grand object of Athens then became to recover these lost dependencies, especially Amphipolis. Nikias and his partisans sought to effect such recovery by making peace, while Kleon and his supporters insisted that it could never be achieved except by military efforts. The expedition under Kleon against Amphipolis had failed—the peace concluded by Nikias had failed also: Athens had surrendered her capital advantages without regaining Amphipolis; and if she wished to regain it, there was no alternative except to repeat the attempt which had failed under Kleon. And this perhaps she might have done (as we shall find her projecting to do in the course of about four years forward), if it had not been, first, that the Athenian mind was now probably sick and disheartened about Amphipolis, in consequence of the prodigious disbursements recently undergone there; next, that Alkibiades, the new chief adviser or prime minister of Athens (if we may be allowed to use an inaccurate expression, which yet suggests the reality of the case), was prompted by his personal impulses to turn the stream of Athenian ardour into a different channel. Full of antipathy to Sparta, he regarded the interior of Peloponnesos as her most vulnerable point, especially in the present separated relations of its component cities. Moreover, his personal thirst for glory was better gratified under the centre of Grecian life than by undertaking an expedition into a distant and barbarous region; lastly, he probably recoiled at the discomfort the hardships and extreme cold (unbearable to all except the few thralls of Skiron<sup>1</sup>) which he had himself endured at the blockade of Potidaia twelve years before, and which any movement destined to oust Amphipolis would have to go through again. It was under these impressions that he now began to press his intra-Peloponnesian operations against Lacedaemon, with the view of organizing a counter-alliance under Argos sufficient to keep her in check, and at any rate to nullify her power of carrying war into beyond the isthmus. All this was to be done without manifestly breaking the peace and alliance between Athens and Lacedaemon, which stood in conspicuous letters on pillars erected in both cities.

<sup>1</sup> Ptolemy, *Geog.* ii. 10, p. 265. *Ανὰ πᾶσι σιδηρὸν γυμνάσιον, ὅπου οὐκ ἔστιν ἄνεμος, οὐκ*

Coming to Argos at the head of a few Athenian hoplites and  
 bowmen, and rendered by Polytechnus, whom  
 Alcibiades enlisted the spectacle of an Athenian  
 general traversing the interior of the peninsula, and  
 imposing his own arrangements in various quarters—  
 a spectacle at that moment new and striking.<sup>1</sup> He  
 first turned his attention to the Achaean towns in the north-west,  
 where he persuaded the inhabitants of Patras to ally themselves  
 with Athens, and even to undertake the labour of connecting  
 their town with the sea by means of long walls, so as to place  
 themselves within the protection of Athens from seaward. He  
 further projected the erection of a fort and the formation of a  
 naval station at the extreme point of Cape Rhene, just at the  
 narrow entrance of the Corinthian Gulf, whereby the Athenians,  
 who already possessed the opposite shore by means of Megaritis,  
 would have become masters of the commerce of the Gulf. But  
 the Corinthians and Sikyonians, to whom this would have  
 been a serious mischief, dispatched forces enough to prevent the  
 consummation of the scheme—and probably also to hinder the  
 erection of the walls at Patras.<sup>2</sup> This the march of Alcibiades  
 decisively strengthened the anti-Laconian interest throughout  
 the Achaean coast.

He then returned to take part with the Argives in a war  
 against Epidaurus. To acquire possession of this city  
 would much facilitate the communication between  
 Athens and Argos, since it was not only immediately  
 opposite to the island of Rhene, now occupied by the  
 Athenians, but also opened to the latter an access by land, dis-  
 passing with the labour of circumnavigating Cape Rheneus  
 (the north-eastern point of the Argives and Epidaurus penin-  
 sula) whenever they sent forces to Argos. Moreover the territory  
 of Epidaurus bordered to the north on that of Corinth, so that  
 the possession of it would be an additional guarantee of the  
 neutrality of the Corinthians. Accordingly it was resolved to  
 attack Epidaurus, for which a pretext was easily found. An  
 existing and administering state of the temple of Apollo

<sup>1</sup>Thucyd. v. 21. Certainly the he has a right to call attention to it  
 Hggs, just as, e. g., the speech of this as certainly very remarkable in the  
 speeches of Alcibiades in his second then.  
 time and arrangement language; but

<sup>2</sup>Thucyd. v. 22.

Pythians (situated within the walls of Argos), the Argians enjoyed a sort of religious supremacy over Epidaurean and other neighbouring cities—essentially the remnant of that extensive supremacy, political as well as religious, which in early times had been theirs.<sup>1</sup> The Epidaureans owed to this temple certain sacrifices and other ceremonial obligations—one of which, arising out of some circumstances which we cannot understand, was now due and unperformed: at least so the Argians alleged. Such default imposed upon them the duty of putting together a military force to attack the Epidaureans and enforce the obligation.

Their marching march however was for a time suspended by the news that King Aga, with the full force of Lacedæmonian<sup>2</sup> daskin and his allies, had advanced as far as Lenkion, one of the border towns of Laconia on the north-west, towards Mount Lykonean and the Argolian Perimeter. What this movement meant was known only to Aga himself, who did not even explain the purpose to his own soldiers or officers or allies.<sup>3</sup> But the sacrifices constantly offered before passing the border was found so unfavourable that he abandoned his march for the present and returned home. The month Karketion, a period of time as well as religious festival among the Dorians, being now at hand, he directed the allies to hold themselves prepared for an out-march as soon as that month had expired.

On being informed that Aga had disbanded his troops, the Argians prepared to execute their invasion of Epidaurea. The day on which they set out was already the fifth of the month preceding the Karketian month, so that there remained only three days before the commencement of that latter month with its holy truce, binding upon the religious feelings of the Dorians states generally, to which Argos, Sparta, and Epidaurea all belonged. But the Argians made use of that very peculiarity of the Greeks, which was accounted likely to keep them at home, to facilitate their scheme, by playing a trick with the calendar, and producing one of those arbitrary interferences with the

The great month, Karketion—this played by the Argians with their calendar.

<sup>1</sup> Thus, e. g., with the Argives, who employed the military force of her allies, whereas they regarded as their privilege only of giving to the help-  
fulges—were so friendly to Argos, that they were most ready than any other to be thus needed.









of their out-march, however, was transmitted to Athens; upon which Alcibiades, at the head of 1000 Athenian hoplites, was sent to join the Argives. But before he arrived, the Lacedæmonian army had been already disbanded; so that his services were no longer required, and the Argives moved their baggage over one-third of the territory of Epidaurea before they at length retreated.<sup>1</sup>

The Epidaureans were reinforced about the end of September by a detachment of 300 Lacedæmonian hoplites under Agonipides, sent by sea without the knowledge of the Athenians. Of this the Argives perceived final complaint at Athens. They had good reason to condemn the negligence of the Athenians as allies, for not having kept better naval watch at their neighbouring station of Epidaurea, and for having allowed this enemy to enter the harbours of Epidaurea. But they took another ground of complaint somewhat remarkable. In the alliance between Athens, Argos, The, and Mantinea, it had been stipulated that neither of the four should suffer the passage of troops through its territory without the joint consent of all. Now the sea was accounted a part of the territory of Athens; so that the Athenians had violated this article of the treaty by permitting the Lacedæmonians to send troops by sea to Epidaurea. And the Argives now required Athens, in compensation for this wrong, to carry back the Meneziæ and Elakæ from Epidaurea to Pylos, and allow them to ravage Laconia. The Athenians, under the persuasion of Alcibiades, complied with their requisition; inscribing, at the foot of the pillar on which their alliance with Sparta stood recorded, that the Lacedæmonians had not observed their oath. Nevertheless they still obtained from

Athenian  
hoplites of  
the name of  
Agonipides  
sent by sea  
without the  
knowledge of  
the Athenians.  
The sea was  
accounted a  
part of the  
territory of  
Athens.

<sup>1</sup> Thucyd. v. 26. and Alcibiades already going, Alcibiades induces the Athenians to send a detachment of 1000 hoplites, and Agonipides, sent by sea without the knowledge of the Athenians. This is the meaning when Thucyd. v. 26. and Alcibiades already going, Alcibiades induces the Athenians to send a detachment of 1000 hoplites, and Agonipides, sent by sea without the knowledge of the Athenians.

It was to not admit this reading, we must suppose Alcibiades had the same and Agonipides sent by sea, the same of "but already completed their

expedition and returned home". But the sentence is destroyed by reading such a meaning upon the word Agonipides, and the fact of the Argives, who themselves had this meaning evidently belongs to the passage of Alcibiades, is generally demonstrated by the use of the word Agonipides in the text. The same word and the same text, yet in a meaning contrary to that which has been.

It appears to me the last objection, and the last, is to suppose with the passage at.

formally throwing up their treaty with Lacedæmonia, or breaking it in any other way.<sup>1</sup> The relations between Athens and Sparta thus remained, in name—peace and alliance—so far as concerns direct operations against each other's territory; in reality—hostile action as well as hostile manoeuvring, against each other, as allies respectively of third parties.

The Argives, after having prolonged their incursions on the Epidaurian territory throughout all the summer, made in the winter an unavailing attempt to take the town itself by storm. Though there was no considerable action, but merely a succession of desultory attacks, in some of which the Epidaurians even had the advantage, yet they still suffered serious hardship, and pressed their case forcibly on the sympathy of Sparta. This importuned, and justified as well as alarmed by the increasing defection or coldness which they now experienced throughout Peloponnesia, the Lacedæmonians determined, during the course of the ensuing summer, to put forth their strength vigorously, and win back their lost ground.<sup>2</sup>

Towards the month of June (B. C. 411), they marched with their full force, freemen as well as Helots, under King Agis, against Argos. The Tegeans and other Arcadian allies joined them on the march, while their other allies near the Isthmus—Boeotians, Megarians, Corinthians, Sicyonians, Phlians, &c.—were directed to assemble at Pallis. The number of these latter allies was very considerable—for we hear of 3000 Boeotian hoplites and 2000 Corinthians; the Boeotians had with them also 2000 light-armed, 500 horsemen, and 500 foot-soldiers, who ran alongside of the horsemen. The numbers of the rest, or of Spartans themselves, we do not know; nor probably did Thucydides himself know; for we find him remarking elsewhere the impenetrable concealment of the Lacedæmonians in all public affairs, in reference to the situation at the subsequent battle of Mantinea. Such master of the Lacedæmonian alliance was no secret to the Argives, who marching first to Mantinea, and there taking up the force of that city as well as 3000 Helot hoplites who came to join them, met the Lacedæmonians in their march at Melipodium in Arcadia.

<sup>1</sup> Thucyd. v. 26.

<sup>2</sup> Thucyd. v. 27.

The two armies being posted on opposite hills, the Argives had resolved to attack Aegae the next day, so as to prevent him from passing his allies at Pilina. But he eluded this separate encounter by decamping in the night, reached Pilina, and operated his junction in safety. We do not hear that there was in the Lacedæmonian army any commander of notice, who, copying the unaccountable pusillity of Ananapharides before the battle of Pilina, refused to obey the order of retreat before the enemy, to the imminent risk of the whole army. And the fact that no similar incident occurred now may be held to prove that the Lacedæmonians had acquired greater familiarity with the exigencies of actual warfare.

As soon as the Lacedæmonian retreat was known in the morning, the Argives left their position also, and marched with their allies, first to Argæ itself, next to Nemea, on the ordinary road from Corinth and Pilina to Argæ, by which they imagined that the invaders would approach. But Agamædon differently.

Approach  
of the  
Lacedæmonians  
seen by  
Agamædon  
from a  
hill.

Distributing his force into three divisions, he himself, with the Lacedæmonians and Arcadians, taking a short, but very rugged and difficult road, crossed the ridge of the mountains, and descended straight into the plain near Argæ. The Corinthians, Peloponnesians, and Pilinians were directed to follow another mountain road, which entered the same plain upon a different point; while the Boeotians, Corinthians, and Sikyonians followed the longer, more even, and more ordinary route by Nemea. This route, though apparently frequented and convenient, led for a considerable distance along a narrow valley called the Trifon, bounded on each side by mountains. The united army under Agæ was much superior in number to the Argives; but if all had marched in one line by the frequented route through the narrow Trifon, their superiority of number would have been of little use, whilst the Argives would have had a position highly favourable to their defence. By dividing his force, and taking the mountain road with his own divisions, Agæ got into the plain of Argæ in the rear of the Argives position at Nemea. He anticipated that when the Argives saw him devastating their properties near the city, they would forthwith quit the advantageous ground near Nemea to come and attack him in the plain;

the Boeotian divisions would thus find the road by Nemea and the Triton open, and would be able to march without hindrance into the plain of Argos, where their numerous cavalry would act with effect against the Argives engaged in attacking Aga. The triple march was executed. Aga with his division, and the Corinthians with them, got across the mountains into the Argive plain during the night; while the Argives, hearing at daybreak that he was near their city, arraying themselves and other places, left their position at Nemea to come down to the plain and attack him. In their march they had a partial skirmish with the Corinthian division, which, having reached a high ground immediately above the Argive plain, was found early in the road. But this affair was indecisive, and they soon found themselves in the plain near to Aga and the Lacedæmonians, who lay between them and their city.

On both sides the armies were marshalled, and order taken for battle. But the situation of the Argives, was in reality little less than desperate; for while they had Aga and his division in their front, the Corinthian detachment was near enough to take them in flank, and the Boeotians marching along the undefended road through the Triton would attack them in the rear. The Boeotian cavalry too would act with full effect upon them in the plain, since neither Argos, Midea, nor Mantinea seems to have possessed any horsemen: a description of force which ought to have been sent from Athens, though from some cause which does not appear the Athenian contingent had not yet arrived. Nevertheless, in spite of a position so very critical, both the Argives and their allies were calm with confidence and impatient for battle; thinking only of the division of Aga immediately in their front which appeared to be endowed between them and their city, and taking no heed to the other formidable enemies in their flank and rear. But the Argive generals were better aware than their soldiers of the real danger; and just as the two armies were about to charge, Alcibiades, governor of the Lacedæmonians at Argos, accompanied Thersites,

<sup>1</sup> Thucyd. v. 68. *at de Argivei pueri Stephanus (sic) et de eis Alcibiades, &c.*

one of the five generals of the Argonæa, to a separate parley with Agia, without consultation or privacy on the part of their own army. They exhorted Agia not to force on a battle, assuring him that the Argonæans were ready both to give and receive equitable satisfaction in all matters of complaint which the Lacedæmonians might urge against them, and to conclude a just peace for the future. Agia, at once acquiescing in the proposal, granted them a truce of four months to accomplish what they had promised. He on his part also took this step without consulting either his army or his allies, simply addressing a few words of confidential talk to one of the official Spartanæ near him. Immediately he gave the order for retreat, and the army, instead of being led to battle, was conducted out of the Argonæan territory, through the Numan road whereby the Boeotians had just been entering. But it required all the habitual discipline of Lacedæmonian soldiers to make them obey the order of the Spartan king, while unexpected and unrevoked.<sup>1</sup> For the army were fully sensible both of the prodigious advantages of their position, and of the overwhelming strength of the invading force, so that all the these divisions were loath to their denunciations of Agia, and punctuated with shame at the thoughts of so disgraceful a retreat. And when they all saw themselves in one united body at Numan, previous to breaking up and going home,—so as to have before their eyes their own full numbers and the complete equipment of one of the best Hellenic armies which had ever been assembled,—the Argonæan body of allies, before whom they were now retreating, appeared contemptible in the comparison, and they separated with yet warmer and more universal indignation against the king who had betrayed their cause.

On returning home, Agia incurred not less blame from the Spartan authorities than from his own army, for having thrown away an admirable an opportunity of subduing Argonæa. This was certainly no more than he deserved; but we read, with no small astonishment, that the Argonæans and their allies on returning were even more suspended against Themistocles,<sup>2</sup> whom they accused of

Themistocles  
was accused  
Agia was the  
guilty in  
Sparta.

<sup>1</sup> Thucyd. v. 26. of the Lacedæmonians  
and of Themistocles. Themistocles was the  
first to suggest, to which Agia assented, that  
they should not fight.

<sup>2</sup> Thucyd. v. 26. Agia was not  
accused, but he was the guilty, and  
Themistocles was the innocent.



having tacitly thrown away a certain victory. They had indeed good ground, in the received practice, to excuse him for having concluded a truce without taking the sense of the people. It was their custom, on returning from a march, to hold a public court-martial before entering the city, at a place called the Chalcidæan winter tent near the walls, for the purpose of adjusting an offence and fault committed in the army. Such was their wish on this occasion against Themistocles, that they would scarcely be persuaded upon even to put him upon his trial, but began to stone him. He was forced to seek personal safety at the altar, upon which the soldiers tried him, and he was condemned to have his property confiscated.<sup>1</sup>

Very shortly afterwards the expected Athenian contingent arrived, which probably ought to have come earlier: 1000 hoplites, with 300 horsemen, under Laches and Niceratus. Alcibiades came as ambassador, probably serving as a soldier also among the horsemen. The Argives, notwithstanding their displeasure against Themistocles, nevertheless felt themselves obliged to observe the truce which he had concluded, and their magistrates accordingly desired the newly-arrived Athenians to depart. Nor was Alcibiades even permitted to approach and address the public assembly, until the Spartan and Helian allies insisted that their request at least should not be refused. An assembly was therefore convened, in which these allies took part, along with the Argives. Alcibiades contended strenuously that the secret truce with the Lacedæmonians was null and void, since it had been contracted without the privity of all the allies, distinctly at variance with the terms of the alliance. He therefore called upon them to resume military operations forthwith, in conjunction with the reinforcement now manfully arrived. His speech so persuaded the assembly, that the Spartans and Helians consented at once to join him in an expedition against the Acadian town of Orchomenus; the Argives also, though at first reluctant, very speedily followed them thither. Orchomenus was a place important to acquire,

Part  
written at  
Athens, in  
1840, by  
the  
author,  
and  
published  
at  
London,  
in  
1841.  
The  
author,  
being  
then  
in  
the  
army,  
was  
in  
the  
city  
of  
Orchomenus.

not merely because its territory joined that of Mantinea on the

<sup>1</sup> Thucyd. i. 10.

northward, but because the Lacedæmonians had deposited therein the hostages which they had taken from Arcadian townships and villages as guarantees for fidelity. Its walls were, however, in bad condition, and its inhabitants, after a short resistance, capitulated. They agreed to become allies of Spartans, to furnish hostages for faithful adhesion to such alliance, and to deliver up the hostages deposited with them by Sparta.<sup>1</sup>

Encouraged by first success, the allies debated what they should next undertake. The Thebans contended strenuously for a march against Leucas, while the Corinthians <sup>Flam. apud</sup> were anxious to attack their enemy and neighbor <sup>Thuc.</sup> Tegea. The Argives and Athenians preferred the <sup>the Theban</sup> home, incomparably the more important enterprise of <sup>reluct</sup> the two; but each was the disgust of the Thebans at the rejection of their proposition, that they abandoned the army altogether, and went home.

Notwithstanding their desertion, however, the remaining allies continued together at Mantinea organizing their attack upon Tegea, in which city they had a strong respectable party, who had usually had their place, and were on the point of proclaiming the revolt of the city from Sparta;<sup>2</sup> when the phœ-Læonides Tegeans just averted themselves by despatching an urgent message to Sparta and receiving the most rapid answer. The Lacedæmonians, filled with indignation at the news of the surrender of Cydonia, vented now all their displeasure against Agis, whom they now threatened with the severe punishment of demolishing his house and fixing him in the seat of 100,000 drachmæ, or about 7½ Attic talents. He urgently entreated that an opportunity might be afforded to him of releasing by some means even the ill name which he had incurred; if he failed in doing so, then they might inflict upon him what penalty they chose. The penalty was accordingly withdrawn; but a restriction, new to the Spartan constitution, was now placed upon the authority of the king. It had been before a part of his prerogative to lead out the army single-handed and on his own authority; but a council of Ten was now named, without whose concurrence he was interdicted from exercising such power.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup>Thucyd. v. 26.

<sup>2</sup>Thucyd. v. 26. *Inter alia* Agiæque, 484.

<sup>3</sup>Thucyd. v. 26.

To the great good fortune of Agis, the pressing message now arrived announcing imminent revolt of Tegea, the most important city of Sparta, and close upon her border. Such was the alarm occasioned by this news, that the whole military population instantly started off to relieve the place, Agis at their head; the most rapid movement ever known to have been made by Lacedæmonian soldiers.<sup>1</sup> When they arrived at Oronchium in Arcadia in their way, perhaps hearing that the danger was somewhat less pressing, they sent back to Sparta one-sixth part of the force, for home defence, the oldest as well as the youngest men. The remainder marched forward to Tegea, where they were speedily joined by their Arcadian allies. They further sent messages to the Corinthians and Boeotians, as well as to the Phocians and Lebitians, invoking the immediate presence of these contingents in the territory of Mantinea. The arrival of such reinforcements, however, even with all possible aid on the part of the cities contributing, could not be looked for without some lapse of time; the rather, as it appears that they could not get into the territory of Mantinea except by passing through that of Argos,<sup>2</sup> which could not be easily attempted until they had all formed a junction. Accordingly Agis, impatient to redeem his reputation, marched at once with the Lacedæmonians and the Arcadian allies present into the territory of Mantinea, and took up a position near the Herakleion, or temple of Herakles,<sup>3</sup> from whence he began to ravage the neighbouring lands. The Argives and their allies presently came forth from Mantinea, planted themselves near him, but on very rugged and impracticable ground, and there offered him battle. Nothing daunted by the difficulty of the position, he marshalled his army and led it up to attack them. His rashness on the present occasion might have produced as much mischief as his inconsiderate conclusion in Thapsos near Argos, had not an ancient Spartan called out to him that he was now merely proceeding "to hasten mischief by mischief". So

<sup>1</sup> Thucyd. v. 26. *ἄρδιστα δὲ βόλῃσιν αὐτῶν ἀποφασίζοντες ὁρμήσαντες ἀπὸ τοῦ ὄρους ἔβησαν ἐπὶ τὴν πόλιν, ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν ἄλλοις ὁδὸς ἰσχυρῆς.* The remark that the Spartans had before the battle of Plataea also looked to Sparta, viz. ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν ἄλλοις ὁδὸς ἰσχυρῆς, may be here taken quite as a metaphorical

indication only.

<sup>2</sup> Thuc. v. 26. *ἰσχυρῇ δὲ βόλῃσιν αὐτῶν ἀποφασίζοντες ὁρμήσαντες ἀπὸ τοῦ ὄρους ἔβησαν ἐπὶ τὴν πόλιν, ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν ἄλλοις ὁδὸς ἰσχυρῆς.* The Lacedæmonians being anxious to have both a means of protection in approaching near a temple of Herakles, their desire precluded even Xenagoras, *ibid.* iv. 1, 2.

forcibly was Agri impressed either with this timely observation, or by the clear view of the position which he had undertaken to assume, that he suddenly halted the army, and gave orders for retreat, though actually within distance no greater than the cast of a javelin from the enemy.<sup>1</sup>

His march was now intended to draw the Argives away from the difficult ground which they occupied. On the dywater between Macedonia and Troy—both situated on a lofty but enclosed plain, divided only by low hills, or natural subterranean channels in the mountains—was situated a head of water, the regular efflux of which seems to have been kept up by joint operations of both cities for their mutual benefit. Together Agri now conducted his army for the purpose of turning the water towards the side of Macedonia, where it would occasion serious damage; calculating that the Macedonians and their allies would certainly descend from their position to hinder it. No stratagem, however, was necessary to induce the latter to adopt this resolution. For as soon as they saw the Lacedæmonians, after advancing to the foot of the hill, first suddenly halt, next retreat, and lastly disappear, their surprise was very great; and this surprise was soon converted into contemptuous confidence and impatience to pursue the flying enemy. The generals, not sharing such confidence, hesitated at first to quit their secure position; upon which the troops became clamorous, and finally demanded them for treason in letting the Lacedæmonians quietly escape a second time, as they had before done near Argos. These generals would probably not be the same with those who had incurred, a short time before, so much observed censure for their convention with Agri; but the warriors on the present occasion, hardly less unreasonable, drove them, not without considerable shame and confusion, to give orders for advance. They descended the hill, marched down into the plain as if to approach the Lacedæmonians, and employed the next day in arranging themselves in good battle order, so as to be ready to fight at a moment's notice.

Meanwhile it appears that Agri had found himself disappointed

<sup>1</sup> Thucyd. v. 26. See an annotation. The moment when a battle was going to be, and Agri was intended to give the command, to Demetrius, Philip, and other of his important companions, at Th. v. 26.





with unbecoming reluctance.<sup>1</sup> Next to the Sicriæ, who were 800 in number, stood the unfrocked Helots, recently returned from serving with Brasidas in Thracæ, and the Neodamodes, both probably recruited home from Lacedæmon, where we were told before that they had been planted. After these, in the centre of the entire line, came the Lacedæmonian lochs, seven in number, with the Argivean dependent allies, Heræa and Mantinea, near them. Lastly, in the right wing, stood the Tegeans, with a small division of Lacedæmonians occupying the extreme right, as the post of honour. On each flank there were some Lacedæmonian *hypomachoi*.<sup>2</sup>

Thucydides, with a frankness which enhances the value of his testimony wherever he gives it positively, informs us <sup>that he cannot pretend to set down the number of</sup> either army. It is evident that this silence is not for want of having inquired—but none of the answers which he received appeared to him trustworthy: the extreme jealousy of Lacedæmonian politics abated of no certainty about their numbers, while the empty unwarlike boasts of other Greeks served only to mislead. In the absence of assured information about accurate number, the historian gives us some general information accessible to every inquirer, and some facts visible to a spectator. From his language it is conjectured, with some probability, by Dr. Thirlwall and others, that he was himself present at the battle, though in what capacity we cannot determine, as he was an exile from his country. First he states that the Lacedæmonian army appeared more numerous than that of the enemy. Next he tells us that, independent of the Sicriæ on the left, who were 800 in number, the remaining Lacedæmonian front, to the extremity of their right wing, consisted of 448 men, each squadron having four men in front. In regard to depth, the different squadrons were not all equal; but for the most part the line was eight deep. There were seven lochs in all (apart from the Sicriæ); each lochus comprised four pentachoriæ—each pentachoriæ contained four *echinæ*.<sup>3</sup> Multiplying 448 by

<sup>1</sup> Xenophon, *Grec. H.* 2. 1. 1; see also Xenophon, *Hæc.* 1. 1. 1.

<sup>2</sup> Xenophon, *Grec. H.* 2. 1. 1.

<sup>3</sup> Xenophon, *Grec. H.* 2. 1. 1.

speaking the situation of the Lacedæmonian army. We know that the Sicriæ was the auxiliary division—the military word; that the Pentachoriæ was composed of a definite quantity.







somewhat silent towards the right. The soldiers on the extreme right of both armies set the example of such Indian-<sup>part of</sup> tise, in order to avoid exposing their own unshielded backs; while for the most reason every man along the line took care to keep close to the shield of his right-hand neighbor. We see from hence that, with equal numbers, the right was not merely the post of honour, but also of comparative safety. So it proved on the present occasion, even the Lacandonian discipline being no way exempt from this cause of disturbance. Though the Lacandonians front, from their superior numbers, was more extended than that of the enemy, still their right files did not think themselves safe without standing still further to the right, and thus contributed very greatly the difference on the opposite left wing; while on the opposite side the Manitowish were forced the right wing, from the same disposition to keep the left shoulder forward, outflanked, though not in so great a degree, the Skirto and Bruidjians on the Lacandonian left. King Aga, whose post was with the Loko in the centre, saw plainly that when the armies closed his left would be certainly taken in flank and perhaps even in the rear. Accordingly he thought it necessary to alter his dispositions even at this critical moment, which he relied upon being able to accomplish through the strict discipline, practical evolutions, and slow march of his soldiers.

The natural mode of meeting the impending danger would have been to bring round a division from the extreme right, where it could well be spared, to the extreme left against the advancing Manitowish. But the ancient privilege of the Skirto, who always fought by themselves on the extreme left, forbade such an order.<sup>1</sup> Accordingly, Aga gave signal to the Bruidjians and Skirto to make a flank movement on the left as so to get on equal front with the Manitowish; while in order to fill up the vacancy thus created in his line, he sent

Movement ordered by Aga to the Skirto before the battle: "Go after the enemy, the Skirto is ordered."

<sup>1</sup> Thurst. p. 21. "By it alone the Skirto keeps off the enemy, and the enemy can never advance without the Skirto's aid." (Thurst. p. 21.)

The Skirto and Bruidjians were sent away from the main body of the army.

ordered such a movement: among the Lacandonians, especially, rapid marches was taken notice of, and was when King Aga is reported to have ordered the Skirto to go after the enemy, the Skirto is ordered.





and driven them back, was less anxious to pursue them than to return to the scene of his own defeated left wing; so that even the Athenians, who were exposed both in flank and front, were enabled to effect their retreat in safety. The Mantinians and the Argives, though victorious on their part of the line, yet seeing the remainder of their army in disorderly flight, had little disposition to renew the combat against Ages and the conquering Lacedæmonians. They sought only to effect their retreat, which however could not be done without severe loss, especially on the part of the Mantinians—and which Ages might have prevented altogether, had not the Lacedæmonians system, enforced on this occasion by the counsel of an unarm'd Spartan named Phares, secured themselves from prolonged pursuit against a defeated enemy.<sup>1</sup> There fell in this battle 700 men of the Argives, Eleians, and Chians; 200 Athenians, together with both the generals Leobis and Mikotasos; and 300 Mantinians. The loss of the Lacedæmonians, though never certainly known, from the habitual secrecy of their public proceedings, was estimated at about 300 men. They stripped the enemy's dead, spreading out to rear the arms thus acquired, and selecting some for a trophy; then picked up their own dead and carried them away for burial at Tegeæ, granting the customary burial-truce to

judgment, the description is here the Lacedæmonians, who, before and during the fight of A., the words will thus read (said) the Argives, an effeminate Mantinian already—"It is better that the sacred games of the Lacedæmonians might not be interrupted in coming upon them," "might not come upon them too late," "it is better that they should get away," and when the word "Lacedæmonians" is substituted in each place, as, "in order to get at the last sentence here, we may substitute the word—words with which it corresponds. In only, Lacedæmonians, we may substitute subject as well as attribute—for the latter perhaps is here immediately implied."

The sentence would thus read, supposing the subject lifted up and the meaning expressed in full sentences: words—how the Lacedæmonians, by the assistance of the Argives, were able to Lacedæmonians at Tegeæ, Lacedæmonians, in this last paragraph.

"As soon as the Lacedæmonians approached Tegeæ, the Argives gave up at once, without giving the Argives, and were with some trouble done by each other, as by their own words, and when it was that the Lacedæmonians might not be interrupted in coming upon them, they were not able to do so."

Concluding in this way the sentence as a new sentence, we have not, as before, said in the original and Lacedæmonians of progress in sentence. The last sentence is plain and natural, and so, in fact, having with the original sentence. But in these two sentences we have seen the words. Nothing more is done than to express a very different sentence, and to fill up the words before sentence which was placed in the history was said. In all this property is the great point, as well as the other sentence, of an expression of thought.

<sup>1</sup> Thucydides, v. 72, Thucyd. 11.

the defeated army. Plistonax, the other Spartan king, had advanced as far as Tegeæ with a reinforcement composed of the elder and younger citizens; but on hearing of the victory he returned home.<sup>1</sup>

Such was the important battle of Mantinæ, fought in the month of June, 418 B.C. Its effect throughout Greece was prodigious. The numbers engaged on both sides were very considerable for a Grecian army of that day, though seemingly not so large as at the battle of Delium five years before: the number and grandeur of the states whose troops were engaged was however greater than at Delium. But what gave peculiar value to the battle was, that it wiped off at once the pre-existing stain upon the honour of Sparta. The disaster in Sphakteria, disappointing all previous expectation, had down upon her the imputation of something like cowardice; and there were other proceedings which, with far larger reason, caused her to be stigmatised as stupid and backward. But the victory of Mantinæ wiped all such disparaging criticism, and replaced Sparta in her old position of military pre-eminence before the eyes of Greece. It worked so much the more powerfully because it was entirely the fruit of Lacedæmonian courage, with little aid from that peculiar skill and tactics, which was generally seen concomitant, but had in the present case been found comparatively wanting. The manoeuvre of Agis, in itself not ill-conceived, for the purpose of extending his left wing, had failed through the disobedience of the two refractory polemarchæ; but in such a case the chance of failure falls more or less upon all parties concerned; nor could either general or soldiers be considered to have displayed at Mantinæ any of that professional aptitude which caused the Lacedæmonians to be styled "artists in warlike affairs". So weak the more unopposedly did Lacedæmonian courage stand out to view. After the left wing had been broken, and when the Argive Thousand had penetrated into the vacant space between the left and centre, so that they might have taken the centre in flank, and ought to have done so had they been well-advised, the troops in the centre, instead of being decimated as most Grecian soldiers would have been, had marched forward

Great  
effects of  
the victory  
in general.  
Sparta has  
regained  
all her hon-  
our.

<sup>1</sup>Thucyd. v. 61.

against the standards in their front, and gained a complete victory. The consequences of the battle were threefold:—in re-establishing the reputation of the Lacedæmonians, and in enabling them again to their ancient dignity of chiefs of Peloponnesus.<sup>1</sup>

We are not surprised to hear that the two polemarchi, Aristicles and Hippocleides, whose disobedience had well-nigh caused the ruin of the army, were tried and condemned to banishment on grounds on their return to Sparta.<sup>2</sup>

Looking at the battle from the point of view of the other side, we may remark that the defeat was greatly occasioned by the selfish caprice of the Eleans in withdrawing their 2000 men immediately before the battle, because the other allies, instead of marching against Lepæum, preferred to attempt the far more important town of Tegeæ: an additional illustration of the remark of Pericles at the beginning of the war, that numerous and equal allies could never be kept in harmonious co-operation.<sup>3</sup> Shortly after the defeat, the 2000 Eleans came back to the aid of Mantinea—probably regretting their previous untoward departure—together with a reinforcement of 1000 Athenians. Moreover, the Spartan month began—a season which the Lacedæmonians kept rigidly holy; even despatching messengers to condemn their entire Peloponnesian allies, whom they had avoided prior to the late battle,<sup>4</sup> and remaining themselves within their own territory, so that the field was for the moment left clear for the operations of a defeated enemy. Accordingly, the Epilærians, though they had made an incursion into the territory of Argos during the absence of the Argives main force at the time of the late battle, and had gained a partial success, now found their own territory overrun by the united Eleans, Mantinians, and Athenians, who were bold enough even to commence a wall of circumvallation round the town of Epilæurn itself. The main work was distributed between them to be accomplished; but the superior activity and perseverance of the Athenians were here displayed in a conspicuous manner. For while the portion of work con-

<sup>1</sup> Thucyd. v. 76. and the last sentence of the preceding page 44.  
<sup>2</sup> Thucyd. v. 76. and the last sentence of the preceding page 44.  
<sup>3</sup> Thucyd. v. 76. and the last sentence of the preceding page 44.  
<sup>4</sup> Thucyd. v. 76. and the last sentence of the preceding page 44.

mitted to them (the fortification of the cape on which the Heraion or temple of Minos was situated) was unobtrusively prosecuted and speedily brought to completion, their allies, both Thasos and Mantinea, abandoned the tasks respectively allotted to them, in confusion and disgust. The idea of circumstances being for this reason relinquished, a joint garrison was left in the new fort at Cape Hermon, after which the allies evacuated the Epikourian territory.<sup>1</sup>

So far the Lacedæmonians appeared to have derived little positive benefit from their late victory; but the fruits of it were soon manifested in the very centre of their enemy's force—at Argos. A material change had taken place since the battle in the political tendencies of that city. There had been within it always an opposition party—*philo-Laconian* and *anti-democratical*; and the effect of the defeat at Mantinea had been to strengthen this party inasmuch as it depressed their opponents. The democratical leaders—who, in conjunction with Athens and Alcibiades, had agreed to maintain an ascendancy in Peloponnesian hostile and equal, if not superior, to Sparta—now found their calculations overthrown and exchanged for the discouraging prospect of self-defence against a victorious enemy. And while these leaders thus lost general influence by so complete a defeat of their foreign policy, the ordinary democratical rulers of Argos brought back with them from the field of Mantinea nothing but humiliation and terror of the Lacedæmonian arms. But the chosen Argives Thousand-regiment returned with very different feelings. Victorious over the left wing of their enemies, they had not been seriously <sup>seriously</sup> <sup>disrupted</sup> in their retreat even by the Lacedæmonian centre. They had thus reaped positive glory,<sup>2</sup> and doubtless felt contempt for their beaten fellow-citizens. Now it has been already mentioned that these Thousand were men of rich families and the best military age, not apart by the Argive democracy to

<sup>1</sup> Thucyd. ii. 28.

<sup>2</sup> Alcibiades (Thucyd. ii. 4) strenuously advised the army joined by the Argives to leave Argos in the hands of Mantinea, as the main cause of the subsequent Lacedæmonian self-defence being that the Argives generally were dissatisfied and prepared to desert.

<sup>3</sup> Thucyd. ii. 28.

An example of courage exhibited by Thucydides' troops was noticed by Thucydides (Thucyd. ii. 28) as mentioned by Thucydides in the Athenian army under Alcibiades and Thucydides, in one of the later years of the Peloponnesian war (see Thucyd. ii. 28, 29).



receive permanent training at the public expense, just at a time when the ambitious views of Argos first began to dawn, after the peace of Nikias. So long as Argos was likely to become or continue the imperial state of Peloponnesus, these Thousand wealthy men would probably find their dignity sufficiently consulted in upholding her as such, and would then acquiesce in the democratical government. But when the defeat of Mantineæ reduced Argos to her own limits, and threw her upon the defensive, there was nothing to counterbalance their natural oligarchical sentiments, so that they became decided opponents of the democratical government in its distress. The oligarchical party in Argos, thus encouraged and reinforced, entered into a conspiracy with the Lacedæmonians to bring the city into alliance with Sparta as well as to overthrow the democracy.<sup>1</sup>

As the first step towards the execution of this scheme, the Lacedæmonians, about the end of September, marched out their full force as far as Tegeæ, thus threatening invasion, and inspiring terror in Argos. From Tegeæ they sent forward as envoy Lichas, proxenos of the Argians at Sparta, with two alternative propositions; one for peace, which he was instructed to tender and press upon the Argians to accept, if he could; another, in case they refused, of a menacing character. It was the scheme of the oligarchical faction first to bring the city into alliance with Lacedæmonia and dissolve the connexion with Athens, before they attempted any innovation in the government. The arrival of Lichas was the signal for them to manifest themselves by strenuously protesting the acceptance of his pacific proposition. But they had to contend against a strong resistance; since Alcibiades, still in Argos, employed his utmost energy to defeat their views. Nothing but the presence of the Lacedæmonian army at Tegeæ and the general dependency of the people at length enabled them to carry their point, and to procure acceptance of the proposed treaty; which, being already adopted by the Ekklesia at Sparta, was sent ready prepared to Argos, and there sanctioned without alteration. The conditions were substantially as follows:—

"The Argians shall restore the boys whom they have received

<sup>1</sup> Thucyd. v. 69. Diodor. xii. 65.

as hostages from Orchomenos, and the men-hostages from the Meneia. They shall restore to the Lacedæmonians the men now in Mantinea, whom the Lacedæmonians had placed as hostages for safety in Orchomenos, and whom the Argives and Mantinians have carried away from that place. They shall evacuate Epidaure, and raise the fort recently erected near it. The Athenians, unless they also forthwith evacuate Epidaure, shall be proclaimed as enemies to Lacedæmonia as well as to Argos, and to the allies of both. The Lacedæmonians shall restore all the hostages whom they now have in keeping, from whatever place they may have been taken. Regarding the sacrifices alleged to be due to Apollo by the Epidaurians, the Argives will consent to tender to them an oath, which if they swear they shall clear themselves.<sup>1</sup> Every city in Peloponnesus, small or great, shall be autonomous and at liberty to maintain its own ancient constitution. If any extra-Peloponnesian city shall come against Peloponnesians with ambitious projects, Lacedæmonia and Argos will take joint counsel against it, in the manner most equitable for the interest of the Peloponnesians generally. The extra-Peloponnesian allies of Sparta shall be in the same position with reference to this treaty as the allies of Lacedæmonia and Argos in Peloponnesus, and shall hold their oars in the same manner. The Argives shall show this treaty to their allies, who shall be admitted to subscribe to it, if they think fit. But if the allies desire anything different, the Argives shall send them home about their business."<sup>2</sup>

Treaty of Peace  
between  
Sparta and  
Argos.

<sup>1</sup> Thucyd. v. 27. The text of Thucydides is, however, corrupt, in regard to several words in this clause. Strong conjectures were proposed and finally rejected, that the Epidaurians were to be allowed to show themselves in readiness to tender to the oath. It appeared in this preliminary work, it seems to have been concluded that the oath should be tendered by one official party and sworn to by the other; perhaps, therefore, either as *free* or *slave* (Peloponnesians' independence might be preferable to their oath).

In Blandin, v. 28, and *Antiquité Moderne* i. 2, 4, with Dr. Arnold and other commentators notice is taken of the practice, we may add the distinctive expression of the religious practice in the presence of

Rome has, as given by Tacitus in his *Historia* the hostages Epidaureans, Mantinians, and Argives, and v. 28. 29. It was an oath tendered by one alleged party to the opposite, it argues that the latter would refuse to take it. It seems, it had the effect of a submission to favour of the former. But the Roman lawyers and their many allies had themselves will consent to take Amphoterous oaths, while the Argives were firm with the same scrupulousity.

<sup>2</sup> Thucyd. v. 27. Antipodians it will preserve, *Antipodians*, it is possible that it is a little less than *Antipodians*, almost *Antipodians*. See Dr. Arnold's note, and Dr. Thucyd. v. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. p. 24.

Such was the agreement now ready prepared by the Lacedæmonians to Argos, and there literally accepted. It presented a reciprocity little more than wanted, imposing one obligation of no importance upon Sparta; though it increased the purpose of the latter by substantially dissolving the alliance of Argos with its three confederates.

But this treaty was moved by the disaffected party in Argos only as pretext to a series of ulterior measures. As soon as it was concluded, the marching army of Sparta was withdrawn from Tigea, and was exchanged for five and peaceful recommunication between the Lacedæmonians and Argives. Probably Alcibiades at the same time retired, while the continued visits and hospitality of Lacedæmonians at Argos strengthened the interest of their party more than ever. They were soon powerful enough to persuade the Argive assembly formally to renounce the alliance with Athens, Milet, and Mantinea, and to conclude a special alliance with Sparta, on the following terms:—

"There shall be peace and alliance for fifty years between the Lacedæmonians and the Argives—upon equal terms—each giving amicable satisfaction, according to its established constitution, to all complaints preferred by the other. On the same condition, also, the other Peloponnesian cities shall partake in this peace and alliance—holding their own territory, laws, and separate constitution. All extra-Peloponnesian cities of Sparta shall be put upon the same footing as the Lacedæmonians themselves. The cities of Argos shall also be put upon the same footing as Argos herself, holding their own territory undisturbed. Should occasion arise for common military operations on any point, the Lacedæmonians and Argives shall take counsel together, determining in the most equitable manner they can for the interest of their allies. If any one of the cities

One would be curious about the meaning of these two last words, but I think it better that they signify a reciprocity and almost a liberal war, such as I have given in the text. The thing were altered to any Athens, Milet, and Mantinea; and besides it being to Sparta. The Lacedæmonians would not wish Argos attacking these cities or being in this way as it does

but would probably think it worthy to send them, even with reluctance, if they desired not change.

I must leave, too, that this last clause undoubtedly has reference as directly to the Argives, and not to the Peloponnesian cities. The type of the treaty is that of a resolution already taken at Sparta, and sent for approval to Argos.



have modified further with him. Being already possessed of Lepreus (through the Boeotian officers planted there), they perhaps did not wish again to provoke the Thebans, from fear of being included a second time from the Olympic festival.

Meanwhile the conclusion of the alliance with Lacedaemonians <sup>negotiations effected at Argos by the Thebans, in concert with the Spartan leaders.</sup> (about November or December, 418 B.C.) had still further depressed the popular leaders at Argos. The oligarchical faction, and the chosen regiment of the Thousand, all men of wealth and family, as well as bound together by their common military training, now saw their way clearly to the dissolution of the democracy by force, and to the accomplishment of a revolution. Indignant by such exclusive views, and flattered by the idea of situated brotherly jealousy with Sparta, they opposed the new policy of the city with extreme vehemence, and began immediately to multiply occasions of collision with Athens. Joint Lacedaemonian and Argive envoys were despatched to Thebes and Macedonia. With the Chalcidians of Thebes, the revolted subjects of Athens, the old alliance was renewed, and even new engagements concluded; while Perdiccas of Macedonia was urged to renounce his connections with Athens, and join the new confederacy. In that quarter the influence of Argos was considerable; for the Macedonian princes prized very highly their distant descent from Argos, which constituted them brothers of the Hellenic family. Accordingly Perdiccas consented to the demand and concluded the new treaty; insisting, however, with his habitual duplicity, that the step should for the moment be kept secret from Athens.<sup>1</sup> In further pursuance of the new line of hostility to that city, joint envoys were also sent thither, to require that the Athenians should quit Peloponnesus, and especially that they should evacuate the fort recently created near Epidaurea. It seems to have been held jointly by Argives, Macedonians, Eleans, and Achaean; and as the latter were only a minority of the whole, the Athenians in the city judged it prudent to send Democleides to bring them away. This general not only effected the retreat, but also conceived a stratagem which gave to it the air almost of an advantage. On his first arrival in the fort, he procured a generous speech outside of the gates for the encouragement of the whole garrison,

<sup>1</sup> Demosthenes, *Orat.* i. 22 and v. 36.





met in the streets a wedding procession, in which the groom of the bride captured his honey. He caused her to be violently torn from her company, carried her to his house, and possessed himself of her by force. But in the middle of the night, this high-spirited woman avenged herself for the outrage by putting out the eyes of the monster while he was fast asleep.<sup>1</sup> A terrible revenge, which the polluted claspings of the *Phryniastres* sometimes enabled women<sup>2</sup> to take upon those who wronged them. Having continued to make harrows, she found encouragement among her friends, as well as protection among the people generally, against the infamous efforts of the chosen Theoi to revenge their ladies.

From incidents such as this, and from the multitude of petty troubles which so flagitious an outrage implies as concomitant, we are not surprised to learn that the Demos of Argos soon recovered their lost courage, and resolved upon an effort to put down their oligarchical oppressors. They waited for the moment when the festival called the *Gymnopolis* was in course of being celebrated at Sparta—a festival at which the choros performances of men, and boys were so interwoven with Spartan religion as well as bodily training, that the Lacedæmonians would make no military movement until they were finished. At this critical moment, the Argives Demos rose in insurrection; and after a sharp contest, gained a victory over the oligarchy, some of whom were slain, while others only saved themselves by flight. Even at the first instant of danger, pressing messages had been sent to Sparta for aid. But the Lacedæmonians at first peremptorily refused to move during the period of their festival; nor was it until messenger after messenger had arrived to set forth the pressing necessity of their friends, that they reluctantly put aside their festival to march towards Argos. They were too late; the precious moment had already passed by. They were met at Tapes by an intimation that their friends were crushed, and Argos in possession of the victorious people. Nevertheless, various exiles who had escaped still promised them success, eagerly entreating them to proceed; but the Lacedæmonians refused to comply, returned to Sparta, and resumed their intermitted festival.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *Plutarchus*, *l. vi.*

<sup>2</sup> *See* *Strabo*, *l. vi.* *Periplus*, *l. vi.* *Thucydides*, *l. vi.* *Thucydides*, *l. vi.* *Thucydides*, *l. vi.*

<sup>3</sup> *See* *Thucydides*, *l. vi.*

<sup>4</sup> *Thucydides*, *l. vi.* *Thucydides*, *l. vi.*



There was the oligarchy of Argos overthrown—after a continuance of about four months,<sup>1</sup> from February to June, 417 B.C.—and the chosen Thousand-regiment either destroyed or destroyed. The movement excited great sympathy in several Peloponnesian cities,<sup>2</sup> who were becoming jealous of the exorbitant preponderance of Sparta. Nevertheless the Argive Demos, through victorious valour, the city, full so much distrust of being able to maintain themselves, that they sent envoys to Sparta to plead their cause and to request favourable treatment; a proceeding which proves the insurrection to have been spontaneous, not fomented by Athens. But the envoys of the expelled oligarchs were there to confound them, and the Lacedæmonians, after a lengthened discussion, adjudging the Demos to have been guilty of wrong, proclaimed the resolution of sending forces to put them down. But the habitual weakness of Lacedæmonian habits prevented any immediate or separate movement. Their allies were to be summoned, none being very zealous in the cause,—and least of all at this moment, when the period of harvest was at hand; so that about three months intervened before any actual force was brought together.

This important interval was turned to account by the Argive Demos, who, being plainly warned that they were to look on Sparta only as an enemy, immediately renewed their alliance with Athens. Requesting her as their main refuge, they commenced the building of long walls to connect their city with the sea, in order that the road might always be open for supplies and reinforcements from Athens in case they should be confined to their walls by a superior Spartan force. The whole Argive population—men and women, free and slave—not except the work with the stone columns, while Alcibiades brought reinforcements from Athens<sup>3</sup>—especially skilled masons and carpenters, of whom they stood in much need. The step may probably have been suggested

<sup>1</sup> Diodorus tells us, page 161, that it lasted eight months, but that, if correct, it must be taken as beginning from the alliance between Sparta, Argos, and the Argive Demos, which would diminish the discrepancy. The contemporary Thucydides does not allow more than four months for the duration of

the siege.

<sup>2</sup> Thucyd. i. 92. *Justitiam et civitatem argenteam et civitate Peloponnesiorum modo regere.*

<sup>3</sup> Thucyd. i. 93. *et de civitate Argivum exstructis, cum viris etis, masonibus et lignis, carpentibus, &c. Peloponnesiorum, &c. &c.*

by himself, as it was the same which, two years before, he had urged upon the inhabitants of Patrae. But the construction of walls adequate for defence, along the line of four miles and a half between Argos and the sea, required a long time. Moreover the oligarchical party within the town, as well as the allies without—a party defeated but not annihilated—strenuously urged the Lacedæmonians to put an end to the work, and even promised them a moderate revolutionary movement in the town, as soon as they drew near to assist—the same intrigue which had been entered into by the oligarchical party at Athens forty years before, when the walls down to Piræus were in course of erection.<sup>1</sup> Accordingly about the end of September (417 B.C.), King Ages conducted an army of Lacedæmonians and allies against Argos, drove the population within the city, and destroyed as much of the Long Walls as had been already raised.

But the oligarchical party within were not able to realize their expectations of rising in arms, so that he was obliged to retire after merely ravaging the territory and taking the town of Myrææ, where he put to death all the women who fell into his hands. After his departure, the Argians retaliated these ravages upon the neighbouring territory of Pilææ, where the allies from Argos chiefly resided.<sup>2</sup>

The close neighbourhood of such allies—together with the declared enmity of Sparta, and the continued advance of the oligarchical party within the walls—kept the Argian democracy in perpetual uneasiness and alarm throughout the winter, in spite of their recent victory and the suppression of the dangerous regiment of a Thousand. To relieve them, in part from misgivings, Alcibiades was detached thither only in the spring with an Athenian armament and twenty triremes. His friends and guests appear to have been sent in accordance, on behalf of the democratical government; and in request with them, he selected 500 married oligarchical persons, whom he

as an  
armament  
of about  
thousand  
for the  
purpose  
of the  
democracy.

<sup>1</sup> *Plutarch*, *L. Alc.*

<sup>2</sup> *Thucyd.* i. 97.

<sup>3</sup> *Thucyd.* v. 25. Alcibiades seems to be aware that the Argians had already built their long walls down to

the sea—whence the Lacedæmonians determined to assault before they were completed, p. 492. Thucydides was the prototype of the present generation of statesmen—p. 492. Alcibiades was a demagogue, &c.



hostilities in an indirect manner, so long as each was acting as ally of some third party—necessarily neither the one nor the other would formally renounce the former alliance, nor abrogate the treaty inscribed on its stone columns. Both parties shrunk from proclaiming the real truth, though each half-year brought them a step nearer to it in fact. Thus during the course of the present summer (418 B.C.) the Athenians and Boeotians, garrisoned at Pylos, became more active than ever in their incursions on Laconia, and brought home huge booty; upon which the Lacedaemonians, though still not renouncing the alliance, publicly proclaimed their willingness to grant what we may call letters of marque, to say so, for privateering against Lacedaemonian commerce. The Corinthians also, on private grounds of quarrel, commenced hostilities against the Athenians.<sup>1</sup> Yet still Sparta and her allies remained in a state of formal peace with Athens; the Athenians resisted all the repeated solicitations of the Argives to induce them to make a landing on any part of Laconia and commit devastation.<sup>2</sup> Nor was the honour of the *agorastrophos* for individuals as yet suspended. We cannot doubt that the Athenians were invited to the Olympic festival of 418 B.C. (the first Olympiad), and sent thither their solemn legation along with those of Sparta and other Doric Greeks.

Now that they had again become allies of Argos, the Athenians probably found out, more fully than they had before known, the intrigue carried on by the former Argæan government with the Macedonian Perdiccas. The effects of these intrigues, however, had made themselves felt even earlier in the conduct of that prince, who, having as an ally of Athens engaged to co-operate with an Athenian expedition projected under Nicias for the spring or summer of 417 B.C., against the Chalkidians of Thrace and Amphipolis, now withdrew his concurrence, renounced the alliance of Athens, and frustrated the whole scheme of expedition. The Athenians

<sup>1</sup> Thucyd. v. 12.  
<sup>2</sup> Thucyd. v. 12.<sup>2</sup> Indirectly Athens had the war declared by Athens against Sparta, on the grounds of the Argæan fleet, in 418 B.C., v. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12. The question is which party was the aggressor.

with Argos was one of the causes of the maintenance of war, but still the wrong done, even if there were grounds. Thucydides tells us that the presence of Argos in 417 B.C. before Athens to show up her alliance with Sparta was reported and meddling.

accordingly placed the ports of Macedonia under naval blockade, proclaiming Perikleides an enemy.<sup>1</sup>

Nearly five years had elapsed since the defeat of Kleon, without any fresh attempt to recover Amphipolis: the project just alluded to appears to have been the first. The proceedings of the Athenians with regard to this important town afford ample proof of that want of wisdom on the part of their leading men, Nikias and Alkibiades, and of excessive tenderness on the part of the body of the citizens, which we shall gradually find conducting their empire to ruin. Among all their possessions out of Attica, there was none so valuable as Amphipolis: the empire of a great commercial and mining region—situated on a large river and lake which the Athenian navy could readily command—and shared by them with reasonable justice, since it was their original colony, planted by their wisest statesman Perikleides. It had been lost only through reprehensible negligence on the part of their guards; and when lost, we should have expected to see the chief energies of Athens directed to the recovery of it; the more so, as, if once recovered, it admitted of being made sure and retained as a future possession. Kleon is the only leading man who at once proclaimed to his countrymen the important truth that it never can be recovered except by force. He strenuously urges his countrymen to make the requisite military effort, and prevails upon them in part to do so, but the attempt disgracefully fails—partly through his own incompetence as commander, whether his undertaking of that duty was a matter of choice or of constraint—partly through the strong opposition and antipathy against him from a large portion of his fellow-citizens, which rendered the military force not handy in the enterprise. Next, Nikias, Lachar, and Alkibiades, all consent in making peace and alliance with the Lacedæmonians, under express promise and purpose to procure the restoration of Amphipolis. But after a series of diplomatic proceedings which display as much silly swiftness in Nikias as selfish desert in Alkibiades, the result becomes evident, as Kleon had intimated, that peace will not restore to them Amphipolis, and that it can only be regained by force. The final defeat of Nikias

<sup>1</sup> Thucyd. i. 101.

is now conspicuously seen: his incoherence of character and inconsistency of decided or energetic effort. When he discovered that he had been out-manoeuvred by the Lacedæmonian diplomacy, and had feebly misdirected his countrymen into making important concessions on the field of equivalents to come, we might have expected to find him spurred on by indignant repentance for the mistake, and putting forth his own strongest efforts, as well as those of his country, in order to recover those portions of her empire which the peace had promised, but did not restore. Instead of which he exhibits no effective movement, while Alcibiades begins to display the defects of his political character, yet more dangerous than those of Nicias—the passion for show, promises, headiness, and even perfunctory action. It is only in the year 417 B.C., after the defeat of Mantineæ had put an end to the political speculations of Alcibiades in the interior of Peloponnesus, that Nicias projects an expedition against Amphipolis; and even then it is projected only contingently upon the aid of Pericles, a prince of notorious party. It was not by any half-measures of force that the place could be regained, as the defeat of Kleon had sufficiently proved. We obtain from these proceedings a fair measure of the foreign politics of Athens at this time, during what is called the peace of Nicias, preparing us for that melancholy catastrophe which will be developed in the coming chapters—where she is brought near to ruin by the defects of Nicias and Alcibiades combined; for by singular misfortune, she does not reap the benefit of the good qualities of either.

It was in one of the three years between 420—415 B.C., though we do not know in which, that the vote of ostracism took place, driving out of the contention between Nicias and Alcibiades.<sup>1</sup> The political antipathy between the two having reached a point

<sup>1</sup> By Thirlwall (*History of Greece*, vol. 10, ch. xiv. p. 307) places this ostracism in connection with the capture of 428 B.C., immediately before the Sicilian expedition.

His grounds for this position are derived from the Ostracism Law, which requires, *Alcibiades*, the prosecution of *Alcibiades* to be carried on in accordance with the law. On that subject, see, for p. 307, vol. 10. Thirlwall's *History of Greece*, vol. 10, ch. xiv.

Further, he says he is not persuaded that it is a question of ostracism of one or two persons after the time to which it is referred in the law. His reasons for this opinion have been already stated in previous notes. I cannot think that Mr. Thirlwall's argument is successful in removing the objection against the justice, viz. of the ostracism. See my preceding ch. note, here.

of great violence, it was proposed that a vote of censure should be taken, and this proposition (probably made by the partisans of Nicias, since Alcibiades was the person most likely to be reputed dangerous) was adopted by the people. Hyperbolus the lamp-maker, son of Cleombus, a speaker of considerable influence in the public assembly, strenuously supported it, hating Nicias not less than Alcibiades. Hyperbolus is named by Aristophanes as having succeeded Kleon in the assembly of the citizens in the *Pnyx*:<sup>1</sup> if this were true, his supposed demagogic pre-eminence would commence about September, 425 B.C., the period of the death of Kleon. Long before that time, however, he had been among the chief hells of the comic writers, who ascribe to him the same baseness, dishonesty, impudence, and malignity in accusation as that which they fasten upon Kleon, though in language which seems to imply an inferior idea of his power. And it may be doubted whether Hyperbolus ever succeeded to the same influence as had been enjoyed by Kleon, when we observe that Thucydides does not name him in any of the important debates which took place at and after the peace of Nicias. Thucydides only mentions him once—in 411 B.C., while he was in banishment under sentence of ostracism, and resident at Samos. He terms him "one Hyperbolus, a person of bad character, who had been ostracised, not from fear of dangerous excess of dignity and power, but through his wickedness and his being felt as a disgrace to the city."<sup>2</sup> This sentence of Thucydides is really the only evidence against Hyperbolus; for it is not less unjust in his case than in that of Kleon to cite the facts and words of comedy as if they were as much authentic fact and trustworthy evidence. It was at Samos that Hyperbolus was slain by the oligarchical conspirators who were aiming to overthrow the democracy at Athens. We have no particular facts respecting him to enable us to test the general character given by Thucydides.

<sup>1</sup> Aristophanes, *Pnyx*, 495.  
<sup>2</sup> Thucyd., *lib. vi.* Thucydides is  
 of course here speaking of the  
 influence, predominance of all kind,  
 over and through the assembly, which the  
 demagogues and demagogues-in-waiting de-

veloped in Aristophanes (*Pnyx*, *lib. vi.*,  
 495-500). Thucydides is speaking  
 of the influence of Hyperbolus, the  
 lamp-maker, who was a very powerful  
 speaker in the assembly, and who was  
 slain by the oligarchical conspirators.





vote against some one else. They had upon a man whom all of them justly detested—Hypobolus! By their consenting, they obtained a sufficient number of votes against him to pass the sentence which sent him into temporary banishment. But such a result was in no one's contemplation when the vote was deemed to take place, and Philocrates even represents the people as clapping their hands at it as a good job. It was generally recognised by every one, seemingly even by the masses of Hypobolus, as a gross abuse of the ostracism. And the language of Theophrastus himself distinctly implies this; for if we even grant that Hypobolus fully deserved the sentence which that tribunal bestowed, no one could treat his presence as dangerous to the commonwealth; nor was the ostracism introduced to meet lawlessness or wickedness. It was, even before, passing out of the political morality of Athens; and this sentence commemorated its extinction, so that we never hear of it as employed afterwards. It had been extremely valuable in earlier days as a security to the growing democracy against individual usurpation of power, and against dangerous exaggeration of rivalry between individual leaders; but the democracy was now strong enough to dispense with such exceptional protection. Yet if Alcibiades had returned as victor from Syracuse, it is highly probable that the Athenians would have had no other means than the precautionary intimation of ostracism to save themselves from him as danger.

It was in the beginning of summer, 416 B.C., that the Athenians  
 226. 22. undertook the siege and conquest of the Doron island  
 226. 23. of Milos—one of the Cyclades, and the only one,  
 226. 24. except Thira, which was not already included in  
 226. 25. their empire. Milos and Thira were both ancient  
 226. 26. colonies of Lacedæmon, with whom they had strong sympathies  
 226. 27. of lineage. They had never joined the confederacy of Milos,  
 226. 28. nor been in any way connected with Athens; but at the same  
 226. 29. time, neither had they ever taken part in the recent war against  
 226. 30. her, nor given her any ground of complaint, whilst she loaded

<sup>1</sup> Philocrates, *de Moribus* c. 10. The  
 book, *de Moribus* c. 10. Theophrastus  
 says that the citizens' opposition to  
 him, and the sentence afterwards,  
 was not between Milos and the

islands, but between Philocrates and  
 Alcibiades.

<sup>2</sup> The inclusion of votes and parties  
 may well have been intended at them.  
<sup>3</sup> Theophrastus, *de Moribus* c. 10.

and attacked them in the sixth year of the recent war. She now renewed her attempt, sending against the city a considerable force under Klosevski and Toman: thirty Albanian officers, with six guns, and two Legions—1500 Albanian hoplites, and 1500 hoplites from the allies—with 800 horsemen and twenty horse-bowmen. These officers, after dismantling their forces, and taking pardon, went straight into the city summoning the government to surrender, and to become a subject-ally of Albania.

It was a practice frequent, if not universal, in Greece—even in governments not professedly democratical—to discuss propositions for peace or war before the assembly of the people. But on the present occasion the Helms leaders departed from this practice, submitting the survey only to a private conversation with their executive council. Of the conversation which ensued

Thucydides professes to give a detailed and dispassionate account—at surprising length, considering his general brevity. He sets down thirteen distinct observations, with as many replies, interchanged between the Athenian envoys and the Melians, no one of them separately long, and some very short; but the dialogue carried on a dialogue and very impressive. There is, indeed, every reason for concluding that what we have read in Thucydides is in the larger proportion his own, and in smaller proportion authentic report, than any of the other speeches which he professes to set down. For this was not a public harangue, in respect to which he might have had the opportunity of consulting the recollection of many different persons; it was a private conversation, wherein those or four Athenians, and perhaps ten or a dozen Melians, may have taken part. Here, as all the Melian prisoners of arbitrary age, and certainly all those leading citizens then in the town who had conducted this interview, were slain immediately after the capture of the town, there remained only the Athenian envoys through whose report Thucydides colloquially here heard what really passed. That he did hear, either from or through them, the general character of what passed, I make no doubt; but there is no ground for believing that he received from them anything like the consecutive string of debate, which, together with part of the



Milias reply, that (setting all appeal to justice and speaking only of what was expedient) they held it to be more expedient for Athens not to break down the common moral sanction of mankind, but to pursue that equity and justice shall still continue as a refuge for men in trouble, with some indulgence even towards those who may be unable to make out a case of full and strict right. Most of all was this the interest of Athens herself, inasmuch as her rule, if it ever occurred, would be useful both as punishment to herself and as lesson to others. "We are not afraid of that (rejoined the Athenians) even if our empire should be overturned. It is not imperial aim like Sparta who deal harshly with the conquered. Moreover, our present contest is not undertaken against Sparta—it is a contest to determine whether subjects shall by their own attack prevail over their rulers. This is a risk for us to judge of: in the meantime, let us remind you that we come here for the advantage of our own empire; and that we are now speaking with a view to your safety—wishing to get you under our empire without trouble to ourselves, and to preserve you for the mutual benefit of both of us." "Grant you have us down, and let us be your friends instead of enemies, but neither allies of you nor of Sparta!" said the Milians. "No (in the reply)—your friendship does us more harm than your enmity: your friendship is a proof of our weakness in the eyes of our subject allies—your enmity will give a demonstration of our power." "But do your subjects really take such a measure of equity as to put us, who have no sort of connexion with you, on the same footing with themselves, most of whom are your own colonists, while many of them have even revolted from you and been reconquered?" "They do; for they think that both one and the other have fair ground for claiming independence, and that if you are left independent, this arises only from your power and from our fear to attack you. So that your subjection will not only enlarge our empire, but strengthen our security throughout the whole; especially as you are islands and fertile islands too, while we are both of the one." "But surely that very circumstance is in other ways a protestant to you, as increasing your moderation; for if you attack us, you will at once alarm all contents, and convert them into enemies." "We are in little fear of continental allies, who

are out of our reach and not likely to take part against us, but only of islanders, either yet unincorporated in our empire, like you, or already in our empire and discontented with the government which it imposes. It is such islanders who, by their ill-judged chafing, are likely, with their eyes open, to bring both us and themselves into peril." "We know well (said the Melians, after some other observations had been interchanged) how terrible it is to contend against your superior power and your good fortune; nevertheless, we trust that on point of fortune we shall receive fair treatment from the gods, since we stand upon grounds of right against injustice; and as to our inferior power, we trust that the deficiency will be made up by our ally Sparta, whose kindred ear will avenge her from very shame to aid us." "We too (replied the Athenians) think that we shall not be worst off than others in regard to the divine favour. For we neither affront any deity, nor do any act, concerning that which men believe in regard to the gods and men in regard to themselves. What we believe about the gods is the same as that which we see to be the practice of men—the impulse of nature induces them of necessity to rule over what is inferior in force to themselves. This is the principle on which we are proceed—not having been the first either to lay it down or to follow it, but finding it established and likely to continue for ever, and knowing well, too, that you or others in our position would do as much. As for your expectations from the Lacedæmonians, founded on the degree of their remaining due to your call, we congratulate you on your innocent simplicity, but we at the same time deprecate such foolishness. For the Lacedæmonians are indeed most stubborn of acquiescence in regard to themselves and their own national customs. But looking at their behaviour towards others, we affirm readily, and can prove by many examples of their history, that they are of all men the most conspicuous in construing what is pleasing as if it were honourable, and what is unpleasant as if it were just. Now that is not the state of mind which you require, to square with your desperate calculations of safety."

After various other observations interchanged in a similar tenor, the Athenians ceased, strenuously urging upon the Melians to reconsider the matter more carefully among themselves, with-

diver, and after a certain interval were recalled by the Median council to hear the following words:—"We hold to the same opinion, as at first, men of Athens. <sup>Refusal of the Median to admit.</sup> We shall not remember the independence of a city which has already stood for 700 years: we shall yet make an effort to save ourselves, relying on that favourable fortune which the gods have hitherto vouchsafed to us, as well as upon aid from men, and especially from the Lacedæmonians. We request that we may be considered as your friends, but as hostile to another party; and that you will leave the island after concluding with a truce as may be mutually acceptable." "Well (said the Athenians amongst), you chose soon to consider before contingencies as clearer than the facts before your eyes, and to look at an uncertain distance through your own wishes, as if it were present reality. You have staked your all upon the Lacedæmonians, upon fortune, and upon dead hopes; and with your all you will soon be ruin."

The siege was forthwith commenced. A wall of circumvallation, distributed in portions among the different cities of Attica, was constructed round the town, which was left under full blockade both by sea and land, while <sup>the great and rapid progress of the siege.</sup> the rest of the army retired home. The town remained blocked up for several months. During the course of that time the besieged made two successful sallies, which afforded them some temporary relief, and forced the Athenians to send an additional detachment under Plistarchus. At length the provisions within were exhausted; plots for betrayal commenced among the Medians themselves, so that they were constrained to surrender at discretion. The Athenians resolved to put to death all the men of military age, and to sell the women and children as slaves. This the proposer of the barbarous resolution was Thucydides does not say; but Plistarch and others inform us that Alcibiades was strenuous in opposing it. Five hundred Athenian soldiers were subsequently sent thither, to form a new community; apparently not in Attica, or out-lyingness of Athens, but upon Melana.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Plistarch, Alcibiades, &c. &c. This is declared one of the wickedest which the conqueror of the Council of Alcibiades against Alcibiades found

corrected in person in the workshop the latter part of 1810. But it does not appear for publishing the work of L. Thucyd. 7. 101. 10-11. 10-11. 10-11.

Taking the proceedings of the Athenians towards Miletos from the beginning to the end, they form one of the ground and most favourable pieces of cruelty combined with injustice which Grecian history presents to us. In appreciating the cruelty of such wholesale executions, we ought to recollect that the laws of war placed the prisoners altogether at the disposal of his conquerors; and that an Athenian prisoner, if captured by the Corinthians in Megara, Sicca, or elsewhere, would naturally have undergone the same fate, unless in so far as they might be kept for exchange. But the treatment of the Milesians goes beyond all regard to the laws of war; for they had never been at war with Athens, nor had they done anything to merit her enmity. Moreover the acquisition of the island was of no material value to Athens; not sufficient to pay the expenses of the armament employed in its capture. And while the gain was thus in every sense slender, the shock to Grecian feeling by the whole proceeding seems to have concerned serious gash to Athens. Far from tending to strengthen her entire empire, by sweeping in this small Ionian population who had hitherto been neutral and harmless, it raised nothing but storm against her, and was treasured up in after times as among the list of her misdeeds.

To gratify her pride of empire, by a new conquest—easy to effect, though of small value—was doubtless her chief motive; probably also strengthened by rage against Sparta, her enemy, whom and herself a thoroughly hostile feeling separated, and by a desire to humiliate Sparta through the Milesians. This passion for new acquisition, superseding the more reasonable hopes of recovering the lost portions of her empire, will be seen in the closing dispatches looking out with still more fatal predominance.

Both these two points, it will be observed, are prominently marked in the dialogue as both by Theophrastus. I have already stated that the dialogue may hardly represent what actually passed, except as to a few general points, which the historian has followed out

degrees, however, or degrees of punishment inflicted. Hence the captured ships belong to the island after the terms of *Apollonius* (Xenoph. *Hellen.* ii. 1, 11); but otherwise must have escaped

or must have been spared, as some of the writers and writers, with an abuse of the title of the capture, must have been released or emancipated from slavery.

into debates and discussions,<sup>1</sup> does demonstrating the given situation in a powerful and characteristic manner. The language gets into the mouth of the Athenian orator in that of parties and colours; as Demosthenes of Halicarnassus<sup>2</sup> long ago remarked, interesting his audience that Thucydides had so set out the case for the purpose of demonstrating the contrary which had and has into exile. Whatever may be thought of this statement, we may at least affirm that the arguments which he here ascribes to Athens are not in harmony even with the defects of the Athenian character. Athenian speakers are more apt to the charge of equivocal wording, multiplication of false pretences, advancing down the bad points of their case, putting an amiable name upon vicious acts, employing what is properly called *equivocation* where their purpose would be.<sup>3</sup> Now the language of the orator at Miletus, which has been sometimes cited as illustrating the immorality of the class or profession (chiefly called a school) named Sophists at Athens, is above all things remarkable for a sort of conscious falsehood—a device not merely of equivocation in the modern sense of the word, but even of such plausible excuses as might have been offered. It has been strangely argued as if "the good old plan, that they should take who have the power, and they should keep who use," had been first discovered and openly promulgated by Athenian sophists; whereas the true purpose and value of sophists, even in the modern and worst sense of the word (putting aside the perversion of applying that name to the persons called Sophists at Athens), is to furnish plausible matter of deceptive justification, so that the strong man may be enabled to set upon this "good old plan" as much as he pleases, but without covering it, and while professing his dealing as just retaliation for some imaginary wrong. The wolf in Sheep's robe (of the Wolf and the Lamb) speaks like a sophist; the Athenian orator at Miletus speaks in a manner hardly unlike a sophist, either in the Athenian sense or in the modern sense of the word; we may add, unlike an Athenian at all, as Demosthenes has observed.

<sup>1</sup> Thus in the oration of Demosthenes, *De Falsis Testibus*, c. 27, § 104, p. 107.

<sup>2</sup> Demosthenes, *De Falsis Testibus*, c. 27, § 104, p. 107.

<sup>3</sup> Demosthenes, *De Falsis Testibus*, c. 27, § 104, p. 107.

<sup>4</sup> The same.

<sup>5</sup> Demosthenes, *De Falsis Testibus*, c. 27, § 104, p. 107.



As a matter of fact and practice, it is true that stronger states, in Greece and in the contemporary world, did habitually tend, as they have tended throughout the course of history down to the present day, to enlarge their power at the expense of the weaker. Every territory in Greece, except Attica and Argolis, had been swept by conquerors who depopulated or enslaved the prior inhabitants. We find Brasidas regarding his soldiers as the great sower of their revolutions, which had established despots over men far more numerous than themselves, as masters of pride and glory;<sup>1</sup> and when we come to the time of Philip and Alexander of Macedonia, we shall see the last of conquest reaching a pitch never witnessed among free Greeks. Of right thus founded on simple superiority of force, there were abundant examples to be quoted, as parallels to the Athenian conquest of Miletus; but that which is unparalleled is the state adopted by the Athenian survey of justifying it, or rather of setting aside all justification, looking at the actual state of civilization in Greece. A barbarous irregular state has relied on the rule in line of argument: a civilized conqueror is bound by received international morality to furnish some justification—a good plea, if he can—a *liber* plea, or a *damnum* plea, if he has no better. But the Athenian survey neither copies the unconscionable alliance of the barbarian nor the smooth lying of the civilized invader. Though coming from the most cultivated city in Greece, where the vices prevalent were those of refinement and not of barbarism, he discards the conventional arts of civilized diplomacy more than would have been done by an envoy sent of Agesilaus or Kerkiras. He even declines to mention—what might have been said with perfect truth on matter of fact, whatever may be thought of its relevancy as a justification,—that the Milesians had enjoyed for the last fifty years the security of the *Algean* waters at the cost of Athens and her allies, without any payment of their own.

So at least he is made to do in the Theophrastean *Grammaticus* fragment—Milesia's *Algean* (The Capture of Miletus)—if we may partly the title of the last tragedy of Euripides—"The Capture of Miletus". And I think a comprehensive view of the history

<sup>1</sup> Compare also what Brasidas says to the Spartans in *Thucydides*, 4. 4 when he is telegraphing to them a confidence, 17. 40—see, 10.

of Thucydides will suggest to us the explanation of this dream, with its powerful and tragical effect. The capture of Miletus comes immediately before the great Athenian expedition against Syracuse, which was resolved upon three or four months afterwards, and despatched during the course of the following summer. That expedition was the gigantic effort of Athens, which ended in the most ruinous catastrophe known to ancient history. From such a blow it was impossible for Athens to recover. Though crippled, indeed, she struggled against its effects with surprising energy; but her fortune went on, in the main, declining—yet with occasional moments of apparent restoration—until her complete prostration and subjugation by Lysander. Now Thucydides, just before he gets upon the plane of this descending progress, makes a halt, to illustrate the sentiment of Athenian pride in its most exaggerated, insolent, and cruel manifestation, by his dramatic fragment of the slaves at Miletus. It will be remembered that Herodotus, when about to describe the forward march of Xerxes into Greece, declined to terminate in such fatal brutalisation, impresses his readers with an elaborate idea of the monarch's violence and superhuman pride by various conversations between him and the courtiers about him, as well as by other anecdotes, combined with the ever-whispering qualifications of the master at Derbion. Such moral contrasts and juxtapositions, especially that of misadversities following upon overweening good fortune, were highly interesting to the Greek mind. And Thucydides—having before him an act of great injustice and cruelty on the part of Athens, committed exactly at this point of time—has availed himself of the form of dialogue, for once in his history, to bring out the sentiments of a dishonoured and confident conqueror in dramatic antithesis. They are however his own sentiments, uncoloured as veritable to the situation, not those of the Athenian envoy—still less, those of the Athenian public—least of all, those of that weak sentimental class of men, the Athenian sophists.

Plan which is carried out in the great historical conception of Thucydides.

## CHAPTER LVII.

GREEK AFFAIRS AFTER THE EXTINCTION OF THE  
OSMANIAN DYNASTY.

In the preceding chapters, I have brought down the general history of the Peloponnesian war to the time immediately preceding the memorable Athenian expedition against Syracuse, which changed the whole face of the war. At this period, and for some time to come, the history of the Peloponnesian Greeks becomes intimately blended with that of the Sicilian Greeks. But hitherto the connection between the two has been merely occasional, and of little permanent effect; so that I have thought it for the convenience of the reader to keep the two streams as truly separate, setting the proceedings of Athens on fire only during the first ten years of the war. I now proceed to fill up this blank; to recount as much as can be made out of Sicilian events during the interval between 415-413 B.C.; and to trace the successive steps whereby the Athenians entangled themselves in various projects against Syracuse, until they at length came to make the larger portion of their force upon that fatal battle.

The extinction of the Osanian dynasty at Syracuse,<sup>1</sup> followed by the expulsion or retirement of all the other despots throughout the island, left the various Greek cities to re-organize themselves in free and self-constituted governments. Unfortunately our monuments respecting this revolution are extremely scanty; but there is enough to indicate that it was sweeping much more than a change from single-headed to popular government. It included, further, transfers on the largest

<sup>1</sup> The story, *de. 413*, for the history of these events. I now take up the thread from that chapter.



Sicily's feeling of local instability, very different from the long-  
 established tenets in Peloponnesus and Attica, and  
 numbered by foreign enemies among the elements of  
 its weakness.<sup>1</sup> The wonder indeed rather is, that such  
 real and powerful causes of disorder were seen so  
 effectively controlled by the popular governments,  
 that the half-century now approaching was doubtless the most  
 prosperous and undisturbed period in the history of the island.

The southern coast of Sicily was occupied (beginning from the  
 westward) by Syracusa, Agrigento, Gela, and Katania. Then  
 came Syracuse, possessing the south-eastern cape, and the southern  
 portion of the eastern coast: next, on the eastern coast, Lentini,  
 Kasena, and Hæra: then, on the coast adjoining Italy. The  
 centre of the island, and even much of the northern coast, was  
 occupied by the non-Hellenic Sikels and Sikans; on this coast  
 Hæra was the only Greek city. Between Hæra and Cape  
 Lilybaeum, the western corner of the island was occupied by the  
 non-Hellenic cities of Egesta and Eryx, and by the Carthaginian  
 imports, of which Panormus (Palermo) was the principal.

Of these various Greek cities, all independent, Syracuse was  
 the first in power, Agrigento the second. The same  
 story is told, starting the first commencement of  
 popular government in all of them, were most power-  
 fully operative at Syracuse. We do not know the  
 particulars of the democratic constitution which was  
 there established, but its stability was threatened by  
 more than one ambitious pretender, eager to seize the  
 empire of Gela and Hæra. The most prominent  
 among these pretenders was Tyndarus, who employed a consider-  
 able fortune in distributing largesses and procuring partisans  
 among the poor. His political designs were at length so openly  
 manifested, that he was brought to trial, condemned, and put to  
 death; not without an abortive insurrection of his partisans  
 to rescue him. After several leading citizens had tried and failed  
 in a similar manner, the people thought it expedient to pass a  
 law similar to the Athenian *nomos*, authorizing the infliction  
 of temporary preventive punishments.<sup>2</sup> Under this law several

<sup>1</sup> Thucyd. vi. 25.

<sup>2</sup> Thucyd. vi. 55, 56. The institution

at Syracuse was called the *prothesis*, because, in taking the votes, the judges

powerful citizens were actually and specifically punished; and each was the theme of the new regime by the political parties in the city, that men of conspicuous position should be liable to become afraid of meddling with public affairs. Thus put in practice, the institution is said to have given rise to new political contentions not less violent than those which it checked, inasmuch that the Syracusans found themselves obliged to repeal the law not long after its introduction. We should have been glad to learn some particulars concerning this political experiment, beyond the vague abstract given by Dodds—and especially to know the precautionary measures by which the application of the restraining measure was restrained at Syracuse. Perhaps no care was taken to copy the details and formalities provided by Kleimants at Athens. Yet under all circumstances, the institution, though certainly ill-suited for its proper emergency, was eminently open to abuse, so that we have no reason to wonder that abuse occurred, especially at a period of great violence and discord. The wonder rather is, that it was so little abused at Athens.

Although the ostracism (or *pesteion*) at Syracuse was speedily discontinued, it may probably have left a salutary impression behind, so far as we can judge from the fact that new provisions to despotism are not hereafter mentioned. The republic increased in wealth and manifested an energetic action in foreign affairs. The Syracusan admiral Paeftius was despatched with a powerful fleet to repress the piracies of the Tyrrhenian maritime towns, and after ravaging the island of Elia, returned home, under the impression of having been brought off by lotus from the enemy, which sensation he was tried and punished—a second fleet of sixty triremes under Apollis being sent to the same regions. The new admiral not only plundered many parts of the Tyrrhenian coast, but also carried his ravages into the island of Corsica (at that time a Tyrrhenian possession), and reduced the island of Elia completely. His return was signified by a large number of captives and a rich booty.<sup>1</sup>

Meanwhile the great antient institutions, among the Greeks, other in Sicily, had raised a new spirit among the chiefs of the

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tributer, and inspired the tribal peace initiative, a man of spirit and ability, with no problem of aggrandizement. Many called Oretake having probably sought advice with him, it was either by their suggestion, or from having himself caught the spirit of the same improvement, that he commenced the plan of bringing the petty tribal communities into something like city-life and collective co-operation. Having acquired glory by the capture of the Gwena town of Mopontant, he induced all the tribal communities (with the exception of Nyika) to enter into a sort of federative compact. Next, in order to obtain a central point for the new organization, he transferred his own little town from the hilltop, called Muna, down to a convenient spot of the neighbouring plain, near to the sacred precinct of the gods called Palika.<sup>1</sup> As the recreation paid to these gods, determined in part by the striking volcanic manifestations in the neighbourhood, rendered this place a suitable point of attraction for Ndisi generally, Oretake was enabled to establish a considerable new city of Palika, with walls of large circumference, and an ample range of adjacent land which he distributed among a numerous Ndisi population, probably with some Gwena intermingled.

The powerful position which Oretake had thus acquired was attested by the aggressive character of his measures, intended gradually to recover a portion at least of that ground which the Gwena had appropriated at the expense of the indigenous population. The tribal town of Enusaka had been seized by the Ilhomuwa Gwena expelled from Muna, and had received from them the name of Muna.<sup>2</sup> Oretake now found means to reconquer it, after securing by stratagem the leading magistrate. He was now bold enough to invade the territory of the Agagwena, and to besiege one of their country garisons called Motyana. We are

<sup>1</sup> History of N. N. N. The pre-  
history of Palika is described by  
the description of Muna in the  
Hist. N. N. N.

Enusaka is described, and also Muna  
in the Hist. N. N. N.

The city walls were, after capture, in  
the hands of the Gwena.

See, if necessary, some additional  
notes.

See, for the history of N. N. N.,  
the Hist. N. N. N.

impressed with a high idea of his power when we learn that the Agreanians, while marching to relieve the place, thought it necessary to involve not from the Syracusans, who sent to them a force under Dathion. Over this united force Dathion gained a victory—in consequence of the treason or cowardice of Balthus, as the Syracusans believed—such that they condemned him to death. In the succeeding year, however, the good fortune of the failed prince changed. The united army of these two powerful cities raised the blockade of Motyrus, completely defeated him in the field, and dispersed all his forces. Finding himself deserted by his comrades and even on the point of being betrayed, he took the desperate resolution of casting himself upon the mercy of the Syracusans. He rode off by night to the gates of Syracuse, entered the city unknown, and sat down as a suppliant on the altar in the open, surrendering himself together with all his territory. A spectacle thus unexpected brought together a crowd of Syracusan citizens, ending in them the strongest emotions; and when the magistrates convened the assembly for the purpose of deciding his fate, the voice of mercy was found predominant, in spite of the contrary recommendations of some of the political leaders. The most respected among the elder citizens—formerly recommending mild treatment towards a foe thus fallen and suppliant, coupled with scrupulous regard not to bring upon the city the avenging hand of Demetrius—found their appeal to the generous sentiment of the people welcomed by one unanimous cry of "Save the suppliant!" Dathion, withdrawn from the altar, was sent off to Corinth under his engagement to live there quietly for the future, the Syracusans providing for his comfortable maintenance.

Another character habitual in ancient writers, this remarkable incident excites mingled surprise and admiration. Doubtless the lowest impulses of the people easily arose from their seeing Dathion actually before them in suppliant posture at their altar, instead of being called upon to determine his fate in his absence—just as the Athenian people were in like manner moved by the actual sight of the captive Demetrius, and induced to spare his life, or at

*Exaggeration.  
Dathion lies  
on the altar  
suppliant to  
Balthus.*

<sup>1</sup> Diodorus, vii. 26, 28. "O Dathion, I have sent you and I have spared Demetrius before the temple."







those of the Syracusans. Her trade with Carthage and the African coast was both extensive and profitable; for at that time neither the vine nor the olive were much cultivated in Libya, and the Carthaginians derived their wine and oil from the southern territory of Sicily,<sup>1</sup> particularly that of Agrigento. The temples of the city, among which that of Olympian Jove stood foremost, were on the grandest scale of magnificence, surpassing everything of the kind in Sicily. The population of the city, even as well as there, was very great; the number of rich men, keeping chariots, and competing for the prize at the Olympic games, was numerous—not less than the accumulation of works of art, statues, and pictures,<sup>2</sup> with warlike insignia of ornament and luxury. All this is particularly brought to our notice, because of the frightful catastrophes which decimated Agrigento in 406 B.C. from the hands of the Carthaginians. It was in the interval which we are now describing that such property was accumulated; doubtless not in Agrigento alone, but more or less throughout all the Greek cities of the island.

Not was it only in material prosperity that they were distinguished. At the time, the intellectual movement in some of the Italian and Sicilian towns was very considerable. The incomparable town of Rhegium in the Gulf of Paestum nourished two of the greatest speculative philosophers in Greece—Parmenides and Zeno. Empedocle of Agrigento was hardly less eminent in the same department, yet combining with it a political and practical efficiency. The popular character of the Sicilian governments stimulated the cultivation of rhetorical studies, wherein not only Empedocle and Pindar at Agrigento, but Timon and Koraiz at Syracuse, and still more, Gorgias at Leontini, acquired great reputation.<sup>3</sup> The constitution established at Agrigento after the displacement of the Theramian dynasty was

<sup>1</sup> Diod. Sic. vii. 25.

<sup>2</sup> Diod. Sic. vii. 25, 26, 27.

<sup>3</sup> The Academy is cited by Diogen. Laert. i. 27. Pindar, *Pythia*, p. 101, p. 102, 103. Gorgias, *Enchiridion*, p. 101, p. 102, p. 103, p. 104, p. 105, p. 106, p. 107, p. 108, p. 109, p. 110, p. 111, p. 112, p. 113, p. 114, p. 115, p. 116, p. 117, p. 118, p. 119, p. 120, p. 121, p. 122, p. 123, p. 124, p. 125, p. 126, p. 127, p. 128, p. 129, p. 130, p. 131, p. 132, p. 133, p. 134, p. 135, p. 136, p. 137, p. 138, p. 139, p. 140, p. 141, p. 142, p. 143, p. 144, p. 145, p. 146, p. 147, p. 148, p. 149, p. 150, p. 151, p. 152, p. 153, p. 154, p. 155, p. 156, p. 157, p. 158, p. 159, p. 160, p. 161, p. 162, p. 163, p. 164, p. 165, p. 166, p. 167, p. 168, p. 169, p. 170, p. 171, p. 172, p. 173, p. 174, p. 175, p. 176, p. 177, p. 178, p. 179, p. 180, p. 181, p. 182, p. 183, p. 184, p. 185, p. 186, p. 187, p. 188, p. 189, p. 190, p. 191, p. 192, p. 193, p. 194, p. 195, p. 196, p. 197, p. 198, p. 199, p. 200, p. 201, p. 202, p. 203, p. 204, p. 205, p. 206, p. 207, p. 208, p. 209, p. 210, p. 211, p. 212, p. 213, p. 214, p. 215, p. 216, p. 217, p. 218, p. 219, p. 220, p. 221, p. 222, 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Diodorus, ii. 12, the tradition of these games is attributed to "the city of Rhegium," which was founded by the Carthaginians, who had colonized them, according to "the city of Rhegium," and had improved upon their traditions. Diodorus further states that they had been so improved upon by the Carthaginians, p. 103.

as first not thoroughly democratic, the principal authority residing in a large Senate of One Thousand members. We are told even that an ambitious club of officers were working at the re-establishment of a despotism, when Epaphrodito, seeking himself of wealth and high position, took the lead in a popular opposition; so as not only to defeat this intrigue, but also to put down the Senate of One Thousand and render the government completely democratic. His influence over the people was enhanced by the veil of mysticism and pretence to miraculous or divine endowments which accompanied his philosophical speculations, in a manner similar to Pythagoras.<sup>5</sup> The same combination of rhetoric with metaphysical speculation appears also in Gorgias of Leontini, whose celebrity as a teacher throughout Greece was both greater and earlier than that of any one else. It was a similar demand for popular speaking in the assembly and the lectures which gave encouragement to the rhetorical teachers Thales and Ktesias at Syracuse.

In such state of material prosperity, popular politics, and intellectual activity, the Sicilian towns were found in the breaking out of the great struggle between Athens and the Peloponnesian confederacy in 431 B.C. In that struggle the Italian and Sicilian Greeks had no direct concern, save in so far as the ambition of Athens; who, though she had founded Thurii in 444 B.C., appears to have never aimed at any political supremacy over that town, much less anywhere else on the coast. But the Sicilian Greeks, though forming a system apart in their own island, from which it suited the domestic policy of Syracuse to exclude all foreign interference, were yet connected by sympathy, and on one side even by alliance, with the two main streams of Hellenic politics. Among the allies of Sparta were numbered all or most of the Dorian cities of Italy—Syracuse, Rhegium, Gela, Agrigento, Selinus, perhaps Himera and Naxos—together with Lakia and Taranto, in Italy; among the allies of Athens, various cities

[illegible]

<sup>2</sup> DeLongue, *Levet*, vol. 22-23; *Geograph. Anzeiger und neue Geogr.*, vol. 1, p. 11. *Wien*, *Monatshefte der Naturforschenden Vereins*, vol. 1, no. 1, p. 100-101.

issue of the speech delivered by Martin Luther King Jr. at the March on Washington in August 1963. The speech is a powerful statement of the civil rights movement and is a key document in the history of the struggle for racial equality in the United States. The speech is a masterpiece of oratory and is a testament to King's leadership and vision. The speech is a call to action and a reminder of the importance of the civil rights movement. The speech is a key document in the history of the struggle for racial equality in the United States.

Chalcids or Ionic Rhodians in Italy.<sup>1</sup> Whether the Ionic cities in Sicily—Syracuse, Katana, and Leontini—were at this time allied with Athens by any special treaty is very doubtful. But if we examine the state of politics prior to the breaking out of the war, it will be found that the extension of the Sicilian alliance on both sides with Central Greece was rather one of sympathy and tendency than of pronounced obligation and action. The Dorians Sicilians, though doubtful during the sympathy of the Peloponnesian Dorians to Athens, had never been called upon for any co-operation with Sparta; nor had the Ionic Sicilians yet learned to look to Athens for protection against their powerful neighbour, Syracuse.

It was the memorable quarrel between Chalcidæ and Eubœa, and the intervention of Athens in that quarrel (B.C. 433-432), which brought the Sicilian parties one step nearer to co-operation in the Peloponnesian quarrel, in two different ways; first, by exciting the most violent anti-Athenian war-spirit in Chalcidæ, with whom the Sicilian Dorians held their chief commerce and sympathy—next, by providing a basis for the action of Athenian maritime force in Italy and Sicily, which would have been impracticable without an established footing in Eubœa. But Flacour (whom most historians have followed) is mistaken, and is contradicted by Thucydides, when he ascribes to the Athenians at this time ambitious projects in Sicily of the nature of those which they came to conceive seven or eight years afterwards. At the outbreak, and for some years before the outbreak, of the war, the

<sup>1</sup> The inscription in Bonelli's *Epigraphæ Græcæ*, 1794, II. Part I. p. 131, relating to the alliance between Athens and Rhodians, Joseph Nolle admits to be uncertain. (See note to p. 131.) It is a document presented in the assembly of Argos in A.D. 149-150, the year before the Peloponnesian war, containing an alliance which was then made of old date. But it appears to me that the supposition of a record is only left one supposition; and even the name of the witness, Agoratus, which he has received by a plausible conjecture, was hardly to be considered as certain.

If we could believe the story in Justin, B.C. Rhodians were first called to be allies before the Peloponnesian war. But that story is a fiction as Rhodians, one of the parties going to war with Rome, first attacked the Romans, leaving their country the theatre of a contest which they were obliged, and exhausted, to finish. The real history was—"and Rhodians with Syracuse confederated." They seized the Sicilian women, and asked ransom for their ransom.

I do not know what is made of this story, which neither agrees with Thucydides, nor seems to contain what could be believed.



here, as elsewhere, she was then on the offensive, and Athens only on the defensive. Probably the Corinthians had encouraged the expectation of ample reinforcements from Syracuse and the neighbouring towns—a hope which must have contributed largely to the confidence with which they began the struggle. What were the causes which prevented it from being realised, we are not distinctly told; and we find Hierocleides, the Syracusan, reproaching his countrymen fifteen years afterwards (immediately before the great Athenian expedition against Syracuse) with their antecedent apathy.<sup>1</sup> But it is easy to see that, as the Italian Greeks had no direct interest in the contest—neither wrongs to avenge nor dangers to apprehend from Athens, nor any habit of shying repugnance from Sparta—so they might naturally content themselves with expressions of sympathy and promises of aid in case of need, without taking themselves to the enormous extent which it pleased Sparta to impose, for purposes both oppressive and purely Peloponnesian. Perhaps the leading men in Syracuse, from attachment to Corinth, may have sought to set upon the order. But no similar motives would be found operative either at Agrigento or at Gela or Helorus.

Though the order was not executed, however, there can be little doubt that it was publicly announced and threatened, thus becoming known to the Ionic cities in Sicily as well as to Athens; and that it weighed materially as detaching the latter afterwards to assist those cities, when they went to invade her aid.

Instead of despatching their forces to Peloponnesus, where they had nothing to gain, the Helian Dorians preferred attacking the Ionic cities in their own island, whose territory they might have reasonable hopes of conquering and appropriating—Naxos, Keos, and Lemnos. These cities doubtless sympathised with Athens in her struggle against Sparta; yet, far from being strong enough to assist her or to threaten their Dorian neighbours, they were unable to defend themselves without Athenian aid. They were isolated by the Dorian city of Epizephyriæ, which was shielded by her powerful hinter city Syracuse, and by Rhegium in Italy; while Lokri in Italy, the bitter enemy of Rhegium,

<sup>1</sup> Thucyd. vi. 54; compare vi. 82.

allied with Syracuse against them. In the fifth campaign of the war, finding themselves blockaded by sea and confined to their walls, they sent to Athens, both to entreat succour as allies<sup>1</sup> and legation, and to represent that if Syracuse succeeded in crushing them, she and the other Dorians in Sicily would forthwith send over the position and which the Peloponnesians had so long been harrying. The ancient rhetor, Demosthenes of Leontini, whose peculiar style of speaking is said to have been new to the Athenian assembly, and to have produced a powerful effect, was at the head of this embassy. It is certain that this rhetor procured for himself numerous pupils and large gains not merely in Athens, but in many other towns of Central Greece,<sup>2</sup> though it is exaggerated to ascribe to his pleading the success of the present application.

Now, the Athenians had a real interest as well in protecting these Ionia Sicilians from being conquered by the Dorians in the island as in obstructing the transport of Sicilians over to Peloponnesus; and they sent twenty triremes under Lachis and Charonides, with instructions, while accomplishing these objects, to ascertain the possibility of going beyond the Peloponnese, and making conquests. Taking station at Rhegium, Lachis did something towards removing the Ionia class in part from their maritime blockade, and even undertook an abortive expedition against the Ligurian city, which was in alliance with Syracuse.<sup>3</sup> Throughout the winter year he passed the war in the neighbourhood of Rhegium and Mandak, his colleague Charonides being slain. Attacking Myla, in the Messanian territory, he was fortunate enough to gain so decisive an advantage over the troops of Mandak, that that city itself capitulated to him, gave hostages, and enrolled itself as ally of Athens and the Ionia cities.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Thucyd. ii. 26.  
<sup>2</sup> Thucyd. ii. 26; Diodor. xii. 48.  
 Plutarch, *Life of Demosthenes*, c. 12. It is remarkable that Thucydides, though he is not very much particular in giving facts among the people of Greece, makes no mention of that rhetor, notwithstanding his name. Diodorus probably copied from Ephorus, the pupil of Lachis. Among the writers

of the Ionian age, the person of distinguished eloquence, and their improved political abilities, excited the most warm regard in the Symposium of Thucydides. Plutarch (c. 12, 13) speaks of Plato also as having been among the troops in this celebrated expedition.

<sup>3</sup> Thucyd. ii. 26; Diodor. xii. 48.

<sup>4</sup> Thucyd. ii. 26; c. 2.



He also contracted an alliance with the semi-Hellenic city of Rhodus, in the north-west portion of Sicily, and he invaded the territory of Lokoi, capturing one of the country forts on the river Hakes;<sup>1</sup> after which, in a second expedition, he defeated a Lokian detachment under Prokoma. But he was unsuccessful in an expedition into the interior of Sicily against Indoma. This was a native Sicel township, holding communion by a Symmachon garrison in the acropolis, which the Athenians readily succeeded in storming, being supplied with boats.<sup>2</sup> Lachis quadrupled his operations in the interior by an effective incursion on the territory of Huxora and on the Iapyx river. On returning to Rhegium at the beginning of the ensuing year (403 B.C.), he found Pythodorus already arrived from Athens to supersede him.<sup>3</sup>

This officer had come at the forwarding of a more considerable naval expedition, intended to arrive in the spring under <sup>Pythodorus</sup> Eurymedon and Sophoklis, who were to command in Pythodorus conjunction with himself. The Lokoi office in Sicily, facing the squadron under Lachis intention to render them a match for their enemies at sea, had been emboldened to send a naval embassy to Athens, with request for further reinforcements at the same time making increased efforts to enlarge their own naval force. It happened that at this moment the Athenians had no special employment elsewhere for their fleet, which they desired to keep in constant practice. They accordingly resolved to send to Sicily forty additional triremes, in full hope of bringing the contest to a speedy close.<sup>4</sup>

Early in the ensuing spring, Eurymedon and Sophoklis started from Athens for Sicily in command of this squadron, <sup>44. 22.</sup> with instructions to afford relief at Kerkira in their way, and with Demosthenes on board to act on the coast of Peloponnesos. It was this fleet which, in conjunction with the land forces under the command of Kleis, making a descent almost by accident on the Larentian coast of Pylos, achieved for Athens the most signal success of the whole war,—the capture of the Larentianian hoplites in Epiktetia.<sup>5</sup> But the fleet was so long occupied, first in the blockade of that island, and in

<sup>1</sup> Thucyd. II. 10.<sup>2</sup> Thucyd. II. 10.<sup>3</sup> Thucyd. II. 12.<sup>4</sup> Thucyd. II. 12.<sup>5</sup> See 45. 10.

operations at Euboea, but it did not reach Sicily until about the month of September.<sup>1</sup>

Such delay, extremely advantageous for Athens generally, was fatal to her hopes of success in Sicily during the whole summer. For Pythodorus, acting only with the fleet previously commanded by Lachis at Rhegium, was not merely defeated in a descent upon Lokri, but experienced a more tremendous loss by the result of Menedæus, which had transferred to Lachis a few months before, and which, together with Rhegium, had given to the Athenians the command of the coast. Apposed of the strong Athenian fleet, the Syracusans were anxious to deprive them of this important base of operations against the island; and a fleet of twenty sail—half Syracusan, half Lokrian—was enabled by the concurrence of a party in Menedæus to seize the town. It would appear that the Athenian fleet was then at Rhegium, but that town was at the same time threatened by the advance of the active land force of Lokri, together with a body of Rhegium allies: these latter were even not without hopes of obtaining admission by means of a favourable party in the town. Though such hopes were disappointed, yet the Lokrians prevented all access from Rhegium to Menedæus. The latter town now served as a harbour for the fleet hostile to Athens,<sup>2</sup> which was quickly reinforced to more than thirty sail, and began maritime operations forthwith, in hopes of crushing the Athenians and capturing Rhegium before Euryonotus should arrive. But the Athenians, though they had only sixteen triremes, together with eight others from Rhegium, gained a decided victory, in an action brought on accidentally for the purpose of a merchantman sailing through the strait. They put the enemy's ships to flight, and drove them to seek refuge, some under protection of the Syracusan land force at Cape Tollyra, near Menedæus, others under the Lokrian force near Rhegium, such as they had could, with the loss of one trireme.<sup>3</sup> This defeat so broke up the

<sup>1</sup> Thucyd. ii. 27.

<sup>2</sup> Thucyd. ii. 27; ii. 3.

<sup>3</sup> Thucyd. ii. 27. and comparing both the *Mythologos* and *Mythologos* with the *Mythologos*, it is evident that, of the 20 or 21 ships sailing out to the Tollyra, were only 16 triremes, the

Comment to the *Mythologos* explanation of this passage, yet concluding that the words in *Mythologos* imply that the fleet of Athenians, which was sent off the Lokrian ships did not get home to the Lokrian ships, but to the Syracusan ships in the Syracusan

schemes of Lokris operations against the latter place, that their land force retired from the Rhodios territory, while the whole detached squadron was retained on the opposite coast under Cape Prileps. Here the ships were secured close on shore, under the protection of the land force, when the Athenians and Rhodians came up to attack them, but without success, and even with the loss of one trireme, which the men on shore contrived to seize and detain by a grappling iron, her crew escaping by swimming to the vessels of their comrades. Having repulsed the enemy, the Syracusans got aboard, and rowed close along shore, partly aided by tow-ropes, to the harbour of Mandel, in which frigate they were again attacked, but the Athenians were a second time beaten off, with the loss of another ship. Their superior manœuvring was of no avail in this along-shore fighting.<sup>1</sup>

The Athenian fleet was now suddenly withdrawn in order to prevent an intended movement in Kosmos, where a philo-Syracusan party under Arkhos threatened revolt; and the Messenian force, then left free, invaded the territory of their neighbours the Chalkidic city of Maron, sending their fleet round to the mouth of the Akroatis near that city. They were ravaging the lands, and were preparing to storm the town, when a considerable body of the indigenous Rhods were seen descending the neighbouring hills to surround the Messians, upon which, the latter, clad with the night and mistaking the newcomers for their Grecian brethren from Leontini, rushed out of the gates and made a vigorous rally at a moment when their enemies were unprepared. The Messians were completely defeated, with the loss of no less than 1000 men, and with a still greater loss sustained in their retreat hither from the pursuit of the Rhods. Their fleet went back also to Mandel, from whence each of the ships as were not Messianian returned home. So much was the city weakened by its recent defeat, that

action; but each separate ship fled to clear sea or the shore, as it best might.

<sup>1</sup> Thucyd., iv., 82. ἀνεπαύρητον λαόν τε καὶ ἀνέπαινον.

[It is not difficult to understand the tactical movement which is suggested by ἀνεπαύρητον, in order to give notice of the consequence. And I

must not doubt the correctness of Dr. Arnold's explanation, when he says: "The Syracuse in a sudden shower of such Greek ships made their way to the spot, the (22) labour increased, and thus became the result said." &c. "The operation was that the Athenians required in order to make themselves that they were completely

a Lesbian garrison was sent for its protection under Democritus, while the Locrians and Styracians, together with the Athenian squadron on returning from Kassos, attacked it by land and sea in the moment of distress. A well-timed sally of the Hionians and Lokians, however, dispersed the Locrian land-force, but the Athenian force, landing from their ships, attacked the mercenaries while in the disorder of pursuit, and drove them back within the walls. The scheme against Mouda, however, had now become impracticable, so that the Athenians crossed the strait to Rhagusa.<sup>1</sup>

Thus ended the war the result of operations in Sicily, during the first half of the seventh year of the Peloponnesian war; nor does it appear that the Athenians undertook anything considerable during the second half, it being the full fleet under Eurymachus that then joined Pythodorus.<sup>2</sup> Yet while the presence of so large an Athenian fleet at Rhagusa would produce considerable effect upon the Syracusan mind, the triumphant progress of Athenian arms, and the astonishing humiliation of Sparta, during the months immediately following the capture of Epikleria, probably struck much deeper. In the spring of the eighth year of the war, Athens was not only in possession of the Spartan prisoners, but also of Pylos and Epikleria, so that a rising among the Helots appeared every probable. She was in the full swing of hope, while her discouraged enemies were all thrown on the defensive. Hence the Sicilian Dorians, intimidated by a state of affairs so different from that in which they had begun the war three years before, were now eager to bring about a pacification in their island. The Dorian city of Kassos, which had hitherto acted along with the Lokoi or Chalkidic cities, was the first to make a separate accommodation with its neighbouring city of Gela; at which latter place deputies were sent to attend from all the cities on the island, with a view to the conclusion of peace.<sup>3</sup>

2 & 3.

Eurymachus and Pythodorus, the Athenian fleet, arrive in Sicily.

<sup>1</sup> Thucyd. iv. 96.

<sup>2</sup> Thucyd. iv. 95.

<sup>3</sup> Cassius is a singular remark made by the Syracusan Herakleides, also just afterwards, when the great

Athenian expedition against Syracuse was made, replying that the increased disposition of Sicily among the Sicilian cities, produced by constant fear of Athens (Thucyd. vi. 82).

<sup>4</sup> Thucyd. iv. 98.

This congress met in the spring of 414 B.C., when Syracuse, the most powerful city in Sicily, took the lead in urging the common interest which all had in the conclusion of peace. The Syracusan Hermocrates, chief adviser of this policy in his native city, now appeared to vindicate and enforce it in the congress. He was a well-born, brave, and able man, superior to all secondary passions, and disinterested in regard to the foreign interests of his country;<sup>1</sup> but at the same time of pronounced oligarchical sentiments, mistrusted by the people, seemingly with good reason, in regard to their internal constitution. The speech which Hermocrates placed in his mouth, on the present occasion, sets forth emphatically the necessity of keeping Sicily at all cost free from foreign intervention, and of settling at home all differences which might arise between the various Sicilian cities. Hermocrates impresses upon his hearers that the aggressive schemes of Athens, now the greatest power in Greece, were directed against all Sicily, and threatened all cities alike, Ithaca not less than Corinth. If they attacked one another by internal quarrels, and then invited the Athenians as arbitrators, the result would be ruin and slavery to all. The Athenians were too ready to march everywhere, even without invitation: they had now come, with a view to cancelling all obligations, under pretence of aiding the Chalcidian cities who had never aided them, but in the real hope of achieving conquest for themselves. The Chalcidian cities must not rely upon their Greek kindred for security against evil designs on the part of Athens: in Sicily, they had a paramount interest in upholding the independence of the island. If possible, they ought to maintain unshaken peace; but if that were impossible, it was essential at least to confine the war to Sicily, apart from any foreign intervention. Complaints should be exchanged, and injuries redressed, by all, in a spirit of mutual forbearance; of which Syracuse—the first city in the island and best able to sustain the heat of war—was prepared to set the example, without that foolish over-valuation of favourable chances so common even to first-rate powers, and with full sense of the uncertainty of the future. Let them all feel that they were neighbours, inhabitants of the same island, and united by the

<sup>1</sup> Thucyd. vi. 1.



the proposition. Athens then was placed on terms of peace with all the Sicilian cities, with liberty of access respectively for any single ship of war, but not for any larger force, to cross the sea between Sicily and Peloponnesus. Eurymedon then sailed with his fleet home.<sup>1</sup>

On reaching Athens, however, he and his colleagues were  
 displease- occurred by the people with much displeasure. He  
 of the himself was fined, and his colleagues Euphobides and  
 Athenian Pythodorus banished, on the charge of having been  
 agents bribed to quit Sicily, at a time when the fleet (so the  
 Eurymedon Athenians believed) was strong enough to have made  
 and his important conquests. 'Why the three colleagues were differently  
 colleagues treated we are not informed.' This sentence was harsh and  
 ungenerous; for it does not seem that Eurymedon had it in his  
 power to prevent the Ionic cities from concluding peace—while  
 it is certain that without them he could have achieved nothing  
 serious. All that seems unexplained, in his conduct as suggested  
 by Thucydides, is, that his arrival at Megara with the entire  
 fleet, in September, 415 B.C., does not seem to have been attended  
 with any increased vigour or success in the prosecution of the  
 war. But the Athenians (besides an undue depreciation of  
 the Sicilian cities which we shall find finally misreading them  
 hereafter) were at this moment at the maximum of extravagant  
 hopes, viewing upon new triumphs everywhere, impatient  
 of disappointment, and anxious of reparation between the nations  
 interested in, and the objects expected from, their commander.  
 Such unmeasured confidence was gradually corrected in the  
 course of a few months, by the battle of Delium and the losses in  
 Thrace. But at the present moment, it was probably not less  
 accounting their grievance to the three generals, who had all left  
 Athens prior to the success in Eubœia.

The Ionic cities in Sicily were soon made to feel that they had  
 been premature in sending away the Athenians. Disputes  
 between Leontini and Syracuse, the same ones which had occasioned  
 the evacuation of Athens three years before, broke out  
 almost soon after the pacification of Gela. The democratical  
 government of Leontini came to the resolution of strengthening  
 their city by the enrolment of many new citizens; and a sale

<sup>1</sup>Thucyd. d. 12-15.

<sup>2</sup>Thucyd. e. 4.





after, the rich Locustine deserted and denuded their own city, transferred their residence to Syracuse, and were enrolled as Syracusan citizens. To them the operation was exceedingly profitable, since they became masters of the properties of the exiled Demos in addition to their own. Presently, however, some of them, dissatisfied with their residence in Syracuse, returned to the abandoned city, and fixed up a portion of it called Phokela, together with a neighbouring strong post called Belkissina. Here, after being joined by a considerable number of the exiled Demos, they contrived to hold out for some time against the efforts of the Syracusans to expel them from their fortifications.

The new enactment of citizens, projected by the Locustine democracy, seems to date during the year succeeding the pacification of Gela, and was probably intended to place the city in a more defensible position in case of renewed attacks from Syracuse—thus compensating for the departure of the Athenian exiles. The Locustine Demos, in exile and suffering, doubtless bitterly regretted that they had consented in abandoning their exiles, sent envoys to Athens with complaints, and renewed prayers for help.<sup>1</sup>

Inferred from Thucydides: "They and circumstances had greatly altered the state of property in all the Sicilian communities, since their resources and important portions of land, which had been made, on the general establishment of a democratical government, after the expulsion of all the lords of Gela, in other words the year named under their lot, had in Locustine they were when he proposed for a first and equal portion," but he afterwards strenuously against the party of the wealthy. They arrived, in the general assembly, a decree for appointing a number of new citizens" (Thucyd. ii. G. 40, 41, 42, and ii. vol. ii. p. 185).

I have already remarked, in a previous note, that Mr. Arnold has interpreted the re-division of lands which took place after the expulsion of the Locustine dynasty. This interpretation had not been upon the principle of equal lots; it is not therefore correct to say, as Mr. Arnold does, that the present movement at Locustine arose

from the increasing mode to them and circumstances in their equal division. as it is to be inferred by the fact that the year at Locustine named "A first and equal portion." Thucydides says not movement arose upon partition. The year forward the re-division of land citizens to the substantial primary resolution, namely, taken by the Locustine, the resolution of the lords on a strictly democratic and voluntary basis, and as yet existing only in reputation. Mr. Arnold claims the first and equal division to have been the real object of desire, and the movement of new citizens to be as then proposed with a view to subvert the popular movement by all means with loss of Thucydides.

<sup>1</sup> Justin's agreement the details general affairs with all the parties of policy and government, while of showing the Athenian assembly.

<sup>2</sup> Thucyd. ii. 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 131, 132, 133, 134, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139, 140, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148, 149, 150, 151, 152, 153, 154, 155, 156, 157, 158, 159, 160, 161, 162, 163, 164, 165, 166, 167, 168, 169, 170, 171, 172, 173, 174, 175, 176, 177, 178, 179, 180, 181, 182, 183, 184, 185, 186, 187, 188, 189, 190, 191, 192, 193, 194, 195, 196, 197, 198, 199, 200, 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215, 216, 217, 218, 219, 220, 221, 222, 223, 224, 225, 226, 227, 228, 229, 230, 231, 232, 233, 234, 235, 236, 237, 238, 239, 240, 241, 242, 243, 244, 245, 246, 247, 248, 249, 250, 251, 252, 253, 254, 255, 256, 257, 258, 259, 260, 261, 262, 263, 264, 265, 266, 267, 268, 269, 270, 271, 272, 273, 274, 275, 276, 277, 278, 279, 280, 281, 282, 283, 284, 285, 286, 287, 288, 289, 290, 291, 292, 293, 294, 295, 296, 297, 298, 299, 300, 301, 302, 303, 304, 305, 306, 307, 308, 309, 310, 311, 312, 313, 314, 315, 316, 317, 318, 319, 320, 321, 322, 323, 324, 325, 326, 327, 328, 329, 330, 331, 332, 333, 334, 335, 336, 337, 338, 339, 340, 341, 342, 343, 344, 345, 346, 347, 348, 349, 350, 351, 352, 353, 354, 355, 356, 357, 358, 359, 360, 361, 362, 363, 364, 365, 366, 367, 368, 369, 370, 371, 372, 373, 374, 375, 376, 377, 378, 379, 380, 381, 382, 383, 384, 385, 386, 387, 388, 389, 390, 391, 392, 393, 394, 395, 396, 397, 398, 399, 400, 401, 402, 403, 404, 405, 406, 407, 408, 409, 410, 411, 412, 413, 414, 415, 416, 417, 418, 419, 420, 421, 422, 423, 424, 425, 426, 427, 428, 429, 430, 431, 432, 433, 434, 435, 436, 437, 438, 439, 440, 441, 442, 443, 444, 445, 446, 447, 448, 449, 450, 451, 452, 453, 454, 455, 456, 457, 458, 459, 460, 461, 462, 463, 464, 465, 466, 467, 468, 469, 470, 471, 472, 473, 474, 475, 476, 477, 478, 479, 480, 481, 482, 483, 484, 485, 486, 487, 488, 489, 490, 491, 492, 493, 494, 495, 496, 497, 498, 499, 500, 501, 502, 503, 504, 505, 506, 507, 508, 509, 510, 511, 512, 513, 514, 515, 516, 517, 518, 519, 520, 521, 522, 523, 524, 525, 526, 527, 528, 529, 530, 531, 532, 533, 534, 535, 536, 537, 538, 539, 540, 541, 542, 543, 544, 545, 546, 547, 548, 549, 550, 551, 552, 553, 554, 555, 556, 557, 558, 559, 560, 561, 562, 563, 564, 565, 566, 567, 568, 569, 570, 571, 572, 573, 574, 575, 576, 577, 578, 579, 580, 581, 582, 583, 584, 585, 586, 587, 588, 589, 590, 591, 592, 593, 594, 595, 596, 597, 598, 599, 600, 601, 602, 603, 604, 605, 606, 607, 608, 609, 610, 611, 612, 613, 614, 615, 616, 617, 618, 619, 620, 621, 622, 623, 624, 625, 626, 627, 628, 629, 630, 631, 632, 633, 634, 635, 636, 637, 638, 639, 640, 641, 642, 643, 644, 645, 646, 647, 648, 649, 650, 651, 652, 653, 654, 655, 656, 657, 658, 659, 660, 661, 662, 663, 664, 665, 666, 667, 668, 669, 670, 671, 672, 673, 674, 675, 676, 677, 678, 679, 680, 681, 682, 683, 684, 685, 686, 687, 688, 689, 690, 691, 692, 693, 694, 695, 696, 697, 698, 699, 700, 701, 702, 703, 704, 705, 706, 707, 708, 709, 710, 711, 712, 713, 714, 715, 716, 717, 718, 719, 720, 721, 722, 723, 724, 725, 726, 727, 728, 729, 730, 731, 732, 733, 734, 735, 736, 737, 738, 739, 740, 741, 742, 743, 744, 745, 746, 747, 748, 749, 750, 751, 752, 753, 754, 755, 756, 757, 758, 759, 760, 761, 762, 763, 764, 765, 766, 767, 768, 769, 770, 771, 772, 773, 774, 775, 776, 777, 778, 779, 780, 781, 782, 783, 784, 785, 786, 787, 788, 789, 790, 791, 792, 793, 794, 795, 796, 797, 798, 799, 800, 801, 802, 803, 804, 805, 806, 807, 808, 809, 810, 811, 812, 813, 814, 815, 816, 817, 818, 819, 820, 821, 822, 823, 824, 825, 826, 827, 828, 829, 830, 831, 832, 833, 834, 835, 836, 837, 838, 839, 840, 841, 842, 843, 844, 845, 846, 847, 848, 849, 850, 851, 852, 853, 854, 855, 856, 857, 858, 859, 860, 861, 862, 863, 864, 865, 866, 867, 868, 869, 870, 871, 872, 873, 874, 875, 876, 877, 878, 879, 880, 881, 882, 883, 884, 885, 886, 887, 888, 889, 890, 891, 892, 893, 894, 895, 896, 897, 898, 899, 900, 901, 902, 903, 904, 905, 906, 907, 908, 909, 910, 911, 912, 913, 914, 915, 916, 917, 918, 919, 920, 921, 922, 923, 924, 925, 926, 927, 928, 929, 930, 931, 932, 933, 934, 935, 936, 937, 938, 939, 940, 941, 942, 943, 944, 945, 946, 947, 948, 949, 950, 951, 952, 953, 954, 955, 956, 957, 958, 959, 960, 961, 962, 963, 964, 965, 966, 967, 968, 969, 970, 971, 972, 973, 974, 975, 976, 977, 978, 979, 980, 981, 982, 983, 984, 985, 986, 987, 988, 989, 990, 991, 992, 993, 994, 995, 996, 997, 998, 999, 1000.

But Athens was then too much pressed to attend to their call. Her defeat at Salamis and her losses in Thessa had been followed by the truce for one year, and even during that truce she had been called upon for strenuous efforts in Thessa to check the progress of Brasidas. After the expiration of the truce, she sent Phocæ and two colleagues to Sicily (p. 472) with the modest force of two triremes. He was directed to try and organize an anti-Syracusan party in the island, for the purpose of re-establishing the Locustine Demos. In passing along the coast of Italy, he concluded amicable relations with some of the Greek cities, especially with Lokro, which had hitherto stood aloof from Athens; and his first address in Sicily appeared to promise success. His representations of danger from Syracusan ambition were well received both at Kamarina and Agrigenton. For, on the one hand, that universal terror of Athens which had dictated the prohibition of Gela had now disappeared; while, on the other hand, the proceeding of Syracuse in regard to Locustini was well calculated to excite alarm. We see by that proceeding that sympathy between democracies in different times was not universal: the Syracusan democracy had joined with the Locustine aristocracy to expel the Demos—just as the despotic Gela had combined with the aristocracy of Megara and Eubœa, sixty years before, and had sold the Demos of those towns into slavery. The birthplace of the famous rhetor Gorgias was struck out of the list of inhabited cities: its temples were deserted, and its territory had become a part of Syracuse. All these were circumstances so powerfully affecting Greek imaginations that the Kamarinians, neighbours of Syracuse on the other side, might well fear lest the like unjust conquest, expulsion, and absorption should soon overtake them. Agrigenton, though without any similar fear, was disposed, from policy and jealousy of Syracuse, to second the views of Phocæ. But when the latter proceeded to Gela, in order to procure the alliance of that city in addition to the other two, he found himself met by so violent an opposition, that his whole scheme was frustrated, nor did he think it advisable even to open his eyes at Salernæ or Hiræna. In returning, he crossed the interior of the island through the territory of the Ithaci to Katana, passing in his way by Melimæna, where the Locustine

Darius were still maintaining a precarious existence. Having encouraged them to hold out by promises of aid, he proceeded on his homeward voyage. In the strait of Monia he struck upon some vessels conveying a body of expelled Lokrians from Mised to Lokri. The Lokrians had got possession of Mised after the pacification of Gela by means of an internal rebellion; but after holding it some time, they were now driven out by a second revolution. Phaux, being under agreement with Lokri, passed by these vessels without any act of hostility.<sup>1</sup>

The Lokrian exiles at Thurium, however, received no benefit from his assurances, and appear soon afterwards to have been completely expelled. Herakleides Athens was now disposed, for a considerable time, to operations in Sicily. A few months after the visit of Phaux to that island came the peace of Nikias. The consequences of that peace occupied her whole attention in Peloponnesus, while the ambition of Alcibiades carried her on for three years in intra-Peloponnesian projects and co-operation with Argos against Sparta. It was only in the year 417 B.C., when these projects had proved abortive, that she had leisure to turn her attention elsewhere. During that year Nikias had contemplated an expedition against Amphipolis in conjunction with Perikles, whose death frustrated the scheme. The year 416 B.C. was that in which Miles was besieged and taken.

Meanwhile the Syracusans had closed and appropriated all the territory of Locumæ, which city now existed only in the talk and hopes of its exiles. Of these latter a portion seem to have continued at Athens, pursuing their enterprises far and wide, which began to attract some attention about the year 417 B.C., when another incident happened to strengthen their chance of success. A quarrel broke out between the neighbouring cities of Selinus (Thellens) and Egesta (see Helland) in the western corner of Sicily; partly about a piece of land on the river which divided the two territories, partly about some alleged wrong in cases of interrupted connexion. The Selinuntians, not satisfied with their own strength, obtained assistance from the Syracusans,

<sup>1</sup> Thucyd. i. 4, 1.

their allies, and thus reduced Egypt to considerable straits by land as well as by sea.<sup>1</sup> Now the Egyptians had allied themselves with Luchis ten years before, during the first expedition sent by the Athenians to Sicily; upon the strength of which alliance they sent to Athens, to solicit her intervention for their defence, after having in vain applied both to Agrigentine and to Carthage. It may seem singular that Carthage did not at this time readily embrace the pretext for interference—considering that ten years afterwards she interfered with such destructive effect against Salamis. At this time, however, the fear of Athens and her formidable navy appears to have been felt even at Carthage,<sup>2</sup> thus protecting the Sicilian Greeks against the most dangerous of their neighbours.

The Egyptians, however, reached Athens in the spring of 414 B.C., at the time when the Athenians had no immediate project to occupy their thoughts, except the enterprise against Miletus, which could not be either long or doubtful. Though urgent in setting forth the necessities of their position, they at the same time did not appear, like the Locrians, as mere hapless suppliants, addressing themselves to Athenian compassion. They rested their appeal chiefly on grounds of policy. The Syracuse, having already extinguished one ally of Athens (Locrians), was now bent pressing upon a second (Egypt), and would thus successively subdue them all: as soon as this was completed, there would be nothing left in Sicily except an unopposed Doric combination, allied to Telegasterus both by race and descent, and sure to bend effective aid in putting down Athens herself.<sup>3</sup> It was therefore essential for Athens to forestall this coming danger by interfering forthwith to uphold her remaining allies against the encroachments of Syracuse. If she would send a naval expedition adequate to the rescue of Egypt, the Egyptians themselves engaged to provide ample funds for the prosecution of the war.<sup>4</sup>

#### THE CASE.

Position of the Egyptian navy:—*See* *Thucyd.* vi. 12. *Thucyd.* vi. 12. *Thucyd.* vi. 12. *Thucyd.* vi. 12.

<sup>1</sup> *Thucyd.* vi. 12. *Thucyd.* vi. 12. *Thucyd.* vi. 12. *Thucyd.* vi. 12. *Thucyd.* vi. 12. *Thucyd.* vi. 12. *Thucyd.* vi. 12. *Thucyd.* vi. 12. *Thucyd.* vi. 12. *Thucyd.* vi. 12.

before Athens Egypt and Athens (ad. 10) in 414 B.C., may probably have been a war between Egypt and Athens.

<sup>2</sup> *Thucyd.* vi. 12.

<sup>3</sup> *Thucyd.* vi. 12. *Thucyd.* vi. 12. *Thucyd.* vi. 12. *Thucyd.* vi. 12.

Such representations from the clergy, and from of Syracuse appointed as a source of strength to Polyperchon, worked along with the prayers of the Lacedæmonians in rickshelling the appetite of Athens for extending her power in Sicily. The impression made upon the Athenian public, favourable from the first, was wound up to a still higher pitch by renewed discussion. The sermons were especially heard in the public assembly,<sup>1</sup> together with those officers who supported their propositions. At the head of these was Alcibiades, who aspired to the command of the intended expedition, trumping alike to his love of glory, of adventure, and of personal gain. But it is plain from these renewed discussions that at first the disposition of the people was by no means decided, much less unanimous; and that a considerable party sustained Nicias as a potential opponent. Even at last, the resolution adopted was not one of positive consent, but a more tame such as perhaps Nicias himself could not resist. Special envoys were despatched to Epizeux<sup>2</sup>—partly to ascertain the wishes of the towns to hold the assurance of defeating the costs of war—partly to make investigations on the spot, and report upon the general state of affairs.

Perhaps the commissioners despatched were men themselves not unfriendly to the enterprise; nor is it impossible that some of them may have been individually bribed by the Epizeuxans—at least such a supposition is not forbidden by the average state of Athenian public morality. But the most honest or even suspicious man would hardly be prepared for the deep-laid stratagem put in practice to detain them on their arrival at Epizeux. They were conducted to the rich temple of Aphrodite, on Mount Eryx, where the plate and donations were exhibited before them; abundant in number and striking to the eye, yet composed mostly of silver-gilt vessels, which, though finely paved off as solid gold, was in reality of little pecuniary value. Moreover, the Epizeuxan citizens were

<sup>1</sup> Thucyd. vi. 8. In the temple of "Aphrodite" is only descriptive, and in "Epizeux" would not have occurred the "Epizeuxian" words, "Epizeuxians," etc.

The Elysiad before an action of all these precious objects, when he was taken to the Athenian army and taken to the Elysiad temple, etc. Thucyd. vi. 8. vol. II. p. 107.



possessors of defraying the cost of the war, the members of their tribunes, addressing the assembly in their character of citizens—beyond all suspicion of being bribed—overflowing with sympathy for the town in which they had just been so cordially welcomed—and full of wonder at the display of wealth which they had witnessed—would probably contribute still more effectively to kindle the sympathies of their countrymen. Accordingly, when the *Agrotæi* again renewed their petitions and representations, confidently appealing to the sympathy which they had undergone—when the distress of the suppliant Locustæ was again depicted—the *Athenian* assembly no longer delayed coming to a final decision. They determined to send forthwith sixty triremes to Sicily, under three generals, with full powers—*Nicias*, *Athénadès*, and *Lamachus*—for the purpose, first, of relieving *Egesta*; next, as soon as that primary object should have been accomplished, of re-establishing the city of *Locustæ*; lastly, of furthering the views of *Athens* in Sicily, by any other means which they might find practicable.<sup>1</sup> Such resolutions being passed, a fresh assembly was appointed, for the fifth day following, to settle the details.

We cannot doubt that this assembly, in which the reports from *Egesta* were first delivered, was one of unqualified triumph to *Athénadès* and those who had from the first advocated the expedition—as well as of embarrassment and frustration to *Nicias* who had opposed it. He was probably more astonished than any one else at the statements of the commissioners and senators, because he did not believe in the point which they went to establish. Yet he could not venture to contradict eye-witnesses speaking in evident good faith; and as the assembly went heartily along with them, he laboured under great difficulty in expressing his objections to a scheme now so much strengthened in public favour. Accordingly his speech was probably hesitating and ineffective; the more so, as his opponents, far from wishing to make good any personal triumph against himself, were forward in proposing his name first on the list of generals, in spite of his

*Exaggerated  
report of  
Nicias as  
opposed to  
the expedi-  
tion.*

<sup>1</sup> *Thucyd.* ii. 17. *Diels*—*ed.* 20.

own declared engagement.<sup>1</sup> But when the assembly broke up, he became sorely impressed with the perfidious resolution which it had adopted, and at the same time conscious that he had not done justice to his own case against it. He therefore resolved to wait himself of the next assembly four days afterwards, for the purpose of reopening the debate, and again denouncing the intended expedition. Properly speaking, the Athenians might have declined to hear him on this subject. Indeed the question which he raised could not be put without illegality; the principle of the measure had been already determined, and it remained only to arrange the details, for which special purpose the reading assembly had been appointed. But he was heard, and with perfect patience; and his language, a veritable sample both of the man and of the time, is set forth at length by Thucydides. I give here the chief points of it, not confining myself to the exact expressions.

"Though we are met to-day, Athenians, to settle the particulars of the expedition already pronounced against Sicily, yet I think we ought to take further account whether it be well to send that expedition at all; nor ought we thus hastily to plunge, in the instance of others, into a dangerous war every belonging to us. To myself, personally, indeed, your resolution has offered no honourable appointment, and for my own bodily danger I care as little as any man; yet no considerations of personal dignity have ever before prevented me, nor shall now prevent me, from giving you my honest opinion, however it may clash with your habitual judgments. I tell you, then, that as your desire to go to Sicily, you have many enemies here behind you, and that you will bring upon yourselves new enemies from thence to help them. Perhaps you fancy that your treaty with Sparta is an adequate protection. In name indeed (though only in name, thanks to the intrigues of parties both here and there) that treaty may stand,

speech of  
CICERO AT  
THE SECOND  
ASSEMBLY  
HELD BY THE  
ATHENIANS.

<sup>1</sup> Thucyd. v. 26. Alcibiades, desiring to be declared Agas, &c. The reading assembly (assembly) before mentioned by him, and undoubtedly more solemn, than previous, which latter word generally refers here to the assembly of great order who he asserted that Alcibiades had been named to attend.

speech which properly belonged to the first—was explained this by supposing that Alcibiades had not been present at the first assembly. There he was not present, however, it is highly probable. The speech, nevertheless, does require some explanation; and I have endeavored to supply one to the best.



so long as your present resources unemployed, but on your first serious reverse the enemy will surely take the opportunity of attacking you. Some of your most powerful cities have never even accepted the yoke; and if you divide your force as you now propose, they will probably set upon you at once along with the Boeotians, whom they would have been too happy to procure as co-operating allies at the beginning of the war. Recollect that your Chalcidian subjects in Thrace are still in revolt, and have never yet been conquered; other contracted subjects, too, are not ready to be treated; and you are going to redress injuries offered to Egeus, before you have got thought of redressing your own. Now your conquests in Thrace, if you make any, can be maintained; but Shilly was too stout and the people so powerful, that you will never be able to maintain permanent ascendancy; and it is absurd to undertake an expedition wherein conquest cannot be permanent, while failure will be destructive. The Egeans alarm you by the prospect of Byzantine aggrandisement. But to you it seems that the Sicilian Greeks, even if they become subjects of Byzantium, will be less dangerous to you than they are at present; for, as matters stand now, they might possibly send aid to Philipopolis, from desire on the part of each to gain the favour of Lacedæmon, but Imperial Byzantium would have no motive to endanger her own empire for the purpose of getting down yours. You are now full of confidence, because you have come out of the war better than you at first feared. But do not trust the Spartans: they, the most sensitive of all men to the reputation of superiority, are lying in wait to play you a trick in order to repair their own dishonour; their oligarchical machinations against you demand all your vigilance, and leave you no leisure to think of these foreigners at Egeus. Having just recovered ourselves somewhat from the pressure of disease and war, we ought to reserve this newly-acquired strength for our own purpose, instead of wasting it upon the treacherous overtures of desperate allies from Shilly."

When then continued, doubling towards Alkibiades—  
"If any man, delighted to be named to the command, though still too young for it, exhibits you to the expedition in his own selfish interests, looking to advancement for his ostentation in chariot-racing, and to profit from his command as a means of



made some impression ; since it completely reversed the entire debate, in spite of the formal disability. Immediately after he sat down, while his words were yet fresh in the ears of the audience, Alcibiades rose to reply. The speech just made, bringing the expedition again into question, endangered his dearest hopes both of fame and of pecuniary acquisition. Opposed to Nicias both in personal character and in political tendencies, he had pushed his rivalry to such a degree of bitterness, that at one moment a vote of ostracism had been on the point of deciding between them. That vote had indeed been turned aside by joint consent, and discharged upon Hyperbolus ; yet the hostile feeling still continued on both sides, and Nicias had just manifested it by a parliamentary attack of the most galling character—all the more galling because it was strictly accurate and well-deserved. Provoked as well as alarmed, Alcibiades started up forthwith—his impetuosity breaking loose from the formalities of an oration.

"Athensians, I both have better title than others to the post of *agorastês*—commander (for the senate of Nicias does me to begin with)—*hagorastês*—hagorastês, and I account myself fully worthy of it. Those very notions, with which he reproaches me, are sources not merely of glory to my ancestors and myself, but of positive advantages to my country. For the Greeks, on witnessing my splendid Thebes at Olympia, were induced to rate the power of Athens even above the reality, having before regarded it as broken down by the war ; when I sent into the lists seven chariots, being more than any private individual had ever sent before—winning the first prize, coming in also second and fourth, and performing all the accessories in a manner suitable to an Olympic victory. Custom attaches honour to such exploits, but the power of the performer is at the same time brought home to the feelings of spectators. My exhibitions at Athens, too, chariots and others, are naturally viewed with jealousy by my rivals here ; but in the eyes of strangers they are evidences of power. Such so-called folly is by no means useless, when a man at his own cost sows the city as well as himself. Nor is it unjust, when a man has an exalted opinion of himself, that he should not conduct himself towards others as if he were their equal ; for the man in misfortune finds no one to bear a share of it. Just as, when we

are in distress, we find no one to speak to us, in like manner let a man buy his account to bear the violence of the prosperous; or else let him give equal dealing to the low, and then claim to receive it from the high. I know well that such wretched personages, and all who have in any way attained eminence, have been during their lifetimes unpopular, chiefly in society with their equals, and to a certain extent with others also; while after their deaths, they have left such a reputation as to make people claim kindness with them falsely, and to induce their country to boast of them, not as though they were allies or wrong-doers, but as her own citizens and as men who did her honour. It is this glory which I desire, and in pursuit of which I wear such reproaches for my private conduct. Yet look at my public conduct, and see whether it will not bear comparison with that of any other citizen. I brought together the most powerful states in Peloponnesus without any serious cost or hazard to you, and made the Lacedæmonians peril their all at Mantinea on the fortune of one day: a peril so great, that, though victorious, they have not even yet regained their steady belief in their own strength.

"Thus did my youth, and my so-called monstrous folly, find suitable work to address the Peloponnesian powers, and urge them to give their confidence and obtain their co-operation. Be not awed, therefore, afraid of this youth of mine, but so long as I possess it in full vigour, and so long as Nicias retains his reputation for good fortune, turn us each to account in our own way."<sup>1</sup>

Having thus vindicated himself personally, Alcibiades went on to deprecate any change on the public resolution already taken. The Sicilian cities (he said) were not so formidable as was represented. Their population was numerous indeed, but fluctuating, turbulent, often on the move, and without local attachment. No man there considered himself as a permanent resident nor cared to defend the city in which he dwelt; nor were there arms or organisation for such a purpose. The native Sikels, detesting Syracuse, would willingly lend their aid to her enemies. As to the Peloponnesians, powerful as they were, they had never yet been more without hope of damaging Athens than they were now: they were not more desperate enemies now than they had

<sup>1</sup> Thucyd. vi. 14, 15.

been in former days :<sup>1</sup> they might invade Attica by land, whether the Athenians sailed to Sicily or not ; but they could do no mischief by sea, for Athens would still have in reserve a navy sufficient to restrain them. What valid ground was there, therefore, to evade performing obligations which Athens had sworn to her Sicilian allies ? To be sure they could bring no help to Sicily in return ; but Athens did not want them on her own side of the water—she wanted them in Sicily, to prevent her Sicilian enemies from coming over to attack her. She had originally acquired her empire by a readiness to interfere wherever she was invited ; nor would she have made any progress, if she had been backward or proud in withdrawing such assistance. She could not now set limits to the extent of her imperial sway ; she was under a necessity not merely to retain her present subjects, but to lay claims for new subjects—on pain of falling into dependence herself if she ceased to be imperial. Let her then persist in the resolution adopted, and strike power into the Peloponnese by undertaking this great expedition. She would probably conquer all Sicily ; at least she would humble Syracuse : in case even of failure, she would always bring back her troops, from her unquestionable superiority at sea. The stationary and inactive policy recommended by Sicily was not less at variance with the temper than with the position of Athens, and would be ruinous to her if pursued. Her military organization would decline, and her energies would be wasted in internal war and conflict, instead of that unspiring readiness of enterprise, which, having become engrafted upon her laws and habits, could not be now retracted, even if had in itself, without speedy destruction.<sup>2</sup>

Such was substantially the reply of Alcibiades to Nicias. The debate was now completely reopened, so that several speakers addressed the assembly on both sides ; more, however, distinctly in favour of the expedition than against it. The charmed Eginaeans and Leptineans renewed their supplications, appealing to the pangs of the city : probably also, those Athenians who had visited Egina stood forward again, to protest against what they would call the regressive doubts and insinua-

<sup>1</sup> Thucyd. vi. 15. and also also Alcibiades, ibid. vi. 15. and also Alcibiades, ibid. vi. 15. and also Alcibiades, ibid. vi. 15.

<sup>2</sup> Thucyd. vi. 15-16.

tion of Sicily. By all these appeals, after considerable debate, the assembly was so powerfully moved, that their determination to send the fleet became more intense than ever; and Nelson, perceiving that further direct opposition was useless, showed his talents. He now attempted a manoeuvre, designed indirectly to disgust his countrymen with the plan, by enlarging upon its dangers and difficulties, and insisting upon a prodigious force as indispensable to execute them. Nor was he without hopes that they might be sufficiently distracted by such prospective headships to throw up the scheme altogether. At any rate, if they persisted, he himself as commander would thus be enabled to execute it with completeness and confidence.

Accepting the expedition, therefore, as the pronounced fiat of the people, he reminded them that the allies which they were about to attack, especially Syracuse and Sicily, were powerful, populous, sea—well—prepared in every way with hoplites, horsemen, light-armed troops, ships of war, plenty of horses to manœvre their cavalry, and abundant corn at home. At best, Athens could hope for no other allies in Sicily except Maceæ and Ketæus, from their kindred with the Locustians. It was no more fleet, therefore, which could cope with enemies like these on their own soil. The fleet indeed must be prodigiously great, for the purpose not merely of maritime contest, but of keeping open communication at sea, and ensuring the superintendence of armbastances. But there must besides be a large force of hoplites, horsemen, and the gun—a large stock of provisions in transports—and, above all, an abundant amount of money; for the funds procured by the Epistates would be found more empty delusion. The army must be not simply a match for the enemy's regular hoplites and powerful cavalry, but also independent of foreign aid from the first day of their landing.<sup>1</sup> If not, in case of the least reverse, they would find everywhere nothing but swift enemies, without a single friend. "I know (he concluded) that there are many dangers against which we must take precaution, and many more in which we must trust to good fortune, such as it is for more men to do so. But I choose to have as little as possible in the power of fortune, and to have in hand all

Second speech of Nicholas—re-asserting the difficulties and dangers of the expedition, and demanding a large force to conquer Sicily.

<sup>1</sup>Thucyd. vi. 20.



he made the same demand, they were delighted to purchase his concurrence by adopting all such conditions as he imposed.<sup>1</sup>

It was thus that Hittas, quite contrary to his own purpose, not only supported the enterprise a gigantic magnitude which the prefecture had never contemplated, but threw into it the whole soul of Athens, and roused a burst of ardour beyond all former example. Every man present, old as well as young, rich and poor, of all classes and professions, was eager to put down his name for personal service. Some were tempted by the love of gain, others by the curiosity of seeing so distant a region, others again by the pride and expected utility of exhibiting in so incredible an armament. So overpowering was the popular voice in calling for the execution of the scheme, that the small minority who retained their dignities were almost held up their hands, for fear of incouraging the rage of patriotism. When the archonment had somewhat subsided, an orator named Demosthenes, coming forward as spokesman of this sentiment, urged Hittas to declare at once, without further evasion, what here he required from the people. Disappointed as Hittas was, yet, being left without any alternative, he sadly responded to the appeal, saying that he would take further counsel with his colleagues; but that, speaking as his first impression, he thought the trireme required must be not less than 100, nor the hoplites less than 5000—Athenians and allies together. There went further to a proportional equipment of other forces and accessories, especially Hittas, bowmen and slingers. Reasonless as this requisition was, the vote of the people not only sanctioned it without delay, but even went beyond it. They conferred upon the generals full power to fix both the number of the armament and every other matter relating to the expedition, just as they might think best for the interest of Athens.

Pursuant to the momentary resolution, the armament and preparation of the forces were immediately begun. Hittas were sent to summon sufficient witnesses from the several cities, as well as to invite hoplites from Argos and Mantinea, and to hire bowmen

Demosthenes is the only name among all others—first by reason of the title as which the expedition was planned.

as it, and a good large proportion of the trireme expedition.

<sup>1</sup> Plutarch. — Compare Hittas and Ctesias, c. 8.



and danger elsewhere. For three months the grounds were busily engaged in these proceedings, while the city was in a state of alarm and bustle — fatally interrupted, however, by an accident which I shall recount in the next chapter.

Considering the prodigious consequences which turned on the expedition of Athens against Sicily, it is worth while to bestow a few reflections on the preliminary proceedings of the Athenian people. Those who are accustomed to ascribe all the misfortunes of Athens to the hurry, passion, and ignorance of democracy will not find the charge borne out by the facts which we have been just considering. The applications of Spartans and Locrians, forwarded to Athens about the spring or summer of 416 B.C., undergo careful and repeated discussion in the public assembly. They at first meet with considerable opposition, but the repeated debates gradually kindle both the sympathies and the animosity of the people. Still, however, no decisive step is taken without more ample and correct information from the spot, and special commissioners are sent to Sparta for the purpose. These men bring back a decisive report, triumphantly verifying all that the Spartans had promised. We cannot at all wonder that the people never suspected the deep-laid fraud whereby their commissioners had been duped.

Upon the result of that mission from Sparta, the two parties for and against the projected expedition had evidently joined issue; and when the commissioners returned, bearing testimony as decisive in favour of the former, the party then strengthened thought itself warranted in calling for a decision immediately, after all the previous debates. Nevertheless, the masses still had to surmount the reserved and hearty opposition of Nicias, before it became finally settled. It was the long and frequent debate, with opposition often repeated but always outmanœuvred, which, working gradually deeper and deeper conviction in the minds of the people, brought them all into hearty unanimity to support it, and made them cling to it with that tenacity which the coming chapters will demonstrate. In so far as the expedition was an error, it certainly was not since arising either from hurry, or want of discussion, or want of inquiry. Never in

Gradual victory was any measure more carefully weighed before-hand, or more deliberately and unanimously resolved.

The position of Nikias in reference to the measure is remarkable. As a disinterested and warning counsellor, he took a slight view of it; but in that capacity he could not carry the people along with him. Yet such was their steady esteem for him personally, and their reluctance to proceed in the enterprise without him, that they eagerly entered any conditions which he thought proper to impose. And the conditions which he named had the effect of suggesting the enterprise into such gigantic magnitude as no one in Athens had ever contemplated, thus casting into it as prodigious a proportion of the blood of Athens, that its destruction would be equivalent to the ruin of the commonwealth. This was the first mistake committed by Nikias, when, after being forced to relinquish his direct opposition, he resorted to the indirect manoeuvre of demanding more than he thought the people would be willing to grant. It will be found only the first among a real series of other mistakes—fatal to his country as well as to himself.

Owing to Nikias, however, for the present, full credit for the wisdom of his disinterested counsel and his scepticism about the reports from Egypt, we cannot but notice the opposite quality in Alcibiades. His speech is not merely full of overbearing haughtiness as a manifestation of individual character, but of rash and ruinous suggestions as regard to the foreign policy of his country. The arguments whereby he refutes the expeditious against Syracuse are indeed more mischievous in their tendency than the expedition itself, for the failure of which Alcibiades is not to be held responsible. It might have succeeded as an special object, had it been properly conducted; but even if it had succeeded, the remark of Nikias is not the less just, that Athens was sliding at an unmeasured breadth of empire, which it would be altogether impossible for her to preserve. When we recollect the true political wisdom with which Pericles had advised his countrymen to maintain strenuously their existing empire, but by no means to grasp at any new acquisitions while they had powerful enemies in Peloponnesus, we shall appreciate by contrast the feverish system of never-ending aggression manifested by Alcibiades, and the

destructive principles which he lays down that Athens must for ever be engaged in new conquests, on pain of forfeiting her existing empire, and leaving herself to perish by internal discord. Even granting the necessity for Athens to employ her military and naval force (as Nicias had truly observed), Amphipolis and the revolted subjects in Thrace were still unobtainable; and the first employment of Athenian force ought to be directed against them, instead of being wasted in distant hostile and treacherous expeditions, creating for Athens a position to which she could never permanently maintain herself. The parallel which Alcibiades draws between the enterprising spirit whereby the Athenian empire had been first acquired, and the unskilful operations which he was himself recommending, is altogether fallacious. The Athenian empire took its rise from Athenian enterprises, working in concert with a serious alarm and necessity on the part of all the Greek cities in or round the Ægean Sea. Athens rendered an essential service by keeping off the Persians, and preserving that sea in a better condition than it had ever been in before: her empire had begun by being a voluntary confederacy, and had only passed by degrees into constraint; while the local situation of all her subjects was sufficiently near to be within the reach of her controlling navy. Her new career of aggression in Sicily was in all these respects different. War is it less surprising to find Alcibiades asserting that the multiplication of subjects in that distant island, employing a large portion of the Athenian naval force to watch them, would impart new stability to the pre-existing Athenian empire. How strange also to read the terms in which he speaks light of enemies both in Peloponnesus and in Sicily, the Sicilian war being a new enterprise hardly less in magnitude and hazard than the Peloponnesian!—to notice the honour which he claims to himself for his operations in Peloponnesus and the battle of Mantinea,<sup>1</sup> which had ended in complete failure, and in restoring Sparta to the mastery of her realm as it had stood before the events of Sphacteria! There is in fact no speech in Thucydides so replete with rash, misapprehending, and fallacious counsels as the harangue of Alcibiades.

As a man of action, Alcibiades was always brave, vigorous, and

<sup>1</sup>Thucyd. vi. 1. of which see Appendix, Chapter, 2d. of volume vi. of the

<sup>2</sup>Compare Plutarch, Pericles, 2d. part, Section, p. 22.



When we recollect how loudly the charges he *is* been preferred against Kleon—of presumption, of rash policy, and of selfish motives, in reference to Epaktkiana, to the prosecution of the war generally, and to Amphipolis, and when we compare these proceedings with the conduct of Alcibiades as here described—we shall see how much more loudly such charges attach to the latter than the former. It will be seen that the views of Alcibiades and the defects of Nikias were the cause of his greater ruin to Athens than either Kleon or Hyperbates, even if we regard the two latter with the eyes of their worst enemies.

(Thucyd. vi. 15.) In this indeed, state like in the general purpose of the inscription. But to derive from that we is here something, in the construction generally, since which were still remaining in his very hands—as we may observe from a recent period of the last twenty chapters of the sixth book of Epiphanius.

In the description of the state of Alcibiades (Thucyd. vi. 15.) it is alleged that the first purpose was to establish in Athens, a state before the Epiphanius, extending to be retained as a part of the Athenian, and affording that purpose would be a more complete life to Athens than Epiphanius or Nikias. This statement is wholly untrue.



END OF VOL. II.



PLAN ILLUSTRATING THE BATTLE BETWEEN THE JERUSALEM JEWISH ARMY AND THE ARABIAN ARMY  
 (SEE PAGE 10 OF THE PLAN, 10, 11)



- a. Jerusalem of the Jews and the Arabs (1948)
- b. First battle of the Jerusalem (1948)
- c. Position of the Jewish Army in the city towards the end of the battle (1948)
- d. Position of the Arab Army in the city towards the end of the battle (1948)

Source: The Jewish Agency for Israel

